The International Atomic Energy Agency has not uncovered evidence confirming Western suspicions that Iran aims to develop nuclear weapons, but “serious concern” remains over Tehran’s alleged studies into the possible militarization of its nuclear capabilities, agency chief Mohamed ElBaradei said in a report released today (see GSN, Feb. 21). The report says questions remain over allegations that Iran has explored technologies to develop high-explosives, missile re-entry vehicles, and nuclear test facilities “The agency is not yet in a position to determine the full nature of Iran’s nuclear program. However, it should be noted that the agency has not detected the use of nuclear material in connection with the alleged studies, nor does it have credible information in this regard,” the report says. The agency has urged Iran to disclose additional information on its alleged work on a missile re-entry vehicle, high explosives testing and the “Green Salt” project, an alleged study into producing uranium enrichment materials. IAEA inspectors confronted Tehran in early February with intelligence identifying an Iranian weapons testing site that included remote detonators and a shaft more than 1,300 feet deep. The U.N. nuclear watchdog said such a site could be used in nuclear weapons development, but Iran has maintained that the schematic plan of the site, provided to the agency by another country, had been forged. IAEA officials are waiting for Pakistani officials to explain how Iran received documents that describe how to shape uranium metal into hemispheres, a key step to producing nuclear weapon cores. Tehran has said the plans were supplied together with nuclear equipment obtained through the nuclear smuggling ring once run by former top Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan and that Iranian officials had not requested the instructions. Asked to explain why several Iranian agencies had taken action to obtain training software for analyzing the effects of shockwaves on metal —information that could be used to engineer a precision system for detonating a nuclear device — Iranian officials said the had been sought “in order to study aircraft, collision of cars, airbags and for the design of safety belts.” Iranian technicians have fed about 3,680 pounds of uranium hexafluoride into its 18 operating centrifuge cascades, U.N. watchdog officials determined in a December inventory of Iran’s Natanz uranium enrichment facility. Inspectors confirmed in late January that Iran had disassembled some older P-1 centrifuge cascades and assembled an experimental 10-centrifuge cascade using the proprietary, high-speed IR-2 centrifuge. Inspectors have resolved concerns over conduct at Iran’s Gchine uranium mine as well as questions over enriched uranium traces found at a Tehran technical university. The report says that concerns over the findings from the uranium trace investigation proved to be consistent with Iran’s explanation that the traces had originated on nuclear equipment supplied by Pakistan (David Barnes, Global Security Newswire, Feb. 22). The U.S. ambassador to the IAEA today expressed disappointment that Iran has not suspended its uranium enrichment program and failed to fully disclose other controversial aspects of its nuclear work. “After five years of evasion, and after promising to cooperate fully with the IAEA ‘work plan,’ Iran’s leaders have lost another opportunity to fully disclose their nuclear activities and to start to regain international confidence. Iran’s nuclear file remains open, both in Vienna and New York, and is a source of continued international concern,” U.S. Ambassador Gregory Schulte said (U.S. release, Feb. 22). In an e-mailed statement, U.S. State Department spokeswoman Susan Doman encouraged Iran to signed the Additional Protocol and provide IAEA officials additional access to its nuclear sites, adding that “the door remains open” for international sanctions to be lifted if Iran suspends its uranium enrichment and other disputed nuclear activities (U.S. State Department release, Feb. 22). The United States provided new intelligence on Iran’s nuclear program to U.N. nuclear watchdog officials before the IAEA report’s release, diplomats said today. The new details followed an earlier round of U.S. intelligence disclosures to the agency, the Associated Press reported. U.S. officials permitted IAEA officials to confront Iran with some of the information to pressure Tehran to share new information on its nuclear activities, but Iranian nuclear officials have showed no interest in the U.S. intelligence and diplomats said it was of little value. “It’s not the amount but the quality that counts,” one diplomat said (Associated Press/International Herald Tribune, Feb. 22). In New York, three European powers formally introduced a sanctions resolution against Iran to the U.N. Security Council yesterday, Agence France-Presse reported. “We will formally introduce this afternoon the draft resolution in the Security Council on behalf of its three co-sponsors, France, Britain and Germany,” French U.N. envoy Jean-Maurice Ripert told journalists. “The goal is to begin formal negotiations" in order to get the council to adopt the resolution "as soon as possible, ideally next week,” Ripert said. A slightly revised version of the resolution has been agreed on by the five permanent Security Council member nations and Germany, Ripert said. The original text was formulated last month by China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States. The resolution’s sponsors said they have secured enough votes among the council’s 10 nonpermanent members to pass the resolution, which requires nine votes and no vetos from the five permanent members (Gerard Aziakou, Agence France-Presse/Yahoo!News, Feb. 21). The resolution’s sponsors are aiming to “secure adoption of the text if possible next week and if possible by consensus,” Ripert said. “We are seeking further substantive comments from more delegations in the first half of next week so we can take this forward expeditiously,” said John Sawyers, U.N. ambassador for the United Kingdom (Gerard Aziakou, Agence France-Presse II/Google News, Feb. 22). In Tehran, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has cautioned world powers against joining a “new game” in the nuclear standoff, Deutsche Presse-Agentur reported today. “Put an end to this game, but if you want to start a new game, you should know that if our nation decides something, then it will definitely be put into practice without the slightest concession,” Ahmadinejad said. “The era that world powers violate Iran’s rights through intimidation and deception is finally over.” Ahmadinejad said the “nation’s will” to move forward with its nuclear activities would overcome pressure to halt them from outside powers. He also attacked the administration of Mohammad Khatami, his presidential predecessor, for taking part in “worthless meetings and ransom-like concessions instead of defending the nation’s rights” (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, Feb. 22).
By Shane Harris
National Journal
WASHINGTON — On Dec. 3, 2007, U.S. Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell declassified a set of key judgments from a National Intelligence Estimate on Iran's efforts to build a nuclear weapon. The judgments may have contained some good news — namely, "that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program" — but few in the upper ranks of the Bush administration warmly embraced this declaration. Indeed, in the month after the release, McConnell and President George W. Bush publicly distanced themselves from the NIE's dramatic headline. Key American allies went further: The French defense minister and the head of Israeli intelligence declared the NIE wrong, contending that Iran's weapons work continues. All of those officials, who play key roles in pressing for further international sanctions against Iran, say that Tehran continues to publicly enrich uranium under the implausible auspices of a civilian energy program, and that it continues to test-fire ballistic missiles. Bush used his State of the Union address to remind the world of these two facts and to assert that Iran remains as much of a threat as it was before December 3. With the key judgments public, intelligence officials and weapons experts are in a definitional sparring match over what constitutes a nuclear weapons program, whether the NIE should have been released at all, and how the estimate was written. The key judgments acknowledged the points that Bush made in his speech. But the final document emphasized the riveting new information about the halted "nuclear weapons program" rather than Iran's ongoing enrichment and missile activities. Furthermore, the NIE narrowly defines the program as consisting of weapons "design work," presumably for a warhead that can be put atop a missile, plus some covert enrichment activities. The estimate explicitly states that the weapons program does not include Iran's publicly acknowledged uranium enrichment work, which Tehran says is aimed at low-level enrichment that can be used for civilian nuclear power. Skeptics say that if Iran masters low-level uranium enrichment it can eventually develop the high-level enrichment necessary for a nuclear bomb. The definition of what exactly constitutes a weapons program is important, but the key judgments relegated it to a footnote. Some former intelligence officials say that the footnoted information could have been stated more boldly, and they speculate whether the key judgments were deliberately written in such a way as to convince readers that Iran's nuclear threat has lessened. Intelligence estimates, by definition, are supposed to state the views of the intelligence community, not to argue policy, these former officials say. There is little evidence to indicate that intelligence analysts are trying to pre-empt a U.S. invasion of Iran by undercutting the Bush administration's ostensible rationale for such action. But the NIE leaves many of the intelligence community's supporters wondering if its authors grasped how the document would be read — quickly, incautiously, and through political lenses. If the NIE was meant to clarify matters on Iran, it has arguably failed. A number of longtime intelligence analysts and weapons experts, including those who have helped draft NIEs in the past and hold no particular allegiance to Bush, criticize the key judgments as poorly written, politically tone-deaf, and betraying a fundamental misunderstanding of what actually constitutes a nuclear weapons program. Production of fissile material — highly enriched uranium, or plutonium — is generally viewed as the long pole in the nuclear tent. Once a country overcomes that hurdle, the path to a finished nuclear weapon is downhill. Iran may have halted some design activities, but how significant is that in light of its continuing low-level uranium enrichment and missile testing? As one former intelligence official with experience in NIEs put it, the intelligence community seemed to go to great lengths to answer the least important question — the work on a warhead design. Defenders of the NIE, including the senior officials and analysts who wrote it, counter that the document is the product of new, compelling information and a rigorous, top-to-bottom scrubbing of all the known intelligence about Iranian nuclear issues. One former senior intelligence official close to the NIE's drafters said that journalists had blown the top finding out of proportion. Indeed, the clause immediately following the opening sentence, which declared that the program was halted in 2003, reads, "We also assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons." The key judgments clearly didn't give the Iranians a "clean bill of health," says Jeffrey Lewis, who directs the Nuclear Strategy and Nonproliferation Initiative at the New America Foundation and runs the blog ArmsControlWonk.com. "The press reporting took a badly written NIE and pulled out probably the least important fact, or misidentified what the NIE said," Lewis argues. Reporters weren't the only ones to run with the headline, however. Meir Dagan, the head of Mossad, Israel's intelligence service, blasted the key judgments before a Knesset committee earlier this month. The document "pulls the rug out from under" the push for stricter Iran sanctions, he said. The U.S. estimate leaves "Israel to face the threat alone," Dagan added. A few days earlier, French Defense Minister Herve Morin said during a visit to Washington, "Coordinated information from a number of intelligence services" had led the French to believe that Iran is "continuing to develop" a nuclear weapon. Both Dagan and Morin presumably have access to information that was not contained in the declassified judgments. But even the U.S. intelligence community's top man has publicly tried to shift attention away from the NIE's conclusion about Iran's narrowly defined weapons program. McConnell, like Bush, has been far more emphatic about the threat that Iran poses. Eschewing the hedged language of his analysts — "high confidence," "moderate confidence" — his assessments are more rigid and more focused on Iran's growing strength. In a lengthy January profile in The New Yorker, McConnell said, "There's no doubt in this observer's mind that Iran is on the path to get a nuclear weapon. It will force an arms race in the region." Where Iran lies on its road to nuclear status may be up for debate. But on one fact, all sides agree: Without all of the key components — fissile material, a compact and resilient warhead, and a long-range missile to deliver it — Iran has no nuclear weapon. Could Iran make a nuclear device that might work? Maybe. Does it have the technological infrastructure to go further? Certainly. But does Iran have a viable, long-range weapon with which to threaten its neighbors? No. And perhaps that was the intelligence community's point in the NIE. If the Iranian nuclear program were likened to a three-legged stool, then one leg — the weapons design — was taken out nearly five years ago. It could be repaired, but in the meantime, the stool is useless. "I turn the tables on the critics of the NIE," says George Friedman, the head of Stratfor, a private intelligence firm. "Lay out the number of components you need to produce a weapon. If there is one that the Iranians weren't working on, they have no program." But this assessment may ignore the political realities of Iranian nuclear ambitions. Tehran's possession of even a rudimentary nuclear device could fundamentally upset the regional power balance. "Would you like to have to convince Israel or the Saudis not to worry that these devices are too large and crude to be delivered by missiles?" asks David Kay. He is the former United Nations chief weapons inspector who led the 2003 Iraq Survey Group that found that Saddam Hussein no longer possessed weapons of mass destruction. "Nukes are less about war fighting than about politics by other means," he says. Kay adds that the intelligence community is apparently conflicted about Iran's capabilities and its intentions. A bullet point within the key judgments states, parenthetically, that because of "intelligence gaps," the Energy Department and the National Intelligence Council "assess with only moderate confidence" that Iran's 2003 halt to the weapons design program represented a stop to the "entire nuclear weapons program." "That's a direct contradiction of the first sentence," which declared that the program had halted, Kay says, "and yet it doesn't come after the first sentence, which implies that all 16 agencies are in agreement." The Energy Department's less confident view is especially worrisome, Kay says, because DOE oversees the nation's nuclear laboratories and has the most nuclear weapons expertise within the intelligence community. For his part, McConnell appears to understand that his release of the key judgments has affected not only the political climate but also the future work of his analysts and spies. He told The New Yorker, "I think putting it out was the right thing." But he admitted that the intelligence community continues to need better information to verify if Iran has restarted its weapons design work. "Our job is to steal the secrets of foreign governments or foreign terrorist organizations, and so the more they know about the effectiveness of our tradecraft the more difficult it's going to be for us," McConnell said. "For the community I represent, I just made our life a lot harder."
North and South Korean nuclear negotiators met yesterday in Beijing in an attempt to re-energize a multilateral agreement to denuclearize North Korea, Agence France-Presse reported (see GSN, Feb. 21). South Korean envoy Chun Yung-woo spoke with lead North Korean delegate Kim Kye Gwan. “I don’t think the gaps are too wide to bridge,” said Chun after the meeting. “We only need more time and efforts. I believe the North is also willing to resolve the issue” (Agence France-Presse I/Straits Times, Feb. 21). The session followed a Wednesday meeting between Kim and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill in which Hill vowed to deliver on U.S. promises. “We made clear that we are committed to following through on our obligations and that they should know that,” he told reporters. “As they do their obligations, we will do ours.” Hill described some concerns he had heard from North Korean officials about the U.S. refusal to accept a North Korean declaration of its nuclear activities. “From the D.P.R.K.’s point of view, they are always concerned that when they tell us something, what they tell us will always be followed by additional questions,” he said. “I want to assure them that, yes, there will be additional questions, but not an infinite number of questions.” Of particular U.S. concern are suspicions that North Korea is concealing uranium enrichment activities with equipment purchased on the black market. “What I wanted to encourage Mr. Kim to understand is that, as they take steps to show us that they are not using the equipment for uranium enrichment, those will be considered positive steps,” said Hill. He expressed hope that unusual visit by the New York Philharmonic to North Korea next week would build good will. “Sometimes the North Koreans don’t like our words. Maybe they’ll like our music,” he said (Korea Herald I, Feb. 21). Hill’s trip to Northeast Asia this week was made in part to pave the way for a visit next week by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, but experts suggested that she would not end the current deadlock because Hill had reported no progress on the uranium issue. “If the U.S. and Chris Hill [have not] heard more than that privately, then it is hard to see at this stage how they’re going to reach any breakthroughs during the secretary’s visit,” said Robert Einhorn of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Agence France-Presse II, Feb. 21). Meanwhile, North Korea has stepped up military exercises early this year, the Korea Herald reported today. The drills included flights by nuclear-capable IL-28 bomber aircraft, according to the Herald (Korea Herald II, Feb. 22).
Estonia wants to become a more active player in an international program aiming to boost security measures at nuclear sites, Estonian Foreign Minister Urmas Paet said yesterday (see GSN, Feb. 6). Paet discussed Estonia’s year-old membership in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism during a meeting with U.S. and Russian ambassadors, the Baltic News Service reported. “Estonia backs international efforts aimed at ensuring control over nuclear substances,” Paet said. The group was established in 2006 by U.S. President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin (Baltic News Service, Feb. 21).
The United States on Wednesday showed South Korean officials a video clip of a purported Syrian nuclear reactor that U.S. officials said might have been built with North Korean assistance, Kyodo News reported (see GSN, Feb. 8). U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill presented the video to Kim Byung-kook, foreign and security affairs secretary for incoming South Korean President Lee Myung-bak, the Munhwa Ilbo quoted an anonymous government official as saying. “The U.S. side also conveyed is judgment that this (Syrian) nuclear reactor has been built with North Korean nuclear technology,” the official was quoted as saying. Hill has told South Korean officials that Pyongyang should detail what nuclear equipment it has provided to Syria in a declaration of its nuclear activities promised under a six-party denuclearization agreement. North Korea has been suspected of providing nuclear development assistance to Syria since Israel carried out air attacks on a Syrian facility last September (see GSN, Jan 17; Kyodo News, Feb. 22).
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