Pakistani tribesman protest a January 2006 U.S. attack that officials once thought had killed a key al-Qaeda operative (Tariq Mahmood/Getty Images). Al-Qaeda Renews WMD Development, U.S. Officials Say An al-Qaeda WMD expert might have escaped his reported death in 2006 and taken charge of the terrorist organization’s efforts to develop unconventional weapons, the Los Angeles Times reported yesterday (see GSN, Jan. 19, 2006)...Full Story

Russia Could Close Two Major Plutonium Production Plants This Summer, Official Says Russia could shut down two major plutonium production reactors this summer, achieving a significant goal of U.S.-Russian efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism, the Associated Press reported Friday (see GSN, Jan. 14)...Full Story

Iran Probe Making Progress, IAEA Chief Says International Atomic Energy Agency chief Mohamed ElBaradei said yesterday that his agency continues to move forward with its investigation into Iran’s nuclear history before his next scheduled report to the U.N. Security Council on the probe’s progress, Reuters reported (see GSN, Feb. 1)...Full Story

	Monday, February 4, 2008

Al-Qaeda Renews WMD Development, U.S. Officials Say An al-Qaeda WMD expert might have escaped his reported death in 2006 and taken charge of the terrorist organization’s efforts to develop unconventional weapons, the Los Angeles Times reported yesterday (see GSN, Jan. 19, 2006). Pakistani officials said in January 2006 that a U.S. missile strike had killed several al-Qaeda leaders, including Abu Khabab Masri, author of manuals on creating chemical and biological weapons.  However, the Egyptian man is now believed to have survived, according to current and former U.S. intelligence officials. While a 2001 U.S. bombing of al-Qaeda’s headquarters and training sites in Afghanistan damaged the group’s efforts to develop unconventional weapons, the program has been reconstituted to some degrees in the subsequent years, officials said. “I am not saying the programs are great and ready for an attack tomorrow,” said former CIA analyst Chris Quillen.  “But whatever they lost in the 2001 invasion, they are back to that level at this point.” The focus of work in Pakistan now appears to be on the production and use of poisons such as cyanide or chlorine that would not cause devastation as large as other WMD types — biological, chemical, nuclear or radiological weapons. Masri and aides are believed to be operating basic facilities for experiments on chemicals and other materials, according to former intelligence officials.  Immunizations against some diseases might have been provided to al-Qaeda operatives, according to one international counterterrorism official. As Masri “has the technical knowledge … it’s very, very clear that they are working both in the chemical and biological fields,” said Raphael Perl, head of the Action Against Terrorism Unit at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.  Al-Qaeda is largely believed to already possess chemical weapons capabilities and is in the least “certainly not far” from acquiring biological weapons capabilities, he said. Other experts expressed more doubt on the efficacy of WMD development efforts operating out of Pakistani mountains. “They are hemmed in in a way that makes it hard to do,” said John Parachini, a senior terrorism and WMD analyst at the RAND Corp.  “It’s hard to get the industrial infrastructure to do these things, and it’s hard to get people who have the expertise to fashion these materials into weapons of mass destruction.” Masri is believed to have been involved in a 2002 plan — ultimately dropped by al-Qaeda — to release cyanide in New York City subway cars, the Times reported.  He also worked on “contact poisons” and has sought money to produce a nuclear weapon, according to a former CIA officer and other U.S. officials. “He has for years told al-Qaeda that he could do it, ‘Just give me the money,’” the former CIA official said.  “He’s full of crap.  He can’t.  But he can certainly build a good” radiological “dirty bomb” (Josh Meyer, Los Angeles Times, Feb. 3). Back to top       Military Ready for WMD Attack, Pentagon Says The U.S. Defense Department on Friday rebuffed an independent panel’s conclusion that military personnel are unprepared to respond to an attack on the United States involving biological, chemical or nuclear weapons, Reuters reported (see GSN, Feb. 1). However, a senior official acknowledged that work remains in planning for  some of 15 federal disaster scenarios, including the release of anthrax in aerosol form or the coordinated detonation of chemical weapons or radiological “dirty bombs” around the nation. “We are prepared to respond,” said Paul McHale, assistant defense secretary for homeland defense.  “We are not prepared to respond with the speed, the efficiency and the effectiveness that we intend to achieve” (Reuters/Yahoo!News, Feb. 2). Back to top

Russia Could Close Two Major Plutonium Production Plants This Summer, Official Says Russia could shut down two major plutonium production reactors this summer, achieving a significant goal of U.S.-Russian efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism, the Associated Press reported Friday (see GSN, Jan. 14). The two reactors at Seversk in Siberia are currently running at half power, Russian nuclear agency head Sergei Kiriyenko told U.S. Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman on Friday.  The prospect of shutting them down completely by summer is “realistic,” Kiriyenko said, according to a senior Energy Department official. In addition, planned security upgrades to Russian nuclear facilities would be finished on schedule this year, and Moscow has made progress toward ensuring that the improvements would be maintained into the future, Kiriyenko reported, according to the department official. Last month, the United States announced reaching a major milestone in an effort to aid the reactor shutdown by building a fossil fuel power plant that would replace the power provided to local communities by the plutonium production reactors at Seversk. Similar efforts are under way at a third reactor at Zheleznogorsk, which is scheduled to be shut down by the end of 2010, according to an Energy Department release. The three reactors have been producing 1.2 metric tons of plutonium annually, complicating U.S. and Russian efforts to reduce their plutonium stocks (see GSN, Sept. 19, 2007; Associated Press/Canadian Press, Feb. 1). Back to top       Iran Probe Making Progress, IAEA Chief Says International Atomic Energy Agency chief Mohamed ElBaradei said yesterday that his agency continues to move forward with its investigation into Iran’s nuclear history before his next scheduled report to the U.N. Security Council on the probe’s progress, Reuters reported (see GSN, Feb. 1). “We are going to have my next report to the (IAEA) Board (of Governors) sometime around the end of this month,” ElBaradei told journalists in Cairo.  “We are making good progress in resolving the remaining outstanding issues of the past,” he said. Iranian officials assured ElBaradei during a visit to Tehran last month that Tehran would resolve the U.N. nuclear watchdog’s remaining concerns about Iran’s past nuclear activities before the middle of February. Iran has already disclosed details on its development of high-speed P-2 centrifuges, and officials allowed ElBaradei and his IAEA colleagues to view a laboratory where the uranium-enriching centrifuges are being developed, diplomats said (see GSN, Jan. 24). ElBaradei said he remains optimistic that Iran could allow more rigorous IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities to help allay Western suspicions that the nation’s nuclear program is aimed at developing weapons (Alaa Shahine, Reuters I, Feb. 3). Meanwhile, some U.N. Security Council members are seeking additional time to review new punitive measures before the body passes its third nuclear sanctions resolution against Iran, Agence France-Presse reported Friday. A “few” Security Council members want to wait for the IAEA report on Iran’s nuclear activities before voting on sanctions to punish Tehran for refusing to halt its uranium enrichment program, said French Ambassador to the United States Pierre Vimont. He added that reaching agreement on a resolution with the Security Council’s nonpermanent member nations could take “some time.” “Some of the members of the Security Council would like to wait to see how the present contacts taking place between Mr. ElBaradei and the Iranian authorities go and how far he will reach a satisfactory agreement on his action regarding the controls he has been asking for,” Vimont said in an address to the Middle East Institute in Washington. Vimont referred specifically to the council’s “new” nonpermanent members, saying that “we want to reach consensus among those and there is more work to be done.” Burkina Faso, Costa Rica, Croatia, Libya and Vietnam joined the council last month as temporary members (P. Parameswaran, Agence France-Presse/Google News, Feb. 1). Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Kislyak said the new sanctions resolution would send Iran “a serious political signal” to suspend its uranium enrichment, a process that could yield a nuclear weapon ingredient, the Associated Press reported yesterday. The draft resolution “contains serious signals for Iran and envisions a certain expansion of the earlier sanctions,” Kislyak said.  “The sanctions are somewhat tightened each time the Security Council passes a resolution.  But the tightening is balanced and commensurable with the situation. “Iran should fully cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency's Board of Governors, and, among other things, get back to the implementation of the Additional Protocol on control, freeze uranium enrichment and take some other measures pending the work to untangle all difficult problems,” he said (Associated Press I/International Herald Tribune, Feb. 3). Iran asked the Security Council on Saturday to wait until the U.N. nuclear watchdog completes its inquiry before voting on any new sanctions, Reuters reported. “The realistic recommendation to all parties — including the five plus one — is to keep their patience and wait for the report of … the IAEA,” Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki told reporters, referring to the five permanent Security Council member nations and Germany. “Then they can sit together and consider the next step based on cooperation, of course, not confrontation,” he said (Barry Malone, Reuters II, Feb. 2). Mottaki also attacked the Bush administration for not renouncing its belief that Iran is developing nuclear weapons after a U.S. intelligence assessment determined that Tehran had suspended nuclear weapons development in 2003, AP reported. The Bush administration should “take the brave step to be honest for the first time with their people and to tell them, ‘We were in doubt,’” Mottaki said. He called on U.S. officials to say, “‘We had concern about Iran's nuclear activities, but based on this report, it has removed our concern, and we do not have any problem’” (Heidi Vogt, Associated Press II/Google News, Feb. 2). Back to top       U.S., North Korea Both Accountable for Slowdown in Denuclearization Process, Russia Says A senior Russian official said Saturday that North Korea and the United States both must accept responsibility for the slowing effort to eliminate the Stalinist state’s nuclear programs, ITAR-Tass reported (see GSN, Feb. 1). The denuclearization process appeared to stumble after Pyongyang missed the Dec. 31 deadline to disable three key nuclear facilities and to release a full declaration of its atomic programs.  The United States said a list submitted in November did not adequately address all of North Korea’s suspected nuclear efforts. “The main reason for a halt” in six-nation nuclear talks is the need for more information on North Korea’s nuclear programs and the fact that Pyongyang remains on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism, said chief Russian negotiator Alexander Losyukov. “We are talking not about how work is proceeding at [the Yongbyon nuclear complex] but rather about how the earlier agreements are performed or improperly performed,” he said.  “These include an announcement about the receipt of complete information about North Korea’s nuclear programs and the performance by the United States of its relevant obligations. “There is some slowdown in doing that,” he added.  “There is still work to be done there.” Technological issues are delaying disablement efforts at Yongbyon, Losyukov said (ITAR-Tass, Feb. 2). The U.S. State Department’s top Korea expert left Pyongyang last week without obtaining the nuclear list, the Associated Press reported. “We met with Foreign Ministry officials and discussed issues related to the declaration and, of course, the need for them to provide a complete and correct declaration,” Sung Kim said Saturday in Beijing. When asked if he received the document, Kim said, “No” (Associated Press/Yahoo!News, Feb. 2). A delegation of U.S. Senate staffers and nuclear experts is expected to arrive in North Korea on Feb. 12 for talks on expanding U.S. threat reduction programs to cover the Asian nation, the Korea Herald reported.  The programs to date have been used primarily to secure and eliminate weapons of mass destruction in former Soviet states. Keith Luse, an aide to program co-founder Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.), is expected to discuss with officials in Pyongyang strategies for finding civilian work for North Korean nuclear technicians (Korea Herald, Feb. 4). Back to top       No Tolerance for Nuke Mistakes, Minot Chief Says The commander of Minot Air Force Base, N.D., has set a zero-tolerance policy for errors involving atomic weapons, following the 2007 incident in which six nuclear-tipped missiles were mistakenly loaded onto an aircraft and flown to a base in Louisiana, the Associated Press reported Saturday (see GSN, Jan. 25). “Our goal in this line of work is not to make errors, our goal is perfection,” said Col. Joel Westa, who was appointed base commander in October.  “It’s one of those missions where the tolerance is very low for error, in fact it’s zero.” Any changes in activity involving the base’s nuclear missiles must be cleared through Westa, who regularly is directly involved when weapons are moved. Following the August 2007 incident, the base has enacted “more robust” policies to ensure that weapons are not misplaced, Westa said.  He said there would be no repeat mishaps during his tenure at Minot or afterward. “It’s nice that he’s confident, but for the purpose of safety, that’s a little worrisome,” said nuclear weapons expert Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists.  “All of our nuclear history tells us that these things will continue to happen.” “As long as you have nukes, you have to expect the unexpected,” he added. The base is still preparing to be recertified for handling nuclear weapons.  Training in correct procedures continues and some airmen have replaced Minot personnel who were disciplined after the flight. The Air Force banned roughly 65 base personnel from handling nuclear weapons, AP reported. While the recertification inspection is not expected for several months, the base’s 91st Space Wing proved “phenomenal” during the December inspection of its handling of Minot’s 150 silo-based Minuteman 3 missiles, Westa said (see GSN, Jan. 7; James MacPherson, Associated Press/The Houma Courier, Feb. 2). Back to top       U.S. Blocks START Extension, Russian Official Says The United States has frustrated Russian efforts to extend key provisions of a major nuclear weapon treaty, raising prospects that the pact could follow the recent downward path of other strategic arms control agreements, a senior Russian official said yesterday (see GSN, Dec. 12, 2007). The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty limits the number of U.S. and Russian long-range nuclear delivery vehicles, but the pact is set to expire next year, taking with it extensive verification tools the two nations use to monitor each other’s nuclear arsenals. Russian officials have sought to extend the treaty, or at least some of its provisions, but so far without success. “As of today, the situation is disappointing.  Our colleagues have a different idea of the tasks set,” said Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Kislyak in an Interfax interview. The two nations agreed last year to “formulate a set of elements for a new agreement, that would carry reliability, stability and predictability further into to the strategic sphere,” Kislyak said.  “There are quite a few elements in the agreement that ensure the sides' considerable restraint in the strategic offensive weapons sphere and would be rather valuable in the future. They would be valuable, above all, in ensuring stability and predictability” (Interfax, Feb. 3). The treaty’s demise would follow difficulties with other agreements, including the 2002 U.S. withdrawal from the Antiballistic Missile Treaty (see GSN, June 13, 2002), the abandonment of the START II pact (see GSN, June 14, 2002), the Russian suspension of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (see GSN, Dec. 12, 2007), and Russian threats to abandon the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty (see GSN, Oct. 12, 2007), Agence France-Presse reported (Agence France-Presse/Spacewar.com, Feb. 3). Back to top       Livermore Discloses Beryllium Exposure A U.S. nuclear weapon laboratory failed to promptly tell workers last year that they might have been exposed to unsafe levels of beryllium during a four-year project, the Contra Costa Times reported Saturday (see GSN, March 28, 2002). Beryllium metal, a nuclear weapon component, can trigger a potentially fatal lung disease in a small number of people who are exposed to the material. The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California in 2002 began to structurally reinforce a machine shop at the site, located in a seismically active part of the world. The project ended in December 2006, and elevated levels of beryllium were detected in the shop in February 2007.  Additional testing in July 2007 confirmed the higher levels.  Only then did the laboratory inform the seismic contractor of the test results, and the shop was later closed in September. “We absolutely could have and should have informed the employees about this sooner,” laboratory spokeswoman Susan Houghton said.  “This is something the lab management finds unacceptable” (see GSN, Oct. 3, 2007). Exposure to beryllium can cause some people to develop beryllium sensitivity, which in turn can trigger chronic beryllium disease, an incurable lung condition that can lead to death, the Times reported (Betsy Mason, Contra Costa Times, Feb. 2). Back to top

Boston Biodefense Lab Opening Delayed A controversial biodefense laboratory at Boston University is no longer expected to begin operating this fall, the Boston Globe reported (see GSN, Jan. 7). The delay is linked to a federal environmental review of the Biosafety Level 4 facility that is now scheduled for completion “on or before April 30, 2009,” the National Institutes of Health said in court records filed last week. “The NIH is doing additional studies, and that clearly adds time to the schedule,” said Boston University spokeswoman Ellen Berlin.  “As the NIH process is ongoing, it is premature to set a precise opening date.” Opponents have sued to block the opening of the facility, arguing it is not safe to house research on lethal pathogens such as plague and Ebola near residential areas. While U.S. District Judge Patti Saris would not order a halt to construction, she has maintained oversight of the laboratory.  Opponents and supporters of the facility must come before Saris again after the environmental review is finished. “The way I read this is they can’t open the BSL-4 piece of this conceivably before the end of 2009 or more likely the beginning of 2010,” said attorney Eloise Lawrence of the Conservation Law Foundation, which filed a lawsuit against the facility.  “She could also decide at that point it will never open” (Stephen Smith, Boston Globe, Feb. 1). Back to top

Iranian Space Program Tests Rocket Iran today test-fired a rocket it said would be used to lift the country’s first indigenous research satellite into space, but defense experts cautioned that the booster could also help deliver weapons, Reuters reported (see GSN, March 6, 2007). “The implications of (the test) are very interesting,” said defense analyst Paul Beaver.  “If they can send a satellite into orbit … the Israelis will claim there is no reason why they can’t launch a weapon system in the same way or why they can’t make a long-range ballistic missile.” “I think it is yet another indication that Iran’s technology is moving very quickly up the scale,” he added. Iran maintains a variety of medium-range missiles.  The nation’s longest-range missile can travel as far as 1,250 miles, enabling it to hit Israeli targets and U.S. bases throughout the Middle East, according to Iranian officials. “I think Israel and the Americans will be concerned about this,” Beaver said (Reuters, Feb. 4). “It’s unfortunate Iran continues to test ballistic missiles,” said White House spokesman Gordon Johndroe.  “This regime continues to take steps that only further isolate it and the Iranian people from the international community” (Anna Fifield, Financial Times, Feb. 4). Back to top       Foreign Technology Remains Crucial to North Korean Ballistic Missile Program, Report Says An upcoming report says foreign technology and equipment remains crucial to North Korea’s ballistic missile development program, Reuters reported yesterday (see GSN, Oct. 11, 2007). “The country is nearly self-sufficient in ballistic missile production, but still relies on some advanced foreign technologies and components, particularly from overseas,” according to the report from Daniel Pinkston, a Korean affairs specialist and missile program expert at the International Crisis Group. Pyongyang skirts international trade sanctions by using front companies to obtain guidance systems and other missile parts from other nations, says the report, due to be published by the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College. “International export controls and denial strategies have made it increasingly difficult to procure dual-use items and technologies,” the report says. The Asian nation is not yet able to integrate missiles and nuclear warheads, according to Reuters. “If diplomacy fails to curb the North Korean nuclear program … scientists and engineers should be expected to surmount their current technical barriers,” according to the report.  The regime has also sought missiles capable of carrying chemical and biological weapons. South Korea and Japan are already within the range of hundreds of North Korean missiles. China, the former Soviet Union and one-time Soviet states have all at some point provided support for North Korea’s missile development, the report says.  Apart from that backing, “North Korea’s level of missile development is remarkable given the size and backwardness of (its) economy,” it adds (Jon Herskovitz, Reuters/Yahoo!News, Feb. 3). Back to top

U.S. Counterterrorism Program Hits Obstacles The U.S. Homeland Security Department’s $90-million Securing the Cities initiative has come under growing scrutiny as technical and operational setbacks have hampered its efforts to counter possible nuclear or radiological weapon attacks in the New York metropolitan area, the Washington Post reported yesterday (see GSN, Jan. 7). The program — starting as a partnership between the Homeland Security Department, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey and officials across 91 localities in three states — has trained more than 1,400 local law enforcement officers to conduct radiation detection operations and distributed portable radiation sensors to thousands of police officers and other workers who travel frequently across the region. Late last year, hundreds of local, state and federal law enforcement officials launched an extensive, secret search for radioactive materials in Manhattan before its New Year’s Eve celebration in an effort to prove they could secure a large urban area against nuclear threats. However, in a 30-minute drill last month, the New York City Police Department failed to locate a black SUV holding a planted piece of cesium 137, a material that would bring lower Manhattan’s financial district to a standstill if it were detonated in a radiological “dirty bomb,” according to the Post. Police blamed the failure on technical problems with the helicopter-borne precision radiation sensors provided through the Securing the Cities program. Nuclear terrorism expert Michael Levi said the Securing the Cities program has value but its supporters should offer a more realistic portrayal of what it can achieve.  He added that the initiative might  be overemphasizing new technology at the expense of coordination. Jonah Czerwinski, a homeland security consultant at IBM who pushed to establish the initiative, said it would continue to evolve “and the only way to evolve it over time is to test it.  As the United States spends $11 billion on missile defense each year, he said, “it seems lopsided to … not spend $40 million on programs like this.” The Homeland Security Department hopes to complete a cost-benefit analysis of the New York nuclear detection effort this year to determine how it could serve as an example for counterterrorism efforts in other cities based on resources, risk levels “and the likelihood of success,” said Vayl Oxford, director of the agency’s Domestic Nuclear Detection Office.  “We don't want to wait until someone has attacked a city with a nuclear weapon or dirty bomb and wait to figure that out,” Oxford said.  “Together with the high risk New York always faces, we feel this is a prudent step to help secure that city, as well as to determine, ‘Does this model work?’” The program has provided New York City with six $500,000 trucks carrying radiation sensors that can differentiate between various sources.  It has directed additional funds for training, field drills, research into new radiation scanning technology for fixed transportation centers, and security upgrades for hospitals and other sites that use radioactive materials, he said. New York police routinely set up scanning checkpoints twice daily to deter and defend against radioactive material smuggling and to train officers.  During the drill when the helicopter failed to find the cesium 137, it was located at a ground-based checkpoint near Times Square. Richard Falkenrath, the New York Police Department’s deputy commissioner for counterterrorism, said the New York nuclear detection framework still requires improved detection technology, upgraded communications and data transfer equipment, and heightened procedures for police to investigate possible threats without delaying traffic. “It's a difficult thing to do, and I'll be frank about it. … It requires really constant vigilance and effort to maintain it,” Falkenrath said.  “Certainly, if this model goes nationwide, they need a lot more help, because most other parts of the country are not going to have the ability to devote these sorts of resources” without sapping resources for more routine law enforcement tasks (Spencer Hsu, Washington Post, Feb. 3). Back to top

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