By Elaine M. Grossman
Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — A top U.S. general is pressing Congress to accelerate plans for a study he said is crucial to the effort to field a new nuclear warhead (see GSN, Feb. 5).
Air Force Gen. Kevin Chilton, head of U.S. Strategic Command, told Global Security Newswire that without results from an as-yet incomplete design study of the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW), he would be ill-prepared to advise the incoming president next year on how best to modernize the atomic arsenal.
The assessment is widely seen as a key step toward ultimately building the controversial warhead because it would flesh out details of what it would take to produce the new design. Yet, in the wake of steep budget cuts to the effort, it could take several years for the executive branch study to get the study done, according to government officials. That, in turn, could deal a serious setback to fielding the proposed weapon any time in the near future. “We need to get on with this,” Chilton said. “Now is the time to do the hard work, to answer the hard questions — that are very fair questions — so that we can tee this up early in the next administration, inform the next [Nuclear Posture Review] and move on.” Lawmakers zeroed the requested $88.8 million budget for the new warhead in fiscal 2008, arguing that the Bush administration must conduct a broad review of U.S. nuclear weapons strategy before such a program could continue. They did provide $15 million for the Navy to conduct “advanced certification” work aimed at ensuring that warhead designs could enter the arsenal without undergoing explosive testing, if desired sometime in the future (see GSN, Dec. 18, 2007). The administration has panned legislative cuts to the RRW budget, saying the only alternative would be a more costly life-extension program for existing weapons that could not match the new warhead’s safety and security features. Proponents of the newly designed warhead also say it would cost less to maintain than Cold War weapons, which were optimized for nuclear exchanges with the Soviet Union by squeezing large explosive yields into relatively small, tightly designed packages. Changes in the international security environment dictate that future weapons include more safety, security and reliability features than today’s aging stockpile, according to advocates. They assert a new “family” of warheads could be introduced into the arsenal without explosive testing. Others have questioned this assertion. The elite JASON defense advisory panel last year cast some doubt as to whether a new warhead could be certified without underground detonations (see GSN, Oct. 1, 2007). The United States has not conducted such tests for more than 15 years. Critics contend that building a new set of warheads would send the wrong signal at a time when the United States aims to curb nuclear weapons proliferation worldwide. Bowing to a 2007 congressional directive banning the Energy Department from proceeding toward RRW production, the administration last month requested just $10 million to continue “maturing” warhead designs in fiscal 2009. The funding sought for next year would allow program officials to respond to the JASON panel’s testing questions about the proposed replacement warhead, according to John Broehm, a spokesman for the National Nuclear Security Administration. The agency is a semiautonomous arm of the Energy Department responsible for maintaining the nuclear weapons force and it would lead any modernization effort. The Bush administration’s future-year budget projections continue to show $10 million allocated annually to the RRW program through 2013. While Chilton said he supports the president’s budget plans, he noted that it would take roughly $66 million for the nuclear agency to complete the RRW design study. The assessment would help determine the scope, schedule and cost for developing and producing the first RRW, which would replace the Navy’s W-76 warhead on Trident D-5 submarine-based missiles, Broehm and others said (see GSN, Nov. 1, 2007). Congress imposed the deep reduction in funds for the current fiscal year specifically so that detailed work on a new warhead could not proceed appreciably closer to production in the near term, according to critics. “Part of our goal last year was to trim [the RRW budget] back so they could not get to that finish line,” Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, said in an interview last week. At the behest of Congress, all work on the warhead has been suspended this year, Broehm said. Since it remains unclear when the program might restart, “right now it would be hard to say how long the study phase would take to complete,” he said. “We don’t anticipate requesting any more [RRW] funding for FY-08 or FY-09,” Broehm added. “Congress made it very clear we had some questions to answer before moving forward. We feel this budget request addresses those concerns.” Chilton said, though, he is anxious to get the RRW design assessment done soon. By raising the issue repeatedly in congressional testimony and in the media, it appears the general hopes to push Capitol Hill into offering additional funds for warhead in the coming year, according to some observers. “He’s willing to take a battle with Congress over these issues,” Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists told GSN last week. In Chilton’s view, each day of delay in modernizing warheads brings him a day closer to being a commander unable to certify that the nuclear deterrent remains viable. “We need to make the appropriate investments today, this year,” the general told an audience in Orlando, Fla., last month. “We need to make the investments this year to answer the key questions on how best to do this. What is the best way to modernize this force?” Last week, NNSA chief Thomas D’Agostino told a House panel that today an ongoing “Stockpile Stewardship Program” ensures that “the stockpile remains safe and reliable and does not require nuclear testing.” However, national laboratory directors are “concerned” that a long-term moratorium on testing the existing stockpile “may pose unacceptable risks to maintaining high confidence in warhead performance,” D’Agostino said. Chilton similarly cast doubt as to whether current or future life-extension measures — absent a new warhead effort — could offer sufficient confidence in the reliability of the nuclear arsenal. “I’m always open to being convinced one way or the other,” the strategic commander told GSN last week. However, from “what I’ve looked at and what I’ve seen, I don’t know how you get there.” The specter of a stockpile on the brink of aging out “is simply not supported by any evidence … provided to Congress,” responded Kimball. In fact, he noted, a U.S. government study released in 2006 found that plutonium pits at the core of nuclear weapons could last another 100 years (see GSN, Nov. 30, 2006). “The administration is trying to resuscitate funding in support of RRW on the basis of arguments that were rejected by Congress last year,” Kimball said. “Both RRW with a modern design and a [life-extension program] strategy have risks [and] unanswered questions that we have to look at, to decide whether or not they would require tests,” said Chilton, who assumed his Strategic Command position in October. However, he added, “if you would ask me today which is the least risky, I would say a modern weapon.” The general conceded that a yardstick for measuring the minimum military requirements for warhead reliability, safety and security, among other attributes, had not yet been determined for the future atomic arsenal. “That’s on the to-do list,” Chilton said. “I’ve spoken broadly about what I think I advocate for. … I want something that is reliable, safe and secure, and maintainable.” Some critics question the rationale for Chilton’s conclusion that a new warhead would be less risky and more able to meet requirements than an expanded life extension effort, if minimum baselines for warhead reliability and other desired attributes have not yet been set. One scenario the general cites as a basis for RRW’s security improvements involves the possibility that a terrorist might steal a U.S. nuclear weapon. “Nirvana for me,” Chilton said, “is if someone unauthorized were able to get hold of a weapon, that they not only would be unable to use it in its current state, but even if they took it apart and tried to use components of it for bad purposes, that even those would be put into such a state that they could not meet their devious needs.” Counters Kimball: “Should we spend billions of dollars to replace existing warhead types in our arsenal to reduce by an infinitesimal amount [the possibility] that al-Qaeda could detonate it?” Following two opinion pieces in the Wall Street Journal — authored by former national security leaders Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, William Perry and Sam Nunn — there has been renewed debate about whether the United States should more swiftly pursue the global elimination of atomic weapons (see GSN, Feb. 27). At a conference last week in Oslo, Norway, current and former high-level officials from around the globe met to explore steps that might be taken to move toward nuclear disarmament (see GSN, Feb. 26). However, that dialogue has not affected Chilton’s determination to ensure that nuclear weapons remain viable for at least another 92 years. Chilton told Congress last week that he needs a nuclear infrastructure that “will allow us to sustain our nuclear capability and expertise throughout the 21st century” (see GSN, March 4). “We must care for the stockpile whether we possess one weapon or thousands.” “He has just moved the milepost for the nuclear era through the year 2100,” said Kristensen, who directs his organization’s Nuclear Information Project. “That’s an extraordinary statement from a person who has a two-year tenure at U.S. Strategic Command. This is the stuff of major international debate.”
A high-level British diplomat yesterday leveled harsh criticism at a U.S. intelligence assessment concluding with “high confidence” that Iran halted nuclear weapons development in 2003, the London Independent reported (see GSN, March 5). “Many of us were surprised by how emphatic the writers of it were. That all the activities stopped in 2003 and had not resumed,” the diplomat said in reference to the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iran, which represented the consensus of the 16 U.S. intelligence agencies. “I haven’t seen any intelligence that gives me even medium confidence that these programs haven’t resumed. So we just don’t know,” he told reporters, noting that Iran has refused to give the International Atomic Energy Agency access to all of its nuclear sites and officials. When the U.S. report was released in December, it “had an impact on the international debate, but I don’t think it ever took the military option off the table,” the diplomat said, adding that the Iranians “continue to pursue a dangerous path, and we shouldn’t underestimate the risk of miscalculation.” “Just because we got it wrong on Iraq, it doesn’t mean we’re getting it wrong on Iran,” he said, referring to flawed intelligence indicating that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction prior to the 2003 invasion. The diplomat emphasized that the United Kingdom intends to “pursue a diplomatic solution to this crisis. We remain absolutely committed to that” (Anne Penketh, London Independent, March 6). Meanwhile, Israeli lawmaker and former intelligence chief Danny Yatom has been traveling across Europe and Asia to urge government officials not to adopt a “wait-and-see” strategy on Iran’s suspected nuclear weapons ambitions, the Financial Times reported yesterday. Countries must move quickly to stop Iran from building a nuclear weapon, Yatom told the Times, noting Israeli projections that Iran could complete a bomb in one year. Tehran has maintained its nuclear program is strictly for civilian energy production (Blitz/Barber, Financial Times, March 5). Tehran will not open new talks over its nuclear program following the enactment of new U.N. Security Council sanctions against Iran earlier this week, Iranian Foreign Minster Manouchehr Mottaki told Agence France-Presse yesterday. “Negotiations and contradictory actions afterwards are not appropriate. Therefore we believe that for any request for negotiations, first the objectives should be set up,” Mottaki said. Delegates representing Western nations at the International Atomic Energy Agency’s 35-nation governing board meeting called for greater nuclear transparency from Iran to refute international suspicions that its nuclear activities are geared toward weapons development. “They have to come back and respond in a serious way to these issues,” Norwegian envoy Ole Lundby told journalists. “If they don’t … we may end up in a worse situation,” Lundby said. “Everyone has spent a lot of time and hope trying to put the past out of the way. If we don’t do that, then we have serious problem. We’ll reach a dead end” (Agence France-Presse/Spacewar.com, March 5).
Nations can offset the threat of atomic terrorism by sharing information on nuclear and radioactive materials in their possession, more than 70 experts said in a report issued today (see GSN, Feb. 20). The report published by the Royal Society, a British science organization, addresses threats such as smuggling of nuclear weapons and illicit material that could be used to produce radiological weapons. The experts concluded that shared databases on the characteristics of nuclear matter could strengthen capabilities to identify the source of dangerous materials. That, in turn, could “deter future terrorism attempts” by making it more difficult to supply nuclear material without being detected, the organization said. In the “worst-case scenario” it would allow authorities to trace material used in an attack,” it added. “To reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism we need to increase our ability to detect and respond to the misuse of nuclear materials. This can help the international collection and sharing of information about nuclear materials,” Roger Cashmore, who led the panel of British, European, Israeli, Russian and U.S. experts, said in a press release. Technical data that should be shared among nations includes the types of nuclear fuel they use for power production and what material is used in weapons, the report says. “If a bomb made from a certain type of uranium or plutonium was detonated, knowing where the material was processed would enable authorities to trace it back to a specific country’s industrial or defense facility,” Cashmore said. “Currently this process could take months but if international information was shared, it could take weeks or even days. Such efficiency would act as a strong deterrent to potential smugglers. “Information on the type of nuclear materials held by countries is valuable only if it is globally available,” he added. “At present there is no requirement for countries to collect or share information on their nuclear industry or weaponry” (Royal Society release, March 6). The report also notes the need for better detection capabilities for material as it is being smuggled, Reuters reported. “Consistent international materials databases, used alongside surveillance and intelligence, will undoubtedly improve the prevention of nuclear threats and will build the international confidence in nuclear security,” the experts said. While security of nuclear materials has increased significantly around the world, vulnerabilities remain in nations such as Pakistan and Russia, according to a 2007 report prepared at Harvard University (see GSN, Sept. 27, 2007; Michael Kahn, Reuters, March 6).
The commission aimed at implementing the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty announced today it is working to verify whether a global system for detecting atomic blasts would function effectively, Agence France-Presse reported (see GSN, Feb. 26). Sixty scientists from 30 countries met in Vienna, Austria, this week to launch an 18-month evaluation of the “readiness and capability” of a detection system being built to monitor the test ban. The verification network links roughly 340 facilities around the world. The “verification regime has now reached a very advanced stage and is nearing completion and a comprehensive assessment has never been done before,” said Tibor Toth, who heads a preparatory commission set up in advance of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization. The organization would be formed only after the agreement has been ratified by 44 key nations with nuclear power or research reactor capability. Nine key nations have yet to approve the treaty, including known or suspected nuclear-weapon holders China, India, Israel, Pakistan and the United States. Among the major nations that have signed off on the treaty are France, Russia and the United Kingdom Toth said “the time is ripe” to perform an assessment. Results are scheduled to be circulated at an international conference in the Austrian capital in June 2009, he said. “The system has to be well calibrated, reliable and secure,” said one participating research scientist, Yves Caristan. “We need to ask ourselves: does the system deliver what we expect it to deliver,” added Caristan, who directs the Saclay Research Center at the French Atomic Energy Commission (Agence France-Presse/Spacewar.com, March 6).
The United Kingdom’s plan to renew its arsenal of Trident missiles is being slowed by technical problems at a U.S. nuclear weapon facility, the London Guardian reported today (see GSN, March 15, 2007). The British government is seeking to extend the service life of the W-76 warheads carried on the missiles, which are intended to remain in service past the end of their design life in the 2020s and to be carried by a new fleet of submarines. The Y-12 nuclear weapon plant in Tennessee is conducting service extensions on the W-76 warheads used in British and U.S. Trident missiles. However, it has run into an unspecified problem involving a material known as “Fogbank,” which is believed to be a cleaning substance. “The only thing we can say is there’s an issue with the W-76 life extension program. It’s been delayed a bit, but we have all our experts working on it,” said a spokesman for the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration, which oversees Y-12. The agency is spending “a lot of money” to produce “Fogbank,” NNSA chief Thomas D’Agostino told lawmakers last year. “We’re not out of the woods yet,” he said, noting the difficulty in working with a substance that is toxic, flammable and explosive (Ian Sample, London Guardian, March 6).
The International Atomic Energy Agency at some point is expected to halt inspections of a storage site at the U.S. Y-12 facility that holds 10 tons of weapon-grade uranium, the Knoxville News Sentinel reported yesterday (see GSN, Oct. 25, 2006). The Clinton administration in the mid-1990s declared the material surplus and allowed the U.N. nuclear watchdog to conduct monthly checks of the vault where the uranium was stored. The move was meant as a gesture of transparency regarding weapons material and to illustrate the U.S. resolve to reduce its nuclear arsenal following the end of the Cold War. However, the amount of material that inspectors are allowed to examine has shrunk from 10 tons to 1 ton, according to Steven Wyatt, a spokesman for the National Nuclear Security Administration. The majority of the material is being readied for relocation to a $549 million storage site set to open this year. Some of that uranium might eventually be processed into a low-enriched form or converted into fuel for nuclear-powered Navy vessels, Wyatt said. The final 1 ton could be put back into weapon-production service or used elsewhere. IAEA inspections at Y-12 are expected to come to a complete end before long. They agency would not be allowed to conduct checks of the new uranium storage facility (Frank Munger, Knoxville News Sentinel, March 5).
Arab League member nations vowed yesterday to terminate their participation in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty if Israel declares it possesses a nuclear weapons arsenal, the Associated Press reported (see GSN, Dec. 13, 2006). “As soon as Israel announces it has nuclear weapons, the Arab will announce their withdrawal from the Nonproliferation Treaty,” Arab League foreign ministers said in a statement. Israel is widely believed to have nuclear arms, but under its “nuclear ambiguity policy” refuses to confirm or deny the existence of an arsenal. It has not joined the nuclear treaty. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert appeared to suggest the existence of Israeli nuclear weapons during an interview late 2006, but he later said his comment was misinterpreted. The Arab nations have all signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and have called for the Middle East to be free of nuclear weapons. They said they would abandon the pact if Israel acknowledged its arsenal and then refused to destroy the weapons and allow international inspections of its nuclear sector. They would not return until Israel joined the treaty. While no Gulf states say they are developing nuclear weapons, various countries in the Middle East have revealed plans to pursue civilian nuclear power programs with international assistance (see GSN, Jan. 26; Associated Press/International Herald Tribune, March 5).
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher yesterday called on the Indian government to close debate over its planned nuclear trade deal with the United States “by the end of May,” the New York Times reported (see GSN, March 5). That schedule would give U.S lawmakers time to consider the agreement before Congress adjourns for the summer, Boucher said. “We are kind of playing in overtime,” Boucher said in New Delhi. “There’s a lot of work, not a lot of time.” The agreement would make U.S. nuclear power plant fuel and technology available to India even though New Delhi has tested nuclear weapons and has not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. India, in turn, would open its civilian nuclear facilities to international inspectors. The deal appeared to be stalled by opposition in India, including from communist political parties key that provide key support for the ruling government. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, though, has recently suggested his administration was preparing for early elections that would take place if communist lawmakers follow through on their threat to withdraw their backing if he moves to implement the deal. In apparent attempts to shore up voter support, New Delhi last week released a budget proposal that contained tax breaks, waived farmers’ debts, and expanded funding for public education and other social services. The government slashed train fares two weeks ago (Somini Sengupta, New York Times, March 6). Meanwhile, four U.S. nuclear proliferation experts critical of the deal yesterday urged the Bush administration to disclose commentary on the agreement provided to lawmakers on condition that it not be made public, Reuters reported. A statement released by Daryl Kimball, Fred McGoldrick, Henry Sokolski and Sharon Squassoni called the secrecy condition “a virtual ‘gag’ order.” “The administration's responses [to congressional questions] should be made publicly available so that U.S. and Indian lawmakers and the public can evaluate whether the draft U.S.-Indian accord conforms to the terms and conditions established by Congress,” Kimball, head of the Arms Control Association, said in the statement. “The administration's unwillingness to make their answers more widely available suggests they have something to hide from either U.S. or Indian legislators,” he said. The Bush administration might be concerned that disclosing its answers might complicate negotiations to approve the pact in India, said Jon Wolfsthal, a nonproliferation analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “But even if that is the case, it would raise concerns,” he said (Arshad Mohammed, Reuters, March 5).
North Korea should carry out its obligations under a 2007 denuclearization agreement before U.S. President George W. Bush leaves office, a top Chinese official reportedly said in January (see GSN, March 5). Wang Jiarui, Chinese Communist Party international liaison chief, encouraged the regime to take action during a meeting in Pyongyang with North Korean leader Kim Jong Il, sources told Reuters. A Democrat is likely to inhabit the White House beginning in January 2009, Wang reportedly told Kim. “Apparently it’s not going to be easy to push forward the six-party process if the Democrats take power,” a source quoted Wang as saying. The source said Kim concurred. North Korea to date has halted operations at its Yongbyon nuclear complex and begun disabling three key nuclear plants. However, progress on the agreement has faltered this year after Washington charged Pyongyang with failure to provide a mandatory full accounting of its nuclear activities. North Korea, meanwhile, has complained about the pace at which it is receiving its expected rewards from the other nations, particularly the United States. The next occupant of the White House is not likely to change Pyongyang’s stand on the nuclear deal, a diplomatic source told Reuters. “When Bush took over from Bill Clinton, the U.S. policy on North Korea suffered a setback,” the source said. “But Bush moved ahead with a policy changeover later on. That is what North Korea evaluates highly” (Teruaki Ueno, Reuters I/Washington Post, March 6). Beijing hopes to help Pyongyang and Washington smooth over their disputes so that negotiations can resume, Reuters reported. “China has raised all kinds of means with both the American and the North Korean sides,” said Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei. “We are still discussing these means” (Lindsay Beck, Reuters/Washington Post, March 6).
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