Officials open the Chemical Weapon Convention’s second review conference earlier this week (OPCW photo). Experts Pitch CW Disarmament, Nonproliferation Plans By Chris Schneidmiller Global Security Newswire THE HAGUE — Experts who have been listening to diplomats speak for several days had their opportunity yesterday to point the way toward improved chemical weapons destruction and nonproliferation regimes (see GSN, April 3)...Full Story

Proliferation Analyst Discourages Focus on Intent By Elaine M. Grossman Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — A British expert is calling on the international community to more effectively discourage the proliferation of nuclear weapons by punishing any and all breaches of agreed safeguards, without first trying to determine intent (see GSN, March 17)...Full Story

U.S. Lawmaker Seeks to Limit Funds for U.S. Missile Defenses in Europe Until Host Nations Agree By Megan Scully CongressDaily WASHINGTON — As the Bush administration nears a formal agreement with the Czech Republic on the U.S. military’s European missile defense plans, a key House lawmaker said Wednesday that she would again seek to restrict funding for the effort unless Poland gives the green light to the plans (see GSN, April 9)...Full Story

	Thursday, April 10, 2008

Taiwanese Lawmaker Questions U.S. Cargo Scanning A Taiwanese lawmaker yesterday requested that Justice Ministry officials justify Taipei’s funding for a WMD detection effort conducted at an island seaport under the U.S. Container Security Initiative, Channel News Asia reported (see GSN, Jan. 29). Taiwanese legislator Lu Hsiu-yen told the nation’s customs director that the Kaohsiung harbor security program provides little benefit to Taiwan while undermining the island’s sovereignty. The customs official had said earlier that Taiwan purchased $13.9 million in unused X-ray equipment for the program, which is staffed by 10 U.S. officials (Channel News Asia, April 10). Back to top

Proliferation Analyst Discourages Focus on Intent By Elaine M. Grossman Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — A British expert is calling on the international community to more effectively discourage the proliferation of nuclear weapons by punishing any and all breaches of agreed safeguards, without first trying to determine intent (see GSN, March 17). Instead of focusing on those infractions by non-nuclear weapons states that are indisputable — such as engaging in a covert uranium enrichment program and denying access to inspectors — global leaders tend to get mired in futile debates over a violator’s motives, says James Acton of King’s College in London. However, it is virtually impossible for outsiders to uncover irrefutable evidence that a nation seeks to develop an atomic bomb, he said.  Thus, illicit activities of would-be proliferators can continue unabated under the guise of a civil power program, until a weapon capability is ultimately unveiled as a fait accompli. Questions about intent dominate the news.  Recently, for example, U.S. President George W. Bush alleged Iran had actually stated a goal of developing nuclear arms, an assertion that was quickly disputed (see GSN, March 21).  Speaking yesterday in Washington, Acton suggested that such discussions divert critical attention away from Tehran’s actual conduct in violation of international law.  In a new development this week, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced plans to install 6,000 new centrifuges at the nation’s Natanz nuclear facility (see GSN, April 8). Though “there is a widespread assumption” that the International Atomic Energy Agency assesses intent, its scope is actually limited to documenting a nation’s capabilities, Acton noted.  In the future, even if the nuclear watchdog organization were given the responsibility of gauging intentions, it is not clear that it could ever achieve much success at the task without being allowed additional intelligence-gathering tools and authorities of its own, he said. Acton did not advise crossing a line that would have the agency employ such things as undercover spies or listening devices in sovereign nations, and he doubted that any such proposal could gain steam among nonproliferation leaders. Rather, he said, the atomic agency should stick to the task of determining the level of capability a nation has achieved.  An additional step should be taken, though, according to Acton.  If the organization determined that a country had broken its safeguards agreement, an appropriate punishment should be applied evenhandedly, and perhaps even automatically, he said at a discussion event sponsored by the New America Foundation. “International sanctions — whether enacted through the IAEA Board of Governors or the [U.N.] Security Council — should be based on what a noncompliant state has done, not on why it acted,” Acton stated in his presentation. Yet, on occasion, the United States has pushed the international community to overlook violations by its friends, he said.  One example is South Korea, which “conducted undeclared reprocessing experiments that were, in both the letter and the spirit, contrary to the safeguards agreement with the IAEA,” Acton said.  “It should have been found in noncompliance with its safeguards agreement and it should have been punished appropriately” (see GSN, Nov. 26, 2004). Though Iran’s violations have been more serious than South Korea’s, the exceptions granted for the U.S. ally weakened Washington’s credibility when it turned to condemn Tehran, Acton said. “Apply the rules equally,” he said.  “There can be no exemptions for U.S. friends and allies who break the rules.” A calibrated set of punishments for violators might begin simply with a U.N. Security Council finding of noncompliance, which might have been a sufficiently humiliating slap on the wrist for Seoul, Acton told Global Security Newswire following the event. More serious punishments for more serious violations might include Security Council condemnation, economic sanctions and — for only the most urgent and unambiguous nuclear weapon threats — military action, he said. However, turning the global discussion away from intent would require enormous discipline on the part of Security Council members, Acton suggested. “Why did Iran violate its safeguards agreement?  Countries want to know,” Acton said.  “They’re not happy in authorizing enforcement merely because Iran has violated its safeguards agreement.  They want to know why.” And, he said, nations are typically eager to seek oft-elusive proof of intent if they have friendly relations with the violating country. “States interpret the evidence based on what they want the answer to be,” Acton said.  “Russia and China support Iran because they’re strong trading partners, not because they really disbelieve the evidence provided by the IAEA.” Had the United States, Britain and France “stopped talking about intent so much in the Board of Governors and the IAEA, it would have been much harder for China and Russia, for instance, to jump on the intent bandwagon,” he said.  “If our argument had been Iran should have sanctions enacted on it because it’s violated its safeguards agreement, the argument would have been a much stronger one over the long run.” Instead, the international focus on intent provides those seeking a nuclear weapon capability a useful fig leaf, he said. “If I was a state that was out developing nuclear weapons at the moment, I would take away from all of this is that if I ever get caught by the IAEA, what I should do is I should play the motives card,” Acton said.  “The best way of … avoiding sanctions will be to say … ‘I didn’t break the rules because I’m building a nuclear weapon.  I broke the rules because I’m worried that if I declared my enrichment program, then I would get bombed by some other state.” The international dispute over Tehran’s true objectives has made the future job of stemming the spread of nuclear weapons enormously more challenging, he said. “Looking beyond the Iranian crisis, we have set a very, very dangerous precedent,” Acton said.  “The extent to which the debate over Iran has revolved around Iran’s motives — without any means of assessing what those motives are — has sent a signal out to future proliferators that here is a very good way of slowing the response of the international community.” Acton did concede that fully resolving the Iran crisis would ultimately demand a better understanding of that nation’s motives.  However, he said, intentions are best explored between nations behind closed doors, using quiet diplomacy.  Such endeavors should be carried out independently of more automatic punishments for safeguard agreement violations, he said. A graduated set of punishments for infractions, Acton said, would likely prove most effective as a deterrent to future proliferators.  He acknowledged that the approach might not offer much hope of persuading a nation that has already violated the rules to change its behavior. Back to top       CTR Program Destroys Final Russian SS-24 Missile The U.S.-funded Cooperative Threat Reduction program has completed the destruction of Russia’s SS-24 intercontinental ballistic missiles, U.S. Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) announced yesterday (see GSN, March 24, 2006). Russia’s SS-24 fleet originally consisted of 14 silo-based ICBMs and 42 missiles that could be fired from rail-based mobile platforms.  The SS-24 had a range of 6,200 miles and each could deliver 10 nuclear warheads to individual targets. A ceremony yesterday marked the destruction of the final SS-24 missile in Perm, Russia, where Lugar announced in August 2003 that the CTR program would begin eliminating the rail-based missiles.  They were transferred from storage railcars into temperature-controlled railcars, and then moved to a disposal facility where their fuel was burned out and the weapons were disassembled. The destroyed missiles will count toward Russia’s nuclear arsenal reduction commitments under the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. The disposal site is expected to continue eliminating SS-25 ICBMs, which can be launched from truck-based platforms (Lugar release, April 9). Back to top       Six Nations Meet on North Korean Nuclear Stalemate Delegates from the countries participating in a six-party North Korean denuclearization deal discussed possible means to resolve an impasse over the agreement’s implementation in a string of meetings conducted in Beijing yesterday, Agence France-Presse reported (see GSN, April 9). North Korea says that it declared all of its nuclear activities last November as the deal requires, but Washington has pressured Pyongyang to report on the suspected existence of a North Korean uranium enrichment program and past nuclear assistance to Syria.  Pyongyang, meanwhile, has accused the United States of stalling in providing promised incentives. "[U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill] is meeting today with his counterparts from the Japanese and South Korean six-party talks delegations and the Russian embassy and he will be meeting with his Chinese counterpart Wu Dawei," to discuss the stalemate over the deal, U.S. Embassy spokeswoman Susan Stevenson said yesterday. China said that Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei would hold separate talks with the five nations, and Wu was seen entering discussions yesterday with North Korean nuclear negotiator Kim Kye Gwan (Agence France-Presse I/Google News, April 9). Meanwhile, the senior adviser to New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson departed for Pyongyang yesterday to attend discussions on North Korea’s nuclear program at the invitation of the Stalinist state. “Dr. [K.A.] Namkung travels to North Korea at a critical junction, as the U.S. government has announced progress toward disabling the DPRK's nuclear facility,” Richardson said.  Namkung left together with other U.S. experts on Asian relations, according to a statement released by the governor’s office (Agence France-Presse II/Google News, April 9). In Tokyo, Japan’s ruling political party today backed a six-month extension of independent sanctions on North Korea, referring to the slowdown in North Korea’s nuclear disarmament, Kyodo News reported. Japan banned North Korean ships from its ports and all North Korean imports following Pyongyang’s nuclear bomb test in October 2006.  Japanese cabinet ministers are expected to formally approve extension of the penalties tomorrow (Kyodo News/BreitBart, April 10). Back to top       Iran Plans New Uranium Ore Processing Site Iran yesterday announced plans to open a new facility for processing uranium ore into yellowcake, the first step in a uranium enrichment process that the United States suspects Tehran of pursuing to develop a key nuclear weapon ingredient, the Associated Press reported (see GSN, April 9). The new yellowcake production plant at Ardakan in Central Iran is expected to begin operating before the Iranian calendar year ends on March 20, 2009, said Hossein Faghihian, deputy chief of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization.  The site would be able to produce up to 70 tons of uranium ore concentrate each year, he added. “With the inauguration of the facility, the country’s needs for uranium ore concentrate will be met,” Iranian state media quoted Faghihian as saying. Iran enriches yellowcake into uranium hexafluoride at its Isfahan uranium conversion plant, and the resulting gas is placed into enrichment centrifuges at its Natanz facility.  Iran says the uranium would only be enriched to the low level necessary for nuclear power plant fuel, but U.S. and Western officials have expressed concerned that Iran could generate highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. Iran currently produces an undisclosed amount of yellowcake at its Bandar Abbas plant on Iran’s southern coast, but it is expected that the new plant would have a higher production capacity (Ali Akbar Dareini, Associated Press/Google News, April 9). Meanwhile, proliferation analysts have said it would take at least four months for Iran to triple the number of centrifuges at its Natanz facility, the Los Angeles Times reported yesterday. On Tuesday, Iran announced plans to place 6,000 new centrifuges at Natanz for a total of about 9,000 machines (see GSN, April 8).  Tehran intends to ultimately run 50,000 centrifuges at the site (see GSN, April 18, 2007). According to experts, Iran could produce enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon in four months if it ran 9,000 centrifuges at maximum efficiency.  However, the Pakistani P-1 centrifuge model that Iran’s enrichment program largely depends on remains marred by technical glitches, according to one expert. “The question is whether the P-1 they’re building is better than the P-1 they’ve got already,” said David Albright, head of the Institute for Science and International Security.  “It hasn’t worked well.  It’s pitiful how poorly it’s performed.” Iran is currently developing the IR-2, a more efficient centrifuge based on a more advanced Pakistani design purportedly obtained through the nuclear smuggling ring once run by former top Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan (see related GSN story, today). “They’re much better machines,” Albright said of the IR-2 centrifuges.  “They both work better if you know what you’re doing, and they’re easier to make.” However, the IR-2 technology remains generations behind current centrifuges developed by Western powers, according to nuclear analysts. The International Atomic Energy Agency continues to send officials to monitor the Natanz enrichment facility, and the U.N. nuclear watchdog is expected to report on new developments at the site during its May governing board meeting (Mostaghim/Daragahi, Los Angeles Times, April 9). Back to top       Pakistani PM to Receive Khan Release Plan Senior Pakistani officials decided Tuesday to send the country’s prime minister a plan to release former top Pakistani nuclear scientist and proliferator Abdul Qadeer Khan from house arrest, Asian News International reported (see GSN, April 8). Pakistani Prime Minister Makhdoom Yousuf Raza Gillani would receive an outline of a plan for Khan’s release and protection, according to sources close to Rehman Malik, Gilliani’s interior and narcotics control adviser.  A date for Khan’s proposed release has not yet been determined. Khan has been confined to his Islamabad home since confessing to providing nuclear knowledge and technology to Iran, Libya and North Korea.  Pakistan’s government has denied all international requests to question the scientist about his nuclear smuggling activities. Khan told an independent television station on Tuesday that he is convinced the government would continue to prevent the International Atomic Energy Agency from speaking with him, and he expects the Pakistani military to provide him with protection. “The concept of my detention as a security measure is totally wrong,” he said.  “I want freedom and to live a normal life with my family.” Khan added that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons arsenal is completely secure (see GSN, April 9; Asian News International/New Kerala, April 9). Back to top       Vanunu Sustains Push for Political Asylum Israeli nuclear whistleblower Mordechai Vanunu continues to seek asylum outside of Israel, particularly in Norway, Agence France-Presse reported yesterday (see GSN, April 18, 2005). The former nuclear technician was jailed for 18 years after leaking what he said were details of Israeli nuclear-weapon activities.  Released in 2004, he applied for asylum in Norway but was rejected by officials citing technical reasons. “Nobody can obtain asylum in Norway without making their request in Norway itself,” Erna Solberg, then the nation’s minister for local and regional affairs, said at the time.  Israel has so far denied Vanunu the freedom to the leave the country. Still, he would move to Norway if he could. “I hope that my request is still valid and under review,” he said.  “If Norway wants me to re-apply, I will (Agence France-Presse/Google News, April 9). Back to top

Experts Pitch CW Disarmament, Nonproliferation Plans By Chris Schneidmiller Global Security Newswire THE HAGUE — Experts who have been listening to diplomats speak for several days had their opportunity yesterday to point the way toward improved chemical weapons destruction and nonproliferation regimes (see GSN, April 3). At their essence, the recommendations often came down to “more”:  more money for chemical weapons destruction, increased pressure and assistance to move a dozen nations toward Chemical Weapons Convention membership, greater attention to certain industry facilities that could be used to produce toxic agents. Representatives from at least 20 national delegations to the second review conference for the treaty attended the nongovernmental discussion forum at the headquarters of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.  Today they joined dozens of other diplomats in closed-door negotiations on a document intended to address challenges to the treaty that must be met in coming years. “All the issues there were pertinent and no doubt will be discussed” as the conference continues through April 18, said Jamaican Ambassador Joy Wheeler. Many of the issues raised yesterday had been noted regularly in 2 1/2 days of opening statements to the conference, beginning with treaty universality (see GSN, April 8). There are now 183 treaty states, leaving it 12 nations short of full membership.  Universality would further strengthen the norm against chemical weapons use, help the treaty become an accepted component of international law, and prevent nations from becoming safe havens for terrorists or proliferators, said Daniel Feakes, a research fellow at the Harvard Sussex Program. Eight nontreaty states have no political objections to the pact and could be brought on board with the right mixture of pressure and support — from potential trade restrictions on some chemicals to increased programs of economic and technical support and protection against chemical weapons for treaty states, Feakes said. That would further isolate those nations politically opposed to the convention — North Korea, Egypt, Israel and Syria, all of which are suspected of maintaining chemical weapons or weapons capabilities. Pyongyang has given no indication of interest in joining the treaty.  However, it could be influenced by South Korea’s own chemical disarmament program and an extended, secret diplomatic effort akin to the one that brought Libya into the convention as a possessor state, said Feakes. The Middle East is particularly worrisome, due to ongoing tensions, the past use of chemical weapons and suspicions that they are still held today, he said. “It can be argued that the CWC is needed more in the Middle East than anywhere else,” he said.  “The region is the one most likely to witness a renewed use of deadly weapons.” Increased political engagement is also needed in the Middle East, where the issue of CWC membership must be disconnected from that of Israel’s nuclear arsenal, said Feakes. Nongovernmental organizations could contribute to these efforts by organizing universality campaigns using awareness-raising and outreach skills not necessarily found in government, he said. Chemical Weapons Destruction Funding is the key to ensuring the prompt destruction of declared chemical weapons in the world’s major possessor states — Russia and the United States, said Paul Walker, head of the Legacy Program at the environmental organization Global Green USA. Albania has already eliminated its stockpile of 16 tons of mustard agent, while India and another “state party” generally known to be South Korea have both destroyed more than 95 percent of their arsenals.  Libya has not begun weapons destruction but has only 23 metric tons of mustard agent. The United States has incinerated or chemically neutralized more than 50 percent of roughly 28,000 metric tons of warfare agents, while Russia has neutralized between 15 and 26 percent of its 40,000-metric-ton stockpile, Walker said.  Both countries presently appear likely to miss their April 2012 destruction deadline, a schedule that Washington has acknowledged and Moscow has denied (see GSN, April 8). In order to move closer to the deadline, the United States should be spending at least $400 million annually on construction of the last two disposal sites at Blue Grass, Ky., and Pueblo, Colo., Walker said (see GSN, Feb. 5). Russia should spend $1 billion annually on destruction, supplemented by at least $50 million in renewed yearly funding from the United States for completion of the Shchuchye weapons disposal plant.  Washington has directed $1 billion toward the facility but the Bush administration has requested no money in the last two years. Another $100 million or more is needed each year for chemical weapons destruction under the G-8 Global Partnership against the Proliferation of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, Walker said. “Everyone has to focus on money.  I can’t emphasize this enough,” he said. National Implementation Continued focus is also needed on ensuring that treaty states have the required internal measures in place and that those measures adequately address key components of the convention, said Angela Woodward, executive director of the Verification Research, Training and Information Center. “Such measures are essential in order to exclude completely the use of chemical weapons,” she said.  “States cannot simply rely on existing measures to give effect to the treaty, due to the specific requirements for penal law, [materials] transfer controls and measures to facilitate the verification regime.” Since enactment of an action plan at the 2003 treaty review conference, the percentage of member nations with laws in place fully covering the crucial components of the treaty’s rules has increased to more than 40 percent. Woodward said nations must be sure to implement laws and regulations that incorporate the treaty’s “general purpose criterion,” which mandates that the many toxic materials not listed in three schedules of chemicals still fall under the prohibitions against development, production, stockpiling, transfer or use of chemical weapons.  An awareness and outreach program is needed to ensure this occurs, she said. National implementation must be seen as a process — requiring periodic reviews and updates of legislation, along with monitoring and enforcement — rather than a project that ends when the regulations are enacted, Woodward said.  Other Chemical Production Facilities There have been more than 500 inspections over the last eight years of “other chemical weapons facilities,” the thousands of industry plants spread across the globe that do not produce materials listed under three chemical categories in the treaty.  Up to 15 percent of these plants could be converted quickly for production of chemical warfare agents. “The same processes used in industry … are used in making chemical agents,” said Bob Mathews, a law professor at the University of Melbourne. Inspections have covered 11 percent of these facilities, however the percentage is less than 1 percent in some member states and not all sites were relevant to the treaty, Mathews said.  He noted that the OPCW Technical Secretariat has determined that “the level of OCPF inspections still does not provide adequate nonproliferation assurances.” Mathews offered several recommendations for improving the inspection regime for these facilities.  Nations should provide more information on the plants, including the production processes used, to help determine which could pose threats to chemical nonproliferation.  More funding is needed for OPCW inspections and the selection methodology should be updated to ensure it targets “high risk” sites while spreading inspections fairly among nations.  He also called for training of inspectors and greater awareness for delegates to the agency. Incapacitants The U.S.-based Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation yesterday called for delegates to the review conference to take several steps to address the potential use of incapacitating agents by law enforcement agencies. The convention allows for law enforcement uses of tear gas and other riot control agents that “produce rapidly in humans sensory irritation or disabling physical effects which disappear within a short time following termination of exposure.” There is interest today in “various communities” for anesthetic forms of incapacitants — “chemicals used under such conditions that they produce temporary physiological and/or mental effects which render individuals incapable of concerted effort … with very low lethality and permanent damage,” said Mark Wheelis, chairman of the center’s Scientists’ Working Group on Biological and Chemical Weapons.  He said that such substances must be considered toxic materials. Incapacitants cannot be considered strictly nonlethal, Wheelis said.  The safety margin between an effective dose and a lethal dose is small, and susceptibility ranges widely based on factors such as age, size and health, he said.  Unlike tear gas, which provokes flight upon contact, a person exposed to an incapacitant is likely to remain in place, increasing the dose received. “A chemical compound that deserves the term incapacitant in a carefully controlled clinical or laboratory setting may well not deserve that term in field use,” he said. Wheelis called on the review conference to consider creating a mechanism for determining under which conditions a toxic chemical could be legally used by law enforcement and what materials could be used for incapacitating purposes.  The conference and member nations should consider a number of transparency measures, including requiring treaty states to declare any chemical compounds held for law enforcement purposes, he said. Several delegates to the conference have called for discussion of nonlethal materials.  However, OPCW chief Rogelio Pfirter has said there is not enough technical information available to allow for a measured debate on the issue. Back to top

U.S. Lawmaker Seeks to Limit Funds for U.S. Missile Defenses in Europe Until Host Nations Agree By Megan Scully CongressDaily WASHINGTON — As the Bush administration nears a formal agreement with the Czech Republic on the U.S. military’s European missile defense plans, a key House lawmaker said Wednesday that she would again seek to restrict funding for the effort unless Poland gives the green light to the plans (see GSN, April 9). During a brief interview, House Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee Chairwoman Ellen Tauscher (D-Calif.) said she does not want to commit the next administration to fielding missile defenses in Europe unless both countries central to the plans formally agree to host them. Tauscher, whose subcommittee will mark up its portion of the fiscal 2009 defense authorization bill in the next several weeks, succeeded last year in attaching language to the annual measure that prohibited funding to build or activate European missile defense sites until the countries give their formal approval (see GSN, Dec. 12, 2007).  The Defense Department has been able to use fiscal 2008 funds to buy 10 missile interceptors, however. “Unless both are ratified, then this is still an issue that is not resolved,” Tauscher said.  “I think it’s safe to say that if nothing has changed, then there is no reason for Congress to change its opinion, either,” she added. The administration has been working to build international support for its plans to build an early-missile warning radar site in the Czech Republic and erect a launch site for missile interceptors in Poland. On Wednesday, U.S. and Czech negotiators began another round of talks on the radar site in the hope of wrapping up discussions soon.  If all goes as expected, Secretary of State Rice would travel to the country next month to sign an agreement allowing the United States to build the radar site near Prague (see related GSN story, today). But talks with Poland, which wants any agreement with the United States to include military aid, are moving more slowly. “I know that they [the administration and Poland] are in significant negotiations,” Tauscher said.  “I know that there are a lot of intergovernment conversations, but these have to be ratified.” House Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee ranking member Terry Everett (R-Ala.) said he would likely agree to continue the types of restrictions outlined in last year’s bill.  But he also said he may try to tweak the language. Tauscher last year criticized the administration’s efforts to build a long-range missile defense system in Europe and has stressed the need to work with NATO to incorporate defenses against any short- and medium-range ballistic missiles that pose a potential threat to the continent from Iran. Earlier this month, she applauded the decision by NATO leaders during a conference in Bucharest to assert their commitment to an alliance-wide antimissile shield that would protect against a wide range of ballistic missiles. “I’m encouraged to hear NATO leaders, including President Bush, formally recognize the need for a comprehensive NATO effort to better protect the U.S., our service men and women abroad and our allies against a growing missile threat,” Tauscher said on April 3. Russia, meanwhile, continues to oppose U.S. plans to build missile defenses in Europe, citing security concerns.  Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin emerged from a meeting last weekend still divided over the missile defense issue.  Putin remarked after the meeting that he would be open to a global missile defense system built by the United States, Russia and European countries. “This is the first time I’ve heard Putin step forward and say he would be interested in this common defense shield strategy,” Tauscher said.  “That’s good news.” Back to top       Canada Updated on Missile Threats, General Says The United States continues to update Canada on missile threats although Ottawa opted out of the U.S. missile defense system three years ago, the U.S. commander of the North American Aerospace Defense Command said yesterday (see GSN, March 29, 2006). “The Canadian deputy commander sits at my side and has full access to information.  He would not be frozen out,” said Gen. Victor Renuart, U.S. head of the joint military command center based in Colorado. The United States did not request Canada to fund the shield if it joined the system, and no ground-based missile interceptors were planned for deployment in Canadian territory, the CanWest News Service reported. Renuart said that missile interceptors in Alaska and other missile defense measures currently exist to protect the United States.  It is uncertain whether the system would be used to defend Canada from a missile attack. “In terms of air defense, it is a totally transparent process.  In terms of missile defense, decisions that we make are to defend the United States, assuming we are targeted,” Renuart said. “I certainly would be comfortable with both nations participating.  I’m not uncomfortable as Canada works through their own debate within the country.  For me, we stay focused on the mission that we have,” he said (Mike Blanchfield, CanWest News Service/Calgary Herald, April 10).   Back to top

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