Led by Director Gen. Michael Hayden, shown in February, the CIA presented evidence yesterday that Syria was building a nuclear reactor, a charge Syrian officials have denied (Saul Loeb/Getty Images). Syrian Reactor Was Not Peaceful, White House Says Syria was within weeks or months of finishing a nuclear reactor that had no peaceful applications before Israel destroyed the facility last September, senior U.S. intelligence officials told Congress yesterday (see GSN, April 24). In a series of briefings to congressional committees, Bush administration officials said North Korea began advising Syria on the nuclear project as early as 1997 and construction began in 2001.  ..Full Story

CWC States Press Membership Drive By Chris Schneidmiller Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — Members of the Chemical Weapons Convention this month threw down something of a challenge to the dozen nations that have yet to join the international disarmament and nonproliferation treaty (see GSN, April 11)...Full Story

North Korean Talks to Continue Following Release of Syria Nuclear Intelligence, White House Says The U.S. release of intelligence linking North Korea to a Syrian nuclear reactor would not halt the multilateral effort to shut down Pyongyang’s atomic program, the White House said yesterday (see GSN, April 24)...Full Story

	Friday, April 25, 2008

Syrian Reactor Was Not Peaceful, White House Says Syria was within weeks or months of finishing a nuclear reactor that had no peaceful applications before Israel destroyed the facility last September, senior U.S. intelligence officials told Congress yesterday (see GSN, April 24). In a series of briefings to congressional committees, Bush administration officials said North Korea began advising Syria on the nuclear project as early as 1997 and construction began in 2001.  Israel acquired more definitive intelligence a year ago and destroyed the facility in a Sept. 6 air raid. “It was nearing operational capability,” said one of the senior intelligence officials who briefed reporters yesterday (Robin Wright, Washington Post, April 25). The timing of yesterday’s disclosure was intended to press Syria to admit its nuclear ambitions and to pressure North Korea to adhere to its denuclearization obligations as laid out in a six-nation deal agreed last year, according to U.S. officials (see related GSN story, today). In addition, officials feared that an earlier release of the information could spur violence between Israel and Syria, the Washington Times reported. “Our first concern was to prevent conflict and broader confrontation in the Middle East,” said one of the senior intelligence officials.  “Syria would feel great pressure to retaliate,” the official said, but “as time has passed, that assessment has receded” (Gertz/Carter, Washington Times, April 25). Among other data shared with lawmakers was a video showing images taken from inside the Syrian facility that analysts said was clearly a gas-cooled, graphite-moderated reactor, the same type that North Korea has used to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons (Wright, Washington Post). “We are convinced, based on a variety of information, that North Korea assisted Syria’s covert nuclear activities,” White House spokeswoman Dana Perino said yesterday.  “We have good reason to believe that reactor … was not intended for peaceful purposes” (White House release, April 24). Bolstering this view was the absence of electrical generation equipment and the overall secrecy of the project, the Post reported.  Still, the intelligence officials acknowledged that the site lacked facilities that would logically accompany a nuclear weapons site, such as a reprocessing plant to separate plutonium from the reactor’s spent fuel. The incomplete nature of the site contributed to intelligence agencies assigning only “low confidence” to the idea that Syria was seeking nuclear weapons, the officials said. One nonproliferation expert agreed with that cautionary stance. The evidence that the site was a reactor was “compelling,” said David Albright, head of the Institute for Science and International Security.  “But the lack of other facilities, such as [a] plutonium separation plant, has to give pause before accusing Syria of having an active nuclear weapons program.” The acquisition of additional intelligence was hampered by Syria using a controlled demolition to raze the site one month after the Israeli attack, the officials said. That attack was conducted with U.S. foreknowledge, but not its approval, according to a senior administration official. “Israel made the decision to attack,” the official said.  “It did so without any so-called green light from us.  None was asked for and none was given” (Hess/Riechmann, Associated Press/International Herald Tribune, April 25). North Korea has suspended its nuclear cooperation with Syria, said Christopher Hill, the State Department official leading the U.S. delegation to the six-nation talks on North Korean denuclearization. “It is the judgment of the United States that there is not an ongoing cooperation with Syria in this area,” Hill said.  “We will deal with this issue as we do with many other issues in the six parties” (Agence France-Presse/Spacewar.com, April 25). Meanwhile, top U.N. nuclear official Mohamed ElBaradei complained today that his International Atomic Energy Agency only yesterday received the U.S. information on the alleged Syrian reactor.  He also criticized the Israeli attack. “The director general deplores the fact that this information was not provided to the agency in a timely manner,” the agency said in a statement. “The agency will treat this information with the seriousness it deserves and will investigate the veracity of the information. Syria has an obligation under its safeguards agreement with the IAEA to report the planning and construction of any nuclear facility to the agency. “The director general views the unilateral use of force by Israel as undermining the due process of verification that is at the heart of the nonproliferation regime,” the release says (International Atomic Energy Agency release, April 25). Back to top       North Korean Talks to Continue Following Release of Syria Nuclear Intelligence, White House Says The U.S. release of intelligence linking North Korea to a Syrian nuclear reactor would not halt the multilateral effort to shut down Pyongyang’s atomic program, the White House said yesterday (see GSN, April 24). “We have long been seriously concerned about North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and its proliferation activities.  North Korea’s clandestine nuclear cooperation with Syria is a dangerous manifestation of those activities,” said a White House statement (see related GSN story, today). “One way we have chosen to deal with this problem is through the six-party framework,” the statement said of the negotiations involving China, Japan, Russia, the United States and both Koreas.  “The United States is … committed to ensuring that North Korea does not further engage in proliferation activities.  We will work with our partners to establish in the six-party framework a rigorous verification mechanism to ensure that such conduct and other nuclear activities have ceased” (White House release, April 24). Observers offered varying opinions on the effect the Syria findings would have on the denuclearization process. The Syrian facility was destroyed in a September Israeli air strike but lawmakers did not see the U.S. information until yesterday, Agence France-Presse reported.  That delay “puts in jeopardy the process that the administration has used what may or may not come out of the six-party talks,” said House Intelligence Committee ranking Republican Peter Hoekstra (Mich.) (P. Parameswaran, Agence France-Presse I/Yahoo!News, April 24). The five nations have offered Pyongyang a variety of benefits for giving up its nuclear program.  A 2007 agreement on denuclearization has been stalled by North Korea’s apparent unwillingness to provide a mandatory full declaration of its atomic activities.  Under a recent compromise proposal, the Stalinist state would detail its plutonium program — believed to have produced enough material for several nuclear weapons — while simply acknowledging U.S. suspicions regarding uranium enrichment and support for Syria. One expert said Pyongyang might squelch the deal rather than abide the high level of verification that would now be required to ensure it is meeting its obligations, AFP reported. “I suspect what will happen is [the Bush administration] will hold the North Koreans to a very high verification standard because they realize what a hard sell this is to Congress and that the North Koreans probably won’t be able to,” said Michael Green, an Asia specialist who served in the Bush administration. “If North Korea supported Syria’s nuclear activities, it would be a big problem,” said Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Nobutaka Machimura. However, South Korean Ambassador to the United States Lee Tae-sik said “this is not a thing that will derail or subvert the six-party talks (Agence France-Presse II/Spacewar.com, April 25). Meanwhile, 14 Republican senators sent a letter to President George W. Bush on Wednesday objecting to the state of the six-party talks, the Washington Times reported. “From all appearances, [North Korean leader] Kim Jong Il believes that the United States will take whatever deal we can get, allowing him to dictate the time, place, manner and content of the fulfillment of his promises,” the letter says. At least one congressional source, through, said it is important to keep the focus on Pyongyang’s plutonium program. “What’s important is to achieve removal of North Korea’s plutonium program,” the source said.  “That might require some sacrifices” (Nicholas Kralev, Washington Times, April 25). Back to top       IAEA Official to Return to Iran Next Week The International Atomic Energy Agency’s safeguards chief is expected back in Tehran on Monday to follow up on his talks this week over allegations of past Iranian nuclear weapon design research, Agence France-Presse reported (see GSN, April 24). The United States and other Western powers have provided intelligence to the U.N. nuclear watchdog that they consider evidence of a possible Iranian nuclear weapons development program (see GSN, Feb. 26).  Iran maintains that its nuclear work has always been aimed strictly at developing civilian nuclear power capabilities. “Olli Heinonen is coming to Tehran on Monday heading a technical delegation for a continuation of the talks whose first round took place last Monday and Tuesday,” a knowledgeable source told Iranian state media. The source said the talks are expected to address “bilateral cooperation, the June report of the IAEA on Iran and how to solve the differences of opinion between Iran and the IAEA on the alleged [nuclear weapon] studies” (Agence France-Presse/Google News, April 25). Meanwhile, one Iranian official on Wednesday called on Russia to clear a shipment of equipment for delivery to Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power plant, Reuters reported. “The issue of stopping a shipment of equipment for Bushehr power plant on the way to Iran is a matter for the Russian contractor,” the Iranian Students News Agency quoted the official as saying. The official added that guaranteeing the “transfer of equipment in the specified timetable” was also the responsibility of Atomstroiexport, the state-run Russian contractor building the Bushehr plant Azerbaijani customs officials halted the shipment late last month on grounds that its delivery could violate U.N. Security Council sanctions imposed on Iran over its disputed atomic activities (Reuters, April 23). “There are certain U.N. Security Council resolutions against Iran in place, and we want to know whether the cargo complies with the resolutions.  Which is why we requested that the Russian side specify the content of the cargo,” said Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry representative Khazar Ibragim. Atomstroiexport said Tuesday that Azerbaijan had not requested additional details on the shipment, RIA Novosti reported.  The Russian firm first announced the stalled delivery of heat insulation equipment on Monday. “We have been prepared to provide explanations on the cargo for the past 25 days since the freight was stopped on the Azerbaijani-Iranian border, but Azerbaijan has not made any official inquiries,” said an Atomstroiexport representative. The spokesperson said that the delivery contained nothing banned under the sanctions such as nuclear material or “dual-use” equipment that could contribute to a nuclear weapons program.  “The shipment was registered in line with all accepted international practical regulations,” the representative said.  “The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran has been informed about the halt in the delivery, needed to complete the construction of the Bushehr plant, by the Azerbaijani side without any explanation.” Ibragim indicated that his nation had sought information from Moscow regarding the cargo (RIA Novosti, April 22). Back to top       U.S., Russia Convert 10 Tons of Weapon-Grade Uranium The United States and Russia have converted 10 metric tons of highly enriched Russian uranium to low-enriched nuclear reactor fuel, the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration announced yesterday (see GSN, July 14, 2006). The U.S.-Russian Material Consolidation and Conversion program effort has eliminated the proliferation risk posed by the original material, which could have been used in 400 nuclear weapons, according to an NNSA release. “This important milestone highlights progress in U.S.-Russian nonproliferation cooperation,” said NNSA Deputy Administrator William Tobey in a press release.  “Our efforts to convert this material have successfully reduced the supply of dangerous nuclear material, while our consolidation efforts have decreased the cost of securing the material.” The U.S.-Russian effort targets stockpiles of highly enriched uranium not used in weapons.  The countries this year observed the 15th anniversary of the HEU Purchase Agreement, an arrangement allowing U.S. power companies to purchase low-enriched uranium produced from weapon-usable material (U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration release, April 24). Back to top       China Sends Ballistic Missile Submarine to New Base Commercial satellite images have revealed a Chinese ballistic missile submarine docked outside the entrance to an underground complex at an island on the South China Sea, the Federation of American Scientists said yesterday (see GSN, March 3). The design of the submarine at Hainan Island suggests it is a Type 094 Jin-class ballistic missile submarine, similar in construction to a submarine the U.S. organization found in satellite imagery of China’s Xiaopingdao submarine base in July 2007 and two it found at China’s Bohai shipyard last October (see GSN, July 6, 2007; GSN, Oct. 5, 2007). According to U.S. estimates, China is operating two Jin-class submarines and building a third.  Washington believes that China might seek to build as many as five Jin-class submarines if Beijing ultimately intends to maintain a deterrent force of submarines armed with nuclear-tipped missiles (see GSN, Feb. 25). The United States is likely to interpret the new base as a sign that Beijing aims to establish a permanent sea-based nuclear deterrent, although China has limited experience in conducting such a mission, the federation said.  The arrival of the submarine at the base could also spur India to continue its efforts to develop a ballistic missile submarine fleet, the organization said. The Chinese facility appeared to include at least 12 tunnel entryways as well as a station for demagnetizing submarines to make them harder for sea-based weaponry to detect, the group noted (Hans Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, April 24). Back to top       U.S. Support for Indian Nuclear Trade Deal Should Remain After Bush Leaves Office, Official Says Support for a pending U.S.-Indian civilian nuclear trade deal is unlikely to flag when the next president enters the White House in January 2009, Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher said Wednesday (see GSN, April 22). When asked how the deal would fare under any of the three remaining presidential contenders — Senators Hillary Clinton (D-N.Y.), John McCain (R-Ariz.) or Barack Obama (D-Ill.) — Boucher replied, “I don’t know.”  However, he noted that all three candidates have expressed “strong support” for U.S.-Indian ties that include nuclear cooperation.  The deal would make U.S. nuclear fuel and technology available to India, which in turn would open its civilian nuclear facilities to international supervision. Boucher, a veteran of Democratic and Republican administrations, said the agreement enjoys strong bipartisan support as evidenced by landslide congressional votes for the U.S. Hyde Act, a law passed in support of the agreement. An incoming presidential administration is likely to at least delay the pact’s implementation, Boucher noted. “Every day that goes by makes it harder,” he said, referring to a warning by U.S. Senator Joseph Biden (D-Del.) that the deal would probably not be approved in the United States by July if India cannot overcome a political deadlock over the agreement before the end of June (see GSN, Feb. 21; Arun Kumar, Indo-Asian News Service/New Kerala, April 24). Back to top       NPT Nations to Begin Annual Meeting Nations party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty plan to open a two-week meeting Monday in Geneva to prepare for the treaty’s next review conference in 2010, the International Atomic Energy Agency announced today.  A similar meeting last year ended without agreeing to a final statement (see GSN, May 14, 2007). The session, to be chaired by Ukrainian Ambassador Volodymyr Yel’chencko, is the second of three preparatory meetings. The U.N. nuclear agency is calling on meeting participants to urge more NPT nations to adopt full nuclear inspections agreements with the agency. “Since this time last year, comprehensive safeguards agreements entered into force for two states. However, there still remain 30 NPT states without safeguards agreements in force," Vilmos Cserveny, director of the IAEA External Relations and Policy Coordination Office, said in a press release.  “The IAEA once again urges the 30 NPT states parties that have still to conclude and bring into force their required safeguards agreements to do so without further delay, and recommends that every effort be made to accomplish this objective prior to the opening of the 2010 NPT Review Conference” (International Atomic Energy Agency release, April 25). Back to top

CWC States Press Membership Drive By Chris Schneidmiller Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — Members of the Chemical Weapons Convention this month threw down something of a challenge to the dozen nations that have yet to join the international disarmament and nonproliferation treaty (see GSN, April 11). Diplomats spent two weeks producing a report that reviews the operations of the treaty and addresses developing issues in its implementation.  The 32-page final version, approved early Saturday morning, urges the final 12 holdouts to joint the pact “as a matter of urgency and without preconditions.” It then names those countries:   Angola, the Bahamas, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Myanmar, North Korea, Somalia and Syria. “No one will have to guess who they are,” said Rogelio Pfirter, director general at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the verification body for the treaty. Nations considered treaty universality in 2003 at the first review conference for the convention but did not identify the outsider states in their final report.  “While this wasn’t done at RC-1 it might have more to do with there being only 12 non-states parties left now compared with over 40 in 2003,” Daniel Feakes, a research fellow at the Harvard Sussex Program, said by e-mail.  “However, it could be a useful hook to pressure the 12 holdouts, although it would need to be brought to their attention first.” Guinea-Bissau, Iraq and Lebanon appear on the cusp of joining the convention, according to the conference report, whose authors called for “full use of all available opportunities and resources” to increase membership. A total of 114 of the 183 treaty states participated in the second review conference in The Hague, where much of the business occurred in closed meetings as delegates sought to turn a draft document prepared before the meeting into a final statement.  As negotiating sessions lengthened and the end of the meeting approached it came down to a select group of about 20 nations to hammer out much of the report.  Negotiations were punctuated by a nearly 24-hour burst of activity at the end of the meeting, according to chemical weapons expert Richard Guthrie. Pfirter called the resulting report, released publicly on Wednesday, a strong affirmation of the principles and objectives of the convention and of the obligations of its members to prevent the development, production, stockpiling or use of materials such as mustard gas and the nerve agents sarin and VX. In the wide-ranging document that addressed many of the issues facing the treaty regime, diplomats noted destruction of nearly 40 percent of the world’s known chemical weapons and emphasized the importance of maintaining disposal campaigns on schedule; recognized the OPCW verification system that has conducted more than 3,000 inspections at weapons and industry sites; urged all member nations to enact legislation and other mandatory treaty implementation measures; and warned of the threat posed by use the of chemical weapons by nonstate actors. “I think that given the fact that it represents a consensus of 183 countries … it is a success, it is a significant success,” Pfirter said in an interview with Global Security Newswire. Observers, though, said that nearly two years of preparations followed by the two-week meeting produced a document that was not as strong as they had hoped. “It’s certainly weaker in parts than many people would have liked,” Guthrie, who filed daily reports from the conference, told GSN.  “The surprising one is that it’s even weaker on some of the demands for destruction than I would have expected.” Chemical weapons stockpiles are still held by treaty states India, Libya, Russia, the United States and an officially unidentified nation known to be South Korea (see GSN, April 8).  China is also home to hundreds of thousands of munitions abandoned by Japan after World War II (see GSN, April 24). The flip side of eliminating nearly 40 percent of the declared global stocks of chemical weapons is the 60 percent that remains, the conference acknowledged.  It reaffirmed the importance of destruction of weapons and weapons production sites and urged possessor states to meet disposal deadlines that were extended in 2006 (see GSN, Dec. 11, 2006). Guthrie argued that firmer language could have put more pressure on the possessor states but also potentially benefited them.  For example, U.S. officials could have used a tougher document as a basis for seeking additional funding to accelerate destruction of the U.S. arsenal, he said. While the language on destruction could have been stronger, Feakes said, it was more firm than what was seen in the 2003 report.  The issue also received higher standing, “a small point but perhaps indicative of its increasing importance,” he said. There has been talk of conducting a special meeting closer to the treaty’s final destruction deadline of 2012 to decide how to deal with the anticipated schedule violations by Russia and the United States.  The problems that arose at this session could reduce interest in following through on the idea, said Cheryl Vos, a research associate at the Federation of American Scientists.  “I think it also decreases the likelihood of something productive emerging from such a meeting,” she said by e-mail. Vos and Feakes, who both attended the first week of the conference, said the review conference statement does not significantly address some unfolding technical issues — developments in science and technology that could produce new threats to the regime and the increasing focus on industry verification as national stockpiles are eliminated. The language regarding science and technology actually represents a step back from what was included in the 2003 document and in the draft version of this year’s report, Feakes said.  The final 2008 statement “notes the impact” of development in these sectors but does not address new chemicals, he said.  There is also no discussion of how advances in biology and nanotechnology might pertain to the convention, Vos said. As expected, the report includes no language regarding concerns about development of new incapacitating agents (see GSN, June 11, 2007).  Pfirter has said that more research is needed before treaty states can reasonably consider the issue. The conference did call for two meetings each year of the OPCW Scientific Advisory Board, which provides guidance on technical issues and to date has met annually.  That “at least will facilitate further study … on issues it receives,” Vos said. Conference participants did not produce much language on the different expertise needed at the agency as it becomes largely a nonproliferation monitor ensuring that industry sites are not diverted for weapons production, Vos said.  However, they took a harder look at verification of the thousands of “other chemical production facilities,” some of which could be converted quickly to produce weapons materials.   Delegates directed Pfirter to consider strategies for determining which sites across the globe are most relevant to the treaty and most in need of inspection.  They ruled out requiring facilities to provide more information about their operations to support such an effort. The document must be considered imperfect but valuable, Guthrie said.  It covers many of the pressing issues surrounding the Chemical Weapons Convention and compromise must be anticipated when more than 100 nations are involved.  The conference is also not the sole forum for consideration of these matters, he said, citing the working group that prepared the draft declaration and various treaty-related events. That delegates were able to reach consensus and produce a statement is an improvement over the results of similar meetings for other nonproliferation treaties, he said (see GSN, Dec. 10, 2001, and May 27, 2005). “It’s not that it’s a missed opportunity, it’s just that there were chances to do more,” Guthrie said.  “I think overall it could have been worse, it could have been far, far worse.” Back to top

U.S., Czech Radar Deal Needs More Time Three days of U.S.-Czech negotiations this week failed to finalize a treaty that would complement a pact to place a missile defense radar in the European nation, the Associated Press reported (see GSN, April 22). The Czech Defense Ministry reported making “considerable progress” in negotiating the second treaty, which would detail how the legal standing of U.S. soldiers at the planned radar site and other technical issues.  The ministry did not announce a planned date for the talks to continue or specify points on which the sides differed. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is expected to sign the primary agreement in the Czech Republic next month (Associated Press/International Herald Tribune, April 24). Back to top

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