Most U.S. nuclear-weapon storage sites in Europe do not meet Defense Department security standards, according to a U.S. Air Force study circulated yesterday by the Federation of American Scientists (see GSN, June 24, 2005). Completed in February, the Blue Ribbon Review has apparently resulted in the Air Force planning to remove nuclear weapons from one of the European bases, according to FAS weapons expert Hans Kristensen. “The main implication of the BRR report is that the nuclear weapons deployment in Europe is, and has been for the past decade, a security risk,” he said. The Air Force review was triggered by last year’s embarrassing security lapse at Minot Air Force, N.D., where crews mistakenly loaded six nuclear-armed cruise missiles aboard a strategic bomber that flew to another air base. Only after more than a day did personnel discover that the weapons had been moved out of their secure storage at Minot (see GSN, Sept. 7, 2007). The lapse resulted in a massive review of nuclear security measures in the United States (see GSN, Jan. 25), a shakeup in Air Force leadership (see GSN, June 9) and the examination of security at European storage sites. “A consistently noted theme throughout the visits,” the review says, “was that most sites require significant additional resources to meet DOD security requirements.” “Host nation security at overseas nuclear-capable units varies from country to country in terms of personnel, facilities, and equipment,” the report says, adding that “inconsistencies in personnel, facilities, and equipment provided to the security mission by the host nation were evident as the team traveled from site to site. … Examples of areas noted in need of repair at several of the sites include support buildings, fencing, lighting, and security systems” (Federation of American Scientists release, June 19). The report as a whole has a generally more positive tone, finding that the Air Force “has a sound nuclear surety program,” but it acknowledges in an understated fashion the need for improvement. “An opportunity to refocus the USAF’s commitment to the nuclear enterprise exists in improving advocacy and realigning priorities,” says the review’s summary. The review team found that nuclear weapons have become a less-important mission for the Air Force since the end of Cold War, leading to diminishing attention by personnel and “waning expertise.” “When the USAF … started doing the nuclear mission as a part-time task, the focus began to erode. This decrease in activity presents challenges to the USAF in the areas of knowledge, skills and abilities as opportunities to gain and maintain experience are diminished,” the report says. “Loss of the historical perspective of the Cold War’s nuclear focus, combined with the now long-term emphasis on conventional operations, has culminated in reduced USAF nuclear mission expertise,” it adds (Greg Webb, Global Security Newswire, June 19). U.S. Nuclear Weapons in EuropeThe United States stores up to 350 B-61 gravity bombs at seven air bases in Europe, only three of which are U.S. air bases, according to an FAS fact sheet. The weapons stored at national bases in Belgium, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands are under U.S. control, but would be released in wartime for delivery by the national air forces. Kristensen said the United States would probably remove the nuclear weapons stored at the Ghedi Torre air base in Italy (FAS release). One European defense official yesterday defended his nation’s protection of the nuclear weapons, Time magazine reported. “We have professionalized the guards in all our installations,” said Belgian Defense Ministry spokesman Cmdr. Olivier Severin. “These are not conscripts, but professional soldiers. Not only that, but everyone is trained specifically for security at air bases. The proof is that there have been no major incidents at our installations.” A NATO official said the alliance has no overarching nuclear security standards. “Security arrangements for U.S. nuclear weapons are made bilaterally between the U.S. and the host country. Any improvements that would be deemed necessary should be discussed between those two governments and not in a NATO context,” said the official (Eben Harrell, Time, June 19).
A comprehensive inventory of U.S. nuclear-weapon holdings has found that hundreds of ballistic missile parts cannot be found, the Financial Times reported today (see GSN, March 28). The U.S. Air Force has apparently lost track of more than 1,000 sensitive components, one official said. The new developments put into question how much control Washington has over its own nuclear-weapon materials as it seeks to persuade other countries to exert more control over their atomic holdings. Defense Secretary Robert Gates said earlier this month that Adm. Kirkland Donald, who headed the review, blamed multiple incidents involving mismanagement of nuclear assets on “the gradual erosion of nuclear standards and a lack of effective oversight by Air Force leadership” (see GSN, Sept. 5, 2007 and March 25). Gates said the inventory was intended to “re-establish positive control of these sensitive, classified components.” The incidents led to the resignations of the two top officials at the Air Force (see GSN, June 9). The Defense Department refused to comment on the results of the classified inventory, which Donald discussed yesterday with U.S. lawmakers. The report outlines “issues about record-keeping,” according to one high-level Pentagon official, adding there was no indication that the missing components were mistakenly transferred to countries not intended to receive them. Daryl Kimball, head of the Arms Control Association, called the results of the inventory “very significant and extremely troubling.” “It raises a serious question about where else these unaccounted-for warhead related parts may have gone,” he said. “I would not be surprised if the recent Taiwan incident is not the only one,” Kimball added, referring to the accidental shipment of nuclear missile fuses to the island. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Adm. Michael McMullen and other military leaders are “deeply troubled” by the inventory, according to one senior military official. They reportedly plan to seriously consider recommendations for improving nuclear safeguards anticipated from former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger (Demetri Sevastopulo, Financial Times, June 19).
Indian leaders are seriously considering moves to implement a nuclear trade deal with the United States, even if such action would trigger early elections this year, two major Indian newspapers reported (see GSN, June 18). Over the past year, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has indicated that keeping his ruling coalition intact was more important than securing the trade agreement (see GSN, April 17), but he has begun to revisit that stance as concerns rise that the deal could die altogether if it is not finalized before U.S. elections in November, the Hindustan Times reported yesterday. The tentative trade pact would allow India to purchase U.S. nuclear materials and technology, an exchange that is currently banned by international trade guidelines that bar key nuclear sales to nations that have not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and do not allow international supervision of all their nuclear activities. The deal calls for India to open its entire civilian nuclear sector to international monitoring, and a draft inspections framework has been completed with the International Atomic Energy Agency (Hindustan Times, June 18). Key allies of Singh’s Congress party-led coalition, however, have threatened to withdraw their support if he signs the IAEA safeguards agreement which would open the way for international nuclear suppliers to ease their trade guidelines for India. “We have several times made our position clear — we are opposed to it," said Nilotpal Basu, a high-level official of the Communist Party of India (Marxist). The deal would "undermine the independent foreign policy of India," he said. “We do not think this deal gives us any advantages” (Matthew Rosenberg, Associated Press/Google News, June 18). Talks between Singh officials and the deal critics were scheduled for yesterday but postponed until June 25 after a preliminary Monday meeting indicated that the critics, consisting chiefly of Basu’s and three other communist parties, would continue their opposition. Singh is now reviewing the political costs of signing the IAEA agreement, in particular the implications of having early elections, should the communists back their pledge to end the coalition’s majority, the Times reported. No decision would be made before next week’s meeting. “We'd have to be prepared for a lame duck status,” said a highly placed source. “Legislative work in parliament would come to a halt for want of the left support and the [main opposition Bharatiya Janata Party] would question the government's legitimacy” (Hindustan Times, June 18). Elections would probably be held in November or December if the government fell, The Hindu reported today. Singh was strongly leaning toward signing the IAEA agreement, concluding that he would appear weak if he conceded to the deal critics, according to The Hindu (The Hindu, June 19). “I don't think the deal itself is a huge election issue, but there is a feeling that this is a government which has been unable to make a stand on pretty much anything," said Pratap Bhanu Mehta of the Center for Policy Research in New Delhi. “For them to go into an election with the BJP and everybody else saying all their allies, including the left, completely walked all over them is a huge minus,” he added. “I don't think Congress has a choice but to go through with this.” Another analyst agreed, Reuters reported. “There is a debate right now. The Congress seems inclined towards bringing about a showdown, forcing the issue and preparing for early polls," said political commentator Mahesh Rangarajan. Some of the coalition partners, however, could be reluctant to cede power. "With this kind of government, allies do count for quite a lot," Rangarajan said. “The fact they have pushed the meeting to June 25 shows they are having some fairly serious problems with their allies” (Mark Williams, Reuters, June 19). Meanwhile, the United States pledged this week to press the deal as quickly as possible once India opted to move forward. Bush administration officials would need to lead both an international lobbying effort — to have the trade rules changed — and a domestic campaign — to obtain final congressional approval for the deal. “From now until January 20 [the last day of the Bush administration], we’ll continue to work to support this agreement. We’ll continue to encourage the Indian government to approve it. And if such time, it is approved, whether that is today, tomorrow, or January 19, we will make every effort to move it through Congress,” State Department spokesman Tom Casey said Tuesday. “We would certainly hope that the next administration, whoever comes to office in January, would also see this agreement as something fundamentally in America’s interest and want to move forward with it as well.” “Fundamentally, we think that the India Civil Nuclear Agreement is something that’s in the interests of both countries,” he told reporters (State Department release, June 17).
The U.S. Homeland Security Department is spending $4 million over four months to assess technology for detecting radioactive material on private passenger aircraft, USA Today reported today (see GSN, Sept. 6, 2007). Radiation scanning of private aircraft began in early 2008 over fears that terrorists might “bypass the traditional ports of entry” while bringing potential weapons material into the United States, said Vayl Oxford, head of the DHS Domestic Nuclear Detection Office. Under an order from Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff, all general aviation aircraft that enter the country from overseas must undergo radiation scanning upon landing. Private jets and other general aviation planes receive less-stringent security checks before takeoff than do commercial passenger aircraft. Customs and Border Protection agents are checking aircraft at 105 airports using shoebox-sized devices more often deployed at seaports and border crossings. There are questions whether machines capable of detecting material stashed in a cargo container could uncover the same source should it be hidden behind an aircraft passenger seat or cockpit or placed in luggage, USA Today reported. Testing on a DC-9 and a Gulf Stream jet at Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland is aimed at finding whether the devices now used by government agents can sense material such as cesium 137, cobalt 57, barium 133 or depleted uranium. Additional testing is also being conducted on other technology, with the ultimate goal of determining whether the government should buy more of the detectors now in use or invest in a different system. One expert said the whole plan is faulty. “Scanning in the United States doesn’t help,” said security consultant Randall Larsen, a former professor at the National War College. Terrorists carrying a nuclear weapon in a plane are likely to detonate it without landing, he said. “It’s not the best return on investment for preventing a mushroom cloud over an American city,” he said. Oxford agreed that it would be best to check planes for dangerous material before they leave for the continental United States. Test programs are planned for Alaska, the Caribbean and Ireland. However, it could take years to finalize agreements for security scanning of planes in foreign nations. Radiation scanning here, meanwhile, serves to “close the front door” to terrorists who would use a devastating weapon in the United States, he said (Mimi Hall, USA Today, June 19).
U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said yesterday that North Korea would issue its long-awaited nuclear declaration in short order, Agence France-Presse reported (see GSN, June 18). “North Korea will soon give its declaration of nuclear programs to China,” she said at a Washington event. The declaration was due Dec. 31 of last year under an agreement that requires Pyongyang to dismantle its nuclear operations in return for a host of benefits from China, Japan, Russia, South Korea and the United States. The denuclearization process faltered when the document failed to materialize; Washington claimed that Pyongyang was refusing to address the full scope of its atomic activities. However, there have been signs of movement in recent months — North Korea released more than 18,000 pages of nuclear records following a reported compromise that requires it to detail its plutonium operations while only acknowledging U.S. suspicions regarding uranium enrichment and nuclear proliferation activities. Once it has the declaration in hand, the Bush administration could remove North Korea from a list of state sponsors of terrorism and give it a waiver for the U.S. Trading with the Enemy Act, Rice said. “In the next 45 days after [informing Congress of the moves], before those actions go into effect, we would continue to assess the level of North Korean cooperation in helping to verify the accuracy of its declaration,” she said. “If that cooperation is insufficient, we will respond accordingly.” Inspections should be part of verifying the nuclear disarmament of North Korea, which has tested one atomic weapon and is believed to have sufficient plutonium for several others, Rice said. “Verifying an agreement with North Korea will be a serious challenge,” she said. “This is the most secretive and opaque regime in the entire world. “It may very well be the case that North Korea does not want to give up its nuclear weapons and its programs. That is a very real possibility,” Rice said, addressing criticism regarding the Bush administration’s strategy on the nuclear standoff. “But we and our partners should test it” (Agence France-Presse/Spacewar.com, June 18). Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill, lead U.S. envoy on the nuclear issue, said yesterday he hoped to see a full round of six-nation talks “as soon as possible,” Kyodo News reported. Hill spoke shortly before flying to Tokyo for meetings with his Japanese and South Korean counterparts. The trip also includes a stop in China. “My focus right now is getting the six parties energized and ready to handle what I think will be some important weeks ahead,” he said. “I think we are getting there on the declaration,” Hill added, noting his desire to “move on to what I hope will be the decisive phase” of fully shuttering North Korea’s nuclear operations. However, there is likely to be little movement prior to the June 26-27 meeting in Japan of the foreign ministers from the Group of Eight nations, Hill said (Kyodo News I, June 19). There is speculation that the next six-party meeting could occur at the end of this month or in early July, Kyodo reported. Hill met today with top Japanese negotiator Akitaka Saiki, head of the Foreign Ministry’s Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau. Saiki was likely to press Washington to delay North Korea’s removal from the terrorism list until more movement was seen on the issue of the Stalinist state’s abduction of Japanese citizens in prior decades. Pyongyang has previously claimed that all surviving abductees had been returned to Japan but pledged last week to again look into the matter. The two men also met with top South Korean negotiator Kim Sook. The session was expected to include a briefing from Saiki on last week’s meeting between Japanese and North Korean officials and a report from Hill on the ongoing analysis of the documents released by Pyongyang (Kyodo News II, June 19). The negotiators agreed to press Pyongyang to move quickly on denuclearization but did not come away with specifics on the matter, Reuters reported. “We all agreed on the need to advance the six-party process quickly,” Saiki said (Reuters/Yahoo!News, June 19).
The U.S. Senate Finance Committee yesterday endorsed a bill to expand economic penalties against Iran for refusing to halt programs that could contribute to nuclear weapons development, Reuters reported (see GSN, June 17). The legislation would augment existing U.S. sanctions against specific Iranians; punish U.S. firms with international branches that conduct business with Iran; and add to existing trade restrictions by banning imports of Iranian carpets, caviar and nuts. In addition, the Senate bill and similar legislation passed in the House of Representatives would prohibit the United States from entering into a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement with Russia — a deal supported by President George W. Bush — until Moscow stops providing nuclear assistance to Iran (see GSN, June 13). “The strong sanctions we've approved today will work to deter the Iranian government from producing a nuclear weapon," said committee Chairman Max Baucus (D-Mont.) (Reuters I, June 18). Experts believe that Bush’s diplomatic options for handling Iran are dwindling as he approaches the end of his term, Time magazine reported. “He’s kind of stuck,” said Robert Einhorn of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, adding that “it’s going to take a new administration” to engage Iran. Einhorn said that U.S. promotion of civilian nuclear energy development in states neighboring Iran is producing more constructive examples for nuclear work in the region, but another analyst urged more significant diplomatic action. “[Bush] should start the process of negotiations” with Iran, said Ray Takeyh at the Council on Foreign Relations. Former U.N. Ambassador John Bolton called for military action against Iran. "We've long passed the point where sanctions can work, so you're pushed in the direction of a targeted use of military force," Bolton said (Massimo Calabressi, Time, June 18). At a news conference in Uganda, Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki said Tehran is ready to negotiate over a new incentives proposal put forward by China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, Reuters reported. "We have informed them of our readiness to negotiate. The package given by the P5+1 countries is currently under consideration and at the appropriate time Tehran will give its reactions," Mottaki said. "We also have what we call the Iranian package which we have sent to the P5+1 countries and we hope they consider it as we consider theirs.” One Iranian official said today that Tehran feels no sense of urgency as it reviews the six-power proposal, which is intended to persuade the government to suspend uranium enrichment operations. “We will review the package but not the part about enrichment freeze. … We are moving forward with our work and Iran’s nuclear capability is being constantly augmented,” said the official, who is taking part in nuclear discussions with EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana (Nyakairu/Kanina, Reuters II, June 19).
Bulgaria and the United States agreed Tuesday to place radiation detection equipment at Bulgarian airports, seaports and border crossings in an effort to combat nuclear smuggling, the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration announced (see GSN, Jan. 25). The memorandum of understanding, which also calls for the United States to train personnel to operate the equipment, follows several years of cooperation between the agency and the Bulgarian Interior Ministry and Border Police to maintain nuclear sensors already in place in the European nation. Washington is providing the counterproliferation assistance to Bulgaria under the U.S. Energy Department’s Second Line of Defense program, which aims to prevent nuclear and radiological smuggling across the borders of participating nations. New equipment to be installed includes upgraded sensors and integrated communication gear. The U.S. program has already placed comparable equipment at 160 sites internationally. “NNSA is committed to detecting and deterring attempts to smuggle nuclear materials or devices into the United States or other countries around the world,” NNSA Deputy Administrator William Tobey said in a statement. “Our agreement with Bulgaria is another opportunity to build upon our international partnerships to detect illicit nuclear activity regardless of origin or destination.” Meanwhile, the U.S. Defense Department’s Defense Threat Reduction Agency on Tuesday completed a deal with Bulgaria to expand cooperation in countering and responding to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats (U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration release, June 18).
International Atomic Energy Agency chief Mohamed ElBaradei has that said an upcoming search of a suspected former Syrian nuclear site is unlikely to yield new insights into what purpose the building served before it was leveled last September in an Israeli air strike, Reuters reported (see GSN, June 18). An IAEA delegation is scheduled to arrive Sunday for a three-day inspection visit. Agency safeguards chief Olli Heinonen is expected to lead the team, which would include two nuclear experts with knowledge of Syria. "We will do everything in our power to clear things up. I take these accusations very seriously," ElBaradei said during a June 7 interview with German media. "But it is doubtful that we will find anything there now, assuming there was anything there in the first place." Damascus razed the site following the Israeli attack. Western diplomats said the U.N. nuclear watchdog would need additional inspections to uncover evidence on Syria’s potential clandestine nuclear work. Syria maintains that its nuclear work is restricted to one research reactor. It has rejected IAEA requests to inspect facilities other than the bombed site. A U.S. official on Tuesday questioned ElBaradei’s recent assertion that Syria appears unable to operate a major nuclear facility. "The reality here is that there's some pretty strong evidence out there about what Syria was doing … It's important that the IAEA be allowed to fully investigate that facility and any other one that they might find of interest to them," State Department spokesman Tom Casey said Tuesday. One high-level diplomat familiar with the U.N. nuclear watchdog said: "The delegation will want Syria to explain what was at the (bombed) site. If Syria still says it was no reactor, they will want information to substantiate that. There is a plan to take samples on the spot. "They will explain why the agency wants to see other sites,” the diplomat said. “That doesn't have to happen (on this trip). If the IAEA doesn't get acceptable answers now, inspectors can go back next month and try again, and so on. This will be a process." Mark Fitzpatrick of the International Institute for Strategic Studies added: "Don't expect much from this trip, given Syria's extensive efforts to remove incriminating evidence and the restrictions they will put on where the IAEA can go. But the IAEA in the past has found things that the hosts didn't expect, as in North Korea. ... So it's possible Syria will be surprised. If the IAEA doesn't find anything (this time), it shouldn't be taken as any exoneration of Syria" (Mark Heinrich, Reuters, June 19).
A small amount of plutonium might have spilled from a broken vial at a U.S. government laboratory and into the sewer system of Boulder, Colo., the Associated Press reported yesterday (see GSN, Jan. 4). The vial that cracked June 9 at the National Institute of Standards and Technology held 250 milligrams of a powder containing plutonium. The laboratory initially reported finding traces of spilled material on a chair, desk and notebook in one room. However, on Tuesday safety personnel located plutonium traces in a sink, suggesting that some of the powder might have escaped down the drain and into the sewers. Experts believe that any contamination in the sewers would not affect the health of city residents because the plutonium would not enter the drinking water supply, according to NIST spokeswoman Gail Porter. Any contamination would run through Boulder’s sewage treatment plant and then into Boulder Creek, public works spokeswoman Jody Jacobson said, adding that any trace amount of plutonium would pose no threat to treatment plant workers or users of the waterway. "No human system is foolproof, but this incident suggests that safety practices at NIST need to be thoroughly reviewed," U.S. Representative Mark Udall (D-Colo.) said in a statement. The institute is known primarily as the agency that operates the atomic clock used for keeping the official time in the United States, AP reported. Both the institute and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which provides licenses for use of plutonium, are conducting safety reviews of the incident. The internal review also encompasses the operations of a NIST site in Maryland. Harvard University physics professor Richard Wilson said it remains uncertain whether the leak poses a public health threat because NIST officials have not yet determined the extent of any contamination. Any plutonium in the sewers would be highly diluted and only large amounts of the element are known to pose a health risk, Wilson said, noting that people exposed to large amounts of nuclear-weapon plutonium in former Soviet states became twice as likely to develop lung cancer (Colleen Slevin, Associated Press/The Examiner, June 18).
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