By Chris Schneidmiller
Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — If new Russian President Dmitry Medvedev plans significant updates to his nation’s strategic policy, he is in no hurry to alert the world (see GSN, May 15).
Since taking office in May, Medvedev has not strayed far from the postures taken by his predecessor and current prime minister, Vladimir Putin, regarding Russia’s nuclear and missile arsenal and relations with the West. Moscow hosted a throw-back to Soviet times just two days after Medvedev’s inauguration, rolling nuclear Topol-M missiles and other heavy weaponry down Red Square in the first such display since the Cold War (see GSN, May 9). In the weeks afterward, Medvedev promised to provide necessary funding for Russian missile forces, warned against further expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and took several jabs at U.S. missile defense plans for Europe (see GSN, May 15). The London Times reported this week that Moscow was considering aiming nuclear missiles at Western Europe should the continent become home to missile shield elements seen as a threat to Russian strategic security — a threat previously made by Putin (see GSN, July 14). “I think in both national security issues and foreign policy issues what we’re seeing right now is a great deal of continuity between now-Prime Minister Putin and the new president, Medvedev,” said U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State David Merkel, whose portfolio includes Russia. That should be no surprise, experts said, given how well those policies have played with the Russian populace. “Any new leader wants to demonstrate that he’s a defender of Russia and an advocate for a strong military,” said nonproliferation expert Joseph Cirincione, president of the Ploughshares Fund. “You can expect speeches in the Putin model by Medvedev before military audiences, promising increased expenditures, perhaps demonstrating what they claim is a new and unique weapons capability, and probably accompanied by some sort of test or demonstration of that capability.” The Putin government established an assertive strategy policy largely from its inception at the end of 1999. Military doctrine adopted the next year allowed for use of a limited nuclear strike to deter a conventional attack on Russia, said Nikolai Sokov, a senior research associate at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Leaders in Moscow wanted to ensure that the United States and NATO would not turn their conventional military might against Russia, he said: “The answer was the limited use of nuclear weapons.” Russia’s strategic nuclear arsenal now stands at an estimated 5,200 warheads. Under Putin, the nation’s military sought to ensure it possessed a modern strategic force — dismantling outdated weapons even as it finished a decade-long project to complete its latest ballistic missile submarine and increased efforts to maintain and extend the lifespan of nuclear-capable missiles. It also deployed ICBMs reputed to be capable of defeating any missile defense system, as the Bush administration pursued just such a program. Putin supported arms control alongside modernization of his nation’s atomic capabilities. The Russian leader and U.S. President George W. Bush in 2002 signed the Moscow Treaty, which limited their nations to between 1,700 and 2,200 operationally deployed warheads each. Moscow also pressed for a pact to replace the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which prohibits the nations from deploying more than 6,000 warheads on 1,600 nuclear delivery vehicles, when it expires in December 2009. Both branches of nuclear policy reflected Russia’s desire to “sustain or recapture its sense of importance in the world,” particularly in relation to its former Cold War enemy, said Jon Wolfsthal, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “President Putin was anxious to make sure that the United States and Russia remained in a situation of nuclear parity, both for strategic stability reasons but also in terms of political parity,” he said. Updating Russia’s nuclear capabilities was fueled by the nation’s oil- and gas-funded prosperity and helped mask the weakness of the nation’s deteriorating conventional forces. Moscow was spending money on both military sectors, but rebuilding the conventional side was significantly more expensive, Wolfsthal said. It is hard to know how much it actually spent, or how central Putin was in directing this strategy, given the Kremlin’s penchant for secrecy, experts said. As president, though, he was in charge of the Defense Ministry and appointed the top officials who would direct the policy. If intent on some areas of arms control, the Putin government appeared “cavalier” in others, Sokov said. Moscow last year suspended participation in the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, which limits deployment of troops and heavy military equipment on the continent (see GSN, Dec. 12, 2007). Putin also suggested Russia would exit from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which forced the Cold War superpowers to remove medium-range nuclear missiles from Europe, unless other nations joined the pact (see GSN, Oct. 12, 2007). “By withdrawing from the [Antiballistic Missile] Treaty in 2002 and pursuing [missile defense] deployment in Europe today, the U.S. has shown the way — practically licensed withdrawal from treaties by others,” according to Sokov. “The military argument in Moscow is, ‘If the U.S. can dump treaties because they are no longer convenient or date back to the Cold War, why can’t we?’” It is too early in Medvedev’s presidency to determine how he will address these matters, or to anticipate significant diversions from Russian policy under Putin, Merkel and analysts told Global Security Newswire. U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates said last month he expected Russia to focus on boosting its nuclear power. However, Sokov argued that Medvedev might be preoccupied with more pressing social and economic matters. The defense industry complained several months ago that not enough money was being directed toward production for a new ICBM. First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov “said we don’t want to switch money from social problems. Production will remain at the same level,” Sokov said. “Neither Putin nor Medvedev will wake up in the middle of the night thinking, ‘Oh my God, what am I going to do with nuclear weapons?’ That’s a small, routine thing compared to the economic agenda, social agenda,” he said. Medvedev’s authority to make significant changes is, from the outside at least, somewhat in doubt. The president is a protege of Putin’s, with a working relationship that dates back to the prime minister’s days in St. Petersburg politics, and questions remain about who holds the figurative reins of government. Putin selected the sitting Russian ambassador to the United States as his foreign affairs chief, suggesting his intention to remain in charge of foreign policy matters as prime minister, analysts told Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Washington continues to see Putin as the “go-to guy” for communication, one expert said. “I think it leans to ‘good cop, bad cop,’” Russia expert Nikolas Gvosdev told RFE/RL. “But I think they’re attempting to divide … different aspects of foreign policy. That is, Medvedev is your go-to business guy, who will sign contracts, and talk up the positives of cooperation and how we can all make money. And Putin is the heavy who comes in and says let’s talk nuclear security.” The Russian constitution establishes the president as the ultimate authority on foreign policy and the manager of the defense and foreign ministers. Washington would address questions on foreign policy to that side of the government rather than to Putin’s office, Merkel said. While Putin himself has declared his successor as Russia’s leader, he is likely to be a significantly more involved in the decision-making process than previous prime ministers, Sokov said. The analyst said that he expects the former president ultimately to worry more about running the economy than nuclear policy. “I don’t think that’s a big interest of his.” Wolfsthal said colleagues in Russia have characterized Medvedev as “his own man” and believe he will be looking to set himself apart from Putin. “One of the few areas where he has freedom of action as Russian commander in chief is in the area of military affairs and particularly nuclear military affairs. So he may in fact seek to develop his own Medvedev policy on strategic nuclear weapons,” the analyst said. The current and former leaders have a strong relationship and appear to be operating on the same wavelength, reducing the potential for conflict, said one State Department official, who spoke on condition of anonymity. Should there be a difference of opinion on an issue, Medvedev is likely to defer to Putin until he has gained experience as his administration progresses, the official said. The president’s authority would also increase as he puts his own people into supporting positions, Sokov said. It took Putin two to three years to complete that process. Russia is preparing an updated military doctrine, Sokov said. While the Kremlin is, unsurprisingly, saying little about its intentions, he said it is unlikely that the new doctrine would amend nuclear policy or that Medvedev would become deeply involved in its preparation. Washington would like to see decisions that help promote stability and reduce reliance on nuclear weapons, Merkel said. The Bush administration is continuing talks with Medvedev’s government on a replacement to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and to allay its concerns regarding deployment of missile defenses in Europe, he said. A senior Russian foreign policy adviser, though, has called U.S. proposals for verification of a new treaty “empty” (see GSN, July 7). Engagement on nuclear reductions could help restore U.S.-Russian ties that became strained under Putin and President George W. Bush, Cirincione said. He said observers might expect for several moves on Moscow’s part. Talk of complete exits from the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaties should be taken seriously, he said: “In the wrong political environment even empty slogans have a way of becoming real weapons programs.” Russia has the resources to restart a medium-range missile program and could see it as another way to extend diplomatic influence through military means. The Kremlin could also become the latest power to destroy a satellite, making clear its ability to destroy other nations’ space-based assets if deemed necessary, Cirincione said (see GSN, Jan. 19, 2007 and Feb. 21, 2008). “China did it, the U.S. did it. You’re almost daring Russia to do it,” he said. “That could be a real problem. Because once Russia tests people will forget what might have provoked that test or set the model for that test. They’ll just see it as something they have to respond to, both in Beijing and in Washington.”
Iran yesterday said that its upcoming talks with the European Union would address how the sides would schedule negotiations over the nation’s controversial nuclear program, Agence France-Presse reported (see GSN, June 14). Senior Iranian nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili is expected to meet Saturday with EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana, who represents Western powers concerned that Iran’s uranium enrichment program could be used to produce nuclear-weapon materials. Iran has insisted that its nuclear program is strictly peaceful and has refused to consider halting enrichment activities despite repeated demands by the U.N. Security Council. "In these talks (between Jalili and Solana) the framework of talks and timetable of talks" will be considered, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said in an interview for Iranian television. Addressing the length of the possible schedule, he said: “Maybe it is four weeks, maybe it [is] eight weeks. It depends on the trend of the talks. There was never an emphasis from each side on this." According to news reports, nations conducting nuclear diplomacy with Iran have offered to carry out preliminary negotiations over a six-week “freeze-for-freeze” period, during which Tehran would not expand its uranium enrichment program and the world powers would suspend efforts to impose new economic penalties on the Middle Eastern state. Despite Iran’s consistent refusal to halt its uranium enrichment program, the country has not rejected a possible freeze period aimed at building mutual confidence. Neither side has formally endorsed a freeze, a proposal not included in an offer of nuclear cooperation incentives put forward to Iran last month (Agence France-Presse/Google News, July 14). Ahmadinejad has also responded to a high-level Iranian adviser’s implied criticism of the president’s rhetoric, Reuters reported yesterday (see GSN, July 2). Former Iranian Foreign Minister Ali-Akbar Velayati, a top adviser to Iran’s supreme leader, earlier this month cautioned Iranian officials against making “provocative” statements on the country’s nuclear program. "Velayati is a respected man. Like everyone else in Iran, he is free to have personal views. … But he is not involved in nuclear decision-making,” the newspaper Mardomsalari quoted Ahmadinejad as saying. Ahmadinejad said his position on Iran’s nuclear work matches the opinion of supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who has the final say in all Iranian political decision-making. "Our nuclear path is clear," Ahmadinejad said. “The government is responsible of the nuclear issue. We manage the issue based on the leader's views.” Some outside experts have suggested that Iran’s leadership is divided over whether they should seek a compromise to the nuclear standoff (Parisa Hafezi, Reuters, July 14). Ahmadinejad yesterday said he is open to holding bilateral negotiations with the United States if each side is considered equal in the talks, the Associated Press reported. "We will hold talks with the United States if they come to us on equal footing," he said in a speech broadcast on Iranian television. “Equal footing means that when two people want to talk, both have to be on equal terms. Dialogue doesn't make any sense if one side stands in a higher position and the other in a lower position.” Ahmadinejad did not reveal any concrete plans for direct U.S.-Iranian discussions, but he said such talks could take place “in the near future” (Ali Akbar Dareini, Associated Press/Google News, July 14).
The International Atomic Energy Agency’s governing board has scheduled a special meeting on Aug. 1 to consider a draft agreement laying out terms for the organization to monitor India’s civilian nuclear programs, Reuters reported today (see GSN, July 14). If the board approves the agreement, as Reuters reported it is likely to do, it would complete a key step toward implementing a U.S.-Indian nuclear trade deal that also promises to enable New Delhi to purchase technology from other nations. The next hurdle for India would be to gain an exemption from Nuclear Suppliers Group rules that bar key nuclear sales to nations, such as India, that have not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and do not allow international supervision of all their nuclear activities. “A (special) meeting of the (35-nation) IAEA Board of Governors will take place on Aug. 1 with the India safeguards agreement on the agenda,” said agency spokeswoman Melissa Fleming. Indian officials would probably be asked to clear up language in the draft agreement that some critics have argued would give New Delhi the option to easily opt out of inspections, said diplomats on the board. Still, the board would probably approve the agreement because it adhered to the agency’s basic standards, analysts said (Mark Heinrich, Reuters, July 15).
Pakistani officials moved today to restore communication restrictions on former Abdul Qadeer Khan, the once-admitted nuclear smuggler who has spoken to the press recently to proclaim his innocence and to implicate Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, the Associated Press reported (see GSN, July 8). Khan has been under house arrest since his 2004 confession to leading an international network that provided nuclear technology to Iran, Libya and North Korea. In frequent media interviews over the past few months, the former nuclear scientist has recanted that confession and specifically charged Musharraf with involvement in sending uranium enrichment centrifuges to North Korea (see GSN, July 7). Today, officials sought court permission to restrict Khan’s communications with outsiders. He should remain in a “restrained atmosphere” with limited telephone and Internet access as well as restrictions on visitors, said Deputy Attorney General Raja Abdul Rahman in a court document filed in response to an effort by Khan’s wife release to win his release from house arrest. Khan deserves to remain confined because his recent comments have had “very damaging legal repercussions,” added government lawyer Ahmer Bilal Sufi. “He has made very specific attribution to an institution of the state in a recent, statement,” Sufi said, apparently referring to Khan’s accusation of Musharraf. “The moment the state of Pakistan becomes responsible, the diplomatic community will have a very, very serious reaction to this.” Khan’s claim, Sufi added, was “absolutely untrue.” Khan lawyer Javed Iqbal Jaffri charged the government with trying to “gag” his client. “They merely want to humiliate Dr. A.Q. Khan, they just want to punish him,” he said. The court session was scheduled to resume tomorrow (Stephen Graham, Associated Press/Washington Times, July 15).
The United States and Armenia yesterday signed a 28-step action plan to help the former Soviet state improve its capabilities to prevent smuggling of nuclear or radioactive materials, the U.S. State Department announced (see GSN, Dec. 1, 2005). The agreement calls for Armenia to whenever possible implement steps on its own “to prevent, detect and respond effectively to attempts to smuggle nuclear or radioactive materials,” according to a press release. Washington would step in as needed with U.S. support or aid from other sectors of the international community. The United States has signed similar agreements under the Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative with Georgia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and Ukraine. Additional deals are planned with another 20 nations considered to be at particular risk for smuggling of nuclear materials. Eight other nations and three international organizations have so far agreed to assist nations involved in the program (U.S. State Department release, July 14). Trafficking of nuclear materials has increased significantly since the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Associated Press reported. Georgian authorities in June 2003 foiled an attempt to bring six ounces of highly enriched uranium into Armenia (Associated Press/Jerusalem Post, July 14).
Former U.S. Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne last week criticized an investigation into nuclear-weapon security lapses as coming “from a Navy perspective” and said his forced resignation was unrelated to the review’s findings, Air Force Times reported (see GSN, June 6). Wynne and Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Michael Moseley lost their jobs last month after a review of two embarrassing incidents found that the Air Force had wavered in securing its nuclear weapons and components. In August 2007, air crews at Minot Air Force Base, N.D., mistakenly loaded six nuclear-armed cruise missiles onto a B-52 bomber that flew to Barksdale Air Force Base, La. The inadvertent weapons transfer was not noticed for about 30 hours, when Barksdale personnel unloaded the missiles from the aircraft (see GSN, Sept. 5, 2007). The second incident involved the inappropriate transfer of nuclear warhead fuses to Taiwan in 2006 (see GSN, March 25). Defense Secretary Robert Gates ordered an investigation of the problems, and the review led by U.S. Navy Adm. Kirkland Donald found serious issues with Air Force leadership. Wynne, however, said his dismissal was triggered by a disagreement with Gates over the future of the Air Force, not by the weapon incidents. His said the Donald report misunderstood Air Force methods. “He looked at us from a Navy perspective. ... I think his guys, because of their nuclear submarine background, did not see a shop with things on the floor as being a very good shop because on a nuclear submarine everything has a place and needs to be in that place. So I think they just see things very differently than we do,” Wynne said. “The fact that we have 500 sites with nuclear components, and they don’t, leads us in different directions about how we delegate responsibility.” He acknowledged that improvements to security procedures are necessary (see GSN, May 30). “Enforcing ‘train as you fight’ [procedures] would have helped. ... If we would have managed that and the discipline characteristics as if we were going to war, we would have probably saved ourselves the embarrassment,” Wynne said (Air Force Times I, July 14). Meanwhile, Wynne’s ousted colleague Gen. Moseley officially retired from the Air Force on Friday after a 37-year career. Presiding over Moseley’s retirement ceremony, Wynne praised him as a “warfighter, diplomat, historian and airman.” Moseley returned the compliment. “It was a real treat and honor to work with Mr. Wynne and fight the good fight for what was best for the U.S. Air Force,” Moseley said. “Every day, at every opportunity, I always felt we were working with the best interests of the republic, doing what was right for America” (Air Force Times II, July 15).
The head of the RAND Corp. said yesterday that international nonproliferation efforts should include reducing the perception that acquiring nuclear weapons increases a nation’s prestige and security, Reuters reported (see GSN, Jan. 21, 2005). James Thomson, president and CEO if the nonprofit research organization, told Reuters that economic penalties and similar measures have largely been used to keep countries from pursuing nuclear weapons. He said the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and International Atomic Energy Agency are “limited” in their abilities to prevent proliferation. "What we've seen is you are able to get to nuclear weapons, or close to nuclear weapons, without worrying about the IAEA," he said. Thomson discussed Iran, which has concerned Western powers because elements of its purportedly civilian nuclear energy program could support development of an atomic bomb. "There is a good chance we are looking at an Iranian nuclear weapon … within five years," he said, adding that the country’s seclusion might count among its potential reasons for seeking a nuclear arsenal. The Iranians, he said, have “no friends and, from their perspective, they have lots of enemies.” Thomson said that the United States accounted for the security concerns of many smaller countries in the 20th century by offering them a range of security assurances (Jeremy Gaunt, Reuters, July 14).
A U.S. House of Representatives panel is today expected to review safety and accident response procedures at the National Institute of Standards and Technology in Boulder, Colo., following the spill of a radioactive plutonium mixture at the site last month, the Denver Post reported (see GSN, July 14). The House Technology and Innovation Subcommittee plans to look at factors that precipitated the leak of one-fourth gram of plutonium from a cracked vial at the laboratory as well as responses to the incident by NIST personnel. The hearing is also expected to address recommendations for improving environmental, health and safety procedures at the laboratory. "The actual handling of the source bordered on the cavalier," wrote Lester Slaback, a former NIST employee who served on a five-member team that investigated the spill. "The simple fact that it was plutonium should have produced some level of respect in the handling of the source.” The laboratory discovered traces of radiological material on the hands of two employees and the shoes of 20 others. Traces were also found in a hallway and office space close to the contaminated laboratory. The congressional panel plans to consider the possible escape of plutonium into Boulder’s sewer system and various parts of the laboratory; examination and treatment of nearly 30 NIST employees who tested positive for plutonium ingestion; and the laboratory’s safety training system, which the committee said had “clearly failed in this case” (Howard Pankratz, Denver Post, July 14).
A waste treatment process yesterday released unusual yellow fumes at a former uranium enrichment facility in Oak Ridge, Tenn., forcing roughly 45 workers to temporarily vacate one plant, the Associated Press reported (see GSN, Feb. 8). Fire crews "verified no ongoing reaction of hazardous constituents involved," U.S. Department Energy spokesman Walter Perry said. The incident occurred at the former K-25 uranium enrichment site, which is now the East Tennessee Technology Park. It was caused by a reaction from “vacuum thermal desorption operations,” which free gravel and soil of dangerous impurities by subjecting them to pressure and heat, at the waste processing firm Materials and Energy Corp. The plant was evacuated and workers in four nearby buildings at the industrial park were ordered to “shelter in place.” "Following data collection at the site, it was determined that there was no on-site or off-site contamination due to this event," the Energy Department said in a statement. The incident caused no injuries and employees were permitted to resume work (Associated Press/Oak Ridger, July 14).
A bipartisan congressional panel has begun its work of reviewing the current and future roles of missile defenses, nonproliferation programs and nuclear weapons in the U.S. strategic posture, the United States Institute of Peace announced Friday (see GSN, March 20). The charter for the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States calls on the group to “examine and make recommendations with respect to the long-term strategic posture of the United States.” The panel has established fives teams of analysts with different focuses: National Security Strategy and Policies; Deterrent Force Posture; Nuclear Infrastructure; Countering WMD Proliferation and Terrorism; and External Conditions and Trends. A final report is due in spring 2009. “The proliferation of nuclear technology and materials is a major war and peace issue of the 21st century, and how to deal with it is one of the most difficult issues the U.S. must come to terms with,” USIP President Richard Solomon said in a statement. His independent, congressionally funded organization is the facilitator for the commission’s work (United States Institute of Peace release, July 11).
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