Iran has effectively blocked international attempts to clarify whether the Middle Eastern state’s nuclear program involves weapons development, International Atomic Energy Agency chief Mohamed ElBaradei said in a report today (see GSN, Sept. 12).
The report states that Tehran has not submitted requested details on alleged documents that indicate Iran has conducted research with bearing on a possible nuclear weapons program. Iran’s alleged studies — according to documents provided electronically by Western nations earlier this year — include precision high-explosives testing and research into modifying its Shahab 3 missile to accommodate a nuclear warhead. “Unless Iran undertakes … to resolve substantively the outstanding issues, the agency will not be in a position to progress in its verification of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran,” the report says, adding that only when Tehran provides the requested information can “doubts … about the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program be dispelled.” Since its previous report (see GSN, May 27), the U.N. nuclear watchdog has questioned Iranian claims that the U.S.-provided documents were forgeries. In two meetings last month, IAEA officials “emphasized that the documentation was sufficiently comprehensive and detailed that it needed to be taken seriously, particularly in light of the fact that, as acknowledged by Iran, some of the information contained in it was factually accurate,” according to the report. The agency asked Iran to distinguish between accurate and forged details in the documents, recommending that Tehran provide access to additional details and personnel to help verify its assertions. “Unfortunately, Iran has not yet provided the requested information, or access to the requested documentation, locations or individuals,” the report states (Diane Barnes, Global Security Newswire, Sept. 15). Two diplomats said that Iran last month barred IAEA officials from visiting sites suspected to be working on missile modification, Reuters reported (Mark Heinrich, Reuters I, Sept. 12). The report adds that Tehran has provided no new information on an Iranian document describing how to shape uranium metal into hemispheres, a key step in producing nuclear weapon cores. Iran maintains it had not requested the document, which it said came with blueprints for a Pakistani uranium enrichment centrifuge received through a nuclear smuggling ring. Iran has placed more than 13,000 pounds of uranium hexafluoride into its enrichment centrifuges since Dec. 12, 2007, the report states. The United States and other Western powers have taken issue with Iran’s uranium enrichment program because it could produce material for a nuclear bomb; Iran maintains it only wants to produce nuclear power plant fuel for civilian use. Iran placed roughly 65 pounds of uranium hexafluoride in its experimental next-generation centrifuges between May 16 and Aug. 25, the report says (Diane Barnes, Global Security Newswire). The report states that Iran has begun operating more than 500 new uranium enrichment centrifuges at its Natanz uranium enrichment facility since May for a new total of 3,820 working machines, Reuters reported. Iran is placing more than 2,000 additional centrifuges at the facility. Iran had roughly 1,050 pounds of low-enriched uranium in storage as of last month. It would require 33,000 pounds to produce enough highly enriched uranium to fuel a nuclear weapon, according to U.N. officials. "That would be a significant quantity, one unit of HEU, and would take on the order of two years," an official said (Mark Heinrich, Reuters II, Sept. 15). "Four thousand [centrifuges] is quite enough to produce highly enriched uranium for a small number of weapons or provide technical expertise and operational cover for a covert capability" if the machines ran at full capacity, a Western diplomat said. However, another diplomat said the machines are "not operating all together but by batches and they are still rotating at quite a low speed, at maximum 20 percent capacity.” Some diplomats suggested Iran has reduced IAEA cooperation to the minimum amount required by its nuclear safeguards pact with the agency by prohibiting access to its military sites. "They don't want visits to national defense sites," said a high-level diplomat familiar with the Iran nuclear probe. Tehran fears that allowing such access would enable the United States and Israel to "get coordinates for future attacks and identify key personnel for targeting,” the diplomat said. "It's not just a simple tale of Iranian stonewalling. But there's a stalemate. The veracity of the alleged (bomb) studies cannot be proven conclusively” (Heinrich, Reuters I). The United States today said that Iran’s lack of nuclear transparency could lead to new economic penalties, Agence France-Presse reported. "We urge Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities or face further implementation of the existing United Nations Security Council sanctions and the possibility of new sanctions," White House spokesman Gordon Johndroe said. "This report shows once again that Iran is refusing to cooperate with the international community. The Iranian regime's continued defiance only further isolates the Iranian people," he added (Agence France-Presse I/Google News, Sept. 15). Iran cautioned the nuclear agency against issuing a harsh report in what it said would be a sign of complicity with U.S. demands. Tehran added that it would require time “to analyze" the report before providing official comment, Reuters reported today. “What we are expecting (from) the agency … (is) to conduct itself based on its own regulations and not to be affected by outside pressure, including U.S. pressure," Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Hassan Qashqavi told reporters before the report’s release. "We are fully expecting the IAEA to remain independent again, to confine its activities to recognized international laws and regulations," he said, adding that Iran’s cooperation “with the agency has to fall within the parameters of the regulations and also the safeguards and our agreements with the agency." "We are always ready for the continuation of our cooperation within the confines of the modality for agreement," he said (Reuters III/International Herald Tribune, Sept. 15). The nation said today it intends to maintain uranium enrichment, AFP reported. “Stating that Iran did not obey the United Nations Security Council resolution asking it to halt uranium enrichment shows this reality — that Iran found no logical and legal reasons for doing so,” said Ali Asghar Soltanieh, Tehran’s ambassador to the U.N. nuclear watchdog (Agence France-Presse II/Spacewar.com, Sept. 15). Meanwhile, the top foreign officials for Iran and Russia met Friday to discuss nuclear cooperation between their countries as well as Russia’s recent military incursion in Georgia, AFP reported. "We will consider agreements … which are developing well," Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said before the meeting, likely referring to the Bushehr nuclear power plant now being built in Iran by a Russian contractor (Agence France-Presse III/Google News, Sept. 12).
By Elaine M. Grossman
Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — A panel commissioned by U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates said Friday that the Air Force should consolidate all its nuclear weapon systems within a single command and shift more than 1,500 personnel into the mission (see GSN, Sept. 11). The task force, chaired by former U.S. Defense Secretary and Central Intelligence Director James Schlesinger, issued a report saying that the “nuclear deterrence mission demands an uncompromising standard of accountability and responsibility and that consolidation of Air Force nuclear forces in a single major command will set the stage for a revitalized nuclear culture.” Accountability for performing the nuclear mission has suffered because “today no senior leader in the Air Force ‘owns’ the nuclear mission,” the task force stated. Gates supported the idea of consolidation but indicated the specifics would have to be sorted out. “I’m not sure what the right answer is,” he said at a Friday press conference, “but … one of the principal actions that needs to be taken is to address this question of unity of command.” The Schlesinger group issued its recommendations in response to two major lapses in Air Force nuclear weapons management. The first incident to surface was an August 2007 bomber flight from one air base in North Dakota to another in Louisiana during which the air crew was unaware the plane was carrying nuclear-armed cruise missiles (see GSN, Sept. 5, 2007). Then, in March, Defense Department officials revealed they had discovered that nuclear weapon fuses had been mistakenly shipped to Taiwan in 2006 (see GSN, March 25). The Air Force immediately took a number of corrective actions, including disciplinary measures and changes in its weapons training. The service anticipates asking Congress for roughly $1.5 billion in its fiscal 2010 budget for management, training and other initiatives aimed at tightening controls over nuclear weapons, Schlesinger said at the press conference. Following the initial efforts, Gates in June announced the resignations of the service’s two top officials, Secretary Michael Wynne and Chief of Staff Michael Moseley. He cited the nuclear incidents as the primary justification for the dismissals. The same day, Gates announced the creation of the Schlesinger panel, which was to report back in 60 days with its Air Force findings (see GSN, June 6). “Clearly I think we have the attention of the Air Force,” Gates said at last week’s media briefing. The task force this fall will also issue a second analysis, focused on defense-wide nuclear management issues. The group’s Air Force findings support the type of consolidated command over nuclear weapons that the service itself began openly pondering in March (see GSN, March 27). Schlesinger’s eight-member panel, which includes retired Air Force and Navy brass, said the service should “redesignate Air Force Space Command as Air Force Strategic Command and vest it with appropriate authority and accountability,” according to the report. The Air Force manages more than 2,800 nuclear weapons, according to Robert Norris of the Natural Resources Defense Council. As it stands, nuclear weapons oversight by the service’s Space Command, located in Colorado Springs, Colo., is limited to ICBMs. Air Combat Command manages nuclear-armed bomber aircraft at its Hampton, Va., headquarters more than 1,500 miles away. Air Combat Command is also responsible for conventional aircraft and missions. Although nuclear bombers were assigned to that command in 1991, its “culture became centered on the employment of conventional missions using fighter aircraft,” states the report. Conventional-force pilots also began dominating the highest Air Force positions. “As a consequence,” states the document, “the special culture that had surrounded the nuclear enterprise dissipated” and the level of discipline in its operations dipped, according to the document. Schlesinger noted that an Air Force Strategic Command would also serve as a single Air Force nuclear component for the multiservice U.S. Strategic Command. Based in Omaha, Neb., U.S. Strategic Command is the Pentagon’s overarching combat organization for nuclear and space missions. Services including the Air Force and Navy provide personnel, equipment and training. The changes would also give the Air Force sole responsibility for the movement of its sensitive weapons components, bringing the service more in line with Navy nuclear weapons practices, said task force member Michael Carns, a retired Air Force general. The erroneous fuse transfer to Taiwan occurred when Defense Logistics Agency workers at Hill Air Force Base, Utah, mistook the nuclear weapons parts for helicopter batteries. The report also describes how nuclear-related jobs in the Air Force have been reduced over time, so that resources could be shifted to conventional weapons procurement programs regarded as higher priorities. Making the personnel shortfall yet worse, positions that remained in the nuclear field have only been partially filled, with operations in Iraq and Afghanistan drawing hundreds of airmen away from nuclear responsibilities. “The task force was told by one bomb wing commander that the wing’s assigned crew chief manning was only at 67 percent of its authorized level — resulting in an inability to fly approximately 20 percent of the [fiscal 2008] training sorties — limiting air-crew proficiency and severely impacting combat readiness,” states the report. At the press conference, Schlesinger said his group estimated that to fill the most pressing shortfalls, the Air Force should move between 1,500 and 2,000 airmen into the nuclear arms sector. Additional personnel shifts might be needed beyond that, Carns said. The retired general would not venture an estimate of additional personnel needs because over time, “these manning [slots] have been reduced, and we therefore need to go back and … make sure the number is right,” he said. For example, “reductions have resulted in the removal of all intelligence officers from missile wings,” Carns said. “So it isn't a matter of sending an intelligence officer back; it's a matter of re-establishing that position and manning it.” Air Force leaders are to meet Sept. 18 in a “nuclear summit” in Washington, where they might initiate new actions based on the Schlesinger panel findings, officials said.
By Elaine M. Grossman
Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — A Senate Appropriations Committee panel on defense spending has slashed $43 million in fiscal 2009 U.S. Navy funds from a multiservice “prompt global strike” account, according to unreleased congressional documents (see GSN, Sept. 9). The Defense Department is developing conventional technologies capable of hitting targets anywhere around the globe with just one hour’s notice. Pentagon officials say the new capabilities are necessary for attacking fleeting targets at a great distance, such as terrorist leaders discovered at a safe house or a rogue nation’s weapon of mass destruction being readied for launch. The only weapons that currently boast the speed and range necessary to hit such urgent targets are nuclear-armed missiles, a feature that some Pentagon leaders have acknowledged makes them less usable (see GSN, May 28). Defense officials had previously proposed that a small number of the Navy’s nuclear-armed, Trident submarine-based D-5 missiles be modified to carry a conventional warhead. However, Congress last year zeroed that effort, with lawmakers saying they could not support a conventional missile whose launch could be mistaken for a nuclear strike (see GSN, Nov. 7, 2007). Capitol Hill is concerned that such launches could elicit an atomic weapons response from Russia or China. The top U.S. commander for strategic combat, Gen. Kevin Chilton, recently took stock of congressional concerns by shifting the primary responsibility for prompt global strike weapons development to the Air Force (see GSN, Sept. 3). Consistent with that shift, the Senate Appropriations defense subcommittee eliminated $40 million from the fiscal 2009 budget request for an “alternative re-entry system” that the Pentagon wanted to develop for prompt global strike, according to a draft markup report obtained by Global Security Newswire (see GSN, April 3). Officials said these funds were to be spent on a Navy concept for a Medium-Lift Re-entry Body that would have been a scaled-up version of designs for the controversial Trident modification program (see GSN, March 20). Critics said funding this alternative submarine-delivered weapon would have prolonged concerns about launch “ambiguity.” The Senate panel also zeroed $3 million in requested funding for a related Navy “Life Extension Test Bed-2” flight demonstration in 2009. The subcommittee moves, if approved by the full Senate Appropriations Committee and ultimately enacted, would leave the multiservice account for prompt global strike funded at $74.6 million. The Bush administration had requested $117.6 for the pan-service funding pot. In a separate account, Senate defense appropriators recommended adding an unrequested $2 million to prepare for an Army demonstration of the Advanced Hypersonic Weapon, a futuristic, fast-flying missile that also might eventually be used for prompt global strike. The subcommittee’s House counterpart earlier provided a $3 million increase for the same Army effort. House lawmakers also offered another $6 million funding boost for Air Force prompt global strike weapons development programs, bringing that panel’s overall funding for the mission to more than $126 million (see GSN, Sept. 9). Like the House defense appropriators, the Senate subcommittee denied the entire $23.3 million in Navy funds for the Reliable Replacement Warhead, according to the draft text. The first version of the weapon was to replace warheads on the Navy’s Trident D-5 missiles, offering increased safety, security, reliability and maintainability. After initially requesting funds for the new warhead effort in the Navy’s fiscal 2009 budget, the administration said the money would not be used for the RRW program. The change reflected lawmaker action to eliminate fiscal 2008 funds for the new warhead in the Energy Department budget, officials said. “Funding for the Reliable Replacement Warhead was rejected by Congress last year, and the committee recommends a reduction of all funds related to this program,” according to the draft fiscal 2009 report text issued by the Senate defense appropriators. The subcommittee did approve shifting $14 million of that money into an account unrelated to RRW work, namely for an effort to improve the “arming, fusing and firing system” of the existing fleet of Mark 5 re-entry vehicles on the Trident D-5 nuclear weapon.
Both houses of the U.S. Congress appear supportive of opening nuclear trade with India, but rules requiring the matter to sit for at least 30 days before lawmakers would have to be modified if the bilateral deal is to be approved this year, Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) said Friday (see GSN, Sept. 12). The Bush administration submitted a formal request last week for Congress to approve the trade, but legislators are only scheduled to be in session for two more weeks. “It will require a waiver of our rules, because you need 30 consecutive legislative days to pass before you could take up such legislation,” Pelosi told reporters Friday. “I hope that work can be done so that we can take it up,” she added. “It does have support in the House.” Key Senate leaders also endorsed the deal last week (Press Trust of India, Sept. 12). Despite the apparent backing for allowing nuclear sales to India, some lawmakers urged their colleagues to move carefully. “We strongly oppose rushing consideration of the proposal to adhere to an imaginary clock since the process of full congressional oversight and deliberation necessarily and properly requires a significant investment of time,” wrote Representatives Edward Markey (D-Mass.), Ellen Tauscher (D-Calif.) and John Spratt (D-S.C.) in a letter to House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Howard Berman (D-Calif.). “The Bush administration is lobbying hard to rush consideration of this unprecedented nuclear deal,” they said. “This tactic is unwise and inappropriate because serious questions remain about whether the deal is consistent with the law of the land” (Indo-Asian News Service, Sept. 13). In their submission to Congress, administration officials argued that India has met the congressional requirements laid out in late 2006, when lawmakers agreed to exempt India from most U.S. nuclear nonproliferation rules. New Delhi has, for example, reaffirmed its commitment to adhere to international rules governing trade in nuclear and missile technologies, according to documents submitted by the administration. It has also expressed interest in joining international efforts to create a nuclear fuel bank, a concept intended to dissuade developing nations from building advanced nuclear facilities (see GSN, Aug. 7). In addition, India has backed U.S. efforts in the U.N. Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency to curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions, Bush officials said in arguing that India is a responsible member of the nuclear community even though it has not joined the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (Siddharth Varadarajan, The Hindu, Sept. 15). Meanwhile, Pakistan has continued to lament the U.S.-Indian nuclear deal, arguing that it would lead to a renewed nuclear arms competition in South Asia and elsewhere. “The speed at which nuclear weapons spread internationally will surely increase,” said Pakistani scientist Pervez Hoodbhoy. “The deal has struck yet another nail into the coffin of nonproliferation.” He warned Indian officials that cooperation with the United States does not always turn out as planned. “Both India and Pakistan, particularly the latter, have paid a hefty price for being America’s strategic partner,” he said. “Once again, India’s elite is building upon nuclear nationalism to the detriment of the country’s true needs (Srinivas Laxman, Times of India, Sept. 14).
The United States and South Korea have failed to develop substantial contingency plans for the fall of the regime in North Korea, Newsweek magazine reported Saturday (see GSN, Sept. 12). “The question has been completely taboo,” says North Korea expert Andrei Lankov of Kookmin University in Seoul. “The major players are completely unprepared. The South Koreans don't want to touch it, and the U.S. takes its lead from the South” (Lee/Hosenball, Newsweek, Sept. 13). The issue has taken on significant relevance in recent days amid reports that North Korean leader Kim Jong Il might be recovering from a stroke. Kim’s health problems reportedly date back to April and are linked to the regime’s latest burst of intransigence over negotiations on its nuclear program, a Chinese source told the Japanese Mainichi newspaper (Reuters/Yahoo!News, Sept. 14). “It will take three to five months to be quite sure about how stable his condition may be in terms of ruling his country,” one South Korean official told the Associated Press (Kelly Olsen, Associated Press/Yahoo!News, Sept. 12). “The possibility of a complete collapse of the system (in the North) is not low,” according to the South Korean Chosun Ilbo. “In that case, it will be difficult to predict the moves of the 1.17 million North Korean soldiers armed with nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.” The U.S.-South Korean Concept Plan 5029 addresses civilian measures for dealing with North Korea’s unconventional weapons threat and other issues should the Kim government fall, Newsweek reported. However, Seoul three years ago blocked an effort by Washington to expand the plan with military measures. Instead, U.S. and South Korean officials agreed to “upgrade” the plan. U.S. officials seemingly believe that Kim will survive this health scare and that South Korea and China would take the needed steps to stabilize their neighbor in the event of a government crisis in Pyongyang. They also play down the nuclear threat posed by North Korea, arguing that the Stalinist state does not appear able to actually launch a nuclear weapon at another nation. The regime — no matter who is in charge — is also not likely to use a weapon or be willing or able to export a bomb or nuclear material, U.S. officials say (Lee/Hosenball, Newsweek). Others appeared less certain about North Korean nuclear security, the New York Times reported yesterday. “The bad news about North Korea is that we don’t know much about their nuclear control system. Or even if they have much of one,” said North Korea expert Jonathan Pollack of the U.S. Naval War College. Observers have argued that the North Korean military would probably take control of the country should Kim die or become too sick to lead. It would then exert full control over the future of a nuclear stockpile officially reported at 82 pounds of weapon-grade plutonium. That could produce six weapons, though some CIA officials believe Pyongyang’s arsenal might stand at 12 or more bombs. ‘The military understands that there is a big chance of retaliation if they ever sold anything to a terrorist — retaliation that would remove them and everyone they ever met from power,” said Harvard University nuclear nonproliferation expert Matthew Bunn (David Sanger, New York Times, Sept. 14).
The United States and Australia have agreed to continue working together on international nuclear safeguards projects for the next decade, the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration announced today (see GSN, July 13, 2005). The U.S. agency and the Australian Safeguards and Nonproliferation Office since 1992 have collaborated on a variety of projects, including implementation in Southeast Asian nations of the Additional Protocol, which allows for more intrusive monitoring of nuclear activities by the International Atomic Energy Agency. “Australia is a key partner in international safeguards and nonproliferation. We are excited about continuing this mutually beneficial relationship as NNSA launches its Next Generation Safeguards Initiative,” NNSA Deputy Administrator William Tobey said in a press release. “This is another step in our effort to strengthen nuclear safeguards worldwide to help ensure the safe, secure and peaceful implementation of civil nuclear energy programs and prevent proliferation.” The Next Generation Safeguards Initiative is intended to help produce new, improve safeguards equipment and technology and to bring highly trained personnel into the field (see GSN, Sept. 9). Washington and Canberra plan under the program to promote nonproliferation-boosting policies, produce new technologies to prevent proliferation and help enact safeguards systems in nations looking to establish nuclear programs (U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration release, Sept. 15).
The U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration announced today that it would help install radiation detectors at border crossings, airports and seaports in Romania (see GSN, Aug. 15). “Today’s agreement with Romania will help keep nuclear and radiological material out of the hands of terrorists and criminals,” William Tobey, deputy administrator for the semiautonomous arm of the Energy Department, said in a press release. “This partnership with Romania is another important step in NNSA’s global effort to foster international partnerships to detect, deter and dispose of dangerous nuclear material around the world.” The agency to date has deployed detection technology and provided operations training at more than 160 sites in other nations through its Second Line of Defense Program. This effort is a collaborative effort with the Romanian Frontier Police. Romania is among the roughly 75 nations that have joined the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration release, Sept. 15).
Russia plans to send a pair of nuclear-capable Tu-160 strategic bombers temporarily stationed in Venezuela on a patrol run over the Caribbean Sea, the Xinhua News Agency reported today (see GSN, Sept. 12). “The long-range aviation planes will take off from the Libertador air base and will fly for about six hours," ITAR-Tass quoted Russian air force Lt. Col. Vladimir Drik as saying. "During the flight the crews will engage in research issues linked with the peculiarities of exploitation of aircraft equipment in the tropical climate," he added, noting that the planes would remain over neutral waters (Xinhua News Agency, Sept. 15). Meanwhile, Cold War memories are being revived for bomber crews at Russia’s Engels air base, home to the two Tu-160 bombers now in Venezuela, Agence France-Presse reported. Russia resumed long-range bomber patrols last year after a 15-year layoff. More than 20 Tu-95 and Tu-160 planes were visible on the base’s runway, AFP said. “We wouldn’t have any problems flying to Cuba,” Russian flight commander Gennady Stekachyov said, referring to recent speculation that Russia could station bombers in the island nation. "If we're told to fly there and base ourselves there, then we'll do it. … Everything that's in the interests of our state is right” (Agence France-Presse/Google News, Sept. 14).
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