By Chris Schneidmiller
Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — The international community must agree on a common set of security standards to ensure that plans to expand the use of nuclear power do not increase opportunities for terrorists or rogue nations to acquire sensitive materials, a top U.S. nuclear official said yesterday (see GSN, Sept. 9). “An effective deterrent against the spread and use of WMD cannot be unilateral in nature,” said Thomas D’Agostino, head of the National Nuclear Security Administration. “Let me be clear when I say I believe the United States has a special responsibility in advancing nonproliferation and global security. But we should not and cannot do it alone.” D’Agostino said his agency is promoting development of standards that would serve as a comprehensive guideline on issues such as export controls, physical protection of nuclear material and safeguards. “Together we must build a system that excludes the possibility that proliferators could [exploit] just one weak link,” D’Agostino said during a discussion at the Center for Strategic and International Studies here. Safeguards are a particular area of concern, due to the increasing burden on the United Nations’ nuclear monitor, the International Atomic Energy Agency. Officials with the U.N. nuclear watchdog now conduct inspections in 145 nations to ensure that their nuclear sites, material and work are not being put to weapons purposes. The number of facilities checked under safeguards agreements has more than tripled in 25 years, while the quantity of weapon-grade uranium and plutonium under safeguards has grown six times, according to an NNSA document. The agency last week unveiled the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative, a program intended to support IAEA efforts by developing new technology and recruiting and training of replacements for safeguards personnel nearing retirement. The announcement came two days before a meeting between officials from Washington, the U.N. agency and 14 foreign nations to consider international cooperation on addressing safeguards issues. D’Agostino yesterday acknowledged the difficulty in persuading the ever-growing number of nations seeking nuclear power to follow one set of security guidelines (see GSN, April 21). “That is very much a difficult area. Standards are very important, whether we’re talking about a graded safeguards table on how much security we should consistently find around the world,” he said. “We’re already dealing with countries that have their own views on how they protect different quantities of what kinds of materials. Normalizing those and making sure we don’t open some gaps in there is very important.” D’Agostino pointed to the World Institute for Nuclear Security as one coming tool that would aid standardization of nuclear security. The program, developed by the Nuclear Threat Initiative and the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management, is intended beginning this month to strengthen information exchanges on best practices for security of nuclear materials at fixed sites and during transport. “We will be an active player and participant in that,” D’Agostino said. Broad-based thinking on nuclear security issues has been lacking to date, one expert said during an event Tuesday. The United States and its partners tend to play “bunch ball,” emphasizing one nuclear threat at a time rather than addressing the issue on the global level, said CSIS senior fellow Jon Wolfsthal. Instead, they should be “working to raise the water so that all boats float higher.” “We need to focus on the weakest link, clearly, but we need to be focused on all the weak links,” Wolfsthal said Tuesday during a panel discussion organized by the Partnership for Global Security. “We tend not to do that very well.” D’Agostino’s agency is a semiautonomous arm of the Energy Department, assigned to oversee the U.S. nuclear weapons complex and to conduct nonproliferation projects around the globe. He spent much of his prepared presentation discussing a host of steps taken to reduce the size of the U.S. atomic arsenal and to prevent nuclear or radiological material from falling into the wrong hands. These include: reducing operationally deployed U.S. nuclear warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 as required by the Moscow Treaty with Russia; increasing security at more than 85 percent of Russian nuclear warhead sites of concern, with completion anticipated this year; and planning the conversion of 68 metric tons of U.S. and Russian weapon-grade plutonium — sufficient to power 8,500 nuclear weapons — into nuclear power reactor fuel (see GSN, May 27). The Bush administration this fall is scheduled to issue a comprehensive report addressing measures by the National Nuclear Security Administration and other U.S. agencies to secure, eliminate and prevent smuggling of nuclear material and equipment, D’Agostino said. On Tuesday, Wolfsthal criticized what he sees as the lack of coordination and prioritization on threat reduction within the U.S. government and the international and nongovernmental communities. A prime example is the money and effort Washington has put into securing Russian nuclear materials even while allowing shipments of weapon-grade uranium to Canada for use in medical isotopes, he said. Threat AssessmentsU.S. and foreign officials for years have warned of the human and financial devastation that could be wreaked by a weapon of mass destruction. The NNSA chief reaffirmed that warning yesterday. In the discussion the day before, one expert suggested that the dire alarms on the WMD threat might be going too far. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists’ famous doomsday clock puts the world at five minutes to midnight — nuclear armageddon; that is two minutes closer than in 1962, the year of the Cuban missile crisis, said Michael Krepon, co-founder of the Henry L. Stimson Center. “We have not had an instance of WMD terrorism or, thank God, another mushroom cloud, not only since 9/11 but since the Soviet Union dissolved almost 20 years ago,” Krepon said. “So something’s off in terms of our threat assessments compared to the facts on the ground. “Obviously there’s no room for complacency,” he added. “Something truly awful could happen this afternoon, this evening or tomorrow. There’s a lot of work to do. But we are still living in an echo chamber of anxiety after 9/11.” Wolfsthal had a different take on whether the threat is being overstated. “There are clearly going to be consequences if you constantly point to a threat and it doesn’t materialize,” he said. “But I still want to throw more water on the fire. Even if that fire looks pretty out to me, I have a lot of water.” The most concern should probably be given to nuclear-armed Pakistan, which is undergoing a jarring transition in leadership after more than seven years under President Pervez Musharraf, speakers said Tuesday. The Musharraf government established a significantly stronger nuclear security infrastructure in the nation — encompassing a command and control system, intensive screening of personnel, tightened export controls and other measures — but there is no independent verification of Islamabad’s security claims or of potential weaknesses in the system, they said. Additional upheaval in the government could have “grave implications for nuclear weapons,” said Stephen Cohen, a senior foreign policy fellow at the Brookings Institution. He played down the likelihood of Islamic extremists taking power, but said the bombs could become an “instrument of policy” or more readily threatened should the military assume control in Islamabad or during a civil war. The most likely proliferation threat is that Iran becomes a nuclear power and Saudi Arabia then demands some form of nuclear aid from Pakistan as compensation for the billions of dollars supplied to Islamabad, Cohen said. That aid could come in the form of expansion of the nuclear umbrella to cover Saudi Arabia, he said. Policy goals should be focused on ensuring that Pakistan — home to former proliferator Abdul Qadeer Khan — does not send actual nuclear weapons to Saudi Arabia and promoting nuclear restraint between Pakistan, India and China, Cohen said: “Make sure their arms race is an arms crawl.” Pakistan would remain skeptical of Washington’s intentions and reluctant to accept U.S. aid in securing its nuclear assets, which are believed to include as many as 120 nuclear warheads, Krepon said. That reluctance is likely to be exacerbated by continued U.S. military anti-insurgent activity at and across Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan, he said. Krepon urged the United States to offer low-key suggestions on nuclear security best practices and technical assistance while putting more effort into promoting normalized diplomatic relations between India and Pakistan. “When Pakistan and India get into a crisis situation, that’s when nuclear assets tend to get moved, that’s when nuclear safety and security measures are most tested,” he said. In their separate appearances, both D’Agostino and Wolfsthal addressed the ongoing U.S. support for Russian nuclear security programs in relation to tensions between Moscow and Washington following the August conflict in Georgia. That crisis, though, does not appear to have affected support in Russia for the threat-reduction efforts, they said (see related GSN story, today). “These programs should transcend … any particular up and down that might exist on the international front,” D’Agostino said yesterday. Wolfsthal said that the gains made under the Nunn-Lugar program beginning in the early 1990s (see GSN, Aug. 18) were supposed to be part of a larger, never-realized attempt to address nuclear transparency, security and dismantlement in Russia and the United States. Questions also persist on whether Russia and other former Soviet states are prepared to sustain WMD security efforts should Western support dry up, he said. D’Agostino said the programs are moving toward cost-sharing and sustainability to ensure their longevity. “It’s right for the country and it’s right for the world and it’s right for Russia,” he said.
While U.S. officials have praised India’s nuclear nonproliferation record, New Delhi has conducted black market nuclear trading and has exercised poor control over key technology designs, a leading proliferation expert charged today. The accusations came hours before this afternoon’s scheduled hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to consider granting final approval to a U.S.-Indian nuclear trade deal (see GSN, Sept. 17). India’s nonproliferation record has been cited in support of recent efforts to restore commercial nuclear trade to the South Asian nation. The United States announced a tentative trade deal with India in 2005, and exempted the nation from most U.S. nuclear nonproliferation laws in late 2006. Last month, the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group waived its ban on key sales to India, leaving U.S. congressional approval as the final hurdle. The Bush administration has touted India’s adherence to nonproliferation norms throughout this process. Recently, former Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns said New Delhi was “playing by the rules of the club but not allowed to join the club,” the Washington Post reported today. However, David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security today questioned that assertion. His group “found several incidents where India conducted illicit nuclear trade and leaked sensitive information,” says a new ISIS report. “ISIS believes that important questions remain about the adequacy and implementation of India’s export control and nuclear classification procedures. In addition, India’s illicit procurement of dual-use nuclear-related items for its unsafeguarded nuclear program belies its commitment to the NSG,” the report says. The report documents how ISIS purchased highly detailed engineering drawings for uranium enrichment centrifuges from a group affiliated with India’s Atomic Energy Department. “The level of detail in the documents is sufficient that they would be considered classified in supplier countries and not distributed without careful controls over their use and requirements for their protection,” the report says. Their easy acquisition raises fears that “a winning bidder may be willing to manufacture and sell the same items to other unknown clients,” adds the report. In addition, the ISIS report details how India acquired a key chemical used to separate plutonium from spent reactor fuel by deceiving suppliers with front companies. Albright said Bush administration officials have shown little interest in his findings. “It didn’t fit with their talking points,” he told the Post. “At the highest level, they were dismissive of our concerns” (Greg Webb, Global Security Newswire, Sept. 18). Meanwhile, Indian officials have hinted that they would not refrain indefinitely from opening nuclear trade with other nations if the U.S. Congress takes too long to approve business with U.S. firms, the Indo-Asian News Service reported yesterday. Last month’s NSG ruling technically freed India to purchase nuclear technology from any exporter, but Indian leaders pledged to wait for the United States. That promise, however, might not persist if the Congress doesn’t approval the so-called “123 agreement” in a timely fashion. “Though India has put its agreements with other countries on nuclear cooperation on hold, it cannot be seen as an open-ended wait,” said an official source. “The onus is now squarely on the U.S. to ensure the 123 agreement runs through the U.S. Congress and is ready for signature at the earliest” (Indo-Asian News Service, Sept. 17).
The United States yesterday placed economic sanctions on six Iranian companies said to be involved with Iran’s ballistic missile and nuclear activities, the U.S. Treasury Department said (see GSN, Sept. 17). The sanctions target Armament Industries Group, Farasakht Industries, Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Co., Iran Communications Industries, Iran Electronics Industries and Shiraz Electronics Industries. The firms are now prohibited from doing business with any U.S. citizen and are set to have any U.S.-based assets frozen (U.S. Treasury Department release, Sept. 17). The firms “fall under Iran’s military-industrial complex,” Adam Szubin, head of the department’s Foreign Assets Control Office, told Reuters. “They are certainly state-owned and controlled. The United States and other Western nations suspect that some Iranian nuclear activities are intended to support nuclear weapons development, but the Middle Eastern state contends its atomic ambitions are strictly peaceful (Jim Loney, Reuters I, Sept. 17). Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said today the United States and five other world powers cannot persuade his nation to abandon its uranium enrichment efforts, Reuters reported. The enrichment process can produce nuclear power plant fuel but also a key nuclear bomb ingredient. "Whatever they do, Iran will continue its activities. Sanctions are not important," Ahmadinejad told reporters. Still, he expressed willingness to meet with both major U.S. presidential contenders on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly next week. "We are ready for talks that are completely free and in front of the media and at the site of the United Nations with America's presidential candidates," he told a news conference. The Iranian leader said Tehran had aided an international probe of its nuclear intentions “with full transparency” and contended the International Atomic Energy Agency has confirmed the purely civilian goals of Iran’s nuclear program, state media reported. That statement is at odds with an IAEA report Monday that said that Iran was blocking progress in the investigation of its nuclear activities. Ahmadinejad added that the assessment of Western intelligence about Iran’s alleged nuclear-weapon design research and ballistic missile development does not fall within the U.N. nuclear watchdog’s authority. "The United States government has made a claim that is beyond and outside of the purview and the provisions of the IAEA and the IAEA does not have a mandate really to examine such claims,” he said. Ahmadinejad said that Israel, which has not ruled out strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, is in "a weak position to launch attacks against any other country," state media reported (Parisa Hafezi, Reuters II, Sept. 18). A former senior adviser to U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney said this week that the United States would not take military action against Iran during the Bush administration’s remaining time in office, the Jerusalem Post reported yesterday. "Two things have to be in place for there to be an attack," said David Wurmser, who advised Cheney on national security issues until 2007. "That time has run out and that diplomacy has run out. The feeling to a large extent now is that diplomacy is working, that there is a trend in the regime toward moderation, that pressure is building on the regime." The movement away from the military option marks a victory by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who had long contested Cheney’s support for air strikes on Iranian nuclear sites, Wurmser said. The next U.S. president takes office in January (Herb Keinon, Jerusalem Post, Sept. 17). The presidential campaign of Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.) yesterday said that Alaska Governor Sarah Palin, McCain’s running mate, would appear at a planned protest against Iran next week outside the U.N. headquarters building in New York, the New York Times reported. The announcement prompted Senator Hillary Clinton (D-N.Y.) to drop plans to attend the rally. “[Palin’s] attendance was news to us, and this was never billed to us as a partisan political event,” Clinton spokesman Philippe Reines said yesterday. “Senator Clinton will therefore not be attending.” “Governor Palin believes that the danger of a nuclear Iran is greater than party or politics,” said campaign spokeswoman Tracey Schmitt. “She hopes that all parties can rally together in opposition to this grave threat” (Bumiller/Healy, New York Times, Sept. 18).
A new disarmament study has criticized leaders from the United Kingdom and other nations for insincerely pursuing the ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons, the British Press Association reported yesterday (see GSN, Feb. 26). “Representatives of nuclear-weapons states pay lip service to the principle of nuclear disarmament, but none of these states has an employee, let alone an interagency group, tasked full-time with figuring out what would be required to verifiably decommission all its nuclear weapons,” says Abolishing Nuclear Weapons, a report released yesterday by the International Institute for Strategic Studies. The report was authored by George Perkovich, of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and James Acton, of King’s College London. The two urge a greater commitment from the nuclear powers, which agreed in the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to pursue total nuclear disarmament. “An international consortium of think tanks should convene a high-level unofficial panel to allow experts from civil society and officials from both nuclear-armed states and non-nuclear-weapons states to explore solutions to the myriad challenges of verifiably and security eliminating nuclear weapons,” the report says. “Governments could assist these explorations by facilitating the participation of their nuclear weapons laboratories and militaries,” it adds. The report singles out the British decision to modernize its ballistic missile submarine fleet as particularly troublesome (see GSN, March 15, 2007). “Contributing to nuclear proliferation by pursuing Trident replacement … is incompatible with the goal of zero nuclear weapons,” it says (Ben Padley, Press Association, Sept. 17).
Australia might cancel a pending agreement to sell uranium to Russia amid recent tensions between Moscow and Western powers, Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd warned today (see GSN, Sept. 7, 2007). Rudd said Russia’s recent military conflict with Georgia has strained ties between Western governments and Moscow, Agence France-Presse reported. "If you look back over the last 20 years or so, what has happened in the last couple of months or so in relation to the West's engagement with the Russian Federation, I fear that we are at one of these turning points," he said. Rudd said that Australia "will spend a lot of time working our way through the question (of uranium sales) together with others on the West's long-term engagement with Russia.” An Australian legislative panel said in a report today that the pending uranium deal should be tabled until the government is confident Moscow would not divert the material for use in nuclear weapons (Agence France-Presse/Google News, Sept. 18). Russia should conduct its military and civilian nuclear work at different sites and activities involving Australian nuclear fuel should be monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency, the joint treaties committee said. Its report also stresses the importance of ensuring Moscow does not withdraw from international nonproliferation safeguards, the Australian Associated Press reported. The Georgian conflict and other political issues should also be taken into account in determining the pact’s fate, the report states. Some Australian lawmakers have questioned the committee’s conclusions and called for ratifying the deal. "The Russians have a huge crisis with energy," Liberal Party Senator Michaelia Cash told lawmakers. "Why would they put the import of Australian uranium at risk by not complying with their obligations under this treaty?" (Australian Associated Press/Western Australia Business News, Sept. 18).
A pair of nuclear-capable Russian strategic bombers departed from Venezuela today on a patrol route expected to take them over the Atlantic and Arctic oceans before the aircraft return to Engels air base in Russia, ITAR-Tass reported (see GSN, Sept. 18). The Tu-160 bombers left Venezuela at 1:30 a.m. local time. Their planned 15-hour flight should keep them in international airspace and might include an aerial refueling, said Maj. Gen. Anatoly Zhikharev, chief of staff for Russia’s long-range air force (ITAR-Tass, Sept. 18).
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