By David Ruppe
Global Security Newswire
Genetic testing suggests the sophisticated anthrax mailed to two U.S. senators and two news organizations was produced in a small batch, and fairly recently, according to a well-connected molecular biologist.
That would further suggest the perpetrator was someone connected with a government program or who works in a laboratory connected with a government program, Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, who runs the Federation of American Scientists’ chemical and biological arms control program, told Global Security Newswire yesterday.
“I’m certain it’s someone connected with a government program, or who works in a laboratory connected with a government program,” she said.
U.S. officials have yet to announce any results of the testing performed by a nongovernmental laboratory.
The anthrax probably was produced already in weapon form for U.S. biological weapons defense research, or was stolen from such a program and weaponized elsewhere, but did not likely come from an old offensive biological weapons program, she said.
“The grapevine has it that the results of an experiment on genetic variation at certain locations suggest that this material was made in a very small batch, and that suggests that the material was not made in some old weapons program on a large scale,” she said, citing sources inside and outside the government.
Mark Wheelis, a University of California-Davis microbiologist, similarly says that if the material were stolen from a government lab, it must have been done after 1980, probably from a small batch used for biological defense research, and not taken from U.S. offensive weapons stocks.
“Assuming for the moment that Barbara’s hypothesis is true, then this spore preparation could not have been stolen from the U.S. weapons program at the time we had an offensive program because the Ames strain wasn’t isolated until 10 years after the programs were ordered closed,” Wheelis said.
Wheelis is doubtful, however, that genetic analysis can pinpoint a specific time when it was made since 1980.
“That’s asking an awful lot for a technique like this, to even pin it down to a decade,” he said.
Strong Track Record
Rosenberg has a good recent track record on theorizing about the anthrax.
For several weeks, she has circulated her theory that a renegade person associated with a U.S. biological weapon defense laboratory was responsible for mailing the letters in September and October.
When she presented the theory in a speech last month at the Biological Weapons Convention review conference in Geneva (see related GSN story, today), a U.S. representative at the conference was said to have walked out of the room.
If her theory proves true, it could be embarrassing for the United States, which effectively killed conference efforts to create a legally binding verification mechanism for the treaty.
Rosenberg’s arguments seem to be gaining increasing credence. A New York Times story yesterday (see GSN, Dec. 3) reported federal scientists and a contractor found the mailed anthrax powder to be “virtually indistinguishable” from anthrax produced by the U.S. military in its offensive biological weapons program, which ended in the early 1970s.
The Times story said the powder had a similarly extremely high concentration of the deadly spores, much higher than other countries and terrorist groups are capable of producing.
An unidentified senior federal science adviser, cited in the story, said the finding lends credence to the idea the terrorist had links to a government lab or its contractors.
The Times also reported Sunday the FBI had expanded the focus of its investigation of the mailings to include government and contractors’ laboratories.
“Barbara’s analysis certainly fit all of the facts as we knew them at the time, and I don’t believe anything has surfaced yet that disagrees with it,” said Wheelis. “Certainly the articles in the Times provide further confirming evidence.”
Citing Publicly Available Evidence
Rosenberg said she developed her theories by analyzing publicly available evidence and with input from other scientists, and from “inside” sources.
She said the strain contained in the letters was the same as one that was used by the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases for biological weapons defense research, the Ames strain.
Further, she said a sample of the anthrax reportedly was mixed with a drying agent believed used by the United States to keep the spores from caking so it will float in the air.
“All the available information is consistent with a U.S. government lab as the source, either of the anthrax itself or of the recipe for the U.S. weaponization process,” wrote Rosenberg.
The U.S. weaponization process is secret, however, she noted, so further analysis would be needed to determine whether the letter samples were made using the special U.S. process.
Investigators have yet to say officially whether the size of the spores and the type of drying agent match that of anthrax made through the secret U.S. process.
“I do think we have to be cautious in recognizing that this is still a hypothesis,” Said Wheelis of U.C.-Davis. “It is still at this point just a theory.”
Informed Speculation
Rosenberg is not alone in her suspicions.
“There is explicit speculation floating around the informed bioweapons community in the United States that this might have been diverted from a U.S. biodefense program,” said Wheelis.
Some scientists have contended, however, that the perpetrator did not necessarily have to be associated with a U.S. biological defense program to produce that particularly virulent strain of anthrax.
Marjorie Pollack, an epidemiologist based in Brooklyn, is not yet convinced there is evidence a person associated with a government program was responsible, although she doesn’t rule it out either.
“Nothing I’ve seen points it to being a government worker,” said Pollack. The perpetrator could be a former scientist, but might also be a disgruntled lab worker or doctoral student in the biological sciences, she said.
Pollack argues equipment that could be used to produce dry anthrax powder, like that used in the attacks, is commonly employed in commercial industries and the drying process is well described in a journal that can be found on the Internet.
“It doesn’t take a rocket scientist to translate this particle size research and get the equipment to do it,” she said “It’s a whole industry out there and if I can find this online so can somebody else.”
A Disgruntled Person With Lab Experience
Rosenberg, Pollack and other scientists seem to agree on the perpetrator’s motivations and basic abilities.
He is probably a disgruntled employee who probably had access to the bacteria at a laboratory somewhere in the United States and some skill at working with hazardous materials, they say.
It could be “somebody who is concerned there is not enough funding for biological terrorism research, and got tipped over the edge by the Sept. 11 attacks and wanted to point out how vulnerable we were,” said Pollack.
The particularly virulent Ames strain has been used in U.S. biological defense work, but it also has been distributed for study to a handful of laboratories within and outside the United States, experts say.
The perpetrator did not appear to intend to inflict mass casualties, suggests Pollack, because the letters, sent nearly a month after Sept. 11, warned the recipients that anthrax was present, and in at least two letters, to take antibiotics.
The FBI Nov. 9 issued a very general profile of the suspected perpetrator based upon an assessment of his handwriting on three of the envelopes and letters. It suggested the letters all were written by one person: an adult male with a scientific background, potentially a loner, and possibly comfortable working with hazardous materials.
The person may also have been vaccinated or used antibiotics, had access to anthrax and possessed knowledge of how to refine it, had access to relevant lab equipment, and could hold grudges for a long time, vowing that he will get even with “them” one day, according to the FBI.
Thousands of letters processed since the anthrax incidents began may be lightly contaminated with anthrax after coming into contact with letters filled with spores, officials said yesterday.
“There seems to be the potential for not just hundreds and not just thousands but tens of thousands and maybe more letters to be potentially at risk for some level of cross-contamination,” said U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Director Jeffrey Koplan.
Such contamination may be responsible for the deaths of Kathy Nguyen and Ottilie Lundgren, officials said. Health and Human Services Secretary Tommy Thompson said, however, that there was no evidence of a widespread threat to public health.
“The risk to any one individual is low,” Koplan said. People with compromised immune systems, however, may want to take precautions such as having another person open their mail, according to officials.
Officials also said yesterday that anthrax spores might have been spread in postal centers not just by mail-sorting machines (see GSN, Dec. 4), but also by mail-stamping equipment. When a letter is stamped, there is “a physical ramming of the letter by the stamping device that in itself may cause some dispersion through the envelope in some way,” Koplan said. If one stamping machine was contaminated, spores could spread to others nearby, he added (Eric Lipton, New York Times, Dec. 4).
Irradiation or Detection?
The U.S. Postal Service may move away from irradiating mail to a plan that would focus on detecting anthrax spores and other agents, according to postal industry sources (see GSN, Nov. 30).
“Postal officials have made abundantly clear that they do not like the option of radiating mail and would like to take whatever steps they can to get out of the mail radiation business,” said Association for Postal Commerce President Gene Del Polito.
The Postal Service, however, said in a statement: “We remain committed to detecting and removing biohazards from the mail. The safety of our employees and the public is paramount.”
Mailers’ Council Executive Director Robert McLean, along with Del Polito, said the Postal Service wanted to choose detection first over irradiation because it is more efficient. “They just told us that they think it would be more efficient, would be less expensive and would not delay the mail as much,” McLean said.
The Postal Service would like $307 million for detecting equipment, such as a “particle-size and density analyzer,” which can determine if particles in a certain size range are biological or not, officials told Congress.
“Both [irradiation and detection] systems are going to be costly,” McLean said. “The question is, is it necessary to irradiate every piece of mail, or is the science behind the detection equipment such that [only] if it is detected would you move into irradiation?” (Ellen Nakashima, Washington Post, Dec. 4)
Gas Decontamination Considered for Other Buildings
It will take about five days to know if chlorine dioxide gas pumped into the Hart Senate Office Building killed anthrax there (see GSN, Dec. 4), U.S. Environmental Protection Agency officials said yesterday.
Before the gas was pumped into Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle’s (D-S.D.) offices, about 3,000 test strips coated with bacteria stronger than anthrax were placed throughout the suite, according to the Washington Times. The strips have been collected, and if the bacteria on them are found to be dead, it will be assumed that the anthrax inside the offices is dead as well.
If the gas method works in the Hart building, it may be used to decontaminate the Brentwood Road postal facility, also in Washington, postal officials said. Richard Rupert, the EPA’s on-site coordinator for the Hart building cleanup, said it was likely the gas method would be pushed for Brentwood, but he was “not sure if it could be used successfully in that space.”
It was still unknown as of yesterday when the Hart building would reopen, the Times reported. “I hope to have my work done here by Christmas,” Rupert said. “Having all of the anthrax out by then would be my present to the U.S. Capitol” (Guy Taylor, Washington Times, Dec. 4).
Representatives are expected today to consider the draft final declaration for the Fifth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention, which began Nov. 19 in Geneva. The Drafting Committee has been working to resolve many remaining differences on proposals for a final declaration (see GSN, Nov. 28). Export controls, scientific and technological cooperation, treaty violations and the future of a verification proposal for the BWC remained the major points of contention Friday, according to an analysis by the Acronym Institute.
The Non-Aligned Movement, a group of countries that includes Iran and Libya (see GSN, Nov. 21), sought a legally binding protocol to strengthen the BWC and multilateral negotiations to achieve such a protocol. The group criticized the United States for rejecting a previously drafted verification protocol (see GSN, Nov. 27) and urged BWC parties to continue to negotiate such a protocol.
The European Union also expressed regret at the inability to agree on a protocol but did not call for continued protocol negotiations. The United States apparently had not included the protocol or continuing its negotiations in its proposals.
Additional Meetings
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Japan and the United States proposed that BWC states hold at least one meeting before the next review conference, although their proposals differed on the number of meetings.
Compliance Issues
The United States called on the conference to ask parties that were not complying with the BWC to end their offensive biological weapons programs, after U.S. Undersecretary of State John Bolton accused several countries of violating the convention (see GSN, Nov. 20). Iran—one of the countries Bolton accused—called for the conference to ask countries to “refrain from unilateral and discriminatory action” concerning disputes under the BWC and to “refrain from baseless allegation and accusation against each other.” The European Union called for measures to deal effectively with compliance issues, but its proposal differed somewhat from the U.S. plan.
The United States has also pushed for a binding agreement to establish a procedure for an international team to investigate reported cases of suspicious disease outbreaks or alleged biological incidents.
Technological Transfer
The issue of the technology transfer and trade in biological materials has also been discussed. The United States proposed that the conference agree that the treaty did not impose restrictions on trade but also did not obligate parties to transfer materials or technology. Cuba, India, Indonesia, Iran, Libya, Pakistan and several other countries, however, recommended that the final declaration say that states have a legal obligation to refrain from imposing restrictions that could hamper economic or technological development.
Confidence-Building Measures
Disagreements remained over additional confidence-building measures. South Africa called for states to disclose their biological facilities, and the European Union proposed that treaty parties provide information on animal vaccines and some other substances. NAM countries, however, advocated that confidence-building measures be voluntary (Jenni Rissanen, BWC Review Conference Bulletin, Nov. 30).
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