U.S. Response I:  Pentagon Official Calls Homeland Defense First Priority

By David Ruppe

Global Security Newswire

A senior Pentagon official today listed homeland defense among its top U.S. military priorities as the United States transforms its forces to reflect a post-Sept. 11-era strategy.  Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Stephen Cambone made clear, however, that the military’s homeland defense role would remain one of support and said the extent of that new role is still under discussion.

“In a global environment, in a world in which it is possible for adversaries to reach across the oceans and attack directly here in the United States, we support civil defense here—and not just missile defense, which you know now is a hallmark of the president’s program (see related GSN story, today)—but also now civil defense, in support of civil authorities, biological, chemical attacks, as well as conventional attacks [and] terrorism,” said Cambone.

He took questions from reporters, congressional officials, and others at a Washington breakfast after describing the Pentagon’s effort to develop a new national military strategy.

Asked whether the new homeland defense role might require major changes in the U.S. force structure, Cambone said the Pentagon would continue to serve a supporting role and that it was continuing to evaluate that role.

“You notice how I’m careful to say ‘support the civil authorities,’” he said. “We have got to be conscious of those things that are properly the province of civil authorities and those things which the president and the Congress might assign the military to do.

“In the same way that the president asked us to get the strategy right before we open the country’s pocketbook, I think we’re doing the same thing here. Let’s sort of think our way through this before we start moving boxes around on the [organizational] charts,” he said.

Cambone noted a “growing relationship” between the Pentagon, Governor Tom Ridge’s Office of Homeland Security and various other agencies on homeland defense that are coming together “slowly but surely,” but he also acknowledged the relationship has had its “ups and downs.”

“Traditionally the military has shied away from these sorts of operations,” Chris Hellman, a senior analyst with the Center for Defense Information in Washington, told Global Security Newswire. “Their mission is national defense, and they view that as war-fighting.”

Hellman anticipates the military would provide additional logistical support to domestic forces, as it has in the U.S. war on drugs, and pitch in during times of crisis. The U.S. military already had the capabilities available to defend the Pentagon and the World Trade Center during the Sept. 11 attacks, said Hellman. They simply had not anticipated that sort of threat, he said.

“That wasn’t in their war-fighting plan.”

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U.S. Response II:  House Expected to Approve CDC Funds

The U.S. House of Representatives is expected to vote today on a measure that would provide $750 million between 2002 and 2003 to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (see GSN, Dec. 11).  Of that amount, $600 million would go to construction, and $150 million would be spent on bioterrorism-related activities.

An Atlanta-area group called Friends of CDC has been lobbying for the funding.  The group began after more than 100 business and civic leaders toured the CDC in 1999 and discovered many areas that needed improvement.

“Million-dollar pieces of equipment were covered in plastic because the roof was leaking.  A refrigeration unit was falling through the floor.  I said this was absolutely ridiculous,” said Phil Jacobs, president of BellSouth of Georgia and co-founder of Friends of CDC.

This year a CDC investigation into an anthrax-tainted letter sent to television anchorman Tom Brokaw (see GSN, Dec. 11) was delayed for 15 hours in October when a 40-year-old power cable at a CDC building burned and cut power to a laboratory.

Jacobs and other area leaders—including Oz Nelson, former CEO and chairman of United Parcel Service, and Bernie Marcus, founder of Home Depot—formed the lobbying organization because, as a federal agency, the CDC cannot lobby Congress on its own behalf.

“I haven’t found anybody up here [on Capitol Hill] that’s not supportive of the CDC,” said Representative Johnny Isakson (R-Ga.).  “We just have a lot of moving parts and capital investment for this war on terrorism, and everyone is fighting for their share of it” (Melanie Eversley, Atlanta Journal-Constitution, Dec. 12).

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Pakistan:  Two Scientists Discussed WMD With Bin Laden

Two Pakistani scientists who formerly worked in Pakistan’s nuclear program allegedly told investigators that they discussed nuclear, chemical and biological weapons with suspected terrorist mastermind Osama bin Laden in August in Kabul, according to Pakistani officials.  The officials said authorities have detained Sultan Bashiru-din Mehmood and Chaudry Abdul Majid since Oct. 23 and questioned them about their links to the Taliban and al-Qaeda (see GSN, Oct. 26).

Pakistani authorities said they believe that Mehmood and Majid used their nongovernmental organization, Ummah Tameer-e-Nau, as a cover for meeting bin Laden (see GSN, Nov. 28).  The scientists said bin Laden indicated he possessed or had access to radiological material, but the material was not sufficient to manufacture a weapon (see GSN, Dec. 5).  Mehmood had experience in uranium enrichment and plutonium production but lacked the knowledge needed to construct a nuclear weapon, according to Pakistani officials.

The scientists’ alleged admissions contradicted their earlier claims that they had only discussed charitable activities with leaders in Afghanistan (see GSN, Nov. 5).  After investigators showed the scientists evidence linking them to bin Laden, the scientists said they had discussed such weapons with bin Laden, Pakistani authorities said.

Authorities have kept secret the location and methods of the interrogations, according to the Washington Post.  They have not charged either scientist with a crime but were considering trying them for violating a national official secrets act (Khan/Moore, Washington Post, Dec. 12).

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Al-Qaeda:  Terrorists Plan to Use BW, Says Taliban Member

Al-Qaeda plans to attack the United States with biological weapons at the end of Ramadan, which ends Sunday, John Walker Lindh, an American captured while fighting for the Taliban, told U.S. investigators.  Lindh said the attack would be “phase two” of al-Qaeda’s war on the United States, and a third phase would destroy the entire country.

U.S. intelligence officials said they distrusted the credibility of the information because Lindh’s position in the Taliban was low.  Nonetheless the United States did issue an attack alert last week partly based on Lindh’s claim, according to the Washington Times (see GSN, Dec. 4).  Lindh provided “very helpful” information, according to U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz.

U.S. Marines have been holding Lindh as an enemy prisoner of war (Bill Gertz, Washington Times, Dec. 12).

No Evidence Al-Qaeda Has WMD, Says Coalition

Meanwhile, U.S. forces and allies in Afghanistan have not found any evidence that al-Qaeda was able to acquire or produce weapons of mass destruction, U.S. Coalition Information Center spokesman Kenton Keith said yesterday.  Keith confirmed that forces had found some al-Qaeda documents specifically about weapons of mass destruction, adding, “What they wanted to achieve from these documents is not clear.”

U.S. Cooperates With Pakistani Investigation Into Scientists

The United States has been cooperating with Pakistan in an investigation into the possibility that Pakistani nuclear scientists—particularly Sultan Bashiru-din Mehmood and Chaudry Abdul Majid—provided assistance or information to al-Qaeda or the Taliban, Keith said (see related GSN story, today).  “It would not be a fair conclusion that we are interested in these people for a specific thing,” he added (DAWN, Dec. 12).

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Al-Qaeda:  ISIS Finds No Evidence of Nukes

There is currently no credible evidence indicating that al-Qaeda possesses nuclear weapons or even sufficient material to produce them, according to an article to be published in the January/February issue of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists.  Lead author David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security, said he could not exclude the possibility that al-Qaeda possesses fissile material, but had no evidence of such possession (see related GSN story, today).

Albright cautioned, however, that if al-Qaeda successfully obtained enough plutonium or highly enriched uranium, it would have the capability to produce a crude nuclear explosive, especially if the organization had a base in Afghanistan where it could conduct nuclear research.  If al-Qaeda built crude nuclear weapons, it would probably deliver them by ship, truck or private plane—a difficult attack to counter, the article said.

Nations should establish an international group staffed or advised by experts that could investigate terrorists’ nuclear activities and coordinate with law enforcement and intelligence agencies, Albright said, noting that existing international organizations, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, were not equipped to deal with the threat.

The authors suggested several other measures governments should take: search for evidence of nuclear activities in Afghanistan, locate any scientists or others who were involved in al-Qaeda or Taliban nuclear projects, strengthen efforts to find al-Qaeda cells that could conduct nuclear work, increase security of nuclear weapons and materials and enhance coordination between governments (Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, January/February 2002).

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United States:  DOE Proposes Waste Disposal Cuts

U.S. Department of Energy cleanup “czar” Jesse Roberson has proposed a dramatic change in the way that officials would deal with the 53 million gallons of highly radioactive nuclear waste at the Hanford former plutonium production facility in Washington, the Tri-City Herald reported last week.

In a memo to the department’s budget office, Roberson proposed cutting vitrification programs at Hanford by at least 75 percent.  Vitrification is the process used to turn potentially leaky nuclear waste into glass.  The Hanford plant has more “tank waste” stored in its 177 underground tanks than all other Energy Department sites combined, but it is the only Energy Department site without a vitrification plant, the Herald reported.

Todd Martin, chairman of the Hanford Advisory Board, circulated the department memo during a board meeting Dec. 6.  It addressed efforts by the department to reduce the estimated 70 years and $300 billion necessary to clean up waste at nuclear weapon production plants.

Roberson was looking for cheaper ways to dispose of wastes over the long term, said Todd Young, a spokesman for U.S. Representative Doc Hastings (R-Wash.).  The Energy Department proposal would not affect cleanup measures over the next decade, which would address 10 percent of the waste, he said.

The proposal angered many advisory board members and other officials.  “I don’t think we have [an Energy Department] that is reflective of the wishes of the Northwest,” said advisory board member Greg DeBruler.  “We have an agency reflective of the Washington, D.C., beltway.”

U.S. Senator Patty Murray (D-Wash.) said, “It is time for the administration to understand that we will not let them renege on the promise made to clean up Hanford.”

Board members and other officials also cautioned that they did not yet know the context of the memo—whether it represents a brainstorming idea or a serious policy consideration and whether the 75 percent figure is arbitrary or backed by specific studies.  The board planned to ask Roberson for clarification, the Herald said (Stang/Cary, Tri-City Herald/Nuclear Control Institute release, Dec. 7).

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U.S. Response: Bioterrorism Response Funding Is Insufficient, Experts Say

By Greg Seigle

Global Security Newswire

While the $3 billion biodefense authorization bill currently under scrutiny in the U.S. Senate appears poised to pass soon and distribute $1 billion across all 54 U.S. states and territories next year—dwarfing the $10 million the White House initially proposed—state and local medical communities could still experience dangerous budget shortfalls in their efforts to prepare for nightmare scenarios, analysts said.

“If we spend less than $2 billion [next] year on local, state [and] city health departments, then our leaders don’t know what’s going on and don’t get it,” Tara O’Toole, director of the Johns Hopkins University Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies, said during a recent speech.

“Some of that money is going to waste. There’s no help for that,” added O’Toole, who served as assistant secretary of energy for environmental safety and health during the Clinton administration. “We have got to get money to the local level very quickly in order to just get some raw capacity in there.”

Roughly two-thirds of the $3 billion offered in the bipartisan bill is slated for federal coffers, much of it earmarked to develop, purchase and stockpile smallpox vaccines (see GSN, Nov. 29). A similar bill being formulated in the House is expected to make similar recommendations, according to congressional staffers (see GSN, Dec. 11).

While the boosting of vaccine stockpiles is sorely needed—including vaccines for biological agents other than smallpox—a national bioterrorism response strategy should give equal weight to preparing local medical authorities, sources said.  It is these people who will be on the front lines should biological weapons ever be unleashed by terrorists.

The Senate bill, introduced by Senators Bill Frist (R-Tenn.) and Ted Kennedy (D-Mass.) (see GSN, Nov. 15), initially sought to provide $5 billion—a large chunk of which was aimed at providing resources to the states and local governments. But Bush administration officials have vowed to veto any bills that surpass the $686 billion budget for 2002—or the $40 billion already designated for terrorism response.

“If we invested the kind of monies now that we did when [the Soviet satellite] Sputnik went up [and led to the creation of the] Apollo project, I think we would not only remove biological weapons as weapons of mass destruction threats, but I think we would also give the world great aid in dealing with malaria, [tuberculosis] and AIDS,” O’Toole said.

“It’s not a matter of [states receiving] $1 billion or $2 billion, it’s a matter of slowly building up your capabilities,” said Jonathan Ban, a research associate with the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute. “You do need a smallpox vaccine and you do need vaccines for all the other [diseases], even though you might not use them. But you can’t do it at the expense of state and local resources because you’re definitely going to use them.”

A “System of Systems” Needed

“You can have all the stockpiles of vaccines you want but if you don’t have a system in place to distribute them there’s going to be hell to pay,” Ban said.

“You have to have a system of systems to combat bioterrorism” at the vital local level, Ban said. “You need a system that has detection capabilities, laboratory diagnostics, epidemiological capabilities … Currently there isn’t any of that.”

Ban served as the lead analyst for the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention report “Bioterrorism in the United States,” released in July after a 15-month study that examined the response capabilities of seven large cities, including New York, which is considered the leader in civilian biological defense preparedness.

In the last couple years New York has established an evolving monitoring system that enables local authorities to track and categorize hospital admissions, 911 calls, water supplies and even absenteeism rates with large employers. If authorities notice a spike in one or more of the categories they might be able to head off a biological outbreak before it spreads too fast, sources said.

Quick Response is Key

“If you don’t detect [a biological attack] early it’s going to be a big problem, the way people move around [the world] today,” Ban said.  “The better you respond, the better you can handle the situation and mitigate the consequences.”

Currently the CDC advocates a “ring containment” strategy (see GSN, Nov. 27) modeled after the World Health Organization method that successfully eradicated smallpox from the world by 1980. If one person is exposed to a contagious, potentially lethal biological agent, local authorities need to quarantine them quickly and at least the last 20 people who had been in contact with them. Sources said the crucial factor in such worrisome scenarios is rapidly identifying the outbreak, so it can be contained. Hence, doctors, emergency crews and other local officials on the front lines need to have as much funding as training as possible, they said.

“I think it’s pretty apparent to people by now, following the anthrax attacks, that medicine and public health is at the heart of a response to bioweapons threats,” said O’Toole.

Public Health Vulnerabilities

“There are a lot of vulnerabilities” at the local level, she said. “First of all, [doctors] haven’t seen anthrax. They haven’t seen smallpox. They don’t know what to look for. They don’t know how to diagnose it. The big problem we saw [was] with the two patients, one in D.C. and one in Maryland who went to their doctor’s offices, went to the emergency room and were sent home with anthrax and later tragically died.”

In addition, there is no surge capability in the medical system, sources said. Hospitals keep just enough supplies and workforce on hand for daily needs—and they are pitted against each other as competitors and not prepared to work together, sources added.

“In the search for [financial] efficiency we have eliminated all excess capability,” said O’Toole.  “The public health system is even worse shape … We have not invested sufficiently in this system … The local health departments are bereft of resources. Half of them do not have Internet connections.”

“Connectivity is a major problem,” Ban added. “Hospitals are unprepared, doctors are unaware … Many of the locales don’t even have distribution systems.”

In the event of a biological attack, CDC plans call for federal authorities to fly in vaccines and other emergency supplies and drop off them at a prearranged airport hangar, sources said. Then it is up to local officials to distribute these crucial supplies.

One big-city fire chief interviewed by Ban for the CDC study said he planned to take the vaccines and other supplies to fire stations, then go on local television to inform the public to come get their shots.

“Can you imagine the psychological effect, the mad runs on the fire house?” Ban asked. “And would the fire chief himself be the one administering antibiotics?”

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Anthrax:  U.S. Army Reconstructs Spores Used in Attacks

The spores used in the U.S. anthrax incidents match those recently produced by the U.S. military for investigative purposes, the Baltimore Sun reported today.  As the “Amerithrax” investigation continues, however, critics are questioning theories that point to a U.S. military connection, according to reports.

Scientists at the Dugway Proving Ground in Utah have produced small amounts of weapon-grade anthrax that is nearly identical to the spores used in the incidents, U.S. sources said.  The production of weaponized anthrax is apparently the first since former U.S. President Richard Nixon ended the U.S. offensive biological weapons program in 1969, the Sun reported.

Dugway researchers sent the newly produced anthrax—via Federal Express—to the U.S. Army Military Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMIID) for sterilization.  USAMIID shipped the spores back to Dugway as a coarse paste, according to the Sun.  Dugway researchers then used the killed spores to minimize risks to workers while conducting experiments.  Some experiments, such as those on decontamination methods and detection systems, needed to use live and weaponized anthrax, according to government sources.

Army officials said the anthrax stored at Dugway and USAMIID were protected by several security measures.  At Dugway, security measures included video cameras, intrusion alarms and a “buddy system,” which does not allow researchers to handle anthrax and other microbes alone, according to one scientist.

Dugway produced the live anthrax because vaccines and other preventive measures need to be tested against aerosolized anthrax, according to David Huxsoll, a former head of the USAMIID’s biodefense program.  “When you’re building a program to defend against biological weapons on the battlefield, you have to be prepared for an aerosol exposure,” Huxsoll said.

The Army’s production of small amounts of weapon-grade anthrax at Dugway would not violate the Biological Weapons Convention, said University of Maryland expert Milton Leitenberg.  The convention only bans the production of biological warfare agents for non-protective measures.  “There’s no specific limit in grams or micrograms,” Leitenberg said.  “But if you got up in the hundreds of grams, people would be very, very skeptical” (Scott Shane, Baltimore Sun, Dec. 12).

Rosenberg Theory Questioned

A recent report that suggests someone connected to the U.S. military is responsible for the anthrax incidents has several inaccuracies that call its conclusions into question, according to the New Republic (see GSN, Dec. 4).

One false conclusion made in the report, prepared by Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, head of the Federation of American Scientists’ Working Group on Biological Weapons Verification, is that the limited circle of research facilities with access to the Ames strain of anthrax—the same strain used in the incidents—suggests a domestic source, the New Republic reported. 

Terrorists could just as easily obtain Ames strain spores from a recently dead cow, according to David Huxsoll, interim director of the Plum Island Animal Disease Center in New York.  The Ames strain, which was first isolated in 1929, is a monomorphic disease—one in which strains mutate slowly, or not at all—Huxsoll said.  Spores taken from a cow that died recently would be virtually the same as the Ames strain used by researchers, he said.

“One should not be at all surprised that you could find something very much the same—it would be a surprise to find something very different,” said Huxsoll.  “If I were a terrorist, I’d just go where the disease occurs naturally and dig it up.”

The Rosenberg report also said the United States first researched a strain of anthrax called Vollum 1B as a weapon (see GSN, Dec. 10), but then “the search undoubtedly continued for better strains.  The U.S. bioweapons program apparently switched to the Ames reference strain because of its high virulence.” 

There is no evidence of such a switch in research having taken place, according to the New Republic.  The U.S. biological weapons program never gave up working with Vollum 1B, according to a law-enforcement official.  Instead, when researchers saw how slowly anthrax killed its victims, they abandoned work on it altogether, the New Republic reported.  “Who the hell wanted a weapon that would take 60 days to kill?” asked the official.

If any former employees of the U.S. biological warfare program kept supplies of old anthrax, they would be Vollum 1B spores, not Ames, according to the New Republic.  There is no evidence the United States has produced weaponized Ames strain anthrax, the New Republic reported.

Rosenberg also wrote in her report that “The extraordinary concentration (one trillion spores per gram) and purity of the letter anthrax is believed to be characteristic of material made by the U.S. process.”  This does not mean, however, that other countries could not produce anthrax of similar quality, according to the New Republic.

The former Soviet biological weapons program deliberately used anthrax powder that consisted of only 25 percent anthrax by weight, according to Ken Alibek, former deputy director of the Soviet biological weapons program.  This was done not because the Soviets could not produce better quality anthrax, but because more concentrated anthrax was unnecessary for use in a missile weapon, the New Republic reported.

“I still don't see any geography here ... we are not going to find a smoking gun,” said former USAMIID commander David Franz.  “The anthrax could have been made in any place at any time. We have to get away from the idea that you can just analyze these samples and tell who made them” (Wendy Orent, New Republic, Dec. 11). 

University Inspections Begin

Research facility inspections began yesterday at the University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston (see GSN, Dec. 10), a university official said.  Investigators from the U.S. Health and Human Services Department’s Office of the Inspector General are examining the security of biological samples and computer data, said university spokesman Tom Curtis. The investigation could last up to four weeks, Curtis said.  “It amounts to an audit.”

The university is fully cooperating with the investigation, Curtis said.  “I don’t question the need for someone to look into dangerous materials and make sure they are being handled appropriately” (CNN.com, Dec. 12).

Information Needs to be Shared

New York Police Commissioner Bernard Kerik yesterday asked the U.S. Senate to pass proposed legislation that would make it easier for local law enforcement to obtain information from the FBI.  The walls between the two agencies were “the worst kind of dysfunctional thinking in government,” Kerik said.

In testimony before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight in the Courts, Kerik discussed the anthrax incident involving a suspicious letter sent to NBC’s studios on Oct. 12.  New York police did not learn about that letter until almost a week after the FBI had been notified, Kerik said. 

That example showed the need for better communication between local and federal law enforcement, according to Kerik.  “We could have been on the issue instantly,” Kerik said.  “And that sort of brought all of this to light.  The FBI had not let us know.”

The proposed legislation, sponsored by Senators Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.) and Hillary Clinton (D-N.Y.), would allow federal authorities to share information gathered from sources such as wiretaps, grand juries and foreign intelligence operations with local law enforcement officials.  The new bill, however, would not require federal law enforcement to do so.

Witnesses at the hearing said that while the legislation would not eliminate the withholding of information between federal and local law enforcement, it would remove an oft-cited reason federal law enforcement uses to do so. 

“It’s possible that countless New Yorkers were unnecessarily put at risk simply because the law and culture makes information-sharing taboo,” said Subcommittee Chairman Schumer.  “That’s a risk that none of us should ever be forced to take” (Raymond Hernandez, New York Times, Dec. 12).

Canadians Knew of Anthrax Letter Dangers

Canadian military officials knew several months before the U.S. anthrax incidents that letters filled with anthrax spores posed a risk to mail handlers and that opening a tainted letter could send spores into the air, according to the Wall Street Journal.

A Canadian study was discussed yesterday at a meeting called by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention regarding the anthrax incidents.  Canadian officials said they had e-mailed the study to the CDC soon after reports of the discovery of anthrax at the American Media Inc. headquarters in Florida.  The e-mail, however, was never opened, said Bradley Perkins, a CDC anthrax investigator.

Perkins said he regretted that the report was not read.  “It is certainly relevant data, but I don’t think it would have altered the decisions that we made,” Perkins said (Chad Terhune, Wall Street Journal, Dec. 12).

Organizers of the CDC meeting also asked participants to come up with the answers to several research questions concerning anthrax, according to the New York Times. The questions included the following:  

*         What is the minimum number of spores needed to infect a human (see GSN, Nov.16)?

*         How long do exposed people need to take antibiotics?

*         When is a decontaminated office or building safe?

“We wish we had the answers today,” said James Hughes, the CDC official overseeing the anthrax investigation (Lawrence Altman, New York Times, Dec. 12).

Hart Building Cleanup Continues

Small items, such as files, computers and books, which may have been tainted with anthrax inside the Hart Senate Office Building, will be shipped to Richmond, Va., for further decontamination, officials said yesterday.

The items have been fumigated once during the decontamination of the entire building, but this move is an extra dose of caution, officials said (see GSN, Dec. 4).  The process, which uses ethylene oxide, could take a week, a U.S. Environmental Protection Agency spokeswoman said.  EPA officials said they hope to reopen the Hart building by the end of the year (Goldstein/Nakashima, Washington Post, Dec. 12).

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Sudan:  Organization Criticizes U.S. Claims Sudan Has BW

The European-Sudanese Public Affairs Council, a London-based advocacy group, Monday criticized U.S. allegations that Sudan was pursuing a biological weapons program.

The council made the announcement in response to a statement by U.S. Undersecretary of State John Bolton at a U.N. meeting in November (see GSN, Nov. 20).  The council said Bolton’s statements were “unsustainable and deeply irresponsible.”

“For its own credibility on this serious issue, the Bush administration cannot allow its reputation with regard to arms control and nonproliferation to be sullied for the sake of cheap propaganda attacks on Sudan,” the council said (U.N. Integrated Regional Information Networks/AllAfrica.com, Dec. 11).

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Russia:  U.K. Might Help Destroy Russian CW

The United Kingdom could sign an agreement with Russia soon after Dec. 20 to help fund the effort to destroy stockpiles of Russian chemical weapons, Russian official Sergey Kiriyenko said this week (see GSN, Nov. 26). 

The United States and other European countries have also stated intentions to help fund the chemical weapons destruction program, ITAR-Tass reported.  Kiriyenko said that next year’s Russian budget for destroying the stockpiles would be twice as large as it is now (ITAR-Tass, Dec. 11).

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Taiwan: Ballistic Missile Being Researched, Study Says

A report released by the U.S. think tank RAND said Taiwan is working to develop a medium-range ballistic missile with the potential to hit targets in mainland China, the Associated Press reported yesterday.

The report, “Taiwan’s Foreign and Defense Policies: Features and Determinants,” said that proposed missile could hit targets up to 620 miles away.  A Taiwanese Defense Ministry official denied that Taiwan was working on such a missile. 

The United States would likely learn of any tests or deployment of a Taiwanese ballistic missile and could attempt to convince Taiwan to halt the program, according to the report.  “Policymakers in Washington should be alerted to the possibility that the program is actually a ‘card’ to be dealt away in exchange for specific weapons systems (AEGIS or Upper Tier [missile defense systems]) or enhanced defense commitments,” the report said (William Foreman, Associated Press/Yahoo.com, Dec. 11).

To read the RAND report, click here.

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India:  Successful Prithvi Test Announced

India successfully test-fired a Prithvi surface-to-surface missile capable of carrying nuclear warheads this morning.  The Indian Defense Ministry said the 250-kilometer range missile, which was developed by Indian scientists, hit its intended target.

“The test was successful and was flawless,” said an Indian defense spokesman.  (Agence France-Presse, Dec. 12).

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ABM Treaty: United States to Withdraw

As soon as today or tomorrow, the United States will announce its intention to withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, according to Bush administration officials.  The decision followed U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell’s visit to Moscow (see GSN, Dec. 11), where he reached no agreement on the treaty after meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov.  U.S. President George W. Bush apparently concluded that Powell would have little success and told Putin of his intentions in a phone call last Friday, according to the New York Times.

Russia had expressed a willingness to allow the United States to conduct missile defense tests that could be interpreted as violating the treaty, but it wanted the right to approve each test, according to the Times.

That was “something we couldn’t live with,” said a senior administration official.  “It would mean subjecting each test to separate scrutiny, and sooner or later they were going to say ‘no,’” a senior official said.

“In a way, the bigger question is how the Chinese will react,” another official said yesterday.  China, with only about 20 nuclear weapons that can reach the United States, fears that its deterrent capability could be affected by even a limited U.S. missile defense system, the Times reported.

The End of an Internal Battle

The decision to withdraw marks a major policy defeat for Powell, according to the Times.  He had argued that continued testing was still possible under the treaty (see GSN, Nov. 29).  Powell’s efforts were countered by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who argued that the treaty was too limited today and could not be amended to allow the type of testing the Pentagon wants to pursue, according to the Times.  National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice sided with Rumsfeld in the end, several administration and congressional officials said yesterday (Sanger/Bumiller, New York Times, Dec. 12).

Little Inkling From Bush

Speaking at the Citadel military academy yesterday, President George W. Bush gave no specific indication of his decision to withdraw from the treaty, but reaffirmed his interest in developing a national missile defense.

“The attacks on our nation made it even more clear that we need to build limited and effective defenses against a missile attack.  Our enemies seek every chance and every means to do harm to our country, our forces and our friends, and we will not permit it.  Suppose the Taliban and the terrorists had been able to strike America or important allies with a ballistic missile.  Our coalition would have become fragile, the stakes in our war much, much higher.  We must protect Americans and our friends against all forms of terror, including the terror that could arrive on a missile,” Bush said.

“We must move beyond the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, a treaty that was written in a different era for a different enemy,” he added (transcript, New York Times, Dec. 12).

Withdrawing From the Treaty

Although the treaty is of unlimited duration, treaty Article XV allows a party to withdraw “if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.”

The withdrawing party can withdraw six months after giving formal notice and must provide an explanatory statement (treaty text, U.S. State Department release).

Russian View

On Monday Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov allowed for the possibility of a U.S. treaty withdrawal.  “In our forecasts, we’re not excluding the possibility that the U.S. may be withdrawing from the ABM Treaty,” he told reporters after meeting with Powell.  “Therefore, in our programs for ensuring national security we are forecasting such an option” (U.S. State Department release, Dec. 10).

Nevertheless, a former adviser to Russian President Boris Yeltsin criticized the U.S. plans to withdraw.  “It is bad for America.  It is bad for the rest of the world.  It is bad for Russia,” said Vyacheslav Nikonov, adding that Russia could respond by putting multiple nuclear warheads on its newest ICBMs (CNN.com, Dec. 12).

Response in the United States

U.S. House Armed Services Committee Chairman Bob Stump (R-Ariz.) praised the administration move.  “There’s all these questions about Russia upholding their end of the treaty anyway, and I just don’t think we should penalize ourselves,” Stump said.  “We shouldn’t delay our ballistic missile defense.  If it takes withdrawing from the ABM Treaty, that’s fine.”

U.S. Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle (D-S.D.) criticized the withdrawal decision, saying, “It’s not a good idea.  It would be a real setback for defense and foreign policy to violate the ABM Treaty.”  He added that “it’s a slap in the face for many people who have committed years if not decades” to arms control (Ron Fournier, Associated Press, Dec. 12).

U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Joseph Biden (D-Del.) issued a statement cautioning that “unilaterally abandoning the ABM Treaty would be a serious mistake.  The administration has not offered any convincing rationale for why any missile defense test it may need to conduct would require walking away from a treaty that has helped keep the peace for the last 30 years” (Biden release, Dec. 11).

John Isaacs, of the Council for a Livable World, said, “Withdrawing from the ABM Treaty now is both unnecessary and unwise….Unnecessary because virtually all scientific experts believe that the U.S. can continue to test a missile defense system without breaking the ABM Treaty for many years to come.  Unwise because it could start a chain reaction that jeopardizes the three decades of progress the United States has made in reducing the threat from nuclear weapons” (Carol Giacomo, Reuters, Dec. 12).

Frank Gaffney, president of the Center for Security Policy, praised the Bush decision.  “President Bush is to be heartily commended for taking the only step vis-?-vis the ABM Treaty that is compatible with his declared purpose of defending the American people against the real and growing ballistic missile threat” (Frank Gaffney, National Review.com, Dec. 11).

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