International Response:  China Agrees to Allow U.S. Inspectors at Ports

China has agreed in principle to join the U.S. Container Security Initiative, in which the United States is working to station its Customs Service inspectors at non-U.S. seaports, U.S. Customs Commissioner Robert Bonner said Friday (see GSN, Sept. 30).

“I am very pleased that the Chinese government has agreed in principle to join with the United States in the Container Security Initiative,” Bonner said in a press statement.  “This is an important step, not only for the protection of trade between the U.S. and China, but for the protection of the most critical component of the world trading system as a whole — containerized cargo.”

U.S. President George W. Bush and Chinese President Jiang Zemin announced China’s decision during their meeting Friday in Crawford, Texas, according to a Customs press release.  U.S. officials have already made arrangements to station inspectors at ports in Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Canada (U.S. Customs Service release, Sept. 25).

For further information, see:

Fact sheet on U.S. Container Security Initiative

U.S. Customs Container Security Initiative Information

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Iraq:  White House Says the Time Is Now for Vote on Resolution

With U.N. Security Council talks on Iraq set to resume this week amid continuing disagreement among the council’s permanent members on what a new resolution should look like, U.S. President George W. Bush’s administration today signaled that a vote could be near on a U.S. resolution formally submitted Friday (see GSN, Oct. 25).

“The time has come for people to raise their hands and cast their vote,” White House spokesman Ari Fleischer said.  “It is coming down to the wire.  This is important.  The United Nations has debated this now long enough” (Reuters/Yahoo.com, Oct. 28).

Fleischer’s remarks followed Bush’s warning over the weekend that Washington “in the name of peace will lead a coalition to disarm” Iraqi President Saddam Hussein if “the United Nations won’t act” and “Saddam Hussein will not act” (Reuters/MSNBC.com, Oct. 27).

Permanent council members France, Russia and China have indicated they want language that gives Iraq a greater chance to comply with demands for weapons of mass destruction inspections than would be possible under U.S. proposals (Edith Lederer, Associated Press/Yahoo.com, Oct. 28).

As the U.S. resolution was introduced Friday, U.S. diplomats made it clear they could call for a vote at any time on the measure (Julia Preston, New York Times, Oct. 26).  The move was met with the submission of informal texts by France and Russia.  France also reversed a previous stance by announcing Saturday that it could formally introduce its own resolution, but Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin added that Paris will “try to work with the Americans on the basis of the text they have proposed” (Elaine Sciolino, New York Times, Oct. 27).

The United Kingdom, Singapore, Norway, Bulgaria, Colombia and Mauritius are said to be likely to vote with the United States, which would leave Washington short of the nine votes it needs.  Along with France, Russia and China, opponents of the U.S. text include Ireland, Mexico, Syria, Guinea and Cameroon, according to the Financial Times (Carola Hoyos, Financial Times, Oct. 26).  The New York Times, though, reported that some diplomats said Guinea could support the United States (Preston, New York Times).

U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell acknowledged Saturday that a council vote could go against the United States (Hutcheson/Hayward, Miami Herald, Oct. 27).

The council was to hear today from chief U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix and the International Atomic Energy Agency’s head, Mohamed ElBaradei (see GSN, Oct. 23; Lederer, AP/Yahoo.com).

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U.S. Response:  Tougher Export Control Regimes Needed

By David McGlinchey
Global Security Newswire

The U.S. State Department should develop a strategy to strengthen multilateral export controls designed to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction, according to a General Accounting Office report released last week (see GSN, Sept. 26).

Multilateral export control regimes have successfully limited the export of weapons — particularly to “countries of concern” — but a number of shortfalls leave them unable to address some proliferation issues, the report says.

The Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Australia Group have had an impact on weapons proliferation, including by increasing the cost of attaining chemical weapons worldwide and by stunting missile programs in Argentina, Brazil and Egypt.

Member nations, however, are not sharing information about export denials and approvals, preventing a complete picture of the regimes’ effectiveness.  Countries are also taking harmfully long periods of time to adopt export control changes into their own laws, and once this does occur the regulations are being applied differently worldwide, according to the GAO.

“This lapse of time might allow proliferators seeking sensitive items to exploit disparities in regime members’ control lists,” the report says.

Export controls are also suffering because countries join the regimes without effective export control systems in place — the United States has identified Argentina, Belarus and Russia as offenders, according to the report.

Any effort to reform the regimes, however, would face imposing hurdles, the GAO says.

One member can stop a change in a regime, resulting in a “difficult process of making consensus-based decisions,” the report says.  The regimes are voluntary, meaning the groups cannot act against blatant violations such as Russia’s sale of nuclear fuel to India (see GSN, April 30).  Earlier this year, the Australia Group adopted stricter controls over chemical and biological weapons but there is no penalty for not adhering to them (see GSN, June 21).

The report also noted that changing technology makes it difficult to maintain current control lists.

“Secondary proliferation,” poses another significant risk to the regimes, as nonmember countries develop the technology to produce weapons of mass destruction.  The GAO singled out North Korea for its export of ballistic missile technology.

The report recommends the U.S. secretary of state develop a strategy to improve the regimes, report all U.S. denials of export licenses and establish criteria for reviewing the regimes.  The secretary should also work with other member nations to toughen the regimes, and as part of that effort the United States should “increase information sharing, improve the consistent adoption and implementation of export controls, and assess ways to overcome organizational obstacles to reaching decision and enforcing members’ compliance with their regime commitments,” the report says.

For further information, see:

Australia Group Web Site

Australia Group Control List

Australia Group Participants

U.S. State Department MTCR Summary

Wassenaar Arrangement Web site

Wassenaar Participating States

Pentagon Executive Summary on Wassenaar

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Georgia:  Aid Sought to Reopen Research Reactor in Nonproliferation First

By Bryan Bender
Global Security Newswire

TBILISI, Georgia — Georgia is seeking new nonproliferation aid to reopen a small nuclear reactor for research purposes.  The proposed project would mark a departure for arms control efforts in the former Soviet Union by funding new nuclear efforts rather than decommissioning facilities or destroying weapons, according to government officials and experts.

After three years of closure, re-opening Georgia’s only reactor would help prevent nuclear scientists from seeking employment elsewhere and would help train a new generation of experts to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, Georgian officials said.

Shukuri Abramidze, director of the Andronikashvili Institute of Physics near here, said in an interview last week that the institute is seeking new assistance from the International Atomic Energy Agency and donor countries to reopen its research reactor for peaceful, scientific pursuits. 

If such assistance were approved and financed, under the U.S.-sponsored Cooperative Threat Reduction program or from other international sources such as the IAEA, experts say it would mark a significant departure for nonproliferation efforts, which have focused primarily on closing down former Soviet nuclear facilities and securing remaining ones from sabotage.

Nevertheless, they say the possibility of funding research reactors with low enriched nuclear fuel is a subject of growing debate as nations pledge additional resources to secure nuclear know-how.

“There is a big effort in this area,” Robert Einhorn, former assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation who is now with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said of discussions about providing research reactor assistance to former Soviet states and others, relying on low enriched uranium fuel to support scientific and educational pursuits.

Pros and Cons

“As far as I know this has never been done [using nonproliferation money] and there could be arguments on both sides,” said Matthew Bunn, a nuclear expert at Harvard University.

For example, while funding nuclear research efforts could prevent nuclear expertise from leaking to would-be proliferators such as Iran, Iraq or North Korea — and help to train a new generation of nuclear scientists in such places as Georgia where many Soviet-era physicists are reaching or have surpassed retirement age — it could also pose new proliferation problems.

“On the downside there are hundreds of research reactors and that is a much larger number than needed for science, for training or for testing of materials,” Bunn said.  “A very small number would do the job if there were more international cooperation.” 

There are also security issues involved, including the possibility of sabotage, he added.  For example, the spent fuel for small research reactors tends to be small and potentially portable, unlike power reactor spent fuel, Bunn said.  While only highly enriched uranium can be used to make a nuclear bomb, low enriched uranium could be used to make a radiation dispersal device, or so-called dirty bomb.

“You would have to make sure [there are] regulations to provide a level of security that is commensurate with the level of threat,” he said.  “You can’t rule out a bunch of guys with machine guns showing up somewhere.”

But in Georgia, the 72-year-old Abramidze and his team of 90 scientists have concluded that reopening the research reactor would be the best way to utilize the workforce, while paving the way for a new generation of Georgian scientists to receive hands-on experience in peaceful nuclear disciplines. 

At its height the reactor employed 400 scientists, most of whom have moved to Russia, other former Soviet states or the West.  Abramidze expressed confidence that none of them has gone to Iran, Iraq, North Korea or other countries allegedly seeking to build nuclear weapons.

The institute has been working on an IAEA-funded study to determine the reactor’s future, according to Abramidze. The light water research reactor was decommissioned in 1999 and its estimated 40 kilograms of low enriched uranium — both fresh and spent fuel — was removed for safe storage in Scotland as part of the U.S.-led Operation Auburn Endeavor, officials said.  The reactor itself is housed beneath two meters of concrete to prevent leakage of any leftover radiation. 

“We are ready to provide a special report by the end of this year to outline a future role for this” reactor, Abramidze said.  “We are hoping to get funds for this new project,” including a 50-kilowatt light water reactor. 

Others see the benefits of such a project.  “They don’t have a new generation [of scientists] anymore,” said Andrei Chupov, head of IAEA technical cooperation in Europe, Africa and West Asia.  “They have no tool anymore,” he said, referring to the decommissioned reactor.

Bunn agreed that a low power research reactor could benefit Georgia. “On the upside, it is certainly true that many of the experts are retiring and there is a need for training another generation of nuclear experts.  A case can also be made that these under-employed scientists … need useful and worthwhile civilian work [so they will] not sell them to somebody who will use them for nefarious purposes.”

However, “I suspect it would make more sense to work out an arrangement where Georgian scientists could travel to a facility in Russia,” Bunn said.

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North Korea:  Pyongyang Urged to Abandon Nuclear Efforts

U.S. President George W. Bush, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and South Korean President Kim Dae-jung Saturday called on North Korea to abandon its recently acknowledged nuclear weapons program.  The three leaders met in conjunction with the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation conference in Mexico (see GSN, Oct. 25).

Bush, Koizumi and Kim agreed that North Korea’s nuclear weapons program violates the 1994 Agreed Framework and the South-North Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, according to a joint statement.  The three leaders urged Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear weapons program and abide by international agreements.

“The three leaders agreed that North Korea’s relations with the international community now rest on North Korea’s prompt and visible actions to dismantle its program to produce highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons,” the joint statement said (U.S. State Department release, Oct. 26).

APEC

Leaders from the 21 countries attending the APEC conference also released a joint statement Sunday calling on North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons program.

“We uphold that a nuclear weapons-free Korean peninsula is important to the peace and stability of the peninsula and northeast Asia, and is also in the interests of all members of the region,” the APEC joint statement said.  “We call upon the D.P.R.K. to visibly honor its commitment to give up nuclear weapons programs and reaffirm our commitment to ensure a peaceful resolution of this issue (Associated Press/Yahoo.com, Oct. 27).

The statement, however, did not reach the level of condemnation that some Bush administration officials had said they wanted, according to the Wall Street Journal.  The APEC conference also made little progress on what, if any, measures should be taken if North Korea continues to maintain its nuclear weapons program (see GSN, Oct. 24).  Some U.S. State Department officials have expressed concerns that Pyongyang might intensify its efforts if threatened, the Journal reported.

“It’s a tricky and complicated problem that I wish would go away in a week or two but I have a feeling that it’s going to be with us for a while,” a senior State official said (Cummings/Cooper, Wall Street Journal, Oct. 28).

China

Chinese President Jiang Zemin said yesterday that he was “completely in the dark” about North Korea’s nuclear weapons program but agreed to work with Bush to convince Pyongyang to bring it to an end.  While China is one of North Korea’s main allies, it is unknown how much influence Beijing has over Pyongyang, according to the Philadelphia Inquirer.

“We Chinese always hold the position that the Korean peninsula should be nuclear-weapons free,” Jiang said following a meeting with Bush at his ranch in Crawford, Texas (Ron Hutcheson, Philadelphia Inquirer, Oct. 26).

China has warned the United States that North Korea might have developed three to five usable nuclear weapons, double the number estimated by U.S. intelligence, according to the London Sunday Times. 

The CIA has previously estimated that North Korea stockpiled enough plutonium to produce one or two nuclear weapons before signing the Agreed Framework, under which Pyongyang agreed to end close it plutonium production reactors in exchange for two light-water nuclear reactors.  China, however, has concluded that North Korea has enough enriched uranium through its recently admitted program to produce several more warheads, according to the Sunday Times.

South Korean officials have said they have been informed by the United States that North Korea has enough enriched uranium, about 70 pounds, to produce two warheads, the Sunday Times reported. 

North Korea is also believed to have succeeded in miniaturizing their nuclear weapons for use on their ballistic missiles, according to experts.

China told U.S. officials last week that a U.S.-North Korean conflict would end in disaster, diplomatic sources said (Michael Sheridan, London Sunday Times, Oct. 27).

Japan

Japanese and North Korean officials arrived in Malaysia today for two days of long-scheduled talks beginning tomorrow on normalizing relations between the two countries. 

The talks will have a “great impact on peace and stability” in the region, and will address the issue of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, Koizumi said today.

“We intend to make the talks comprehensive,” he said during a speech at the APEC conference.  “We will discuss the abduction issues and security, as well as problems of the past, the present and the future.”

The talks are expected to be difficult, said Katsunari Suzuki, head of the Japanese delegation.

“The hurdle is very high,” Suzuki said.  “But we will do our utmost to take advantage of this door opened by the prime minister. ... We hope to make appreciable progress” (Eric Talmadge, Associated Press/Yahoo.com, Oct. 28).

KEDO

The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, which oversees the light-water reactor construction project, finished a round of working-level talks with North Korea Saturday on the creation of a satellite network as part of the project (see GSN, Oct. 22).

During the talks, held in Pyongyang, KEDO and North Korea discussed the construction of a satellite connection between Seoul and the Kumho district in North Korea’s South Hamkyong province, where the reactors are to be built.

“The KEDO and North Korea will hold further talks to push for the communication network,” said an official at the Office of Planning for the Light-Water Reactor Project (Sohn Suk-joo, Korea Times, Oct. 28).

For further information, see:

Agreed Framework Text

KEDO

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Al-Qaeda:  Intelligence Sources Describe Al-Qaeda as Nuclear Threat

Many intelligence and defense officials operate under the assumption that the al-Qaeda terrorist network has nuclear capabilities, the Washington Times reported today (see GSN, Oct. 8).

Several anonymous sources said that al-Qaeda definitely has nuclear warheads.

Israeli intelligence reported that al-Qaeda “bought tactical nuclear weapons from some former Soviet republics,” a former Soviet intelligence officer said.  “They are not the suitcase-type bombs that people often refer to, but more the warhead-type munitions.  These are the payloads of short-range missiles, torpedoes and the like.”

An unnamed Western intelligence official said Russian mob figures sold nuclear weapons to al-Qaeda operatives, who then took the devices to Central Asia.  Osama bin-Laden’s followers also sought technical expertise in the area, according to the Times.

“Several Russian nuclear technicians were hired by the Islamic fundamentalists to try and make the weapons operational,” the Western official said.

These allegations are supported by the discovery of non-weapons-usable uranium 238 almost a year ago in a tunnel near Kandahar, Afghanistan, and indications from officials that al-Qaeda has nuclear capabilities, the Times reported.

Some disputed the intelligence sources, however.

“I believe that the chance that al-Qaeda controls actual warheads is virtually nil,” said Rose Gottemoeller, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Neil Doyle, Washington Times, Oct. 28).

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Interview:  Former U.S. Ambassador to China and South Korea James Lilley

National Journal correspondent Lee Michael Katz interviewed James Lilley on October 19.  Lilley served as U.S. ambassador to China and to South Korea, as well as assistant secretary of defense for international affairs. He is now a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.

In the edited excerpts that follow, Lilley contends that insular North Korea uses nuclear “extortion” to gain foreign aid.

NJ: North Korea just made this declaration, but the United States has long had suspicions about a North Korean nuclear weapons program. How did this come out now?

Lilley: It took time for the Bush administration to gather the convincing evidence. They first got indications about two years ago. Gradually, information accumulated and they connected the dots. They decided they would lay it before the North Koreans in a pretty cold way, and got a rather unexpected response.

The first day was a pretty typical North Korean response: tantrums, accusations that we were lying, cheating, and fabricating. The second day we got the real surprise: They said, “OK, it’s happening; what are you going to do about it?”

NJ: What were the motives of North Korea and its dictator Kim Jong Il?

Lilley: Certain motives we can spot, such as survival or extortion. It’s very hard, because you are trying to read the mind of King Jong Il, essentially, and he’s a very strange, weird, and contradictory person.

Why now? They think they can use it as a means to get additional aid. The first time they were caught, they got $4 billion for two nuclear reactors, plus 500,000 tons of oil a year. It was a tremendous shot in the arm for them. The acquisition of money — that’s very much their technique, and they’ve been phenomenally successful.

NJ: North Korea has made some public gestures, while still maintaining clandestine programs. Are they trying to open up to the world or are they desperate for aid?

Lilley: What they’re trying to have is a North Korean-controlled opening-up. They have to do it because of their miserable conditions.  Their agriculture’s a terrible mess. They have no workable financial system. They can’t produce goods, heat their country, provide light.

They can keep their population repressed indefinitely because of very totalitarian methods, but they have to try to get the West and South Korea and Japan to feed them. This requires controlled openings, but their objective is to keep their weapons of mass destruction, and their huge conventional force, as a military threat to extort money.

NJ: The White House called the North Korean nuclear revelation “troubling, sobering news.” Was that an understatement by a Bush administration focused on Iraq?

Lilley: I don’t think they’re downplaying it, but the point they’re trying to make is, this is a different tactical situation. Military force is a major component in Iraq to accomplish our objectives. This is not the case in North Korea. There is no military option. These countries are radically different.

The big war happened for North Korea in 1950 when they invaded the South.  Iraq has more of a tendency for external violence. The whole attitude of Saddam is messianic, to become conqueror of the Middle East.

Iraq has a lot of oil and it’s a comparatively richer country. North Korea is a basket case. Kim Jong Il can only survive in his own little country.  We have to pressure North Korea, using our tremendous economic leverage, to contain their nuclear program and start economic reform, which would lead to a basic regime change over time. So Kim Jong Il either has to change or he’s out of there. I’m not saying he’s not in control, but his whole situation is more challengeable.

NJ: Do you think Kim Jong Il would use nuclear weapons against U.S. troops or allies in the region?

Lilley: The Americans have made it clear to him that this would lead to massive retaliation-the end of his whole country. That doesn’t mean he can’t use them for psychological purposes. He’s very good at that. He has a million-man army, 70 percent of it in aggressive deployment.

He threatened to attack in 1993, 1994, and we bought him off. First time we’ve ever done that: Buy off a nation that’s creating nuclear weapons with this huge aid package. Congress was enraged [that the Clinton administration] committed all this money.

But the little guys from the U.S. government would trundle up and say, he needs this or he would make war. They got the money. So the threat of war has been a very useful device for extorting money. It’s a very complicated psychological warfare game.

NJ: North Korea has one of the world’s largest armies, but the U.S. military is the strongest. Would attacking North Korea be so different from attacking Iraq?

Lilley: Yes, it would be. First, South Korea is absolutely adamant that we do nothing like a pre-emptive strike on the North because they know the North Koreans have 12,000 artillery pieces. The day you touched North Korea, you would get probably half a million shells dropped on Seoul and probably lose between 5 million and 10 million people. Or you’d get suicide planes crashing into nuclear plants in the South. The devastation would be unbelievable.

South Korea, when the loose talk of pre-emptive strikes came up in 1994, came to me, and others, and said, “You Americans, you’re playing games with our life.”

Second, North Korea has got this secret, weapons-of-mass-destruction program spread out all over the place — people say 11,000 caves. They’ve been working underground for 40 years. You’d never find it. They’ve got some World War II “Fat Boy” plutonium bombs they can deliver by air.

So your closest allies are dead-set against it; the cost would be much, much greater; and the results would be much worse than in Iraq.

NJ: Do you agree with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who says North Korea already has several nuclear weapons?

Lilley: The CIA has been saying that for eight years-it estimates they’ve got two or three bombs. Of course, the North Koreans hinted in talks, “Oh, we’ve got something much worse than uranium enrichment.”

We say they have biological and chemical weapons and two or three plutonium bombs, so they look at us in a sly way and say, “Maybe you’re right.” I would say they were bluffing when they said they would go to war in ‘93, ’94 — and it worked beautifully for them. I think now, it’s not an empty threat.

NJ: Under President Clinton, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright went to North Korea, but it took the Bush administration until last month to have an assistant secretary of state meet with North Korean officials.  Why?

Lilley: My sense is Bush was trying to make the case to the North Koreans:  “You’re in a new ball game. This is not Madeleine Albright. This is not our deal. We are not going to bribe you with billions of dollars.” The Clinton approach was basically, “We will reward you if you do things.” The Bush approach is basically, “We will punish you if you do bad things.” To give them unconditional food aid was not very smart, but it created a dependency they can’t live without.

NJ: There’s a real question of how to respond to desperate reports from North Korea. Do we let them starve?

Lilley: First of all, in every other country in the world, including Stalinist Russia, when we gave food aid, we monitored its distribution.  North Korea is the exception. The result is, probably a good percentage of that food aid is not going to the children. It’s going right into their military and their prized bureaucrats. You’ve got to get monitors in there.

Of course you’ve got to worry about starving children. It’s a very pathetic sight. And you can be sure, you’re going to get lots of pictures of swollen bellies and sunken jaws. But they’re causing it. It’s like Saddam Hussein has got 14 palaces and he shows you pictures of starving children. This is an internal problem of theirs. Somebody has got to say, “This must change.”

NJ: Members of Congress are upset they weren’t informed when North Korea told administration officials about its nuclear weapons program.

Lilley: My reading is they did tell certain congressmen. It was a very confused time. The North Koreans had blindsided us. We weren’t sure how we’d handle it. We were afraid it would have leaked prematurely.

NJ: Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle says North Korea should immediately accept inspections and the dismantling of its weapons-of-mass-destruction program. What do you think?

Lilley: It won’t happen. It makes Daschle look tough and the administration look weak and watery. I don’t think it’s terribly helpful.  You’re going to get progress in an evolutionary manner. Part of the reason they came through this time is that they didn’t want inspections, which would reveal how many bombs they have and prove them to the world as liars all along.

NJ: What should U.S. officials do in upcoming diplomatic contacts with China, Japan, and South Korea?

Lilley: You’ve got to include China to a greater extent-perhaps Russia, all the countries around North Korea. The first issue is to get some sort of common policy. China has considerable leverage with North Korea, I don’t give a damn what they say.

NJ: Aside from this, how is the U.S.-China relationship?

Lilley: I think it’s pretty good. China’s approach in helping us on counter-terrorism has been pretty solid. Chinese and Taiwan economic cooperation has gone through the roof, and war is the last thing they want.

So, there’s every reason that America and China can push along. And the big thing is the symbolism of summitry. The Chinese wanted this very much. I’m not saying the Chinese are not spreading anti-American propaganda among their youth. They are, but if you can’t handle contradictions, get the hell out of the Far East. Jiang Zemin is committed to having this strong relationship with the United States, not because he likes us, but because he has to.

NJ: U.S. policy efforts have focused on Iraq and the Mideast. Is Asia and the outcome of the Bush-Jiang summit suddenly more of a life-and-death issue?

Lilley: It certainly becomes more interesting and dramatic, something more than a barbecue in cowboy boots and clearing brush on the ranch. This will be the catalyst for getting closer cooperation with North Asia. The big bombing in Bali certainly dramatized terrorist problems.

What’s been missing has been a real reason to bring us together. Now you have two things: counter-terrorism and North Korea. It’s not going to be easy.

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Cuba:  Havana Ratifies Treaty of Tlatelolco

Cuba last week ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which establishes a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Caribbean and Latin America (see GSN, Oct. 2).  Even though Cuba signed the treaty in 1995, it was the last of 33 eligible states to ratify the treaty, according to Inter Press Service/TerraViva.  In early October, Cuba announced its intention to ratify the treaty.

“The ratification of the Tlatelolco Treaty reaffirms Cuba’s commitment to and respect for the principle of nuclear nonproliferation in a global context,” the Cuban Foreign Ministry said in a statement Friday (Patricia Grogg, Inter Press Service/TerraViva, Oct. 28).

For further information, see:

Treaty of Tlatelolco Text

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Anthrax:  Scientists Criticize FBI’s Theory on Lone Culprit in Attacks

Some experts have said the spores used in last fall’s anthrax attacks required technical knowledge and production capabilities beyond that of a lone individual, contrary to the FBI’s views, the Washington Post reported today (see GSN, Oct. 23).

Instead of pursuing a “lone individual” theory, investigators might want to examine if state-sponsored terrorism played some role in the attacks, or if the person responsible obtained the spores from a foreign biological defense program, experts said. 

“In my opinion, there are maybe four or five people in the whole country who might be able to make this stuff, and I’m one of them,” said Richard Spertzel, chief biological inspector for the U.N. Special Commission from 1994 to 1998.  “And even with a good lab and staff to help run it, it might take me a year to come up with a product as good.”

An FBI profile released last November described the person believed to be responsible as a “lone individual” with “some” scientific knowledge who could have made the spores in a primitive laboratory for as little as $2,500 (see GSN, Aug. 15).  The FBI also said there appeared to be no “direct or clear link” between the attacks and foreign terrorism. 

That profile, however, clashed with what was known about the complexity of the spores used in the attacks, according to experts.  The profile was issued three weeks after U.S. Army scientists examined spores taken from a tainted letter sent to U.S. Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle (D-S.D.).  The scientists found that the spores were processed to a size of 1 trillion per gram — 50 times finer than the spores made through the now-closed U.S. biological weapons program and 10 times finer than known Soviet-made anthrax, the Post reported (see GSN, June 13).

“Just collecting this stuff is a trick,” said Steven Lancos, executive vice president of Niro Inc., a leading manufacturer of spray dryers, viewed by several sources as the likeliest tool needed to weaponize anthrax.  “Even on a small scale, you still need containment.  If you’re going to do it right, it could cost millions of dollars.”

Silica

The FBI had initially ruled out the possibility that Iraq might have been behind the anthrax attacks because the spores used were coated in silica to aid in their dispersion, rather than mineral bentonite, believed to have been used in Iraq’s anthrax weaponization program.  That belief, however, appears to be based on a single sample taken by U.N. authorities in the mid-1990s, according to the Post.  As early as 1989, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency reported that Iraq was acquiring silica to use in chemical weapons and in 1998, Iraq informed the United Nations that it had conducted an artillery test of a live biological agent that used silica as a dispersant, the Post reported (see GSN, April 24).

“Iraq almost certainly had their anthrax spores in a powdered form,” Spertzel said.  “They had used silica gel to aid in dispersibility of (wheat) smut spores, and also indicated they were looking at it as a carrier for aflatoxin,” a carcinogen, he said.

The silica-coated spores used in the attacks were probably produced through mixing fine glass particles, known as “fumed silica,” with the spores in a spray dryer.  “I know of no other technique that might give you that finished product,” Spertzel said.

Fumed silica particles are tiny and will stick to larger particles, such as an anthrax spore.  Fumed silica particles also absorb moisture and can acquire an electric charge, both of which keep the particles from clumping together and aid in their dispersion, according to the Post.

“This concept of using something that would serve as a dessicant and a carrier at the same time is new,” said Harvard University chemical engineer David Edwards.  “It’s a diabolically brilliant idea.”

While some fumed silicas are difficult to produce, two brands — Aerosil and Cab-O-Sil — are internationally available for purchase in bulk, according to the Post.  The Soviet Union used Aerosil in producing biological agents, said Ken Alibek, former deputy director of the Soviet biological weapons program.  A 1991 Pentagon memo said Iraq had “imported approximately 100 MT (metric tons) of Aerosil during the last 8-9 years.”  The United Nations also reported in the 1990s that Iraq possessed about 10 metric tons of Cab-O-Sil, Spertzel said.

Equipment

The anthrax production would also require expensive and specialized equipment — several hundred thousand dollars worth, according to experts.  Niro’s least expensive spray dryer costs about $50,000.  An electron microscope, needed to examine the results of the production process, also costs hundreds of thousands of dollars, the Post reported.

The United Nations discovered three Niro spray dryers in Iraq during inspections conducted in the 1990s, according to the Post.  Two of the spray dryers were destroyed and the third was sterilized before it could be inspected, Spertzel said.

Whoever produced the anthrax spores used in the attack would “need some experience” with aerosols and “would have to have a lot of anthrax, so you could practice,” Edwards said.  “You’d have to do a lot of trial and error to get the particles you wanted.”

All together, “you would need (a) chemist who is familiar with colloidal [fumed] silica, and a material science person to put it all together, and then some mechanical engineers to make this work . . . probably some containment people, if you don't want to kill anybody,” Lancos said.  “You need half a dozen, I think, really smart people”(Gugliotta/Matsumoto, Washington Post, Oct. 28).

For further information, see:

CDC Frequently Asked Questions About Anthrax

FBI Amerithrax Investigation

Journal of the American Medical Association Background on Anthrax

GSN Anthrax Attack Chronology (Dec. 12, 2001)

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Russia:  Moscow Refuses to Identify Deadly Theater Gas

All but two of the hostages killed in a Moscow theater died from the gas that was used to incapacitate the Chechen separatists who had taken the building, a senior Russian health official said yesterday.  Russian officials would not identify the gas; some experts are saying it might violate the Chemical Weapons Convention.

More than 115 hostages died “from the effects of the gas exposure,” said Andrei Seltsovsky, head of the Moscow health department.  About 650 former hostages remained hospitalized yesterday, 45 of whom were in critical condition.

The gas was described as an incapacitating agent, used as an anesthesia, by Yevgeny Yevdokimov, chief anesthetist in Moscow (Glasser/Baker, Washington Post, Oct. 28).

Seltovsky said he did not know the name of the gas.

Russian authorities have been criticized for not releasing information on the gas, which was pumped in through the theater’s ventilation system early Saturday morning.  Russian officials turned away a request for information on the gas from the U.S. Embassy.

Chemical Speculation

Lev Fedorov, president of the Russian Union for Chemical Safety, said the chemical agent used in the raid was apparently a Valium-based military gas, developed during the Soviet era.

Vil Mirzayanov, a former colleague of Fedorov at the State Scientific and Research Institute of Organic Chemistry and Technology, said the Soviet Union had altered the molecular structure of the incapacitating agent BZ, and it proved effective as an anesthetic.  Mirzayanov suggested the gas used in the raid was an anesthetic.

The gas used in Saturday’s assault might violate the Chemical Weapons Convention but conflict with the treaty is unclear, some experts said.  The treaty bans the use of all lethal gasses.  It allows incapacitating gasses for domestic law enforcement, but the effects must diminish quickly.

Because the gas was pumped into the theater, without regard to dosage for children, the sick or the elderly, the move violates the intent of the convention, Mirzayanov said.

Fedorov disagreed, saying that other countries research similar agents (Steven Myers, New York Times, Oct. 28).

The gas might have been a version of sleeping gas Adamsite, and the refusal to identify it could be because undeclared stocks of the gas would be in violation of the convention, the Financial Times reported (Andrew Jack, Oct. 28, Financial Times).

Treaty Implications

Amy Smithson, a chemical weapons expert at the Henry L. Stimson arms research organization in Washington, said there many questions remained regarding Russia’s compliance with the chemical treaty.

“This is kind of like pornography, you know it when you see it,” Smithson said.  “There are going to be people on both sides who will argue that the treaty does not prohibit it.  But how it was used, I think, is going to make it a huge debate.”

Federov said Russian officials would probably never disclose the nature of the chemical.

“We are never going to know exactly what chemical it was because in this country the state is more important than the people,” he said (Glasser/Baker, Washington Post).

The fact that the hostages had been weakened by stress and hunger made the gas much more deadly, health officials said.  Fedorov agreed with this assessment.

“This weapon was developed to be used on healthy men who serve in the army,” he said.  “It was used here on some of the so-called risk groups — women, children, people with liver and kidney problems” (Myers, New York Times).

Russia Will Not Disclose Gas

Officials have come under criticism as well for not disclosing the agent to doctors who treated the hostages.  The doctors were themselves confused, according to a hospitalized former hostage.

“Some of the doctors were telling us it was nerve gas, some were saying it was tear gas,” said a freed hostage identified only as Natasha (Susan Glasser, Washington Post, Oct. 28).

None of the victims suffered symptoms associated with lethal — and therefore prohibited — chemical weapons.

Yevdokimov described the gas a “psychotropic.”

“It is safe if used as a general anesthetic, but large doses can affect basic functions of the organism, causing unconsciousness, respiratory and blood circulation problems,” he said.

A British doctor said the effect of anesthesia varies based on the subject.

“The range of human reaction to any anesthetic is very great,” said David Scott, an anesthesiologist at Edinburgh Royal Infirmary.  “If, for example, 50 percent of the people in the auditorium were put to sleep, you would expect another 40 percent to be unaffected and 10 percent would die” (McGrory/Hartley, London Times, Oct. 28).

Russian authorities, meanwhile, are investigating a link between the Chechen militants and the al-Qaeda terrorist group.

“There were definitely Arab terrorists in the building with links to al-Qaeda,” a senior Western diplomat said.  “The Russians will now want to know how much help the Chechens received from [Osama] bin Laden’s organization” (Lab/Aris, London Sunday Telegraph, Oct. 27).

For further information, see:

CWC Text

OPCW Main Page

CWC States Parties

Pentagon Executive Summary of CWC

OPCW List of Other Chemical Conventions

Federation of American Scientists List of Chemical Weapon Agents

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CWC:  Budget Problems Have Thwarted Treaty Inspections

By David Ruppe
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in recent years was unable to conduct some inspections of chemical facilities for illicit chemical weapons production because of budget troubles, the U.S. General Accounting Office said last week (see GSN, Oct. 25).

Problems cited by the GAO included failures by some states to pay their annual dues and by certain states to reimburse the organization for monitoring the destruction of their declared chemical weapons. The organization also underestimated personnel expenses for the last three years, the report said.

States owe nearly $1 million in unpaid dues and, as of June, owed more than $2 million in reimbursements.

The OPCW was $2.8 million in deficit in 2000 and has a potential deficit of $5.2 million in 2002, the report said.

The GAO concluded, “Weak budgeting practices and budget deficits have affected the organization’s ability to perform inspection activities as mandated by the Chemical Weapons Convention,” noting it had to reduce the number of planned inspections for 2001 and 2002.

A U.S. State Department response included in the report said the GAO analysis does not take into account OPCW changes underway in recent months.  The GAO report was based largely on an audit of documents collected from the OPCW in May.

Changes Underway

The organization’s budgeting difficulties have been well known for some time.  The Bush administration until earlier this year had withheld some of its dues while publicly criticizing and pressing for removal of the previous OPCW director general, Jose Bustani (see GSN, April 12). 

There have been recent signs, however, of a turnaround.  A U.S. campaign to remove the official was successful last April.  A new director general, Rogelio Pfirter, took charge in July and is beginning a management review this week.  Washington has resumed payments, as have other key contributors, and has donated an additional $2 million to the organization for 2002. 

Treaty parties also voted this month to increase the organization’s $54 million 2003 budget by 10 percent and to allow OPCW to use its 2001 cash surplus and its working capital fund.

Pfirter in an interview last week with Global Security Newswire said the additional money would put the organization back on its feet for the near term and would provide for a substantial number of additional inspections, approved by the member states, in the coming year.

The GAO report did specify several changes made by OPCW under Pfirter, including creation of a more accurate and timely invoicing process for inspection reimbursements and exclusion of the dues assessments of states in arrears.  The State Department had hired a budgeting consultant to aid the organization, it said.

The GAO further noted Pfirter’s stated commitment to address the organization’s financial difficulties by ensuring that adequate funding be available for the 2003 budget.

Additional Changes Recommended

The report, however, concluded that some changes are still needed and recommended developing a comprehensive plan for dealing with the budgeting issues. 

“Although the organization and the State Department have taken some steps to address the budget problems, the organization has not developed a comprehensive plan to overcome its inherent budgeting weaknesses,” it said. 

The GAO assigned the overall blame for the budgeting shortfalls to the OPCW, as opposed to states.

“Unless the organization improves its planning, budget shortfalls will continue to affect its ability to conduct inspections,” the report said.

“The organization’s budgets (like those of other international organizations) are based on the presumption that all member states will pay their assessments in full,” it said.

Pfirter, last week, said the organization would be able to conduct the additional inspections voted for by member states for 2002 as long as members paid their dues in full.

“The member states worked out a compromise formulation whereas in which 60 DOCs [inspections of discrete organic chemical facilities] are anticipated and we will have the financing for that, if member states again comply with their assessed contributions,” he said.

The State Department said the GAO’s observation that “there is no coherent plan to address these problems, while accurately portraying the situation for the first part of 2002, does not reflect the current situation.”

It suggested a comprehensive plan was not needed, as the organization currently was addressing its budgeting issues in a comprehensive way, including by discounting expected income by one-sixth, based on historical experience, as opposed to already discounted expectations.

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International Response:  MTCR Changes Address Cruise Missile Proliferation

By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — Revised definitions of “range” and “payload” in the Missile Technology Control Regime will help reduce the proliferation of cruise missiles, a U.S. expert told Global Security Newswire Friday (see GSN, Nov. 9).

The new definitions close a major loophole that “never should have been a loophole,” said Richard Speier, a former Pentagon official who helped negotiate the regime.  They are “a great, great improvement.”

The regime seeks to restrict the export of critical missile technologies by establishing common export controls among leading industrial nations.

At a meeting last month in Warsaw, MTCR members agreed that range, as related to cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles, would be the distance capable when flying at “range-maximizing” capability (see GSN, Oct. 2).  This more explicit wording will help prevent cruise missile exporters from circumventing the MTCR by expressing a missile’s range as the distance capable when flying at sea level for stealth purposes, Speier said.

Under the MTCR, the export of missile systems with a range greater than 300 kilometers and capable of carrying a payload greater than 500 kilograms is subject to a strong presumption of denial.  In the late 1990s, controversy arose over a decision by the United Kingdom and France to sell Black Shaheen cruise missiles, which have a maximum range of 500 kilometers, to the United Arab Emirates.  The two countries, both MTCR members, argued that the sale did not violate the regime because the missile’s range when flying at sea level was below 300 kilometers.

Cruise missiles, however, do not have to continuously fly at sea level to avoid detection, according to Speier.  Instead, the missile can fly at its range-maximizing altitude, extending its distance by a factor of three, until it approaches the target, Speier said.  The new MTCR range definition will “make it doubly clear” which cruise missile and unmanned aerial vehicle exports will be covered by the regime, he said.

During the Warsaw meeting, the MTCR members also agreed to a more explicitly worded definition of payload, which expands the term to cover support structures and countermeasures, as well as the warhead itself.  This new definition addresses earlier ambiguity as to whether the 500-kilogram limit applied only to the warhead, Speier said.

Some Regime Improvements Still Needed

The changes to the MTCR control list did not address a small number of remaining technical issues, Speier said.  For example, a better exploration of range-payload tradeoffs allowed under the MTCR is still needed, especially in relation to UAVs and cruise missiles, since these systems can be easily modified to lighten the warhead and add fuel, thereby increasing range, he said. 

For further information, see:

Missile Technology Control Regime (U.S. State Department)

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U.S. Plans:  Lockheed Martin to Propose Airship

Lockheed Martin is ready to propose designing an airship that could be equipped with an early warning radar for U.S. missile defense systems, Defense Week reported today (see GSN, Aug. 9).

The Missile Defense Agency, the North American Aerospace Defense Command and the Office of the Secretary of Defense held an “industry day” last week on requirements for an unmanned airship that could carry a payload of up to 4,000 pounds at an altitude of 70,000 feet for more than a month, according to Defense Week.  The airship is the subject of a proposed three-year Defense Department Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration, worth between $50 million and $100 million, Defense Week reported. 

A request for airship proposals is expected to be issued in mid-January, with the proposals due in early February and the contract awarded by mid-March, according to sources.  The MDA has planned three demonstrations of the airship — in August 2004, November 2004 and April 2005, Defense Week reported

The Lockheed Martin airship would be 482 feet long, 180 feet tall and 153 feet in diameter, Defense Week reported.  The airship is expected to be able to scan a 1,200-kilometer area, said Ronald Browning, director of business development for surveillance systems at Lockheed Martin Naval Electronics and Surveillance Systems in Akron, Ohio.  The airship would contain about 5 million cubic feet of gas with no internal structure, Browning said.  It would also have four moveable propeller engines, but no rudders or fins.

At 70,000 feet, there exists an area of low wind — a good environment for airships, Browning said.

“It’s a very benign environment,” he said.  “You get up here through the jet stream and basically just park at that level” (Ann Roosevelt, Defense Week, Oct. 28).

For further information, see:

MDA Basics of Missile Defense

MDA Missile Defense System

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French Plans:  Defense Ministry Plans Upgrade to Air Defense Missile

France announced last week it would begin to upgrade its Aster 30 air defense missile to make it capable of intercepting theater ballistic missiles, Aviation Week and Space Technology reported today (see GSN, July 31).

The new Block 2 Aster 30 is expected to have more than twice the range of the original, from 600 kilometers to 1,500 kilometers.  During a Euronaval exhibition in Le Bourget, France, the French armaments agency announced it would begin preliminary design on the new Aster.

Some analysts said France could be seeking to take advantage of the cancellation of the U.S. Navy Area Wide missile defense system (see GSN, March 28).  Several European countries had considered the U.S. system — developed by U.S. defense contractor Raytheon — and might now turn to France, Aviation Week reported (Aviation Week and Space Technology, Oct. 28)

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