Iraq I:  Bush Says WMD Threat Is Unique as Congress Prepares to Vote

By Bryan Bender
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — U.S. President George W. Bush, in a major speech on Iraq policy, last night put forward his rationale for immediate action to remove Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein and his arsenal, saying the country is a unique case given its continued pursuit of outlawed weapons of mass destruction, history of aggression and links to terrorist groups (see GSN, Sept. 12).

In an effort to build support for military force to disarm Iraq if diplomatic attempts by the United Nations fail, Bush said the Iraqi regime is “a threat to peace” and pledged to defeat the threat if Hussein does not agree to unfettered inspections and the verified destruction of the chemical and biological weapons and nuclear development efforts he agreed to forgo at the end of the 1991 Gulf War.

“Some ask why Iraq is different from other countries or regimes that also have terrible weapons,” he said in the Cincinnati speech.  “While there are many dangers in the world, the threat from Iraq stands alone because it gathers the most serious dangers of our age in one place.”

Unlike other regimes seeking such weapons, Bush said Iraq’s weapons are controlled by a “murderous tyrant” who has used chemical weapons in the past to kill thousands of his own people and during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War.

He cited the thousands of tons of chemical agents, including mustard gas, sarin nerve gas and VX nerve gas, as well as at least 30,000 liters of anthrax and other biological pathogens that Iraq previously acknowledged but remain unaccounted for. As for nuclear weapons, he said new evidence indicates that Iraq is reconstituting its efforts to build a nuclear bomb, including satellite photographs that reveal rebuilding at nuclear facilities.

“We agree that the Iraqi dictator must not be permitted to threaten America and the world with horrible poisons and gases and atomic weapons,” Bush said of recent deliberations among his top national security and intelligence advisers.

One More Chance to Disarm

Despite Bush’s indictment of the Iraqi regime, he did hold out the prospect that military force can be avoided if Hussein takes certain steps, saying military force to disarm him is not unavoidable.

These steps would include unfettered access to suspected weapons sites by U.N. inspectors — accompanied by military personnel to destroy the weapons — the ability to interview Iraq weapons personnel outside the country without the threat of retribution as well as Iraq ceasing its support for terrorism, among other steps.

Members of the U.N. Security Council are considering a resolution calling on Iraq to take the diplomatic approach to avoid a military showdown (see GSN, Oct. 3).

Despite his U.N. maneuvering, Bush is clearly not counting on Hussein to meet those demands.  “I hope this will not require military action,” he said.  “But it may.  And military conflict could be difficult.  An Iraqi regime faced with its own demise may attempt cruel and desperate measures.  If Saddam Hussein orders such measures, his generals would be well advised to refuse those orders.  If they do not refuse, they must understand that all war criminals will be pursued and punished.”

Bush’s speech came as U.S. lawmakers prepare to vote this week on a resolution authorizing the use of military force in Iraq if necessary (see GSN, Oct. 3).  Bush is expected to get overwhelming support.  Two holdouts in his own party, Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) and Representative Richard Armey (R-Texas) said yesterday that their doubts have been set to rest and they will vote for the congressional resolution.

“The time of denying, deceiving and delaying has come to an end,” Bush said.  “Saddam Hussein must disarm himself, or, for the sake of peace, we will lead a coalition to disarm him.”

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Iraq II:  U.N. Inspectors Begin Training

The United Nations began technical training for 50 of its weapons inspectors Monday in preparation for an assignment to Iraq, the Associated Press reported yesterday (see GSN, Oct. 4).

The newly trained group should give the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission more than 250 personnel ready to conduct inspections.

“We will need these numbers,” chief inspector Hans Blix said.  Blix said he anticipates that the United Nations will conduct three inspections in Iraq each year (Vanessa Gera, Associated Press, Oct. 7).

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North Korea:  United States Is Arrogant and Hostile, Pyongyang Says

U.S. diplomats were “hostile” during last week’s high-level talks in Pyongyang, North Korea’s state-run news outlet said yesterday (see GSN, Oct. 7).

U.S. envoy James Kelly, who visited for three days of discussions, assumed a “high-handed and arrogant” attitude, North Korean officials said.  Kelly “made it clear that the Bush administration is pursuing not a policy of dialogue but a hard-line policy of hostility,” the Korean Central News Agency said (Korean Central News Agency, Oct. 7).

The comments contradict Kelly’s own appraisal of the talks, which he described as “frank but useful.”  Kelly said he addressed Washington’s “serious concerns” about weapons of mass destruction, conventional forces and humanitarian issues.

The North Korean comments also seem to contradict reports that the communist state is open to cutting its conventional forces and removing its military from a state of war readiness — two steps Washington is seeking — according to the Financial Times.

North Korea might be trying to create differences between Japan, South Korea and the United States by opening relations with its Asian neighbors and rejecting Washington’s overtures, according to some analysts (Andrew Ward, Financial Times, Oct. 8).

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Pakistan:  U.S. Visit Finds Continuing Obstacles to Nuclear Cooperation

By Bryan Bender
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — The first high-level U.S. military delegation to visit Pakistan in four years to discuss security cooperation failed to address possible joint efforts in the area of nuclear security, despite concerns that the country’s small but shrouded nuclear weapons complex may be at risk of theft or leakage, according to U.S. and Pakistani officials (see GSN, March 18).

Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith and dozens of U.S. officials spent nearly a week in Pakistan in late September as part of the U.S.-Pakistan Defense Consultative Group (see GSN, Sept. 27). The group was holding its first meeting since 1998, when Washington levied sanctions on both Pakistan and India following their exchange of nuclear tests.

In seeking South Asian cooperation in the war on terrorism, Washington has renewed military ties with both India and Pakistan and has restarted arms transfers and other military assistance to both.  Officials said, however, that expanding cooperation to the nuclear sphere has so far not been seriously broached, indicating the difficulty facing U.S. officials as they seek to expand nonproliferation programs to South Asia.

U.S. law currently bars substantial cooperation because neither Pakistan nor India is a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.  Lawmakers have proposed removing such restrictions so that U.S. nonproliferation aid can be expanded beyond the former Soviet Union to South Asia and elsewhere to meet the growing threat of nuclear terrorism (see GSN, March 20). 

One proposal calls for spending up to $50 million of unobligated Cooperative Threat Reduction funds — originally intended for nonproliferation efforts in the former Soviet Union — to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism in other regions of the world.

Officials say the obstacles to nuclear cooperation are deeper outside the United States, however, especially in Pakistan and India, where nuclear programs are a key source of national pride and considered a critical defense against encroachment by their neighbors.

Without addressing the outstanding issues between the two countries — mainly settling the competing claims over the disputed territory of Kashmir — progress in opening up their nuclear programs to scrutiny and international cooperation will be difficult, according to government officials and private experts.

“It’s a sovereignty issue,” said one Pakistani diplomat.  “Kashmir and the nuclear program are very central.  Any compromise would be seen as strategic failure.”

Others warn of the difficulty in broaching nuclear cooperation with Pakistan and India given past disagreements with Washington and the inability of the two countries to settle their disputes.

“India and Pakistan have for many years taken a combative stance with regard to the Nonproliferation Treaty, branding it a discriminatory document in international forums and resisting policies developed on its basis,” Rose Gottemoeller, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said last month.   “In this context, the United States has often seen New Delhi or Islamabad as a kind of adversary in nonproliferation policy.”

She said that new cooperation would be difficult without addressing other underlying issues.  For example, India is likely to seek a resolution of its long-standing concerns with the nonproliferation regime — perhaps to allow it to buy reactors for its civilian nuclear program (see GSN, April 30).

“In other words, the new cooperation will disturb the long-standing policy status quo in a complicated and not wholly predictable way,” Gottemoeller testified Sept. 24 before the House Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations.

As a result, discussions about security cooperation with both Pakistan and India have remained in the traditional spheres of arms sales and military training. 

In the recent consultation in Pakistan, which ended Sept. 30, U.S. officials focused on enhancing assistance to the Pakistani military to continue its crackdown on the al-Qaeda terrorist network, believed to be operating in its western border region with Afghanistan, while jumpstarting discussions about long-stalled Pakistani requests for new and upgraded military equipment, including F-16 fighter jets.

As for India, the United States has also discussed new arms sales and other transfers of military equipment, while expanding collective training.  Last week 85 Indian soldiers and airmen landed in Alaska to participate in the Geronimo Thrust ’02 exercise with U.S. forces, the first of its kind in North America.  The exercise, to last until Oct. 11, follows a weeklong exercise last month in which the U.S. and Indian navies participated in joint maneuvers.

Experts worry, however, that nuclear cooperation is much too important to pass up, despite the apparent hurdles.

“Concerns have … been raised about the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal,” according to Rensselaer Lee, a Congressional Research Service international affairs consultant.  “Little public information exists on how well or poorly that country’s nuclear protective regime functions.”

Pakistani President Pervez Musharraff has repeatedly said that “there is an excellent command and control system in place and there is no question of their falling into the hands of any fundamentalists.”

Lee believes, however, that al-Qaeda terrorists and Taliban sympathizers may be present in the Pakistani nuclear complex, as they are in other spheres of Pakistani society.  “Hence, the possibility of ideologically motivated thefts of nuclear assets cannot be excluded,” she said.  “And, of course, an unanticipated regime change would create a whole new host of problems.”

Gottemoeller said that ways must be found to overcome the obstacles to nuclear cooperation in South Asia. 

“At a minimum, countries such as the United States, India and Pakistan have each amassed individual experience over the years in protecting nuclear assets,” she said.  “Such experience can be shared in a way that could benefit others.  If the United States worked separately with India and Pakistan to share information on protection and control of nuclear assets, the United States would be taking the first step toward transformation of these countries from adversaries to partners in the nonproliferation arena.”

Still, resistance will not be easy to overcome.  Even offers of simple cooperation, such as providing Pakistan with permissive action links that prevent the unauthorized use of nuclear weapons have had little effect (see GSN, Nov. 5, 2001).

“We register and are cognizant and sympathetic on nuclear proliferation concerns,” the Pakistani diplomat said.  “Thanks but no thanks, we can take care of ourselves.”

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Al-Qaeda:  Operatives Seek Russian Weapons and Materials, U.S. Suspects

U.S. intelligence agencies are concerned that terrorist groups including al-Qaeda are attempting to obtain small nuclear devices and weapon-grade materials from Russian sources, the Washington Times reported today (see GSN, Sept. 26).

Recent intelligence reports have noted discussions between al-Qaeda operatives on the purchase of nuclear weapons and weapon-grade materials from Russian organized crime groups, according to the Times.  The murder of Sergei Bakhvalov, a Russian nuclear chemist and expert in plutonium extraction, in August might also have been linked to terrorists attempts to obtain nuclear weapons, materials or expertise, according to Russian authorities. 

There have been instances where al-Qaeda operatives have made contacts to see if it is possible to purchase weapons of mass destruction on the international black market, a senior U.S. defense official said.

“I can’t tell you here that I have evidence they’ve made use of them,” the official said.  “I know that they are working on them; the documentation is there.”

Russian stockpiles of nuclear weapons and weapon-grade materials are secure and can resist terrorist attacks, Russian officials said.

“A theft or a leak from our nuclear weapons storage facilities is absolutely impossible,” said Col. Gen. Igor Volynkin, head of the Russian Defense Ministry’s 12th main department in charge of nuclear security.  “The Defense Ministry’s 12th department is reinforcing and is capable of resisting any terrorist attacks.”

There are no signs yet that al-Qaeda has successfully obtained a nuclear weapon or the materials needed to construct one, a U.S. intelligence official said, but the possibility cannot be completely dismissed.

Terrorists might also be able to use Russian nuclear weapons through indirect methods such as cyberterrorism, according to Bruce Blair, director of the Center for Defense Information.  He noted a U.S. Defense Department study indicating that terrorists could gain remote access to the U.S. Navy’s nuclear command system and send a launch order to Trident nuclear missile submarines.

“The point of this last story is that the nuclear security problem in Russia has been too narrowly conceived,” Blair said.  “There are other scenarios besides the loss of a weapon or materials that fall into the wrong hands” (Bill Gertz, Washington Times, Oct. 8).

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Smallpox:  U.S. Medical Groups Urge Caution on Mass Vaccination

Several U.S. medical groups have said the United States should be cautious in providing smallpox vaccine to the public, especially before an outbreak has occurred, the New York Times reported today (see GSN, Oct. 7).

The American Medical Association said yesterday that it supports the smallpox guidelines that the United States released in June (see GSN, Dec. 5, 2001).  The guidelines call for the vaccination of health care workers and the use of the “ring vaccination” strategy — vaccinating those who came into contact with an infected person — in the event of an outbreak.

“The need for further voluntary vaccination beyond front-line health care workers is a very complex issue,” the association said in a press statement.  Policy-makers must compare the potential health risks of a smallpox outbreak with the side effects of the vaccine, the association said, noting concerns about who would be responsible for deaths or injuries in a mass vaccination campaign.

The American Academy of Family Physicians has taken a similar position, according to the Times.

The American Academy of Allergy, Asthma and Immunology has also called for caution, said spokesman James Baker.  The group is concerned about potential risks that the vaccine poses to people with the skin conditions such as atopic dermatitis and eczema, he said.

In their calls for caution, the medical groups have not criticized U.S. smallpox vaccination plans, according to the Times.  They also have said that mass vaccination would probably be appropriate in the event of an actual outbreak.

The groups’ concerns are based on the potential risks of the smallpox vaccine, which is more likely to cause serious side effects than other vaccines, the Times reported.  The rates of complications caused by mass vaccination are expected to be higher now than during vaccination campaigns of the 1960s and 1970s because the number of people at risk from the vaccine’s side effects has increased.  People at increased risk from the vaccine include immuno-compromised patients, those on chemotherapy and pregnant women.

People who are vaccinated can also endanger those who are especially vulnerable to the vaccine’s side effects, according to the Times (see GSN, Nov. 21, 2001).  The vaccine, which uses a live version of the virus, can be shed for up to several weeks from the vaccination site and poses an infection risk to others (Denise Grady, New York Times, Oct. 8).

For further information, see:

CDC Smallpox Information

Journal of the American Medical Association Background on Smallpox

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CWC:  Russia Threatens to “Suspend” Treaty Participation

Russia has threatened to “suspend its membership” in the Chemical Weapons Convention if the deadline for destroying its chemical weapons stockpile is not pushed back by five years, the Associated Press reported today (see GSN, Sept. 24).

“If the conference does not meet our request, Russia will have to suspend its membership in the convention,” lawmaker Nikolai Bezborodov — who serves as deputy chief of the Russian commission in charge of chemical weapons destruction — recently told the Interfax-Military News Agency.

Russia has asked fellow members of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which oversees the treaty’s implementation, to extend the 2007 deadline to 2012 (Associated Press/Moscow Times, Oct. 8).

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Al-Qaeda:  Laboratories Indicate Continuing Weapon Efforts

Three small chemical laboratories discovered in Karachi, Pakistan, in July might indicate that al-Qaeda is still attempting to develop weapons of mass destruction, the Washington Times reported Sunday (see GSN, Sept. 18).

Stockpiles of cyanide and other toxic chemicals were discovered in the laboratories in safe houses used by the Lashkar-i-Jhangvi group, which had connections to pre-Sept. 11 Afghanistan.  Group members have trained in Afghanistan and probably have worked with al-Qaeda in Pakistan since the end of the Taliban regime, according to the Times.

The discovery of the laboratories shocked Pakistani authorities because they had believed that al-Qaeda had moved its resources to develop weapons to other Middle Eastern countries but not to Pakistan, officials said.  The Lashkar-i-Jhangvi group, which is relatively unsophisticated, probably received aid from al-Qaeda operatives in the laboratories, Pakistani intelligence officials said.

It will probably be more difficult now for Pakistani authorities to locate other weapon-development operations within Pakistan, according to the Times.  Al-Qaeda operatives in Pakistan, along with the Lashkar-i-Jhangvi group and the Jaish-i-Mohammed group, have reorganized into function-specific cells of three to five people each, the Times reported (see GSN, Jan. 4).

An attempt to find a cell of three to five people in Karachi, a city with more than 10 million people, “is next to impossible,” said Lt. Gen. Javad Ashraf Qazi, a former Pakistani military intelligence chief (Ralph Joseph, Washington Times, Oct. 6).

For further information, see:

CDC List of Chemical Agents

Federation of American Scientists Information on Chemical Weapons

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Pakistan:  Officials Test Second Ballistic Missile in Five Days

Pakistan today successfully fired a Shaheen-series ballistic missile, its second such test in five days (see GSN, Oct. 7).  The test of the nuclear-capable missile, also known as the Hatf 4, was needed to develop the missile further, defense officials said.

“This test was in continuation of the one conducted on Oct. 4, 2002 to validate certain additional parameters,” the Defense Ministry said.

Indian officials dismissed the two recent missile tests as posturing in preparation for general elections in Pakistan beginning Thursday.

“The tests are aimed at Pakistan’s domestic audience and has more to do with their internal politics than anything else,” a senior Indian official said (Thomas Marzahl, Agence France-Presse, Oct. 8).

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First Committee:  United States Criticized as Undermining Arms Control

By Jim Wurst

Global Security Newswire

UNITED NATIONS — Using words like “failure,” “crisis” and “forlorn,” speakers during the first week of debate at the U.N. General Assembly’s First Committee on disarmament lamented the state of international arms control efforts, but the target of much of the criticism — the United States — said its policies indicate strong commitment to multilateral arms control (see GSN, Oct 1).

“The failure of the existing nonproliferation regime can be attributed to its very discriminatory nature, which has been extended in perpetuity, thus compounding the problem,” Ambassador Rakesh Sood of India said yesterday.  “Until unequivocal undertakings given for the total elimination of nuclear arsenals are honored, it will be necessary for all nuclear-weapon states to take steps to reassure the world that they will reduce the risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons.”

Ncumisa Pamella Notutela of South Africa said, “The crisis in the international community’s endeavors to address nonproliferation, disarmament and arms control issues has further deepened in the last year.  The international community has largely remained unable to substantively address these issues, which are some of the most central issues of our day.”  Speaking on Oct. 2, she added, “Narrow self-interest, unilateralism, lack of political will and statesmanship paralyze our multilateral fora, which were specifically established for these purposes” (see GSN, March 27).

Recent U.S. actions cited by these governments as damaging to multilateralism — the U.S-engineered ouster of the head of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (see GSN, April 23), the withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (see GSN, June 13), the rejection of negotiations for a verification protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention (see GSN, Dec. 10, 2001) and the U.S.-Russian Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (see GSN, May 24) — were hailed by the United States as examples of its commitment to multilateral arms control.

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control Stephen Rademaker told the committee on Oct. 3 that the United States is taking advantage of “new opportunities.”  He said, “Many were reluctant to part with familiar institutions of the Cold War.  It was widely predicted, for example, that the ABM Treaty could not be ended without plunging the world into a new arms race.  We have proven over the past year, however, that these predictions were ill-founded.  The ABM Treaty was amicably terminated, and the U.S. and Russia promptly agreed to implement the largest reduction ever in deployed nuclear forces.”  Concerning the nuclear arms pact, Rademaker said,  “As contrasted with strategic arms control during the Cold War, the negotiations of these agreements did not require years to work out complicated limits, sublimits and verification regimes — regimes that both countries agreed were unnecessary in the treaty.”

While delegates did welcome the new treaty, it was with reservations.  Ambassador Nugroho Wisnumurti of Indonesia called it “an important milestone,” but added, “In the effort to rid the world of nuclear weapons, the picture is hardly encouraging.  There is growing concern at the slow pace of progress in achieving the total elimination of nuclear arsenals.  The situation has been further compounded by the updating of strategic doctrines which set out new rationales for the permanent retention of these weapons, a new generation of such weapons and the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons.”  Notutela said, “While de-alerting and reliance on substantively fewer deployed nuclear weapons has made significant gains in [the new treaty], real disarmament has not been addressed.”

Rademaker also framed U.S. actions on the chemical and biological weapons conventions as helpful to multilateralism.  “When the United States and other parties to the CWC recognized that the OPCW was not being effectively administered, the politically expedient course would have been to remain silent while the CWC slowly atrophied.  Indeed, many countries strongly counseled us to follow precisely such a course.  We chose instead, however, to initiate efforts to revitalize the organization.  Now that the OPCW is under new leadership, we are confident that it can effectively enforce international norms with respect to chemical weapons” (see GSN, July 26).

The United States last year blocked consensus at a review conference for the Biological Weapons Convention on a verification protocol and has signaled it will oppose any new initiatives when the conference resumes in November (see GSN, Sept. 6).  In this context, Sood said, “The anthrax incidents of last year, instead of prompting the world community to act collectively to challenge the threat of biological weapons, have instead led to a path that rejects the framework for multilateral action and may threaten the norm that has existed for 30 years.”  He added, “We hope that the resumed review conference can be saved from failure by at least reaching agreement on a modest follow-up work in the truly multilateral context.”

Rademaker said, “Measures to assist in verification of compliance are key features of most traditional arms control regimes, which often include provisions for declarations, inspections, and even the establishment of implementation bodies.  There are instances, such as biological weapons, where other approaches are more appropriate.”

Conference on Disarmament

A focus of the frustration is that the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, the only permanent body for negotiating arms control treaties, is still deadlocked after four years, unable to agree even to a program of work (see GSN, Sept. 4).

Notutela of South Africa expressed “deep regret” that the conference remains deadlocked.  “This is despite the fact that there is almost unanimous support in the CD for some mechanism to deal with the issues that we have been deliberating on over the last few years.”  Rademaker said, “The effort by some CD members to hold up progress on a matter which all agree is ripe for negotiation in an attempt to force negotiations in unrelated areas is a perversion of the consensus rule of the Conference.”  The United States favors immediate negotiations on a fissile materials production cut-off treaty, while others, notably China, want other issues, such as the prevention of an arms race in space, on the table as well.  “Persisting in these efforts most assuredly will not succeed in forcing the premature commencement of negotiations in other areas.  The continued deadlock in the CD will serve only to further marginalize it in international security affairs, and lead more nations to question the continued utility of the forum,” said Rademaker.

Notutela said, “Despite the valiant efforts and leadership shown in the CD by certain countries and their representatives this year, some delegations continue to refuse to recognize the legitimate concerns of other states, while insisting that respect and understanding should be shown of theirs.”  The “valiant efforts” was an apparent reference to a plan issued by five ambassadors near the end of the CD session in September that tried to finesse the problems.

The plan — developed by Algeria, Belgium, Chile, Colombia and Sweden — would set up ad hoc committees on negative security assurances (guarantees not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states), nuclear disarmament, a ban of the production of weapons-grade fissile materials and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.  The deadlock is the result of countries placing greater emphasis on one issue over another and some want each issue dealt with in isolation while others sought a linkage.  The “five ambassadors” initiative seeks to overcome this problem by dealing with four issues on parallel tracks.  In previous years, the conference has focused on only one issue at a time.

Sood, who will be the president of the CD when it resumes in January, and thus will be in a position to promote the plan, said, “We have welcomed the cross-group initiative of five ambassadors and expressed our readiness to support it, if it can lead us out of the long-prevailing stalemate at the conference.”  As incoming president, he said he “will engage in extensive consultations on the margins of this committee in an attempt to untie the Gordian knot ... The validity of multilateral disarmament negotiations in the sole forum designated for the purpose needs to be upheld.”

For further information, see:

ABM Treaty Text and Associated Documents (U.S. Defense Department)

U.S. Fact Sheet on Withdrawal from ABM Treaty

BWC Text and Associated Documents (U.S. Defense Department)

Fifth Review Conference of BWC

CWC Text

U.S.-Russia Nuclear Reduction Treaty Text (U.S. State Department)

Conference on Disarmament Web Site

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