U.S. Response:  Controversial Provisions Could Delay Senate Homeland Vote

By Brody Mullins and April Fulton

CongressDaily

While senators remain focused on debate over personnel rules for the new homeland security department, that issue is far from the only controversial matter remaining in the bill.  From vaccine liability protections to a delay in an airport baggage-screening deadline, the Republican-drafted bill that passed the House yesterday and heads to the Senate today includes contentious measures quietly written into the bill as the congressional session draws to a close.

Senate leaders, determined to create the homeland security department before the year’s end, are likely to accept most of the provisions.  Still, the new debates could push a final vote on the underlying bill into next week. Governmental Affairs Chairman Joseph Lieberman (D-Conn.), who wrote the Democrats’ version of the bill, said he is “especially concerned” about the latest Republican bill, because it contains “a number of special-interest provisions that are being sprung on the Senate without prior warning or consideration.  This is really not the time for that.”

“We all ought to be focusing on the terrorist threat, the need to create a department of homeland security to meet that threat, and not on using a vehicle that is moving, probably to passage, to put into it a host of pet personal projects,” Lieberman said.

Chief among the concerns of Lieberman and others are provisions to eliminate or reduce a manufacturer’s product liability, two of which relate to vaccines. According to the new bill, a broad range of items, from drugs to life preservers, could escape liability lawsuits if the head of the homeland security department designated them as “necessary for security purposes.”

One provision in the bill would require liability claims against smallpox vaccine manufacturers to go through the federal tort system. The federal government would pay the damages, and punitive damages would be banned.

The new bill also would limit liabilities for airport screening companies and high-tech firms that develop equipment essential to ensure domestic security.

It would aid the airline industry further by extending aviation war-risk insurance for a year and giving airports another year to install baggage-screening equipment.  It would also allow pilots to carry handguns in airline cockpits.

The latest version of the homeland bill strips several provisions that were top priorities to key members of Congress.

Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle (D-S.D.), Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.) and Lieberman were enraged to find out that the new bill removes language calling for an independent commission to examine the roots of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.

Without an investigation by such an independent commission, Daschle said, “we will never fully have an objective evaluation.”

Daschle also said the bill guts congressional oversight over a critical part of the federal government.

The bill does not include $1.2 billion to increase passenger rail and tunnel security, though the funds were in the earlier Senate version.

“We’re very disappointed,” said Senator Thomas Carper (D-Del.), a rail advocate and former member of the Amtrak board of directors.  “Our failure to act to improve security of our rail travel is an Achilles heel in our nation’s efforts to secure our transportation system,” Carper said.

The bill also drops provisions that would have applied labor protections to workers contracting with the homeland security department and a provision that would have safeguarded the public’s ability to use the Freedom of Information Act to find out information about the department.

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Iraq I:  Baghdad’s Acceptance Generally Welcomed, but Doubted by U.S.

By Jim Wurst
Global Security Newswire

UNITED NATIONS — U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan and Security Council members welcomed yesterday’s letter from Iraq accepting Resolution 1441, saying it paves the way for the return of U.N. weapons inspectors.  The initial reaction from the United States was one of skepticism.

Before meeting with Annan yesterday, U.S. President George W. Bush said, “There’s no negotiations with Mr. Saddam Hussein.  Those days are long gone.  And so are the days of deceit and denial.  And now it’s up to him.  And I want to remind you all that inspectors are there to determine whether or not Saddam Hussein is willing to disarm.  It’s his choice to make.  And should he choose not to disarm, we will disarm him.”

After meeting with Bush, Annan said, “We all have to be a bit patient.  The inspectors will be there in a few days ... and we are going to test [Iraq’s commitment].”

Iraq delivered the letter yesterday to the United Nations saying, “We hereby inform you that we will deal with Resolution 1441, despite its iniquitous contents, even though it is to be implemented against the background of the intentions harbored by those of bad faith.”  The nine-page letter, signed by Foreign Minister Naji Sabri, says, “We are ready to receive the inspectors so that they can perform their duties and ascertain that Iraq has produced no weapons of mass destruction in their absence from Iraq.”

The letter is filled with hostile language against the United States and United Kingdom, the two key sponsors of the resolution.  Sabri called the two governments “the gang of evil” spreading a “most wicked slander.”  He wrote, ”Send the inspectors to Iraq. … Everyone will be assured that Iraq has produced no nuclear, chemical or biological weapons of mass destruction, whatever the allegations to the contrary are made by the evil pretenders.  The fabrications of the liars and the deceit of the charlatans in the American and British administrations will be revealed before the world.”

Announcing the delivery of the letter yesterday, Iraqi Ambassador Mohammed al-Douri told reporters his government accepted the resolution “without conditions and without reservations.” That phrase does not appear in the letter, however.  Speaking outside the Security Council chambers after briefing the council on the government’s decision, al-Douri said, “We are always opting for the path of peace ... to protect our country, to protect the region against the threat of war, which is real.”  He added, “We do not have any mass destruction weapons so we are not worried about the inspectors when they come back. … Iraq is clean.”

In the letter, Sabri wrote to Annan, “We request you to inform the Security Council that we are ready to receive the inspectors in accordance with the established dates.”  He continued, “We are eager for them to accomplish their task in accordance with international law as soon as possible. If they do so in a professional and lawful manner, and without previously planned goals, the fabrications of the liars will be revealed to the public and the declared aim of the Security Council will be achieved.  At that point, the Security Council will become legally obligated to lift … the embargo and all the other unjust sanctions from Iraq.”

The initial English translation of the letter was provided by the Iraqi government.  But, as is policy, the United Nations did its own translation of the letter from the Arabic original before issuing it as an official document.  While some of the wording is different in the translations, the tone is the same.

As to the abrasive tone of the letter, Annan said in Washington, “I will wait to see whether it is an indication that they are going to play games, or is a message they are sending to their own people. I really don’t know.  What is important is that the resolution is mandatory.  The resolution went into force the moment it was adopted and the inspectors are going to go there and do their work and they have to comply and we will see what happens when they are on the ground.”

Arriving at U.N. headquarters last night after his trip to Washington, Annan said, “The essential thing is that they did say that the inspectors can come back. ... The rest in the scheme of things is not that important.”

Hans Blix, the head of the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, last week said he would have an advance team in Iraq to starting setting up communications, computers, and transportation by Monday, with the first inspectors arriving by Nov. 25.

Government Reactions

Security Council diplomats welcomed the letter.  Irish Ambassador Richard Ryan said this morning, “It’s great, the inspectors are going in.”  He said he was “not worried at all” about the tone of the letter. 

Mexican Ambassador Adolfo Aguilar Zinser said, “We are awaiting the return of the inspectors. … We continue to press for the return of inspectors and we expect that Saddam Hussein gives full unrestricted access to them for them to do their job.”  As to the tone of the letter, Zinser said, “It is to be expected, but what we need to see is a commitment expressed in that letter translated into action.”

Officials of the permanent members of the council responded to the letter with varying degrees of enthusiasm.  Britain Foreign Minister Jack Straw welcomed the letter but said, “We must remain vigilant.  Iraq’s intentions are notoriously changeable.”

French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin said his government “took note of Iraq’s acceptance.”  Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said the letter “is opening the way for the situation in Iraq to be settled politically.”

Syrian Deputy Ambassador Fayssal Mekdad yesterday welcomed Iraq’s acceptance of the resolution.  ”We think that the main issue now is how soon the inspectors will be there,” he said. “It is the responsibility of the inspectors to make sure relevant issues of the Security Council are implemented in the correct way.”

Egyptian Ambassador Ahmed Aboul Gheit also welcomed the letter.  Regarding Iraq’s claim that it is “clean” of weapons of mass destruction, he said, ”We have to accept it as long as there is no evidence that they harbor any or are hiding anything.”  While not a member of the council, Egypt is a key player in the Arab League.

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Iraq II:  U.N. Personnel to Arrive Next Week to Prepare for Inspections

Preparing for a new round of weapons inspections, 30 U.N. disarmament experts are scheduled to arrive in Iraq Monday to set up communications and inspect a remote system for monitoring dual-use equipment (see related GSN story, today).

After that, an advance team of 12 inspectors is scheduled to arrive Nov. 25 to begin spot inspections, the Washington Post reported today.  A full team of up to 100 U.N. inspectors is expected to begin work in Iraq by the end of December, according to the Post.

With the aid of U.S. and British intelligence and information provided by Iraqi defectors and former U.N. arms experts, inspectors have created a list of more than 1,000 sites suspected of being involved in Iraq’s WMD program.  Over the next two months, the inspectors plan to focus their efforts on 100 sites, including an improved missile launch facility located west of Baghdad at al-Rafah and a former nuclear power plant at al-Furat, south of the Iraqi capital.

U.N. inspectors also plan to travel to at least one of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s palaces, which had been previously off-limits, as a test of Iraqi compliance with the new U.N. resolution, officials said (see GSN, Oct. 7).

“We have a plan of action which we cannot obviously lay out in detail,” said Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, who is heading the U.N. nuclear weapons inspection efforts.  “But we will have to go and visit some of the facilities which have been relevant in the past” and conduct “no notice inspections” at previously unknown sites, he said.

“We would not want to work in an expected fashion; we will have to do some surprise visits to facilities that we might not be expected to visit,” ElBaradei said.

Former Iraqi WMD sites are only one component of Iraq’s broader weapons program, ElBaradei added.  Inspectors also plan to install a soil, water and air monitoring system to detect chemical or radioactive traces, according to  ElBaradei and Hans Blix, head of the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, which is responsible for inspecting Iraqi chemical, biological and missile programs.

U.N. inspectors plan to request information from U.N. members on Iraqi attempts to purchase weapon-related equipment, the Post reported.  They also plan to interview hundreds of Iraqi scientists believed to have been involved in Iraq’s former WMD efforts to determine whether they are still participating in prohibited programs, ElBaradei said (see GSN, Oct. 31).

The key to the inspectors’ success, however, is obtaining unimpeded access to any site within Iraq, ElBaradei and other senior U.N. officials said (see GSN, Sept. 25).

“If there is a piece of equipment, it will have to be installed; and if it has been installed and is being used, we will have a chance to bump into it,” said Jacques Baute, head of the IAEA’s Iraq action team (Colum Lynch, Washington Post, Nov. 14).

For further information, see:

UNMOVIC

IAEA Iraq Action Team

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U.S. Response:  Congress Sends $393 Billion Authorization Bill to Bush

The U.S. Congress has approved the 2003 defense authorization bill to allow $393 billion in Defense Department spending.  The House of Representatives passed the bill Tuesday and the Senate voted for it on Wednesday, sending it to President George W. Bush for final approval (see GSN, June 28; Murray, Rogers, Wall Street Journal, Nov. 14).

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Threat Assessment:  IAEA Director Lashes Nuclear Weapon States

By Bryan Bender
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — The world’s nuclear powers have failed to live up to their 30-year pledge to work toward nuclear disarmament, the head of the global nuclear watchdog said today.

Furthermore, growing reliance by those countries on nuclear weapons has eroded the ability of international organizations to control the spread of nuclear arms and other catastrophic weapons, said Mohammed ElBaradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

While not naming specific countries, ElBaradei appeared to be addressing primarily the United States, which has been widely criticized for recent activities that, some have said, raise the profile of nuclear weapons and increase the likelihood of their use.

ElBaradei’s remarks reflect the views of many countries that the five declared nuclear weapons states that are party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty — China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States — have been slow to reduce their nuclear stockpiles as called for by the treaty, and that such delays undermine efforts to disarm other states believed to be developing weapons of mass destruction.

ElBaradei’s speech to a nonproliferation conference sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace comes as U.N. weapon inspectors are poised to return to inspect and destroy suspected weapons in Iraq, the only country ever formally found to violate the NPT (see GSN, Nov. 13).  In addition, the IAEA is closely watching a revived North Korean crisis after evidence emerged that North Korea has possibly failed to dismantle its nuclear weapons development programs and is now seeking to enrich uranium for nuclear bombs (see GSN, Nov. 6).

ElBaradei said overall disarmament is hampered by adherence to nuclear weapons as a key tenet of several countries’ security policies, including the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, which earlier this year raised the prospect of using nuclear weapons both against non-nuclear states and in pre-emptive wars against new threats from terrorists and rogue states (see GSN, Mar. 14).

“I should note that some non-nuclear weapon states are hedging on their willingness to conclude required additional protocols to their [IAEA] safeguard agreements by pointing to the lack of progress on nuclear disarmament,” ElBaradei said (see GSN, Sept. 25).

The Bush administration has indicated plans to study whether to develop a new nuclear penetrator for deeply buried targets (see GSN, Oct. 10) and whether to lift the moratorium on underground nuclear tests in the future to assure the viability of new nuclear weapon designs (see GSN, Oct. 22).

The lack of progress in nuclear disarmament “can be traced in general to the continuing reliance on the doctrine of nuclear deterrence and the lack of an overall disarmament strategy,” ElBaradei said.

In an apparent critique of the Bush administration, he added:  “Some nuclear weapon states have reversed direction, by stressing the continuing value of nuclear weapons in defense of national security interests, including discussions of the feasibility of developing new types of nuclear weapons, and scenarios for the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states.”

A major theme of the NPT, opened for signature in 1968 and now encompassing 188 parties, was to bridge the divide between nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states, what then-U.S. president and sponsor of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty John F. Kennedy called the nuclear “haves and have-nots.”

“A key assumption at the core of the NPT was that the asymmetry between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states would gradually disappear,” ElBaradei said.  The five nuclear weapons states that signed the treaty agreed at the time “to divest themselves of those weapons through ‘good faith’ negotiations,” he said.  All other signatories committed to “not acquire nuclear weapons, and to accept IAEA verification of all their peaceful nuclear activities, in return for access to peaceful nuclear technology,” he said.

“But the record on upholding those commitments is mixed,” ElBaradei said.  Recent activities by declared nuclear states, including the U.S. withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty earlier this year, threaten to broaden the divide and in the process make it more difficult to persuade states not to seek nuclear weapons or their delivery systems (see GSN, June 13).

For example, the NPT review conference in 2000 called for an “unequivocal undertaking” by nuclear weapon states to completely eliminate their nuclear arsenals.

“But a scant two years later,” according to ElBaradei, “we have moved sharply away from those commitments, with a number of the ‘13 steps’ toward nuclear disarmament — such as ‘irreversibility,’ ‘START II, START III and the ABM Treaty,’ further ‘unilateral’ reductions in nuclear arsenals, ‘increased transparency,’ ‘further reduction of nonstrategic nuclear weapons’ and ‘regular reports’ on the implementation of Article VI of the NPT — left without concrete follow-up actions and in some cases discarded.”

The setbacks include the rejection of the CTBT by the U.S. Senate in 1999, the scrapping of the ABM Treaty, as well as failure so far to negotiate a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty more than seven years after agreement was reached on a mandate, he said.  He also cited faltering progress on hammering out verification procedures for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, negotiations the United States has opposed (see related GSN story, today).

“These regressions have led to stagnation in the disarmament process and have put a damper on the hopes for further progress,” ElBaradei said.

“The ability to move forward on nuclear nonproliferation, including meaningful cuts in nuclear arsenals, will depend heavily on the nuclear powers’ ability to develop alternative security strategies that do not feature nuclear deterrence,” he added.

As for the three nuclear powers that have not signed the NPT — India, Pakistan and Israel — ElBaradei said that they should be engaged rather than isolated.  “In my view, we should not continue to treat these states only as ‘outsiders,’ but rather induce them to act as partners in the global effort to consolidate the nonproliferation regime and to make progress in nuclear disarmament.”

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North Korea:  United States Permits Oil Now, Refuses Future Deliveries

The United States will allow this month’s shipment of heavy fuel oil to North Korea to proceed as called for under the 1994 Agreed Framework, but it will not fund future deliveries, the White House said yesterday (see GSN, Nov. 13).

The United States does not plan to demand that the tanker delivering the oil, which is en route from Singapore, reverse course, the Bush administration said.  That ship is only a few days away from its destination, officials said.

After this delivery, however, the United States will no longer fund the monthly fuel oil shipments, which North Korea agreed to take in exchange for freezing any nuclear weapons efforts, the White House said.  The move is in response to recent suspicions that Pyongyang is once again trying to develop nuclear weapons.

The United States plans to present its argument against future oil shipments during a meeting in New York today of the board of the international Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, which oversees the framework, according to the New York Times.  While the KEDO board also includes representatives from Japan, South Korea and the European Union, it is the United States that funds the bulk of the oil shipments, the Times reported.

KEDO does not have the necessary funds to pay for the December oil shipment, officials said.  South Korea or Japan could choose to pay for it, but both countries are expected to adopt the U.S. position, at least for the time being, U.S and Asian diplomats said.

“One of our goals here has been to present North Korea with a united front,” a senior Bush administration official said.  “We are interested in maintaining that consensus when we come out of that meeting” (James Dao, New York Times, Nov. 14).

North Korean Response

A decision by KEDO to end future oil deliveries might prompt North Korea to evict international nuclear inspectors, raising concerns that Pyongyang might expand its suspected nuclear weapons program, analysts and diplomats said.

The International Atomic Energy Agency has monitored North Korea’s Yongbyon nuclear plants and its hundreds of on-site spent-fuel containers since 1994, the Washington Post reported.  Diplomats and analysts are concerned that without the IAEA inspections, however, the spent fuel could be used for weapons, the Post reported.

“If North Korea decides they want to really rattle sabers, they could expel the IAEA and threaten to reprocess the fuel.  That would be a very serious situation,” said Kenneth Quinones, who helped set up the inspection program in 1994.

After conducting some repairs to the Yongbyon plant, in six to eight months North Korea could begin reprocessing stored spent fuel into enough plutonium for weapons. 

“North Korea can quickly un-can the stored fuel rods to begin extracting plutonium, allowing it to build up a nuclear force far more quickly than would be possible through uranium enrichment,” said Timothy Savage, a visiting fellow at Kyungnam University in Seoul.

With a large amount of repairs, North Korea could even choose to restart the Yongbyon reactor to produce more spent fuel, according to the Post.

North Korea might also choose to expel 1,400 South Korean and Uzbek KEDO workers currently constructing a light-water nuclear reactor as called for under the Agreed Framework, the Post reported (see GSN, Sept. 13).

“If they feel the United States is going to end the fuel shipments, they would most likely respond by evicting KEDO,” Quinones said.

North Korea could even escalate tensions with the United States by choosing to test-launch a long-range ballistic missile, the Post reported (see GSN, Nov. 5).  Pyongyang indicated last week that it was considering ending a self-imposed moratorium on such tests, which has been in place since 1999.

“North Korea could test-fire long-range missiles off the coast of Washington or New York in the Atlantic Ocean, and it would be legal under international law, said Kim Myong Chol, former editor of the People’s Korea magazine in Tokyo, which often reflects North Korean positions.  “It all depends on the American response.  We’re just at the beginning of a crisis.  We’re on a threshold,” Kim added (Doug Struck, Washington Post, Nov. 14).

For further information, see:

Agreed Framework Text

KEDO

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United States:  New Nuclear Weapons Might Not Be Worth the Tradeoff

By David McGlinchey
Global Security Newswire

Developing nuclear weapons to destroy deeply buried weapons of mass destruction might not provide a significant military advantage to the United States and could be an “irreversible step that would weaken nonproliferation regimes,” says a report released today by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (see GSN, Oct. 10).

A small nuclear device detonated inside a facility does have the exceptional ability to take out dangerous chemical and biological agents, says the report, Fire in the Hole:  Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Options for Counterproliferation, which was written by Michael Levi, director of the Strategic Security Project at the Federation of American Scientists.  Nevertheless, the United States can still achieve its ends — destroying hard and deeply buried targets — with a more measured and accurate non-nuclear approach, the report says.

Reacting to the 2002 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review — which suggested an earth-penetrating nuclear weapon might be beneficial — Levi compared the military benefit and drawbacks of developing and potentially using small, specialized nuclear weapons.  Congress cautiously approved $15 million dollars for a Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator in the 2003 defense spending bill, which would also require the Defense Department to address how the weapons would be used and whether conventional arms could achieve the same ends (see GSN, Oct. 10).

“New weapons might require nuclear testing, which would break America’s self-imposed testing moratorium and weaken international norms against the testing of nuclear weapons,” Levi wrote (see GSN, Oct. 22).  “Many argue that the military advantages to be gained by building new nuclear weapons outweigh these liabilities,” he added.

Nuclear vs. Conventional Weapons

The destructive power of large nuclear weapons is “unmatched by even the most advanced non-nuclear weapons,” the report says.  Conventional weapons, however, may match the effectiveness of smaller nuclear weapons, it says.

Many underground facilities cannot be destroyed by current or prospective nuclear weapons, either because a weapon detonated near an urban center would cause widespread civilian deaths or because the radiation from a nuclear explosion in an isolated area could hinder the movement of friendly troops, according to the report.

Nuclear weapons can neutralize chemical and biological weapons even if they are detonated outside some facilities, the report says.  It is unclear, however, whether civilians in the area would suffer less from nuclear fallout or from biological and chemical agents that escape a facility.

Conventional weapons can effectively destroy biological agents, but might not be as effective against tougher chemical agents, according to the report.  A small nuclear device that explodes within a facility has “unique capabilities for simultaneous neutralization of chemical and biological agents” and at the same time can “avoid spreading substantial nuclear fallout,” the report says.

Increase Effectiveness of Conventional Weapons

Conventional weapons become dramatically more effective with a focus on increased intelligence, and nuclear weapons become much less effective without it, the report says.

“Even the most powerful nuclear weapons cannot destroy bunkers tunneled under just 400 meters of granite,” the report says.  “A focus on intelligence, particularly in identifying targets and localizing their entrances, will be more difficult to counter,” it adds.

Levi also noted that what nuclear weapons can destroy in one strike, conventional weapons can wipe out with many air attacks — a luxury that U.S. air superiority allows.  He faulted the goal of finding a weapon to defeat chemical and biological weapons simultaneously.

“Because chemical weapons are much more difficult to destroy than biological agents, the requirement for a universal weapon undermines the pursuit of approaches that might succeed against biological agents,” Levi wrote.  The United States should focus on destroying biological agents such as smallpox because the “potential for collateral damage from dispersal of chemical weapons is much lower than that from biological weapons,” he added.

The report cautions that conventional weapons can be critically evaluated in war games and exercises, but nuclear weapons are only supported based on their theoretical benefits.

“The valuable taboo against the use of nuclear weapons perversely shields these weapons from the same examination during their development that all other weapons receive,” the report says.  “If civilian leaders decide to consider pursuit of new nuclear weapons, uniformed military must subject these weapons concepts to the same scrutiny they apply to other weapons systems,” it says.

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Pakistan:  United States Declines to Punish Possible North Korea Transfers

The United States will not impose sanctions on Pakistan over suspected transfers of nuclear technology to North Korea, the Bush administration said yesterday (see GSN, Nov. 13).

Under U.S. law, countries found to have transferred nuclear technologies without international safeguards can face economic and military sanctions.  Such sanctions were imposed on Pakistan in 1979, but lifted last year due to Pakistan’s assistance in the U.S. war on terrorism, according to United Press International.

The president is allowed to waive sanctions if such a move is believed to be in the best interests of U.S. national security, according to UPI.  The United States plans to issue such waivers if a determination is made that would trigger the sanctions in regard to any Pakistani nuclear transfers to North Korea made prior to last month, when Islamabad assured Secretary of State Colin Powell that such assistance had ended, State spokesman Richard Boucher said (see GSN, Oct. 21).

“I think we’ll follow the laws as appropriate, including using any particular waivers that might exist,” Boucher said (Iqbal/Waterman, United Press International, Nov. 13).

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India:  Joint Panel Seeks to Accelerate U.S. Technology Transfers

The United States and India plan to create a joint panel to encourage the sale of complex U.S. technology — including material that can be used for nuclear and space programs — to the South Asian state, the two countries said yesterday (see GSN, Oct. 17, 2001).

“The group would expeditiously work toward developing a new statement of principles governing bilateral cooperation in high-technology trade … including ways to increase trade in dual use goods and technologies,” the countries said in a joint statement.

Officials agreed to the panel after two days of discussions between U.S. Undersecretary of Commerce Kenneth Juster and Indian Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal.  Transfer of advanced U.S. technologies to India was banned until last year, when India became one of the first countries to support the U.S. war on terrorism (Reuters/CNN.com, Nov. 14).

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BWC:  Diplomats Expect Conference Agreement Today

By David Ruppe
Global Security Newswire

GENEVA — Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention are expected to approve a final decision of the treaty’s fifth review conference later today.  Delegates said countries that were seeking to change the text of a draft decision proposed by the conference chairman have relented, and the draft will most likely be approved by consensus with no changes (see GSN, Nov. 13).

Chairman Tibor Toth has scheduled a plenary meeting for late today to submit the plan for approval without any of the changes that some states had advocated.  He had offered a draft decision to the conference Monday (see GSN, Nov. 11).

“I cannot hand out last minute goodies because all of those compromises have been built into the draft decision as it stands now,” Toth told Global Security Newswire this morning.

Approving review conference decisions has traditionally required consensus among the parties, but until now consensus has eluded the current conference, which Toth suspended in December 2001 after parties failed to agree on a final declaration.

The inability of parties to agree to any kind of plan for cooperation for more than a year is seen by many diplomats and outside experts as a sign that the international community is unable to address biological weapon proliferation multilaterally.  Many have said they are troubled by such a shortcoming in light of developments in the biotechnology field, the anthrax attacks in the United States and other high-profile terrorist attacks.

“Facing a threat that is ubiquitous means multilateral measures are needed,” said a Western diplomat at the conference.  While the Toth proposal does not create any multilateral measures, it could promote needed international cooperation, the diplomat added.

The Toth plan calls for holding annual meetings until the next review conference in 2006.  Discussion at these meetings would be limited to five subjects primarily addressing ways that individual countries could improve domestic measures to control and penalize biological weapons activities.  Virtually every state is believed to support such meetings in principle.

Without Changes

Toth’s decision to submit his proposal without any changes should be a disappointment to some delegations.  Since the chairman formally proposed the text Monday, some diplomats from a collection of developing states known as the Nonaligned Movement have attempted to expand the scope of the proposed annual meetings.

A collection of developed countries known as the Western Group has opposed broadening the proposal, and the United States reportedly supports that position.  For instance, it has opposed discussions to create a global inspection mechanism for checking compliance with the treaty.  Citing commercial interests and national security, it withdrew from efforts to create such a mechanism last year, disappointing Western Group and NAM members alike.

Toth has said that he opposes allowing changes because parties are unlikely to reach agreement if the text of his draft decision is opened for negotiation.

“I have not promised last-minute compromises because all of the compromises were embedded in the draft decision,” he said.  “I explained to delegations what compromises were required by others and what compromises were required by them,” he said.

Toth also cited precedents for taking a gradual approach to developing a major nonproliferation treaty, he said.

Implied in Toth’s proposal, though not specifically addressed in it, is that an ad hoc group that had been negotiating a treaty protocol would not be abolished or have its mandate terminated.  That protocol, under negotiation for more than seven years, would create verification and monitoring systems for the treaty, which currently has none.  In the past, U.S. officials have sought to end the group’s existence.

Some Optimism

The Western Group diplomat said there is cause for optimism that delegates will accept the proposal.  NAM delegations that had proposed changes said explicitly on Wednesday that they would not veto the proposal, the diplomat said.

“I think that no country wants to stand up and deny the will of all the other states,” the diplomat said.  “Countries will want to join in and support the decision for the common good.”

Toth was slightly more cautious this morning.  “We are very, very close to consensus and we shouldn’t let the process drift in a negative way and turn it into an agonizing exercise.”  He said he is motivated to bring the proposal forward today because a delay might decrease the chances of a successful outcome.

U.S. Support Anticipated

Diplomats have said that the United States has indicated it plans to support the proposal.  U.S. officials appear to have taken a step back from their previous position, stated in September to other developed countries, of opposing any meetings preceding the next review conference in 2006 (see GSN, Sept. 6).

“I think [it was] the vocal, unanimous views expressed in September by all of its allies that their position was unacceptable,” said the Western diplomat.  “I think they heard that and I think they were listening.”

Toth said his proposal is similar to one proposed by U.S. delegates late last year, and that that U.S. proposal was built upon elements already approved in previous review conference final declarations.

“It would be very difficult at this time for the U.S. not to support it,” Toth said.

For further information, see:

BWC Text and Associated Documents (U.S. Defense Department)

BWC States Parties (U.S. State Department)

U.N. Background on BWC

Pentagon Executive Summary of BWC

Fifth Review Conference of BWC

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Smallpox:  Homeland Bill Includes Smallpox Vaccine Liability Protection

Removing a large roadblock to smallpox immunizations, U.S. legislators have included language in the homeland security bill to limit lawsuits against medical workers administering smallpox vaccine (see GSN, Oct. 24).

Senators are expected to vote by next week on the bill, which the House of Representatives passed yesterday.  If the bill passes intact, the U.S. government would pay damages to those who are injured or to the families of those who are killed by the vaccine, but victims would not receive punitive damages, the Associated Press reported.

“Because of risks associated with the smallpox vaccine, many health professionals may be unwilling to give the vaccine without some measure of liability protection,” Senator Bill Frist (R-Tenn.) said.  “The threat of lawsuits mustn’t be a barrier to protecting the American people,” he added (Laura Meckler, Associated Press, Nov. 13).

Meanwhile, scientists in New York are leading a study on residual immunity from old smallpox vaccinations, and how it might affect any new inoculation.  U.S. health officials have said that the existing batch of smallpox vaccine — some doses are more than 40 years old — can be diluted and remain effective.  For people who were vaccinated long ago, existing immunity could be too weak to be effective against smallpox, but such immunity might still resist a diluted dose of vaccine, scientists have said.

If this theory is correct, people with existing immunity would now need full-strength doses of the vaccine.

“It’s likely the body may tamp down the diluted vaccine; we don’t know,” said John Treanor, a medical professor at the University of Rochester who is leading the study.  “The subjects in this study are people who were vaccinated as children, and for some people that may have been 30, 40, 50 years ago,” he added.

Researches plan to use 1,000 volunteers — ranging in age from their early 30s to 75 years old — and to administer either a full dose of the vaccine or a diluted dose (Delthia Ricks, Baltimore Sun, Nov. 14).

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Iraq:  Turkish Health Officials Deny Atropine Purchase

Turkish health and pharmaceutical officials yesterday denied any knowledge of an Iraqi order for 1.25 million doses of atropine, a nerve gas antidote, from a Turkish supplier, according to the state-run Anatolian news agency, Reuters reported (see GSN, Nov. 14).

“No official request has come and no official trade has taken place, but we know that other countries carry out unofficial trade,” Turkish Health Ministry Undersecretary Sefer Aycan said.  “It may have been by other means,” he added (Reuters/Washington Times, Nov. 14).

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International Response:  Chinese Opposition to Code of Conduct Might Inspire Others

By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — China’s decision to not participate in a proposed international code of conduct to halt ballistic missile proliferation might prompt other countries to do the same, experts told Global Security Newswire this week (see GSN, Nov. 12).

Beijing announced Tuesday that it probably will not participate in a signing ceremony for the code scheduled at The Hague later this month.  The action could create a domino effect, disrupting the political momentum of the code and creating a precedent for other countries of concern such as India and Pakistan, according to experts.

India might choose to reject the code now because it has historically been wary of Chinese missile capabilities, said Mark Smith of the Mountbatten Center for International Studies at the University of Southampton in the United Kingdom.  In turn, a rejection by India could prompt Pakistan to do the same, he said.

The code “will need to be signed by states like China, India, Pakistan, Iran ... or else it will simply be a club of EU members, the U.S. and their allies — in which case it will struggle to establish itself,” Smith said in a written response to an inquiry by GSN.

At the very least, China’s refusal to sign could provide other countries with political cover for other reasons for rejecting the code, said Tim McCarthy, a senior analyst at the Monterey Institute of International Studies.

Reasons for Refusal

Experts have outlined several reasons why China has decided to abandon the code, including a perceived lack of involvement in its creation, disappointment over its scope and transparency concerns.

Beijing’s stance might be a “philosophical” position arising from concerns that Chinese officials had little input in the code’s development, McCarthy said.  While China may agree with the goal of the code, it sees little reason to support the code’s provisions because Beijing had little say in their creation, he said.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry Tuesday indicated its concern that several Chinese proposals have been rejected.

“We support the principle of anti-proliferation in the code,” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Kong Quan said.  China, however, “is very regretful that the final document of the code did not absorb or adopt the Chinese suggestions, making it difficult for China to participate in the code,” he added.

China had hoped the code would create a more far-reaching missile nonproliferation regime that would have ultimately superceded the Missile Technology Control Regime, the current international missile control regime, said Steve LaMontagne, an analyst at the Council for a Livable World, citing a Chinese Foreign Ministry memo issued during negotiations.  Beijing has believed that the MTCR, to which it does not belong, is imperfect and discriminatory, he said.

Disapproval with an agreement that prohibits some but not all transfers contributed to China’s decision to reject the code, LaMontagne said.  Beijing had wanted the code to prohibit technology transfers that it views as threats to Chinese national security, for example, transfers of U.S. anti-missile technology to Taiwan, he said.

China also objects to certain transparency and confidence-building measures in the code, Smith said.  The code calls on members to provide each other with advance information on missile policies, test sites and launches, which China regards as “the handing over of free intelligence,” Smith said. 

China had proposed that the code’s provisions be implemented voluntarily, a condition that the European Union members — which were a primary force in creating the code and have guided it through its development — were not likely to accept, Smith said.

“I think that modifying the code to make its transparency measures a ‘take your pick’ smorgasbord was beyond what was acceptable,” Smith said.  “A balance has to be struck between a code that as many states as possible can join, and a code that holds out the promise of doing something meaningful,” he added.

“Organic Growth”

Experts agreed that China’s rejection of the code does not necessarily doom it to failure.  The move could diminish the code’s chances for success, but it is not a “fatal blow,” Smith said.

The EU has envisioned an “organic growth” process for the code’s acceptance, McCarthy said.  The MTCR began with seven members and has seen its membership grow to 33 countries, he added.  The EU did not expect the code of conduct to be universally accepted at its onset, he said.

For further information, see:

Draft International Code of Conduct (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute)

Missile Technology Control Regime (U.S. State Department)

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Radiological Weapons:  “Dirty Bomb” Conference Set for Next March

The United States, Russia and the International Atomic Energy Agency yesterday announced plans to support a three-day international conference next March in Vienna to examine the dangers of radiological dispersal devices, known as “dirty bombs,” and develop an international plan to safeguard against them (see GSN, Sept. 16).

“The detailed instructions on how to make dirty bombs found in al-Qaeda’s caves make horrifyingly clear our need to have a firm plan to reduce the vulnerability of dangerous radiological materials to acquisition by those seeking to use them as weapons,” U.S. Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham said during a Washington press briefing with IAEA Director General Mohamed El Baradei.

The conference will focus on recovering dangerous radiological sources, improving future controls on radioactive materials, strengthening border controls and responding to a dirty bomb attack, organizers said.

“The primary purpose of this international conference is to address the new and present dangers posed to our communities and further develop the international framework for dealing with the specific threat posed by dirty bombs,” Abraham said (U.S. Energy Department release, Nov. 13).

Meanwhile, the IAEA, with U.S. Energy Department support, has located five potent radiological devices in the former Soviet republic of Georgia, the Washington Post reported earlier this week.  The devices, known as Gamma Kolos, are lead-shielded containers that hold large amounts of cesium 137.  The Soviet Union dispersed the cesium canisters through Georgia to measure the effect of radiation on plants (see GSN, Oct. 23).

Four canisters have also been found in Moldova, the Post reported.

“It’s like talc — extremely dispersible,” said Abel Gonzales, director of radiation and waste safety at the atomic agency.  “You don’t even need a bomb.  Just open a can and people will die,” he said (Joby Warrick, Washington Post, Nov. 11).

U.S. personnel are in Moldova hunting for additional cesium containers, the U.S. Embassy in Moldova said Tuesday (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Nov. 13).

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