Bryan Bender
Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — The international official responsible for dismantling Iraq’s suspected nuclear weapons program said yesterday that he would look for a “pattern” of obstruction before reporting Baghdad’s noncompliance with the new inspections regime.
“If there is a pattern of lack of cooperation, then we have to report to the Security Council and the Security Council will decide if that is a material breach,” Mohammed ElBaradei, director of the International Atomic Energy Agency, said in a speech to a nonproliferation conference sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. If, however, “there is minor omission and this is clearly not intentional, we are not running to the Security Council to say that it’s a material breach.”
His comments — just four days before he is scheduled to arrive in Baghdad in advance of the inspection teams along with Hans Blix, chief of the U.N. team responsible for locating and destroying chemical and biological weapons — mark the first clear indication of what will be considered a breach of Iraq’s pledge to cooperate fully.
ElBaradei’s views appear, however, to be at odds with the Bush administration. The White House has said that any indication of Iraqi intransigence will be considered a breach of its obligations.
U.S. President George W. Bush said Wednesday that a policy of “zero tolerance” would be followed regarding Iraqi noncompliance. “We will not tolerate any deception, denial or deceit, period,” Bush said before meeting with U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan in Washington.
Bush has pledged to lead a coalition to forcibly disarm Iraq and overthrow its leader, Saddam Hussein, in the event that Baghdad does not comply with U.N. Resolution 1441, passed unanimously by the Security Council last week, warning of “serious consequences” if the regime once again fails to live up to its international agreements and does not provide irrefutable evidence that it is free of weapons of mass destruction (see GSN, Nov. 8).
ElBaradei, meanwhile, outlined five “interrelated prerequisites” that he believes are necessary for the new round of inspections to work. They include:
* immediate and unfettered access to any location or site in Iraq, and full use of all the authority provided for in the U.N. resolution;
* ready access to all sources of information — including timely intelligence information from U.N. members;
* unified and unequivocal support from the U.N. Security Council, with the affirmed resolve to act promptly in the case of noncompliance;
* active cooperation from Iraq, including demonstration of its stated willingness to be transparent and allow inspectors to fulfill their mission without conditions; and
* the preservation of the integrity and impartiality of the inspections teams, free from outside influence.
In an apparent caution to the Bush administration, ElBaradei said, “Efforts by national governments to infiltrate the inspection process are ultimately counterproductive, because they lead to the destruction of the very fabric of the process, let alone credibility.”
The IAEA head also ruled out making any requested adjustments to the makeup of the agency’s inspection team. The Arab League has proposed that Arab countries be better represented. “Diversity is necessary,” ElBaradei said, but “the key is competence and impartiality.”
By Bryan Bender
Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — The United States and its European allies have different perceptions of the threat from weapons of mass destruction, but have begun to bridge a conceptual divide that has hampered trans-Atlantic cooperation in nonproliferation efforts, a panel of European experts said yesterday.
The United States, particularly in the wake of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks and the subsequent anthrax letter spree, tends to exaggerate the threat from nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological weapons, they said. Meanwhile, European governments — which disagree even among themselves about the extent of the threat — tend to underestimate the potential that terrorists or rogue states will acquire and use these weapons against Western targets, according to the experts.
Still, they agreed Europe has been slow to come to terms with the full extent of proliferation dangers and if European nations compile a collective assessment, they would likely find themselves more in line with the U.S. view that the threat is substantial, growing and requires immediate and cooperative threat reduction measures.
The government and private experts presented their analysis in opening a two-day conference on nonproliferation sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
They cited a variety of reasons why European governments have not reflected the same level of urgency as the United States in addressing the proliferation threat, including the fact that continental Europe has not suffered a major terrorist attack; the anachronistic view in some European capitals that the key to security remains having good neighbors; a less globally focused foreign policy than Washington; a more multilateral approach and greater faith in international consensus; and perhaps even a “fatigue” with security issues given Europe’s history of a war.
Yet they also cited recent examples they believe demonstrate that European views, however divided they may be, are maturing and that the differences in perception with the United States are narrowing.
The European Versus American Perspective
“There is a gap” between the United States and Europe on the assessment of the WMD threat, said Paolo Cotta-Ramusino of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs.
He noted that the divergent views are not a new phenomenon, but date back at least to the end of the Cold War a decade ago, when the United States began addressing the proliferation threat posed by former Soviet nuclear weapons and delivery systems — a decade in which Europe took relatively little action on the proliferation front.
Last year’s terrorist attacks in the United States make it appear that the trans-Atlantic differences are more pronounced, several experts said. In other words, the killing of 3,000 people on U.S. soil led directly to U.S. urgency about the WMD threat, while no comparable event has taken place in Europe.
Until recent terror alerts in the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy about the potential for an impending attack by al-Qaeda operatives or associates, European countries have not been as vigilant as the United States, which has lived with terrorist alerts on a regular basis since the events of Sept.11, and the still-unsolved anthrax attacks.
“We have not been receiving high threats,” said Therese Delpech of the French Atomic Energy Commission. The lack of a Sept. 11-type attack in Europe, added Tomas Ries of the Finnish National Defense College, “makes all the difference.”
He said Europe remains largely in a “state of delusion” when it comes to the threat of catastrophic terrorism. While numerous terrorist attacks have been thwarted by European law enforcement and intelligence agencies in recent years, the European public still lacks the attentiveness to large-scale terrorist threats that the United States has exhibited since Sept. 11, he said.
At the same time, European governments are sometimes accused of adhering to an outdated definition of national security, according to Delpech. Europeans “still don’t understand that … borders are irrelevant,” she said. European countries, perhaps with the exception of the United Kingdom, also have a historically “provincial view of security,” focused primarily on the immediate geographic area.
“The United States has a global security view,” said Dieter Dettke of Germany’s Freidrich Ebert Foundation.
He also believes that a major difference between the U.S. and European approaches lies in divergent views of when a coalition is required to address collective threats. Washington ascribes to the tenet that the mission should determine the coalition — and has been criticized at times for being unilateralist — while “for Europe it’s the other way around.”
Europeans are also more concerned than the United States with matching military and other security efforts to thwart terrorist attacks with “soft” approaches that include reliance on humanitarian aid, political reform, nation-building and other activities likely to have a longer-term effect on reducing the ranks of militant terrorists seeking weapons of mass destruction, the experts said.
The international effort to disarm Iraq illustrates the trans-Atlantic foreign policy divide, Dettke added. Germany believes Iraq can be contained and that continuing the current approach is “less risky” than forcing it to dismantle its weapons programs, which could interfere with the overall war on terrorism and even if successful, breed future terrorists.
Where U.S. and European views on the WMD threat intersect most is in London, officials said. The United Kingdom, the most vocal supporter of U.S. security policies, recently outlined weapons of mass destruction as the greatest threat it faces.
WMD “is not under terrorism, it is on top of it” as perceived threats, said Simon Fraser of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
He said, however, that a common European assessment of the threat, what he called a “shared perception,” is sorely required. “European thinking is … behind the United States.” Such an assessment is “desperately needed,” Ries added, blaming its absence on the lack of a recognizable European leader to lead the way.
“The Americans may hype the threat, but the truth is the Europeans overlook it,” Delpech said.
A Meeting of the Minds
While WMD threat assessments in Washington and European capitals tend to differ, the experts underlined several reasons to believe that the two sides are coming closer together.
For one, “our strategic vacation is over,” said Delpech. She cited the terrorist alerts spreading across Europe, while others highlighted recent attacks — in Indonesia, Tunisia, against a French oil tanker — to demonstrate a heightened awareness about the potential for mass casualty attacks in the future.
Meanwhile, European governments and their publics have begun in recent years to extend their security view outward, Dettke said. Germany now has more than 10,000 troops stationed overseas — in Afghanistan, patrolling the waters off the Horn of Africa for terrorist fugitives and elsewhere — a dramatic change from its largely passive military history of the past half a century.
According to Delpech, another sign of this is the European Union’s commitment to set up a rapid reaction force by next year to respond quickly to crises, including outside of Europe.
A major test of European seriousness in addressing the WMD threat, however, will be whether European countries live up to their pledge earlier this year to help the Group of Eight economic powers contribute $20 billion during the next decade to secure former Soviet nuclear, chemical and biological arsenals and radiological materials, numerous conference participants said.
Delpech expressed confidence that France, set to become the rotating head of the G-8 next year, will get countries to provide precise figures for their contributions to the global partnership.
“Closer cooperation over the Atlantic is an absolute necessity,” she said. Europe must “put parochial differences aside.”
But even if there is a meeting of U.S. and European minds about the seriousness of the proliferation threats, Fraser warned that the next hurdle is for both sides to agree on what to do about each of them.
By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — China’s top arms control official yesterday reaffirmed Beijing’s commitment to WMD and ballistic missile nonproliferation, and outlined a number of domestic and international steps China has taken to reduce proliferation (see GSN, Nov. 4).
“China has been firm, consistent and clear-cut in its policy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery,” Liu Jieyi, director general of the Chinese Foreign Ministry Arms Control and Disarmament Department, said in a speech before a nonproliferation conference sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “We have all along stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all kinds of weapons of mass destruction ... We have steadfastly pursued a policy of not advocating, encouraging or assisting any other country in developing weapons of mass destruction,” Liu added.
China has worked internally, through the promulgation of export control regulations, and internationally, by signing a number of multilateral agreements, to combat WMD proliferation, Liu said. China has also attempted to improve cooperation with the United States on nonproliferation issues, he said.
Domestic Measures
To stem WMD proliferation on a national level, China has created export control regulations and control lists to cover sensitive nuclear, biological, chemical and missile technology exports, Liu said (see GSN, Oct. 21). China’s export control systems are similar to those of other countries, including an end-use and end-user guarantee system, an export licensing system and “catch-all” principles — which prohibit the export of sensitive items that could be used for weapons purposes even if they are not included on an export control list, he said.
China’s export control lists are virtually identical to those enshrined in other multilateral international export control regimes, such as the Zaanger Committee and Australia Group, Liu said. China’s missile control list, the promulgation of which has been praised by experts, is “by and large identical” with the annex of the Missile Technology Control Regime in regard to scope and parameters, he said (see GSN, Sept. 3).
“In a nutshell, China’s export controls ... are basically the same as those of the United States, EU and other countries in both scope and enforcement,” Liu said.
International Measures
China believes that its long-term development goals will become more and more dependant on a peaceful world, Liu said. For that reason, and to improve global security as a whole, China is committed to improving international nonproliferation efforts, he said.
“In the final analysis, to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery is conducive to regional and global peace and development and serves the common interest of all countries, certainly China’s fundamental interest,” Liu said.
China has joined almost every international WMD nonproliferation agreement, including the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention, Liu said. China has also placed its civilian nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and is the first of the declared nuclear states to sign the additional protocol to the IAEA safeguards agreement, he said (see GSN, May 10).
While Beijing supports the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, it has been stalled in the Chinese People’s Assembly, Liu said. The issue is not linked to other international Chinese concerns and Beijing supports the treaty’s early entry into force, he said.
China has also apparently rejected an international code of conduct to halt ballistic missile proliferation (see GSN, Nov. 14). While China agrees with the code’s nonproliferation and cooperation elements, Beijing opposes the code’s transparency and confidence-building measures, Liu said, Beijing believed that the measures should have been made voluntary, he added.
United States
The reduction of the role of nuclear weapons in international relations is important for progress in international nonproliferation efforts, Liu said. He noted that the declared weapons states have a “special and unshirkable responsibility in this respect” (see GSN, Nov. 14).
In his comments, Liu made a veiled attack on U.S. nuclear weapons policy. “It does not make sense, morally or legally,” to maintain large nuclear weapons arsenals, to develop new weapons, to assert the right to conduct nuclear tests and to target other countries with nuclear weapons when “global efforts for nonproliferation are advocated,” Liu said.
There is room, however, for the United States and China to cooperate on nonproliferation efforts, Liu said. One step that has already been taken is the establishment of a U.S.-Chinese joint consultative group on strategic security, multilateral arms control and nonproliferation issues, he said.
“It is true that differences do exist. The key is how to address them, “ Liu said. “China believes that differences should and can be settled in the spirit of mutual respect and mutual trust. ... I am convinced that through joint efforts, nonproliferation will be a positive factor in the healthy development of the Sino-U.S. relations,” he added.
For further information, see:
BWC Text and Associated Documents (U.S. Defense Department)
CWC Text
CTBT Text
NPT Text
Australia Group Web Site
U.S. State Department MTCR Summary
Draft International Code of Conduct (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute)
By Bryan Bender
Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — U.S. Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham yesterday recommitted the Bush administration to plans by the Group of Eight economic powers to allocate at least $20 billion to cooperative threat reduction efforts in the former Soviet Union during the next decade and outlined “10 principles” to enhance the protection of nuclear and radiological materials worldwide (see GSN, Oct. 11).
“The Bush administration is fully committed to this agenda, and I think what we have accomplished by establishing the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction indicates the seriousness of purpose we bring to it,” Abraham said in a speech to a nonproliferation conference sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
“Indeed, this is a challenge shared by all civilized nations of the world, and certainly [U.S.] President [George] Bush’s leadership has been crucial to bringing the international community together to find the common ground necessary to counter a threat common to each of us,” he said. “It was a commitment taken very seriously throughout our administration and is reflected prominently in our recently published national security strategy,” Abraham said.
His remarks came as nonproliferation experts in attendance and others raise questions about the seriousness of the pledge and contend that progress has been minimal. While the United States has said it will provide $10 billion and the United Kingdom and Germany have also promised resources, the ultimate commitment of the G-8 countries remains uncertain nearly six months after the original proposal. The other participants, France, Russia, Japan and Canada, have not announced any formal financial commitments.
Bush administration officials expressed hope last month that G-8 projects could get underway by the early next year, but so far little groundwork has been laid and experts predict little progress is likely before the next G-8 summit scheduled for June.
Former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn, co-chairman of the private Nuclear Threat Initiative, told the conference in a later speech that “by then, we should expect to see them turn principles into a clear set of priorities, to establish a timeline to guide their work based on a risk-based analysis of the threats, and to dramatically increase funding to reflect the risk that catastrophic terrorism presents to the health, economy and security of every nation.”
Even in Washington, the largest donor, G-8 related efforts have been slow moving. For example, Stephen Younger, director of the Defense Department’s Defense Threat Reduction Agency, recently told Global Security Newswire that his agency — which is responsible for overseeing much of the U.S. cooperative threat reduction activities in the former Soviet Union and is expected to help other donor nations navigate through the Russian bureaucracy — has yet to be asked to play a role in coordinating the G-8 effort.
“The policy community hasn’t figured that out yet,” Younger said Oct. 31.
Abraham assured the audience, however, that “the United States is already working with our G-8 partners to identify ways to carry out the ambitious goals the global partnership has established.”
“But it should concern us that this announcement [back in June] received almost no attention, Nunn added. “We must hold them to their words and their declaration … We are well past the time where we can take satisfaction with a step in the right direction … It’s not just a question of direction; it’s a matter of speed. We’re not moving as fast as we can or as fast as we must.”
10 Principles
Meanwhile, Abraham outlined “10 Principles” he says must underpin U.S. and international efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear weapon materials and technology as well as radiological sources that could be used to build a radiation dispersal device, or dirty bomb.
“Addressing the nonproliferation question is among the most serious responsibilities I have as energy secretary,” Abraham said. “In nearly two years in office, I’ve organized my thoughts into 10 principles for nuclear and radiological security.” They include:
* The threat continues to evolve. During the past decade the proliferation threat has focused primarily on rogue states, while the international community must now address the threats posed by terrorists “with the unblinking commitment” to cause mass casualties.
* The margin of error is small. “Even a little success in smuggling or theft can have a great impact,” Abraham said. “Terrorists or rogue states do not need exorbitant quantities of nuclear or radiological materials to achieve their ends. Based on International Atomic Energy Agency calculations, only a relatively small amount of highly enriched uranium could be enough for a nuclear explosive device. And if the goal is to build a radiological dispersal device, or dirty bomb, the amount can be even less, depending on the material used.”
* The problem demands a broad array of responses. Given that securing nuclear and radiological materials is a multifaceted problem, nonproliferation mechanisms need to run the gamut, including improving physical security, consolidating material into fewer storage locations, down-blending HEU or burning plutonium, and halting the production of excess nuclear material.
* There are good reasons to focus on Russia. U.S. nonproliferation efforts have focused on the former Soviet Union, and rightly so, according to Abraham. The dissolution of the Soviet Union left 40,000 nuclear weapons and over 1,000 metric tons of nuclear materials. “We’ve paid so much attention to Russia because that is where the material is,” he said.
* This is a worldwide problem demanding international solutions. “The international cooperation that was demonstrated in the recent effort at the Vinca research reactor in Yugoslavia, where enough nuclear material for more than two nuclear weapons was removed, was exemplary,” according to Abraham (see GSN, Aug. 23). He said that there are 17 other facilities like Vinca that need to be addressed. Other examples of international cooperation include recent efforts to remove radiological material from the Republic of Georgia and security improvements made at the Nuclear Research Institute in Rez in Ukraine (see GSN, Oct. 23).
* The potential misuse of radiological sources needs to be addressed. “This is an urgent problem and we need to treat it as such,” he said. Abraham and IAEA Director General Mohammed ElBaradei announced plans Wednesday, along with Russia, to sponsor an international conference in March in Vienna to specifically address radiological threats (see GSN, Nov. 14).
* The IAEA’s contribution is invaluable. “But the IAEA needs resources to do its job,” Abraham stressed. “The United States will continue to support the IAEA strongly, because it is foolhardy to do otherwise. I urge all others to do the same” (see GSN, Sept. 25).
* Materials security is ultimately a national responsibility. While international cooperation is critical, Abraham said that nations with nuclear or radiological materials on their territory must take a leading role in securing them. “One point that I cannot stress too much is that responsibility for progress falls on each individual member of the international community.”
* This is a long-term effort. The effort to reduce nuclear and radiological dangers does not lend itself to any quick fixes. In fact, solutions must “stand the test of time” for “however long it takes to achieve success,” Abraham said.
* Success is possible. “Working together we can make the world safer,” he said. “We owe our people, our children, and their children, nothing less.” He concluded, “I have no illusions that such a day is around the corner. But I do believe that through cooperation and determination, it is eventually attainable.”
[EDITOR'S NOTE: Sam Nunn is co-chairman and chief executive officer of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, the sole sponsor of Global Security Newswire, which is published independently by National Journal Group.]
By Bryan Bender
Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — The presidents of Russia and the United States should each appoint a single person to oversee efforts to secure nuclear, chemical and biological materials to raise the profile of the “the greatest danger in the world today,” according to former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn, co-chairman of the private Nuclear Threat Initiative.
“The first step is to put our own houses in order — identifying, accounting for, and securing the weapons and materials in Russia and the United States,” Nunn said in a speech to a nonproliferation conference sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “Each president should appoint one high-level person, reporting directly to the president, to take full responsibility for this issue, and this issue alone.”
He added, “Both presidents should pledge to complete this task at the fastest possible pace and urge other nations to do likewise.”
Nunn, an original co-sponsor of the so-called Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, the decade-old U.S. effort to secure former Soviet weapons of mass destruction and related materials, said that despite dramatic progress in recent years, “I think we have been slow to perceive this danger and respond to this threat.”
“The likeliest use of these weapons is in terrorists’ hands,” he said.
In addition to naming a senior official in the U.S., Russian and other governments to coordinate cooperative threat reduction efforts, Nunn recommended that Moscow and Washington:
* immediately begin outlining adequate safeguards for tactical nuclear weapons — a perfect terrorism weapon that is not covered by any arms control treaties;
* devise operational changes in the alert status of U.S. and Russian nuclear forces to reduce the risk of accidental launch or miscalculation, while expanding the decision time for each president to decide whether to retaliate to a perceived nuclear attack;
* combine their collective biological defense knowledge, beginning with a joint fight against infectious diseases in Russia; and
* launch a global partnership against catastrophic terrorism, based on the premise that the greatest dangers of the 21st century are threats to all nations and must be solved by all nations.
Moreover, there is no doubt that securing WMD materials at their source will be the most effective way to stave off the terrorist WMD threat, he added.
“Acquiring weapons and materials is the hardest step for the terrorists to take, and the easiest step for us to stop. By contrast, every subsequent step in the process is easier for the terrorists to take, and harder for us to stop. Once they gain access to nuclear materials, they’ve completed the most difficult step — and our nightmare begins.”
Quoting statistics provided by Wall Street investor Warren Buffet, who recently pledged $2.5 million to the Nuclear Threat Initiative, Nunn said even a small improvement in security can make a big difference over time.
If the chance of a weapon of mass destruction being used in a given year is 10 percent, the chance of getting through a 50-year period without a disaster is only .51 percent, Nunn said. If the chance can be reduced to 1 percent each year, there is a 60.5 percent chance of making it through 50 years safely, according to Nunn.
“We can make it 120 times less likely that we will suffer from a use of these weapons for the next 50 years. As Warren Buffet would say, that’s real leverage,” Nunn said.
[EDITOR'S NOTE: Sam Nunn is co-chairman and chief executive officer of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, the sole sponsor of Global Security Newswire, which is published independently by National Journal Group.]
By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — Terrorists and international criminal organizations are becoming increasingly able to obtain contraband materials, including weapons of mass destruction, in international “gray zones” — regions with weak governmental control and rule of law, Vladimir Orlov, director of the Nuclear Nonproliferation and Russia Program at the Moscow-based PIR Center, said yesterday (see GSN, Oct. 8).
Three of the most critical gray zones are Southeast Asia, the former Soviet Union — primarily Central Asia — and the Transnistria region of Moldova, Orlov said during a panel discussion at a nonproliferation conference sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. In Southeast Asia, a lack of government control has led to an increase in terrorist and organized crime activities in Indonesia, the southern Philippines and the “Golden Triangle” — consisting of sections of Myanmar, Laos and Thailand, he said.
Continuing instability in Afghanistan and Tajikistan, as well as in Chechnya, the Georgian region of Abkhazia and the Russian Ingushetiya region, also pose illegal trafficking concerns, Orlov said (see GSN, Oct. 23). In the Transnistria region of Moldova, there have been reported contacts between Russian and other international nonstate groups, he said. Representatives from al-Qaeda, Hamas, Iran and Chechnya are also believed to have traveled to the region.
States of concern might also take advantage of the lack of governmental oversight and control in the international gray zones to expand their contacts with terrorist and organized criminal groups, Orlov said. For example, there have been reports of meetings between Libyan representatives and terrorists in unstable regions of Colombia, he said. In the mid-1990s, North Korean agents are believed to have attempted to obtain chemical weapons from Russian organized crime groups, Orlov said.
Orlov said he was skeptical of the effectiveness of encouraging the authorities in the so-called gray zones to take a greater role in cracking down on illegal trafficking and possible WMD proliferation. Instead, an international response should begin to be considered, which could include exchanges of information and threat assessments, he said.
By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — While India has had an export control system in place since the late 1940s, a gradual process of economic liberalization has raised new concerns over its continued effectiveness, Seema Gahlaut, director of the South Asia program at the University of Georgia’s Center for International Trade and Security, said yesterday (see GSN, Nov. 14).
India, which seriously began developing nuclear weapons in the mid-1960s, has historically chosen to restrain its nuclear exports, Gahlaut said during a panel discussion at a nonproliferation conference sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. India’s export control system has also been overseen by a conservative bureaucracy, inclined to restrict such exports heavily, she added. The economic liberalization program, however, has both expanded the scope of India’s economy and reduced the public sector’s role in its oversight, Gahlaut said, noting, for example that dual-use exports are likely to increase (see GSN, Sept. 27).
In response, India has begun to adapt its export control policies to the changing national economic situation, according to Gahlaut. For example, India has begun to harmonize its dual-use classification standards with those of the European Union. New Delhi has also worked to devise a more detailed control list and to develop end-use certification measures, Gahlaut said. She added that India has enacted prelicensing site-visit requirements for chemical exporters.
The main remaining weaknesses in India’s export control policy center on enforcement, she said, adding that information on export control violations and imposed penalties is not widely available.
While India has made some progress in addressing the new export control concerns caused by its expanding economy, there are still issues of concern, according to Gahlaut. India still needs to develop “catch-all” provisions, which prohibit the export of sensitive technologies even if they are not included on a control list, and controls on intangible technology transfers, she said. India also needs to focus on transit and re-export issues and work to harmonize its export control systems with multilateral regimes.
International Efforts
Some of India’s export control concerns might be resolved through increased dialogue with the United States, Gahlaut said. India has expressed interest in obtaining on-line software designed to streamline export licensing procedures, increased customs training and information on improving public-private sector export control cooperation from the United States, she said.
The international community as a whole also has a role to play in aiding India’s efforts, according to Gahlaut. India’s policy of export restraint should continue to be encouraged and the export of sensitive technologies to India should be monitored, instead of outright denied, she said (see GSN, Oct. 2, 2001).
India and Pakistan also need to be seen as two distinct entities, Gahlaut said, calling for a “nonhyphenated” paradigm for South Asia. While the two countries do share some concerns, there are also several important differences between them, she said. For example, India’s nuclear program is under civilian control and has large civilian uses. Pakistan’s nuclear program, however, is almost entirely intended for the military and is run by the military, Gahlaut said.
A provision in the new U.N. resolution on Iraq that authorizes inspectors to remove Iraqi scientists from the country to interview them could have the unintended consequence of reducing access, a senior U.N. official said yesterday (see GSN, Nov. 14).
The provision was meant to improve interviews with Iraqi scientists because they are expected to be more forthcoming once they are away from Iraqi oversight, according to the New York Times. The flaw in the provision, however, is that Iraq might now be more concerned about possible defections and less forthcoming on the identities of its scientists who are involved in weapons programs, the official said.
It is important for inspectors to learn the identities of Iraqi scientists who joined weapons programs since inspections ended in 1998, the U.N. official said. Such scientists are now mainly unknown, and it will take an unusual level of Iraqi cooperation for inspectors to learn more about them, the official said.
The identification of new Iraqi WMD scientists for interview purposes is likely to become one of the hardest aspects of the U.N. inspectors’ work, the official said. “The authority to take them out will make things more difficult,” the official added (William Broad, New York Times, Nov. 15).
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