Iraq:  Blix Reports Progress; Council Reconsiders Oil-For-Food Deal

By Jim Wurst
Global Security Newswire

UNITED NATIONS — Two contentious U.N. activities in Iraq — the search for weapons of mass destruction and the humanitarian aid program called “oil-for-food” — were discussed yesterday in a series of Security Council meetings in which the chief U.N. weapons inspector reported progress on restarting inspections and the humanitarian program was extended only nine days owing to new disagreements between the United States and other council members (see GSN, Nov. 22).

Reporting on his recent trip to Iraq, Hans Blix, executive chairman of the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, said he told Iraq that “the most important thing [it needed to do] was that whatever there existed by way of weapons programs and proscribed items should be fully declared.”  Blix said that “the Iraqi side assured us that Iraq intended to provide full cooperation with us.”

Speaking to reporters after the briefing, Blix said, “We are going in in good faith and … the Iraqis are saying to us that they want to cooperate.”

On the delicate question of inspection of presidential sites, Blix said, “We will inspect all sites on an equal basis, as the Security Council has said very explicitly.  The Iraqis said that they intend to cooperate in all respects under the resolution.  They did remark, however, that ministerial buildings and ministries and presidential sites are not the same thing as factories.  And that is undeniable.”

“The essential physical infrastructure is now in place to start inspections,” he said, adding, “Any indications of where we might be going or what types of places we’ll go to are speculations, and that we are not going to tell.  The council authorizes us to go anywhere, any time, and we intend to do so.”

After the briefing, Chinese Ambassador Wang Yingfan, the current president of the council, said, “I think that the general view is that the work of Dr. Blix and his team in Iraq during their brief visit is so far, so good.”

The first inspections begin tomorrow.

A few hours later, the council found itself deadlocked on the extension of the U.N.-administered oil-for-food program, under which proceeds from the sale of Iraqi oil are used for meeting the humanitarian needs of Iraqis, as well as paying for weapons inspections.  An integral part of the program is the Goods Review List, a lengthy list of items that Iraq may import without conditions and items that may have military applications and whose import is subject to council approval.

The United States said it wants new items added to the list before agreeing to a full extension of the program.  As a result, the council unanimously approved Resolution 1443, which grants an extension only until next Wednesday in order to give the council time to work out its differences.  Normally, the program is extended for six-month periods.

U.S. Ambassador John Negroponte said Washington was concerned that “some items” Iraq wants to import “did not necessarily have a benign or purely civilian or humanitarian purpose.”  The United States wanted “a prompt review to tighten it up to ensure that it is not exploited … by the government of Iraq to import items for military purpose under civilian guise.”  Negroponte identified some of those items as jammers for global positioning equipment, atropine — a drug that can be used as an antidote to nerve gas exposure — and atropine injectors.  Although atropine has civilian uses, the quantities sought by Iraq “have no legitimate civilian purpose,” he said (see GSN, Nov. 13).

“We have nothing against the humanitarian program, and once we have reached agreement on a modified Goods Review List, we would be prepared to [approve the program extension] on a normal basis,” said Negroponte.

Letter Rebuts Resolution 1441

The United Nations yesterday reissued Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri’s letter, originally released Saturday in Baghdad, criticizing Resolution 1441.  The letter is a point-by-point rebuttal of nearly every paragraph in the resolution, which Baghdad says has “no legal basis,” “distorts the facts” and raises “imaginary threats.”

The resolution “makes it perfectly clear that the intent is to find pretexts for distorting Iraq’s position and justify military action against that country,” Sabri wrote.

In a polemic-filled letter on Nov. 13 accepting Resolution 1441 but strongly criticizing the United States and United Kingdom, Sabri said Iraq would send another letter “stating our comments on the procedures and measures [in 1441] that are inconsistent with international law.”  The Nov. 23 letter is that response.

Negroponte said the letter “questioned or challenged, in one way or another, virtually every single paragraph of [Resolution 1441].  That kind of letter … does not inspire much confidence that they are really motivated to comply with the resolution.”

For example, Sabri said the resolution’s finding that Iraq is in “material breach” of previous resolutions “dismisses out of hand the cooperation Iraq displayed over eight years to secure the implementation of the council’s resolution.”  The idea that “omissions” in reporting would be a further breach “means that Iraq has already been selected as a target,” he wrote. The resolution’s requirement that Iraq provide by Dec. 8 “an accurate, full and complete declaration” of its weapons programs “is based on the entirely unrealistic assumption that programs for the development of weapons of mass destruction exist in Iraq,” according to the letter.

The preambular paragraphs “focus on the imaginary threats to regional and international peace and security allegedly posed by Iraq’s supposed weapons of mass destruction,” Sabri wrote.  In particular, the letter says the assumption that Resolution 678, the 1990 resolution that authorized the use of force to expel Iraq from Kuwait, is still in force is “fallacious,” since Iraq no longer occupies Kuwait.  “It follows that there is no legal basis that can be invoked as authorizing the use of force against Iraq after the formal cease-fire that was declared by the council [in 1991] and in the absence of any new authorization,” wrote Sabri.  Before the passage of Resolution 1441, the United States said Resolution 678 and others already gave the United States authority to use force against Iraq.

For further information, see:

U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441

U.N. Security Council Resolution 678

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U.S. Response:  Congressional Gas Masks May Be Faulty

Congressional workers may be equipped with thousands of faulty gas masks, says a report released yesterday by the Congressional Office of Compliance, the office responsible for workplace codes in Congress (see GSN, June 27).

The protective hoods — 25,000 of which were distributed this year — are designed to protect workers and visitors if another chemical or biological terrorist attack hits Capitol Hill.  They fail, however, to meet National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health standards, and they might fail to protect users in an emergency, according to the report.

The Capitol and its related buildings also have inadequate emergency plans, the report says.  Specifically, Capitol police leaders endangered officers last year when they did not have a plan to deal with the anthrax attack (Carl Hulse, New York Times, Nov. 26).

“We concluded that the actions of the Capitol Police during these incidents were the predictable result of the lack of an appropriate emergency response plan, governing training, equipment and procedures,” the report says.

Police officials disputed the findings but refused to disclose why the report is inaccurate or what their current emergency response plan is, citing security issues.

While the report says that officials have taken some steps toward better safety since Sept. 11, it also indicates many shortcomings, including inadequate emergency radios and insufficiently audible alarms (Larry Margasak, Associated Press/Boston Globe, Nov. 26).

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North Korea:  Powell Issues Stern U.S. Warning to Pakistan

Any future Pakistani nuclear transfers to North Korea would be met with “consequences,” U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell said yesterday (see GSN, Nov. 25).

Reports have targeted Pakistan as the source for much of North Korea’s nuclear weapon technology and Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf has told Powell that there are no continuing transfers.

“In my conversations with President Musharraf in recent months, I have made clear to him that any, any sort of contact between Pakistan and North Korea, we believe would be improper, inappropriate and would have consequences,” Powell told reporters yesterday.  “He has assured me on more than one occasion that there are no further contacts,” Powell added.

Certain provisions of U.S. law require imposing economic sanctions on nations that transfer uranium enrichment technology without international safeguards, according to the Washington Post, and Powell hinted those laws could be triggered if Pakistan were found to be continuing illicit nuclear transfers.  “There are laws that apply, and we will obey the laws,” he said (Glenn Kessler, Washington Post, Nov. 26).

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China:  Russia Detects ICBM Test Launch

China launched a Dongfeng 31 intercontinental ballistic missile Saturday, according to officials from the Russian space corps, which detected the flight (see GSN, Sept. 27).  China does not announce its test flights and “their launches are always unexpected, but our services can always detect them,” a Russian official said (AFX, Nov. 26).

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Smallpox:  Acambis Expects to Miss Vaccine Deadline, CEO Says

British pharmaceutical company Acambis has announced that it will miss the 2002 deadline to provide 209 million doses of smallpox vaccine to the United States, the London Independent reported today (see GSN, Nov. 5).

Testing problems have caused the delay, according to the Independent.

“We had a shortage of a chemical agent used in the testing, so we had the product backed up waiting to be tested,” company Chief Executive Officer John Brown said.  The company plans to deliver the vaccine early next year, Brown added.

Meanwhile, Austria has indicated an interest in buying smallpox vaccine from Acambis, the Independent reported.  In addition, two other countries — which Brown refused to identify — have signed contracts to purchase the vaccine.  Those contracts are “small in comparison” to the U.S. order, Brown said (Stephen Foley, London Independent, Nov. 26).

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U.S. Response:  Laboratory Oversight Is Failing, GAO Says

Insufficient resources and information have handicapped U.S. enforcement of a 1997 law to restrict dangerous biological pathogens, the General Accounting Office said in a letter released Monday (see GSN, Nov. 16, 2001).

The lax enforcement has created an “urgent and potentially serious public health threat,” according to the letter, which GAO Director for Health Care Cynthia Bascetta sent to Health and Human Services Secretary Tommy Thompson.  Thompson oversees the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, which is responsible for enforcing the restrictions.  Immediate action is necessary to reduce public risk, Bascetta wrote, adding that auditors “will be conducting periodic work to follow up on your progress in implementing our recommendations.”

The GAO began its study after the mail-based anthrax attacks last year, when the system failed to clearly indicate which laboratories had strains of anthrax similar to the one found in the lethal letters, the Associated Press reported (see GSN, Oct. 3).

The law requires laboratories that transfer certain biological agents — including anthrax, plague and Ebola — to register with the CDC.  Previously, laboratories that had possessed the agents before 1997 had not been required to report them, but Congress has since closed that loophole, according to the letter.  In the meantime, the CDC has failed to keep current and accurate records of laboratories that transfer the agents, according to the Associated Press.

The agency has also failed to inspect the laboratories sufficiently, Bascetta wrote.  Only 13 employees have been assigned to conduct inspections, and they have been overmatched by the demands of the job, said CDC spokesman David Daigle.

The letter criticized the inspection program’s proximity to its parent organization and the resulting conflict of interest in monitoring CDC laboratories.  The agency has since transferred the program to the National Center for Infectious Diseases, and it may be moved again, Daigle said.

The CDC has responded quickly to the auditor’s criticisms, according to Bascetta.  The agency has contracted out for assistance with inspections and managing the information regarding laboratories nationwide, Daigle said Monday.

The CDC is hindered because it is not, traditionally, an enforcement agency, officials have said.

“The CDC has never committed the full resources and efforts that are needed to protect the nation in terms of who has select agents,” said Ronald Atlas, president of the American Society of Microbiologists (Laura Meckler, Associated Press, Nov. 25).

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U.S. Response:  Justice Department Outlines Security Roadmap for Chemical Plants

By Bryan Bender
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — The U.S. Justice Department has published a plan to help thousands of U.S. chemical plant operators assess their vulnerability to terrorist attack and identify necessary security measures to prevent or mitigate attempts to use chemical facilities as potential weapons of mass destruction (see GSN, July 30).

The National Institute of Justice report marks one in a series of federal initiatives to help the industry beef up security as intelligence officials warn of possible terrorist attacks on chemical factories and shipping routes.

A guide for assessing a facility’s security weaknesses, A Method to Assess the Vulnerability of U.S. Chemical Facilities was compiled with the assistance of the Energy Department’s Sandia National Laboratory, responsible for assessing the vulnerability of critical U.S. infrastructure (see GSN, Nov. 5).  Also participating in the effort were the Office of Homeland Security, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Transportation Department and the chemical industry.

“The use of the vulnerability assessment methodology is limited to preventing or mitigating terrorist or criminal actions that could have significant national impact — such as the loss of chemicals vital to the national defense or economy — or could seriously affect localities — such as the release of hazardous chemicals that would compromise the integrity of the facility, contaminate adjoining areas, or injure or kill facility employees or adjoining populations,” according to the report.

The methodology includes steps to determine the level of threat posed by insiders, outsiders or a combination of the two; identify the most likely means of attack at a particular facility, whether theft, destruction, violence or bombing; and measure a facility’s ability to detect an attack, delay it, or respond in order to defeat an adversary.

The report underscores the importance of “protection in depth,” so that potential attackers must breach several security barriers to succeed.  Should those barriers fail, however, measures must be in place to mitigate the effectiveness of an attack, it says.

“When the protection system cannot prevent an undesired event, mitigation features can reduce consequences, thus reducing risk,” according to the report.  “Mitigation features range from sensors that cause systems to shut down and assume fail-safe condition if a problem is detected to early warning systems that alert first responders,” the report says.

Growing concern that chemical plants could be terrorist targets has forced an industry re-evaluation of facility security.  Congress this year considered the Chemical Security Act, requiring enhanced security measures at the thousands of U.S. facilities, particularly those most at risk.  The legislation was not passed, but is expected to be taken up again early next year.

Last month the Defense Department official responsible for reducing the threat of weapons of mass destruction, Stephen Younger, said he was increasingly concerned about the vulnerability of the U.S. chemical industry, including the transportation of deadly chemicals (see GSN, Nov. 1).

The Bush administration and Congress, however, have had difficulty agreeing on security standards, while chemical industry officials have been accused of dragging their feet on new and costly security enhancements (see GSN, July 26).

The Justice document marks an effort to provide industry with some of the tools necessary to meet new security standards.

In advising chemical industry officials on assessing security weaknesses, the report also provides guidance on making recommendations to reduce the risk of attack.  “The goal is low-cost, high-return upgrades,” it says.

For example, instituting upgrades that can reduce risk against multiple threats “should be considered first because this can result in greater protection against many scenarios,” the report says.

To create the new roadmap the agency collected threat information, data about current security measures at chemical plants and inspected a variety of facilities, officials said.

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Russia:  Theater Raid Death Toll Reaches 129

A woman died Sunday from the effects of an opiate-based gas that was used to break the Moscow theater siege last month, pushing the civilian death toll from that incident to 129 people (see GSN, Nov. 19).

Authorities pumped the gas through the theater’s ventilation system at the beginning of the Oct. 26 raid to disable 50 Chechen hostage-takers.  Eight of the hostages from the incident remained in hospitals yesterday (Associated Press/Canoe Online CNews, Nov. 25).

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International Response:  Missile Code of Conduct Launches in The Hague

By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire

THE HAGUE, Netherlands — Seeking new ways to stem the spread of ballistic missiles, several dozen nations yesterday inaugurated the International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, the first multilateral agreement to address the production, development, testing and transfer of ballistic missiles (see GSN, Nov. 22).

“Today a new nonproliferation instrument saw the light of day,” Dutch Foreign Minister Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said yesterday.

In total, 92 countries have subscribed to the code, with delegates from about 80 nations attending a ceremony here to launch the new system of confidence-building measures.  In remarks before the assembled delegations, representatives from a number of countries praised the code as an important new measure to address missile proliferation. 

Heading the U.S. delegation, Undersecretary of State John Bolton said the code’s establishment is “an important contribution” to efforts to address missile proliferation.  Bolton’s presence surprised experts here, who had perceived that the Bush administration did not consider the code to be of major significance.  Countering those perceptions, however, Bolton said yesterday that missiles capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction are a direct threat to U.S. security. 

Furthermore, Bolton said the United States considered the code to be “an important addition to the wide range of tools available to countries to impede and roll back this proliferation threat.”

Bolton said U.S. efforts to develop a missile defense system complement both the new code of conduct and the 15-year-old Missile Technology Control Regime, a system of common export controls among industrialized nations (see GSN, Oct. 28).  Each is meant to defend the United States against missiles and all three help to reduce missile proliferation, he said.  Bolton also noted U.S. efforts to cooperate with allies and Russia on missile defense.

The European Union “attaches great importance” to the code, said a Danish representative, speaking for the EU and associated countries.  The code establishes both fundamental behavior norms and a framework for cooperation to address missile proliferation, where there had previously been none, the Danish representative said.

The EU has played a fundamental role in the code’s development, Scheffer told an afternoon press conference yesterday.  After the Netherlands proposed the code in 1999, the EU offered to shepherd it through development with the goal of launching it before the end of this year, he said.

Missile proliferation poses a “real and urgent threat” to peace and, “by their very nature, ballistic missiles are destabilizing in regions of tensions,” according to British Foreign Office official Mike O’ Brien.  The code is “the most concrete step so far” to address the issue, he said.

Canadian Deputy Defense Minister Margaret Bloodworth said the code of conduct would work in tandem with the MTCR.  While the regime is a supply-side arrangement, the code works to address the demand side of missile proliferation, she said.

Limitations

During the conference, several countries, including the United States and Russia, identified what they perceived to be some of the code’s limitations. 

Although the code calls for participants to “exercise maximum possible restraint” in developing and testing missile systems, Bolton said the United States “understands this commitment as not limiting our right to take steps in these areas necessary to meet our national security requirements consistent with U.S. national security strategy.”

Much of the work to implement the code will focus on the issue of prelaunch notification, Bolton said, adding that the United States will issue its notifications concurrent with the U.S.-Russian joint notification system.  The United States also reserves the right in times of war to launch ballistic missiles and space-launch vehicles without prior notification, he said.

Russian Ambassador to The Hague Alexander Khodakov said some of the confidence-building measures within the code, such as transfers of information, should be made voluntary to help persuade some remaining countries to subscribe.  China, one of a number of significant countries that chose not to join, noted this issue as one reason for its rejection of the code.

Libya offered its support for the code, but called for the code to be enlarged into a total ban on ballistic missiles.  Libyan Foreign Minister Abdurrahman Shalgham called for the title of the code to be amended to reflect a prohibition on the use, stockpiling and transfer of ballistic missiles.  The code should also contain a provision calling for the need to destroy all missiles capable of carrying a nuclear weapon, regardless of which country may possess them, he said.  A total missile ban is needed to ensure peace for all people without distinction, Shalgham added.

Tensions rose during yesterday’s conference when the United States and Libya sparred over each country’s asserted commitment to WMD nonproliferation.  In his remarks, Bolton specifically named Libya as a country the United States believes to be developing weapons of mass destruction in violation of its international obligations. 

Shortly before the morning session of the conference adjourned, Libya exercised its right of reply to Bolton’s claims.  Libya has signed almost all of the international WMD nonproliferation agreements and is used to Bolton saying Libya has not respected those agreements, Shalgham said.  He asked when Bolton would cease his accusations and whether the United States also planned to honor its nonproliferation obligations. 

Work Remains

While the code of conduct represents an important “first step” toward addressing missile proliferation, much work remains, many delegations said, highlighting the goal of expanding the code’s membership until all nations participate.

If all countries believed to possess ballistic missiles had attended yesterday’s conference, it would have made the launching of the code a “bigger event,” said Johann Kyrle, Austrian secretary general for foreign affairs. 

“Ninety-two is a lot, but it’s not enough,” Dutch Foreign Minister Scheffer said.

Many countries believed by the United States to be developing or transferring missile technologies, including Iran, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea, have chosen not to subscribe to the code.  Some, such as India, elected not to join because of concerns over how the code would affect their space-launch programs. 

Work should be done to help reassure countries on this issue to convince them to subscribe, O’Brien said, noting that peaceful space-launch technologies are in the common interest.  Countries with peaceful space-launch programs have “nothing to lose and everything to gain” by joining the code, he said.

Kerstin Mueller, German Foreign Office minister of state, also called on remaining countries to subscribe, saying the code serves their security concerns as well. 

South Korea, along with Japan and Australia, have worked to persuade other countries to subscribe to the code through regional efforts, South Korean Deputy Foreign Minister Cho Chang-beom said, adding that his country would continue such efforts.

While the code calls for annual member meetings to further its development, those countries that have not yet subscribed should also be involved in the process, Khodakov said.  The code cannot create new lines of division between those who have joined and those who have not, he said.

“Peer pressure” will be an important factor in persuading countries to subscribe to the code of conduct, Scheffer said.  While some countries might not choose to join the code today, “they might tomorrow.  Or the next day,” he said.

Responding to questions about the code’s lack of penalties, Scheffer said they would have been unhelpful and that he believed more in the effectiveness of transparency and peer pressure.  Some countries that continue to oppose the code think they have little to gain by increasing transparency, Scheffer said.  “We will work to convince them,” he added.

Schaffer also defended the code’s lack of incentives for countries to join, which some experts have said renders the code less effective.  The code is not meant to be a development instrument, he said.

The Wall Street Journal reported this month that while China had announced it would not join the code, it had been interested in sending an observer to yesterday’s conference.  Observers were not permitted, however, because it would have lessened pressure on reticent countries to subscribe to the code, Scheffer said.

While most delegates urged that remaining countries subscribe to the code, Bolton said the United States was not concerned that those countries had not yet joined.  Too often, countries make a “great public flourish” about joining international arms control agreements and then, in private, do the opposite, Bolton said.  It is better to know who is willing to live under the terms of the code and who will not, he added.

A number of countries also called for the code to be a first step in creation of a legally binding treaty on ballistic missiles.  Russia is prepared to consider any proposals for the creation of such a treaty, Khodakov said.  Canada also supports the creation of a legally binding document, developing out of the code of conduct, Bloodworth said.  She said that it was important to develop an international consensus on addressing missile proliferation, however, before attempting to enshrine such consensus in international law.

“Neither Rome nor The Hague was built in a day,” Bloodworth said.

Other Concerns

A number of delegations used their remarks before the conference to highlight a number of their own WMD and missile concerns.  O’Brien called on the assembled countries to maintain, and increase, support for the U.N. inspections set to begin in Iraq this week.  Representatives from Ghana and Sudan urged countries to use funds that would be released by ending missile development efforts for humanitarian aid. 

Some countries, such as Bulgaria, noted their efforts to further strengthen domestic export control regulations.  Meglena Kouneva, Bulgarian minister for European affairs, also said her country is willing to join the MTCR.

Ukraine continues to abide by the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, said Ukrainian Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Kharchenko, noting his country’s recent dismantlement of its Soviet-era intercontinental ballistic missiles (see GSN, Nov. 6).  In her comments, Yugoslav Ambassador to The Hague Maja Mitrovic referred to recent press reports that the United States has accused Yugoslav defense firms of aiding Iraqi and Libyan missile development (see GSN I and II, Oct. 31).  Yugoslavia does not have the technology to develop long-range missiles and the military possesses no such weapons, Mitrovic said, refuting the reported U.S. allegations.

Next Step

The first meeting of the code’s members is to be held today at The Hague.  They are scheduled to discuss a number of issues related to implementation, including naming a central contact to collect information called for under the code’s confidence-building measures, selecting a chairman, creating financial arrangements, scheduling the next annual meeting, defining the code’s relationship with the United Nations and establishing procedures for exchanging information among code members, according to a Dutch Foreign Ministry press release.

Several countries, including Ireland and Germany, proposed bringing the code under the auspices of the United Nations.  Germany is ready to consider proposals for attaching the code to the U.N. framework in today’s scheduled meeting, Mueller said during her remarks to the conference yesterday.  Greater participation in the code can be accomplished through its integration with other international regimes, said Tom Kitt, Irish foreign minister with special responsibility for overseas development assistance and human rights.

The code was not originally developed through the United Nations, however, because of concerns such a move would have hindered the process, Scheffer said.  It would not have been possible to make so much progress on the code in the relatively short time it was developed if it had been done through the United Nations, in part, because the code’s obligatory transparency measures would have caused much more debate, he said.

U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan did not address the issue in a statement yesterday.  Annan praised the new agreement and expressed hope that the code would help establish an international norm against missile proliferation.  “The code of conduct, as a voluntary, nonlegally binding instrument, is a positive step towards preventing the proliferation of ballistic missiles and towards international peace and security,” he said.

Austria has proposed Vienna as the code’s central contact point and this will probably be approved because no other proposals have been put forward, said a Dutch official.  Vienna is also attractive for cost reasons because the U.N. presence there could be utilized, the official added.

For further information, see:

International Code of Conduct (Dutch Foreign Ministry)

Missile Technology Control Regime (U.S. State Department)

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NATO Plans:  Alliance Considers National Missile Defenses

By David Ruppe
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — NATO heads of state last week agreed to initiate a study of options for national missile defenses, in what experts said was at least a symbolic concession to U.S. missile defense objectives.

The leaders agreed to conduct a feasibility study of developing defenses to protect against long- and short-range ballistic missile threats to protect NATO homelands and population centers.  NATO previously had studied only theater missile defenses for protecting deployed forces in the field. 

“Today we initiated a new NATO missile defense feasibility study to examine options for protecting alliance territory, forces and population centers against the full range of missile threats, which we will continue to assess,” the leaders said Thursday at their meeting in Prague.

The declaration has symbolic importance, says Otfried Nassauer, director of the Berlin Information Center for Trans-Atlantic Security, because with this move, “NATO turns away from the assumption that there will be no strategic missiles and it takes up the U.S. risk assessment.”

The United States had been pushing heavily for the new analysis, officials and experts said, as it would consider defenses against ICBMs, the longest-range ballistic missiles, and threats to populations and territories, both major focuses of the controversial U.S. national missile defense program.

While the Bush administration has sought ICBM defenses against perceived threats developing from North Korea and the Middle East, experts said most of NATO’s European territory would not require long-range defenses for protection against missiles fired from states such as Iran and Iraq.

The new study was made legally possible when the United States withdrew in June from the Antiballistic Missile Treaty, which barred the United States from cooperating on national missile defenses, experts said (see GSN, June 13).

The statement also appeared somewhat symbolic since NATO’s Atlantic Council, its political decision-making body, had two weeks earlier already directed initiation of the new study.

Jeremy Stocker, a research associate with the Royal United Services Institute said the declaration was not so much a breakthrough as an incremental step toward supporting strategic missile defense development.

“What we’ve seen in the course of the last few years in Britain and to a less extent Europe is a series of incremental steps forward.  This is merely the latest,” he said.

He cited as another example a comment by British Defense Minister Geoffrey Hoon earlier this month, that “developing the capacity to defend against the threat of ballistic missile attack is as much in the interest of the U.K. and its people as it is in the interest of the United States” (see GSN, Nov. 13).

Differences of Perceived Necessity

The Bush administration sees the study as an important step toward trans-Atlantic cooperation on fielding missile defenses.

“This will establish the framework within which NATO allies can work cooperatively toward fielding the required capabilities,” said U.S. Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton in a speech days before the summit. 

The United States has spent an estimated $60 billion on developing national missile defense systems during the past 10 years and hopes to begin deploying a proven system this decade.

European governments, however, continue to appear skeptical about whether national missile defense technology would actually work, could be affordable and is necessary and beneficial.

The British arms procurement minister, Willy Bach, said last week he viewed “no essential need at the present time” for his country to cooperate on developing national missile defenses.  He said the British “priority at this stage” is to protect its deployed forces and it would only agree to cooperation on national missile defense “if we’re convinced that the security of the United Kingdom or NATO would be enhanced.”

NATO members have indicated support for other ways of addressing ballistic missile threats, such as through diplomacy and deterrent force, and the joint NATO statement issued by the leaders also stressed that such approaches were not being abandoned.

“We reaffirm that disarmament, arms control and nonproliferation make an essential contribution to preventing the spread and use of WMD and their means of delivery.  We stress the importance of abiding by and strengthening existing multilateral nonproliferation and export control regimes and international arms control and disarmament accords,” the statement said.

Bach last week mentioned the scheduled signing at The Hague this week of an International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation as an important way of dealing with ballistic missile threats (see related GSN story, today).

Bolton, appearing at the missile conference yesterday, said the new code would be a companion to, rather than a substitute for missile defense.

“We view our missile defense efforts as complementary to, and consistent with the objectives of, the ICOC and the MTCR [Missile Technology Control Regime].  Each seeks in different ways to protect us from the dangers posed by WMD and ballistic missile proliferation,” he said.

“We are now in the process of discussing with allies and friends, including the Russian Federation, cooperation on missile defense programs because our nation is hardly alone in needing the additional protection that such programs can provide.”

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U.S. Plans I:  Pentagon Fires Second Scud

The U.S. Defense Department test fired its second Scud missile in a month yesterday, in an effort to gather data to improve missile defenses (see GSN, Nov. 15).

The missile, which was fired from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California, flew 186 miles before falling into the Pacific Ocean, U.S. Missile Defense Agency spokesman Chris Taylor said.  The test is part of a $13 million Pentagon effort to help develop missile defense systems, according to officials (see GSN, Oct. 22; Associated Press/Newsday, Nov. 25).

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Israel:  Germany, United States Consider Sharing Patriot Systems

To bolster its missile defenses, Israel last week requested Patriot missile systems from Germany, German Defense Ministry official said today (Die Welt, Nov. 26, GSN translation).

“It is true that Israel has asked Germany to supply it with Patriot anti-missile missiles,” a ministry spokesman said in a statement.  German officials are “currently studying the request,” he said (see GSN, Nov. 25).

Israel has neither confirmed nor denied the report, according to Agence France-Presse (Agence France-Press/Yahoo.com, Nov. 26).

German Defense Minister Peter Struck has previously denied that the United States has asked Germany to commit any of its 30 Patriot missile systems in the event of an attack on Iraq, according to the Associated Press.  Israel’s request, however, is separate from discussions with the United States, a German Defense Ministry spokesman said (Associated Press/Ha’aretz, Nov. 26).

Meanwhile, the United States has offered its own Patriots to Israel under the condition that U.S. troops would control the missile systems, Agence France-Presse reported today (see GSN, Aug. 15).  Israel is expected to decline the offer, fearing that U.S. troops deployed in Israel might invite an Iraqi attack, according to the agency (Agence France-Press/Yahoo.com).

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U.S. Plans II:  Laser Airplane Completes Flight Tests

The first airplane to be modified for the U.S. Airborne Laser program has successfully completed flight worthiness tests, Defense Daily reported today (see GSN, Nov. 19).  Officials plan to send it to Edwards Air Force Base in California next month to install the laser system.

The plane — a Boeing 747-400 modified to carry the laser system — conducted flight tests this summer and fall (see GSN, Aug. 12).  Developers at Edwards plan to put the aircraft through ground tests before installing tracking and laser equipment.  Officials expect to take one year to integrate the system, according to Defense Daily (see GSN, Nov. 1; Kerry Gildea, Defense Daily, Nov. 26).

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