U.S. Response:  Bush Urges Lame-Duck Congress to Approve Security Bills

U.S. President George W. Bush yesterday called on lawmakers to pass legislation to create homeland security department when they return to Washington next week for a lame-duck session (see GSN, Oct. 4).

The creation of a homeland security department is “the single-most important item of unfinished business on Capitol Hill,” Bush said.

Legislation to create the department, introduced in June, has been bogged down in the Democrat-controlled Senate over provisions that would allow the president to suspend labor rights for the new department’s employees if their jobs were considered vital to national security.  Tuesday’s midterm elections, however, returned control of both houses of Congress to Republicans.

Aides to both Democratic and Republican senators yesterday said the Senate might still delay taking action on the homeland security department bill until the new session of Congress.  Once Congress reconvenes, new Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-Miss.) will have a better chance to gain approval for the legislation without a Democratic filibuster, said a Republican Senate aide.

The aide said he didn’t think Democrats would attempt to block a vote on the bill.  “That’s the reason that some people lost the elections this year,” the aide said.

Terrorism Insurance

Bush yesterday also called on the postelection Congress to pass terrorism insurance legislation (see GSN, Oct. 4).  Passing such legislation would help create “thousands of good hard-hat jobs,” he said (Chen/Gerstenzang, Los Angeles Times, Nov. 8).

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Threat Assessment:  United Kingdom Issues Warning, Replaces It Quickly

Britain’s Home Office warned yesterday of terrorist attacks using poison gas or “dirty bombs,” then withdrew the warning and replaced it with a generic caution, which included the caveat that “no country is immune from attack” (see GSN, June 20; Eaglesham/Huband, Financial Times, Nov. 7).

“Maybe they will try to develop a so-called dirty bomb, or some kind of poison gas; maybe they will try to use boats or trains rather than planes.  The bottom line is that we simply cannot be sure,” the withdrawn first release said.

Officials denied they were trying to avoid causing panic by retracting the statement by Home Secretary David Blunkett.

“We cannot be sure of when or how terrorists will strike, but we can be sure they will try.  They may attempt to use more familiar terrorist methods, such as leaving parcel or vehicle bombs in public places or hijacking passenger aircraft,” the first release cautioned (see GSN, Feb. 21).

The second version avoided any mention of poison gas or radiological devices.  Less than 30 minutes after the first statement was released, journalists were asked to give it back.

“If al-Qaeda could mount an attack upon key economic targets, or upon our transport infrastructure, they would.  If they could inflict damage upon the health of our population, they would,” the second release says.

British intelligence sources said the warnings in Blunkett’s first release — reportedly from a week-old draft — were not linked to specific information, but were intended to ensure watchfulness.

Security preparations in the United Kingdom, however, have been increasing, according to the 35-page report on safety precautions that followed Blunkett’s warnings.  The document was released as Blunkett met with U.S. homeland security chief Tom Ridge.

The United Kingdom has created a stockpile of medicine and medical supplies to respond to anthrax, smallpox or radiological attacks (see GSN, Oct. 9).  British ministers are also establishing a health protection agency, to counter a terrorist attack.  Officials have planned post-attack procedures with essential services and have refurbished the emergency response system; hospitals should receive 300 mobile decontamination units and 8,000 protective suits.

British intelligence and law enforcement have also established a National Counter Terrorism and Security Office, intended to keep track of the threat and prepare Britain’s defense.  A multiagency unit has also been created to fight terrorism (Ford/Tendler, London Times, Nov. 8).

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Iraq:  Security Council Unanimously Gives “Final Opportunity” to Iraq

By Jim Wurst
Global Security Newswire

UNITED NATIONS — The Security Council this morning unanimously adopted a new resolution giving Iraq “a final opportunity” to disarm or face “serious consequences.”

The resolution, sponsored by the United States and United Kingdom, creates a tougher weapons inspection regime, including unrestricted access to eight “presidential sites.”  Last-minute changes last night took into account the concerns of France, Russia and other states that earlier drafts contained “hidden triggers” that the United States could use to justify any military action against Iraq without first getting council approval. 

U.S. Ambassador John Negroponte said that at the ”core [of the resolution] is immediate and unimpeded access to every site, including presidential or other sensitive sites, structure, or vehicle [inspectors] choose to inspect and equally immediate and unimpeded access to people they wish to interview.  In other words, ‘anyone, anywhere, any time.’”

British Ambassador Jeremy Greenstock said the unanimous support “sends the most powerful signal to Iraq that this is the only choice. ... There is at last a chance that Iraq will finally comply with its obligations and that military action can be averted.”

After the meeting, the chief U.N. weapons inspector, Hans Blix, said he would have an advance team in Iraq by Nov. 18.

Blix, the head of the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), and Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency — the men who will lead the inspections — were in the council chambers.

While the last-minute changes in wording brought all council members on board, governments nevertheless stressed their belief that the “hidden triggers” had been removed. 

“War can only be a last recourse,” said French Ambassador Jean-David Levitte.  “The rules of the game set by the Security Council are clear and demanding.  They require full cooperation by the Iraqi leaders.  If Iraq wishes to avoid confrontation it must understand that this opportunity is the final one.”  He added, “France welcomes the elimination from the resolution of all ambiguity on this point and the elimination of all ‘automaticity.’”

Russian Ambassador Sergey Lavrov said the deliberations were “guided by the need to direct a settlement onto the diplomatic and political path not to allow for any military scenarios.”  The resolution “does not contain any provision for any automatic use of force.  It is important that  the sponsors of the resolution today officially confirmed … that that was their understanding.  And they gave an assurance that the resolution sought the goal of implementing existing decisions by the Security Council on Iraq through inspections.”

Negroponte told the council, “As we have said on numerous occasions to council members, this resolution contains no ‘hidden triggers’ and no automaticity with respect to the use of force.  If there is a further Iraqi breach, reported to the council by UNMOVIC, the IAEA or a member state, the matter will return to the council for discussions as required in paragraph 12.  The resolution makes clear that any Iraqi failure to comply is unacceptable and that Iraq must be disarmed.  And one way or another … Iraq will be disarmed.”

He added, “If the Security Council fails to act decisively in the event of a further Iraqi violation, this resolution does not constrain any member state from acting to defend itself against the threat posed by Iraq, or to enforce relevant U.N. resolutions and protect world peace and security.”

“Every act of Iraqi noncompliance will be a serious matter, because it would tell us that Iraq has no intention of disarming,” Negroponte said.

The resolution retained references to Iraq being in “material breach of its obligations” to disarm and to the threat of  “serious consequences as a result of its continued violations.”  Critics had seen both phrases as “hidden triggers.”  However, the reference to “serious consequences” was moved from the beginning of the resolution to the end.  Placing that phrase at the end of the text, meaning it follows the details of the new inspection regime and the procedure for reporting violations to the council, suggests action would have to follow in that order.  The earlier placement of the phrase could be interpreted to means consequences could follow at any time since Iraq is already in material breach of U.N. resolutions.

Consensus Hinged on Replacing “Or” With “And”

The culmination of eight weeks of debate, draft resolutions and counterproposals ended up hinging on a single word:  replacing an “or” with an “and.”

According to paragraph 4 of the resolution, if Iraq makes “false statements or omissions in the declarations” or fails to cooperate with inspectors, this “shall constitute a further material breach of Iraq’s obligations and will be reported to the council for assessment in accordance with paragraph 11 and 12.”  Yesterday’s version said “paragraph 11 or 12.” 

Paragraph 11 “directs” Blix and ElBaradei “to report immediately to the council  any interference by Iraq with inspection activities, as well as any failure by Iraq to comply with its disarmament obligations,” while paragraph 12 says the council will ”convene immediately … in order to consider the situation and the need for full compliance.” 

By replacing the “or” with “and,” France and others were satisfied that the council must meet after a reported violation.  In other words, the report alone would not be enough to trigger military action.  Last night, Greenstock said, “Paragraphs 4, 11 and 12 become a clearer nexus of paragraphs with the word ‘or.’”

Addressing the council, Lavrov said, “In the event of any kind of dispute or disagreement matters, it is the heads of  UNMOVIC and the IAEA that will report this to the Security Council and it is the Security Council that will consider the situation. … That is the sequence that is set forth clearly in paragraph  4, 11, and 12 of the resolution.”  

Syrian Deputy Ambassador Fayssal Mekdad said his government has received “reassurances that this resolution would not be used as a pretext to strike Iraq and does not constitute a basis for any automatic strikes against Iraq.”  He added that the resolution “reaffirms the central role of the Security Council in dealing with all phases of the Iraqi file.”

The resolution includes a specific timeline for Iraq’s compliance and the inspection regime. Baghdad has until Nov. 15 to accept the resolution and another 23 days to provide “a currently accurate, full and complete declaration of all aspects” of weapons of mass destruction programs, and well as declarations of all its other nuclear, chemical and biological programs.  UNMOVIC and the IAEA will resume inspections no later than 45 days after the council adopts the resolution and will “update the council 60 days thereafter,” meaning Feb. 21, 2003.

Secretary General Kofi Annan commented following the vote.  “This is a time of trial — for Iraq, for the United Nations and for the world,” he said.  “The goal is to ensure the peaceful disarmament of Iraq in compliance with Security Council resolutions and a better, more secure future for its people,” he said.

Annan added, “I urge the Iraqi leadership — for the sake of is own people, and for the sake of world security and world order — to seize this opportunity. … If Iraq’s defiance continues, however, the Security Council must face its responsibilities.”

In Washington, U.S. President George W. Bush applauded the unanimous passage of the resolution.  Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s “cooperation must be prompt and unconditional, or he will face the severest consequences,” Bush told reporters at the White House following the Security Council vote.

“The outcome of the current crisis is already determined:  the full disarmament of weapons of mass destruction by Iraq will occur,” Bush said.  “The only question for the Iraqi regime is to decide how.  The United States prefers that Iraq meet its obligations voluntarily, yet we are prepared for the alternative.  In either case, the just demands of the world will be met,” Bush said.

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North Korea:  Bush in No Hurry to Resolve Nuclear Weapons Crisis

By Bryan Bender
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — The United States has few quick diplomatic solutions to deal with the latest North Korean nuclear crisis and the Bush administration is likely to put off resolving it at least until next year, according to U.S. officials and experts.  In the meantime, Washington will seek to further isolate the North Korean regime and force its hand, they predicted (see GSN, Nov. 6).

U.S. allies in the region and critics of the Bush approach, however, have warned that a policy that is too confrontational and chooses isolation over engagement is likely to backfire, prompting Pyongyang to continue its nuclear developments and in the process threaten stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the region.

U.S. Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith held meetings with counterparts in South Korea and Japan this week, saying North Korea’s reported admission last month that it is seeking to enrich uranium does not lend itself to simple diplomacy.

“This is an authentically difficult subject,” Feith told reporters in Seoul Wednesday.  “It is not a problem that presents an easy and obvious solution.  There are debates about the best way to proceed and how to make diplomacy effective.”

A Range of Options

A variety of proposals have been floated in recent weeks for how to respond to North Korea’s revelations, which came when Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly confronted North Korean officials with new U.S. intelligence pointing to a covert uranium enrichment program, according to published reports (see GSN, Oct. 17).

Some are calling for isolating the regime entirely — including freezing diplomatic talks, a 1994 nuclear agreement and all but critical humanitarian aid — to force it to disarm.  South Korean and Japanese officials, however, have warned the Bush administration that doing so could be a dangerous move given North Korea’s unpredictability.  Japan, seeking to keep dialogue open with the North, went ahead with normalization talks this week.

Others support immediate negotiations with Pyongyang to resolve not only the nuclear issue but also other long-standing disagreements dating back to the Korean War.  Still others are calling for a combination of negotiation, diplomatic pressure and the threat of credible military force to pressure North Korea into giving up its nuclear program once and for all in return for Western aid and acceptance.

According to U.S. officials and a variety of North Korea experts, however, the Bush administration is unlikely to seek a resolution in the coming months, as it concentrates on a possible military campaign in Iraq and awaits scheduled January elections in South Korea in the hopes that a more conservative government will replace the administration of Kim Dae-jung and be more supportive of a confrontational policy toward the North.

U.S. President George W. Bush yesterday reiterated his long-held view that North Korea poses a serious national security threat the United States, but indicated that Washington will play for time while it decides what it wants to do in the longer term.

“As I said from the beginning of this new war in the 21^st century, we’ll deal with each threat differently,” he told a news conference.  “Each threat requires a different type of response.  You’ve heard my strategy on Iraq.  With North Korea we’re taking a different strategy initially.”

North Korea’s Suspected  Nuclear Capabilities

One reason for the slower approach is that very little is known about the North Korean uranium enrichment program, according to U.S. officials, including how advanced it is or where North Korea’s covert facilities are located inside the largely closed society.  

“There is much about the program that we don’t know,” Feith said.  “I cannot answer with precision exactly what they have accomplished with their uranium enrichment program to date.”

Intelligence officials assert that while they lack conclusive evidence, they believe it is unlikely that the uranium enrichment effort has reached a level at which the North Koreans have produced nuclear weapons using the enrichment method.

“It takes a very long time to produce a weapon based on that system,” said a U.S. intelligence official.  “And there would be more fingerprints.”

U.S. intelligence, which has long suspected North Korea of secretly developing nuclear weapons, discovered in August of this year that North Korea was attempting to acquire large quantities of high-strength aluminum, which could be used in centrifuges to enrich uranium.  Meanwhile, construction activity appearing to be related to a uranium enrichment facility was also detected by U.S. intelligence agencies, officials said.

“The fact that the North Koreans are seeking a production-scale capability to produce weapons-grade uranium is a cause of grave concern to us, to the states of the region, and to the world as a whole,” Undersecretary of State John Bolton said last week.

The new intelligence, combined with Kelly’s report that Pyongyang surprisingly admitted to seeking to develop nuclear weapons, pointed to a clear violation — in spirit if not in letter — of the 1994 Agreed Framework, in which North Korea agreed to forgo its plutonium production capability in return for two modern light-water nuclear power reactors.

Under the agreement, North Korea is storing spent nuclear reactor fuel rods containing enough plutonium to make up to five nuclear bombs.  Those fuel rods have been monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency under the 1994 agreement.  This material is in addition to a plutonium stockpile North Korea had previously separated from spent fuel.

“North Korea has produced enough plutonium for at least one, and possibly two, nuclear weapons,” Bolton said, not including the material now in storage.  Others, including Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, have said that North Korea already has manufactured two nuclear bombs with the material not covered by the 1994 agreement.

“Ours is very much keeping with the Rumsfeld view,” said a U.S. intelligence official.  In other words, Pyongyang is believed to already have at least two plutonium-based nuclear weapons.  Moreover, without a diplomatic solution to the current standoff, it could build more with the additional material it has, while also proceeding with its uranium enrichment program, the official said.

Data Collection Intensifying

Meanwhile, the new revelations about uranium enrichment have spurred U.S. intelligence agencies and others to increase efforts to collect information about North Korea’s efforts and intentions.

An estimated 200 U.S. reconnaissance flights were flown over North Korea last month, 20 more than in September, according to North Korea’s government-run news services.  A variety of aircraft are being utilized, including U-2s, RC-135s, E-3s and the RC-12, the reports said.

Other information has also contributed to the U.S. monitoring of the North’s activities.  For example, satellite images taken by the private firm Space Imaging in October of 2000, released this week, shows a sprawling group of buildings surrounding the entrance to a large underground facility in the Myohyang Mountains. 

South Korea’s Atomic Energy Institute has concluded the complex houses an underground nuclear reactor, a reprocessing facility, a storage facility and a high explosive test site, according to the Center for Nonproliferation Studies.  U.S. officials, however, doubt that assessment, according to a Nov. 1 report by InsideDefense.com.

Nuclear Negotiation

Despite the covert nature of the program, many North Korea watchers believe Pyongyang’s reported admission was an attempt to bring the United States — which has labeled it a member of the “axis of evil” — and its regional allies to the bargaining table for one last effort to resolve their long-standing differences.

“I think they would like the U.S. to give them some assurances that we do not intend to blow them out of the water,” said Donald Gregg, former U.S. ambassador to South Korea.  Gregg returned this week from North Korea, where he met with Deputy Foreign Minister Kang Sok.

“The danger has increased but the opportunity is still there if we are willing and able to take it,” Gregg added.  “Talking and discussion is the only way out of what is a very delicate situation at the moment.”

Others say those negotiations should build on the 1994 agreement.  “I think the main point is that we were able to freeze the operation of the plutonium-producing reactor and put the fuel rods in storage and they have been under inspection,” said Selig Harrison, a North Korea expert at the Center for International Policy.  “They have enough to make five more bombs.  These fuel rods are its card.”

Preventing North Korea from using those fuel rods should be paramount, Harrison believes.  “What is important that they don’t feel pushed into in a corner and will use those fuel rods,” he added. “Japan and South Korea are saying ‘don’t let the agreement lapse,’” Harrison said.

The Bush administration, however, has so far ruled out negotiations until North Korea opens the uranium enrichment program to international scrutiny and dismantles it.

“We’re happy to undertake the negotiations, but first North Korea has to dismantle, and do so rather promptly, this program that they have, which is in clear violation of the previous agreements we’ve had in some three other international agreements,” Kelly said this week.  “This is not an unsolvable problem but it is clearly one that there’s really nothing to negotiate, at least at this time.”

Meanwhile, the Bush administration has all but declared the 1994 agreement dead.  “It’s going to be something that’s going to be very difficult for us to continue,” Kelly said. 

Nuclear Isolation

Other experts agree with the Bush administration and say that the 1994 agreement is a failure and warn against any further concessions to Pyongyang.

“First, our continued payment of nuclear blackmail has got to stop,” said Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center. 

“Our diplomats have all but turned North Korea’s nuclear cheating into a recreational diplomatic drug,” he said.  “Breaking the habit won’t be easy, but continuing it is a one-way ticket to nuclear chaos.  It will not only increase proliferators’ contempt for U.S. and allied pleas for restraint, it will teach the world that a tyrannical state that succeeds in acquiring nuclear weapons will then get its way,” he said.

Sokolski is calling for a complete withdrawal by the United States from the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), which, along with South Korea, Japan and the European Union, oversees the 1994 agreement.

“At a minimum, the United States and its allies have to end their transfer of nuclear technology and fuel oil to Pyongyang,” Sokolski said.  “We must also figure out some way to penalize Kim Jong Il’s regime for violating the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.  Certainly, North Korea is not going to self-disarm,” he added.

The U.S. negotiators of the 1994 agreement partially agree.  “We should, first, persuade out allies to suspend economic and political engagement with the North, except for vital food aid,” wrote Anthony Lake, former national security adviser, and Robert Gallucci, former ambassador-at-large, in Wednesday’s Washington Post.

“Second, we should suspend our own performance under the Agreed Framework until the North shows us the destruction of its uranium enrichment facilities,” they said.

Unlike Sokolski, however, they believe the 1994 agreement, which in part successfully addressed North Korea’s plutonium, should be salvaged.  “Some changes to the agreement are needed in light of the North’s clandestine activities:  immediate initiation of full-scope inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency; prompt removal of the stored spent fuel out of North Korea; and agreement by the North to accept any future requests from the IAEA for special inspections.”

The threat of force is also necessary, they said.  “A powerful military reaction to any North Korean provocation should be on the table, too, as was the case in 1994, while also reserving the possibility of a pre-emptive strike.”  However,  “an ideological disdain for negotiating with our adversaries seldom serves our interests, and in this case could be highly dangerous,” Lake and Gallucci said.

Harrison agreed, saying, “It is critically important for the United States to pursue a dialogue with Pyongyang to keep the key provisions of the 1994 agreement in force, while renegotiating the rest of the accord to settle the nuclear issue once and for all.”

Biding Time

Whatever diplomatic or military approach Washington ultimately chooses, the Bush administration will likely bide its time, according to knowledgeable sources.

“There are lots of good reasons to resolve this,” said Joshua Handler, a Princeton University nuclear expert.  “But you have to appreciate the conservatives in each country, the United States and North Korea, have little incentive to change things.”

“The White House wants some sort of punitive approach,” Harrison added.  “At the moment, the Bush administration will be stalling until January, hoping to get a more conservative government in South Korea.  And they don’t want North Korea to take away from Iraq.”

Handler added: “My impression is that the Pentagon and the national security community never thought the Korean standoff was going to end.  If we have a breakthrough it will have significant implications,” for missile defense, for U.S. military force structure and a variety of other strategic factors, he said.  The lack of urgency in resolving the crisis, he said, is understandable in such a context.

Events to closely watch, experts say, include the KEDO meeting next week, at which board members will decide whether to continue shipments of fuel oil to North Korea, as called for by the 1994 agreement.  A new shipment left Singapore Tuesday, headed to North Korea and takes an estimated 10 to 12 days to arrive (see GSN, Nov. 5).

“There’s a board meeting next Monday that’s going to decide whether that one goes ahead,” Kelly said.  Feith, in Japan today, discussed cutting off the shipments and halting construction of the two U.S.-built nuclear power plants, as a way to pressure Pyongyang.

At the same time, North Korea this week warned that if relations are not normalized with Japan soon, it may lift its moratorium on live missile tests. Should Pyongyang make such a move, the region would find itself in further turmoil, experts said (see GSN, Nov. 5).

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United States:  U.S. Technology Exported to Suspected Bioweapons States

By David Ruppe
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — The U.S. Commerce Department in recent years licensed biotechnology exports to six countries that are not members of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention and six suspected of having offensive biological weapons programs, according to a General Accounting Office report last month (see GSN, Oct. 2).

U.S. officials defended the approvals, saying they were made only after a thorough interagency review to ensure that the recipient governments would not divert the technology for illicit purposes, and that exports of controlled pathogens were in minute quantities intended for public health uses.

Between October 1999 and December 2001, Commerce licensed exports of dual-use pathogens or technology to Egypt, Israel, Kazakhstan, Trinidad and Tobago, Malawi and the United Arab Emirates, “none of which have ratified the BWC,” according to the GAO report.

In addition, Commerce cleared China, Cuba, India, Pakistan, Taiwan and Russia to receive exports even though they “are mentioned as possibly violating the BWC and carrying on offensive biological weapons research,” the report says.

U.S. officials have repeatedly criticized Cuba this year for exporting dual-use equipment to Iran and other so-called “rogue nations.”  Iran is a party to the convention but is suspected by the United States of producing biological weapons and supporting terrorism (see GSN, May 22).

“Cuba has provided dual-use biotechnology to other rogue states,” Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton said in a speech at the Heritage Foundation in May (see GSN, May 7).  “We are concerned that such technology could support BW programs in those states. We call on Cuba to cease all BW-applicable cooperation with rogue states and to fully comply with all of its obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention.”

Review Process Cited

A State Department official Thursday said the difference between the U.S. approvals and the Cuban exports is “very much apples and oranges.”

“The kinds of things we are going to be exporting are the kinds of things, even though they are classified as dual-use … that won’t contribute to a weapons program, that are going to contribute to legitimate purposes,” the official said.

Without speaking specifically to what was approved, the official said such things generally tend to include “gram quantities of a controlled pathogen” or “regular laboratory equipment.”

“I think the concern about people selling things to Iran is when they’re selling production technology or equipment to manufacture CW or BW.  They are the real significant things, they are not the gram quantities of a controlled substance or material,” the official said.

“So on the face of it, it might seem a little hypocritical, but it’s really not,” the official said.

The report, Arms Control:  Efforts to Strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention, was sent in late September to U.S. Representative Christopher Shays (R-Conn.), who chairs the National Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations Subcommittee of the House Government Reform Committee, and released to the public late last month.

Reviewing the report before publication, Commerce expressed concern the report suggested it had acted “negligently.”

“The Department of Commerce is concerned that … the report could give the incorrect impression that the United States is negligently authorizing the export of pathogens that could be diverted to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs or other illicit uses,” wrote Deputy Assistant Secretary Matthew Borman.

He wrote it was “important to note” that such licenses to non-Biological Weapons Convention countries and certain countries of concern were authorized after “careful scrutiny” by Commerce, the State Department and the Pentagon, with intelligence community involvement.

The review, Borman wrote, was intended “to ensure the proposed end users are not involved in WMD programs and that the exports are not otherwise likely to be diverted.”

The items approved to nonsignatories were for human health purposes only, he wrote, such as “minute” quantities of aflatoxin for use to establish quality control standards to test food items for contamination.

The State Department official said if the department had a problem with any of the approvals they could have opposed them, bumping the decision up the chain to the president if need be.

“I don’t know of any case that have been escalated that high,” the official said.

“I imagine that a lot of these licenses have to do with gram quantities of a controlled pathogen or something that might be used in test kits, testing food, or water, or that kind of things,” the official said.  “So it’s very legitimate, benign uses, we see a lot of that kind of stuff, and then, regular laboratory equipment as well.”

The GAO report, however, contended that it is difficult to verify compliance with the treaty, because pathogens, knowledge and technology can have both commercial and military applications.

“Many pathogens that can be used to produce biological weapons also have commercial applications in the health and biotechnology spheres,” it says.

Difficult to Prove

The main focus of the report was to analyze various efforts to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention.  The report says the absence of a strong verification mechanism is a factor making it difficult to prove suspicions of illicit programs.

The report says it is difficult to find proof by monitoring a country’s imports, because biological items that can be used for commercial research and production purposes also can be used for military purposes.

“The difference between developing a vaccine for humans and developing a biological weapon may be very small.  When developing a vaccine, a large volume of pathogen is created.  The development of the vaccine would require killing the pathogen.  But if the pathogen were to be used as a biological weapon, one would keep it alive,” it said.

The report says the BWC is weak because it lacks a strong verification mechanism.  The Bush administration last year rejected a draft protocol intended to create such a mechanism, saying it would be ineffective and could harm U.S. security interests and commercial interests. 

The GAO report says, though, “With no verification procedures, it is difficult to prove or disprove these allegations within the auspices of the BWC.”

U.S. officials have maintained that strengthening the BWC is not the solution for dealing with biological weapons proliferation and have proposed a list of other measures for international action.  They include criminalizing violations by individuals of prohibited activity and enhancing infectious disease surveillance and response.

U.S. officials are pushing for a quick resolution, without a protocol to the treaty, of the fifth annual BWC review conference scheduled to begin Monday in Geneva (see GSN, Nov. 7).

For further information, see:

BWC Text and Associated Documents (U.S. Defense Department)

BWC States Parties (U.S. State Department)

U.N. Background on BWC

Fifth Review Conference of BWC

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Smallpox:  Rumsfeld Recommends Smallpox Vaccine Plan For Military

U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld yesterday recommended a military smallpox immunization plan to President George W. Bush, but many of the president’s concerns were left unanswered, according to a White House official (see GSN, Oct. 15).

The plan would vaccinate up to 500,000 troops, beginning with emergency and medical personnel and moving on to U.S. forces in the Middle East that might see combat soon, the Washington Post reported.

“There’s a lot of issues on both sides,” the official said of Bush’s caution in making a decision on the vaccine.  “He’s concerned not just about whether to do it, but how you do it.  You don’t want to do it if you can’t do it right,” the official added (Allen/Graham, Washington Post, Nov. 8).

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Russia:  Officials Raise Hostage Death Toll

Without explanation, Russian authorities yesterday said 128 hostages died in the Oct. 26 raid on a Moscow theater — eight more than had previously been reported (see GSN, Nov. 4).

Russia said that 123 hostages had died from the fenatnyl gas used in the raid and officials increased the number of hostages that were shot by the Chechen extremists who held the theater, from two to five.  Officials did not explain when or how the hostages were shot.

The Internet news site Grani reported that 136 hostages had died, but speculated that officials were going to announce the deaths slowly to reduce the fallout from the raid (Steven Lee Myers, New York Times, Nov. 8).

Among the dead civilians were eight foreigners, from Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Austria, the United States and the Netherlands, according to the Moscow city prosecutor.

Russian commandos who stormed the theater also killed 41 Chechens, 22 men and 19 women.  Authorities have said it was necessary to kill the extremists to prevent them from detonating more than 100 pounds of explosives that they had set up in the theater, which they captured Oct. 23.

Doctors continue to treat 67 hostages who are still hospitalized from the effects of the gas.  Of those, 26 have been discharged but returned for further care.

Nine Russian Federal Security Service commandos are also hospitalized, most likely from the effects of the gas, said Sergei Goncharov, former leader of the elite unit (Judith Ingram, Associated Press/Boston Globe, Nov. 8).

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ABM Treaty:  Decision Expected Soon in Congressional Lawsuit

A decision is expected within a few weeks on a lawsuit filed by 32 members of the U.S. House of Representatives to stop the U.S. withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, The Nation reported Tuesday (see GSN, Aug. 11). 

The representatives, led by Dennis Kucinich (D-Ohio), have claimed the Bush administration does not have the right to withdraw the United States from a treaty without first seeking the approval of Congress.  During the hearing, which began Oct. 31, Peter Weiss of the Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy argued that the U.S. Constitution describes a treaty as a “supreme law of the land,” and that the president is obligated to execute all laws.

“The president insists he has unilateral authority to terminate treaties and he can do so without Congress,” Kucinich said during a press conference held after the hearing.  “But nowhere in the Constitution does it say the president has the power to repeal laws,” he added.

“What is to prevent this or future presidents,” the representatives’ legal filing asks, “from terminating, by his or her sole decision, U.S. adherence to the North Atlantic Treaty (NATO), the Genocide Convention, the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, various anti-terrorism conventions, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions or, for that matter, the charter of the United Nations?”

U.S. Deputy Assistant Attorney General Shannen Coffin, representing the White House, claimed that the plaintiffs were trying to improperly fight an issue in the legal system that they had already lost in the political arena.  The Justice Department’s legal filing in the case labels the lawmakers’ claims as “little more than a purely political attack” (Matt Bivens, The Nation, Nov. 5).

For further information, see:

ABM Treaty Text and Associated Documents (U.S. Defense Department)

U.S. Fact Sheet on Withdrawal from ABM Treaty

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Israel:  Washington and Tel Aviv Plan Joint Exercise

The United States and Israel are preparing to conduct a joint missile defense exercise in Israel in January, the Israeli Defense Ministry said today.

Both U.S. and Israeli air defense units are to participate in the exercise, with the United States expected to leave behind three upgraded Patriot air defense batteries when the exercise is completed, the Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz reported, according to the Associated Press (see GSN, Nov. 4).

The exercise is part of the continuing cooperation between the U.S. and Israeli militaries, Israeli Defense Ministry spokeswoman Rachel Ashkenazi said (Associated Press/Yahoo.com, Nov. 8).

Israel Shows Off Interceptors

Israel displayed its Arrow missile interceptors to reporters yesterday as part of an effort to deter Iraqi missile strikes in the event of war with the United States (see GSN, Oct. 7).

The Arrow is considered the most advanced missile defense system currently deployed in the world, according to the Associated Press.  The Israeli military has said the system will provide a better defense against Iraqi missile attacks than Israel had during the 1991 Gulf War.

“I’m sure we are better prepared today,” said Brig. Gen. Yair Dori, head of the Israeli air defense forces.  “In 1991, we had almost nothing.  Now we have a very active, robust defense,” he added.

Israel deployed its first Arrow battery two years ago at the Palmachim Air Force Base to defend Tel Aviv.  A second system has been deployed near the northern costal city of Hadera and a third is currently being constructed, AP reported.  Israel jointly developed the Arrow with the United States at a cost of about $2 billion.

Israeli military historian Martin van Creweld said that while the Arrow represented a significant technological advance, it is overly expensive for the level of threat Israel faces from Iraqi missile strikes.

“If it were me, I would rely on the threat of retaliation,” van Creweld said.  “There is no defense system that is 100 percent effective,” he added (Greg Myre, Associated Press/Boston Globe, Nov. 8).

For further information, see:

MDA Terminal Defense Segment

Federation of American Scientists Background on Arrow

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Japan:  Washington to Urge Tokyo to Develop System

U.S. defense officials planned today to urge Japan to construct its own missile defense system to counter threats from North Korean ballistic missiles, the Japanese newspaper Yomiuri Shimbun reported, according to CNN.com (see GSN, Nov. 5).

U.S. Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith is expected to promote the idea when he meets with Japanese Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba today, the newspaper reported, quoting a U.S. defense official.

Japan signed a memorandum of understanding with the United States on a joint missile defense study in 1998, following a North Korean missile test.  Japan has been hesitant to move the program into the development stage, however, because of cost concerns and fears of antagonizing China, CNN.com reported.

So far, Japan has focused its missile defense efforts on research, including examining the use of Aegis radar-equipped warships, according to CNN.com.  Such a system would use infrared sensors and low-cost interceptors to destroy enemy ballistic missiles.  The program is expected to cost more than $8 billion and would require Japan to review its constitution on exercising the right of self-defense, the newspaper reported (CNN.com, Nov. 8).

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