By Bryan Bender
Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — The Bush administration this morning published the first national strategy on combating the threat of weapons of mass destruction, signaling to terrorist groups and hostile states in the strongest language yet that the United States would retaliate with nuclear weapons if attacked with nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological weapons.
The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, drafted by the National Security Council and White House Office of Homeland Security, lays out a three-pronged strategy for countering what is described as “one of the greatest security challenges facing the United States” (see GSN, Sept. 9).
The strategy calls for the development of new military and civilian capabilities to defeat WMD-armed adversaries, the strengthening of nonproliferation treaties and arms control regimes, and preparations to reduce, “to the extent possible,” the potentially catastrophic consequences of a successful WMD attack against the United States or its allies.
The strong language threatening overwhelming U.S. retaliation in response to a WMD attack represents part of the Bush administration’s expanding effort to strengthen the U.S. ability to deter potential adversaries. National security officials believe that the doctrine of deterrence — convincing enemies not to attack for fear of the consequences — was eroded by the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.
“States hostile to the United States and to our friends and allies have demonstrated their willingness to take high risks to achieve their goals, and are aggressively pursuing WMD and their means of delivery as critical tools in this effort,” the strategy states. “As a consequence, we require new methods of deterrence.” In addition to strong military forces as a deterrent, it says, is the need for a “strong declaratory policy.”
“The United States will continue to make clear that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force — including through resort to all of our options — to the use of WMD against the United States, our forces abroad, and friends and allies,” according to the document.
Such a doctrine, however, requires an enhanced ability to determine the source of a WMD attack quickly and effectively as well as improved means of launching a counterstrike, the strategy adds. “The primary objective of a response is to disrupt an imminent attack or an attack in progress, and eliminate the threat of future attacks,” it says. “As with deterrence and prevention, an effective response requires rapid attribution and robust strike capability.”
The WMD strategy affirms the Bush administration case for pre-emptive measures to prevent a WMD attack in the first place (see GSN, Dec. 5). “This requires capabilities to detect and destroy an adversary’s WMD assets before these weapons are used,” according to the strategy document.
“In addition, robust active and passive defenses and mitigation measures must be in place to enable U.S. military forces and appropriate civilian agencies to accomplish their missions, and to assist friends and allies when WMD are used,” the White House document says.
The six-page document, the first of its kind to be published by Washington, underscores the level of concern at the highest levels of the U.S. government about what Bush calls the “crossroads of radicalism and technology.”
It calls for a “comprehensive strategy to counter this threat in all of its dimensions.”
Nonproliferation treaties and other multilateral regimes — including the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, efforts to negotiate a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention and the Missile Technology Control Regime — will remain a key pillar of U.S. anti-WMD efforts, according to the strategy.
Increasing the Nunn-Lugar program to dismantle WMD materials in the former Soviet Union — “particularly through the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction” — is also considered a priority. Strengthened U.S. export controls and sanctions will also remain valuable tools, it adds.
Lastly, the strategy acknowledges that ultimately all of these efforts may fail to stop a successful nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological attack. “As part of our defense, the United States must be fully prepared to respond to the consequences of WMD use on our soil, whether by hostile states or by terrorists.”
It concludes, “The requirements to prevent, deter, defend against, and respond to today’s WMD threats are complex and challenging. But they are not daunting. We can and will succeed in the tasks laid out in this strategy; we have no other choice.”
U.N. weapons inspectors visited several new sites today believed to be connected with Iraq’s efforts to develop nuclear and biological weapons, according to reports (see GSN, Dec. 10).
Today, inspectors continued work at the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center and at the Ashakat phosphate mining facility, both believed to be connected to Iraq’s nuclear weapons program (CNN.com, Dec. 11). Inspectors also visited the bin Sina nuclear site, located in Tarmiya, about 20 miles northwest of Baghdad, and the Fateh chemical site on the outskirts of the Iraqi capital. In addition, they revisited the Amariyah Serum and Vaccine Institute at Abu Ghraib, just west of Baghdad, according to Reuters (Nadim Ladki, Reuters/MSNBC, Dec. 11).
Yesterday, an International Atomic Energy Agency team worked to determine the current activities at four sites that the group visited in the al-Karama complex — bin al-Haytham, the al-Sumood factory, the al-Fatah Company and stores of the Military Industrialization Committee — and to learn more about the use of various previously known equipment, the agency said in a press release yesterday (International Atomic Energy Agency release, Dec. 10). The al-Fatah Company is believed to be connected to efforts to develop ballistic missiles, according to CNN (CNN.com, Dec. 11).
Also yesterday, a team from the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission visited two sites, the Saddam Center for Biotechnology and the National Project for Controlling Brucellosis and Tuberculosis, the IAEA said.
Inspectors at the Saddam Center, a newly declared site, gathered information to set a baseline for future inspections. They conducted similar inspections at the Brucellosis and Tuberculosis site to reset a baseline in accordance with information that Iraq submitted in October (see GSN, Oct. 2).
The UNMOVIC team also confirmed the location of a newly declared third site, in Baghdad, involved in research on communicable diseases, the IAEA said (IAEA release).
U.S. Analyzes Declaration
In Washington, the CIA is expected to give the White House today a preliminary analysis of the 12,000-page declaration that Iraq recently submitted to the United Nations to outline its WMD programs, Bush administration officials said.
“The CIA is working on it, and the analysis will obviously take time, but the agency will prepare a preliminary assessment tomorrow and will send it to the White House,” an administration official said yesterday.
It may take a “few weeks” to complete a more detailed assessment that compares the information in the declaration with U.S. intelligence, an official said.
Officials distributed the U.S. copy of the declaration yesterday to CIA counterproliferation, linguistics and weapons experts, and sent some sections to weapons experts at other U.S. agencies, the Washington Times reported.
“The CIA is in charge. There must be six or eight agencies involved,” a U.S. official said.
The United States plans to analyze the declaration carefully to “understand what it is that Iraq is purporting to declare, as well as what they have failed to declare,” White House press secretary Ari Fleischer said (Pisik/Kralev, Washington Times, Dec. 11).
The United States might be ready by the end of the week to declare that Iraq is in “material breach” of U.N. Resolution 1441 — which mandates the Iraqi declaration and U.N. inspections — because early reviews of the declaration have led U.S. officials to believe that it contains “serious deficiencies,” one senior administration official said.
The U.S. response to the declaration “will be a fairly definitive readout, but not a blow-by-blow rebuttal” a senior administration official said. The official added that the U.S. response would probably be presented in a document of more than 100 pages that includes small amounts of classified information (Joel Mowbray, Washington Times, Dec. 11).
Iraq yesterday criticized the United States for obtaining an early copy of the declaration, calling the U.S. move “an act of unprecedented extortion in the history of the United Nations.” In a statement released by the Iraqi Foreign Ministry, Iraq accused the United States of “possibly forging what it wants to forge” in the declaration to persuade other countries that Iraq has lied (John Burns, New York Times, Dec. 11).
U.N. Translates
Meanwhile, in a meeting with U.N. Security Council members yesterday, U.N. chief weapons inspector Hans Blix said he expects to translate a working version of the Iraqi declaration by Monday and to complete a preliminary assessment by Dec. 19. Blix and several council members said they expect to distribute an edited declaration to the full council by early next week.
“The bottleneck, frankly, is translation,” Blix said. “We have about 500 pages in Arabic which need to be translated,” he added (Pisik/Kralev, Washington Times).
Blix told the five permanent Security Council members — China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States — that by Friday he wants their assessments of what information should be omitted. China and Russia said they probably would not have their assessments ready in time, according to the New York Times.
Blix also told the Security Council that the United Nations would not release the names of non-Iraqi companies in the declaration because they might provide valuable information, the Times reported. Those companies could report which items Iraq has tried to purchase and where, Blix said (Julia Preston, New York Times, Dec. 11).
Regarding the substance of the declaration, Blix only said that it “covers the period of time practically up to the present. They have not done that before, so it is evident that there will be something new, but … as for any revisions of the past, I do not know” (Jim Wurst, Global Security Newswire, Dec. 11).
Iraqi Scientists
In Baghdad, officials have yet to give U.N. inspectors a list of scientists involved in WMD programs, even though the United Nations requested the list two weeks ago, according to USA Today.
“We are still waiting for the list of names,” U.N. spokesman Hiro Ueki said. “Cooperation has to be judged over time. It is only the beginning of the process,” he added (Vivienne Walt, USA Today, Dec. 11).
Iraqi officials have begun moving scientists to positions with no direct involvement in WMD programs to put them beyond the reach of U.N. inspectors, according to the Western officials and Iraqi defectors.
“These are the people with the know-how, so the best way to hide the know-how is to hide the people,” a Western official said.
“Most of those working on the nuclear program in the 1980s and early 1990s have been sent away to university or industrial positions,” said Hussein al-Shahristani, the former chief researcher for Iraq’s atomic energy agency. “Some have been sent outside Iraq, including those working on chemical and biological warfare agents,” he added.
Iraqi officials have already begun telling scientists and others involved in WMD programs that their families will be in danger if they reveal sensitive information to inspectors, according to the London Sunday Telegraph. Some personnel have been sent to countries such as Libya and Syria and told to remain there while their families are kept in Iraq, the Sunday Telegraph reported (Wastell/Gilmore, London Sunday Telegraph, Dec. 8).
U.S. officials have said that any attempt by Iraq to block access to scientists will be seen as a material breach of the U.N. resolution, according to the Los Angeles Times.
“If anyone should show up black and blue, that would also be seen as a sign of poor Iraqi cooperation,” a senior U.S. State Department official said.
The United States has proposed that inspectors summon scientists both individually and in groups of as many as 50 to multiple interviews both within and outside Iraq, White House officials said yesterday. The purpose of such a plan would be to get several scientists in each of Iraq’s WMD programs — nuclear, biological, chemical and missile — to provide information, according to the Times.
The United States wants the scientists to provide enough information to convince the international community that Iraq is still hiding its WMD arsenals and programs, White House officials said.
“Now that the Iraqi declaration is in, the scientists will become a hugely important tool,” said a senior State Department official.
At first, it will be difficult to persuade the scientists to talk, officials said. “We’re looking for one string to pull so we can begin to unravel the whole thing,” the State official said.
Most Iraqi scientists eventually would be willing to talk, said Khidir Hamza, a former scientist in Iraq’s nuclear program.
“The majority of scientists don’t like the government or the thuggish family running the country, confiscating property, enriching themselves, restricting movement, threatening their families,” Hamza said.
The scientists, however, are unlikely to make the first move in contacting inspectors, according to experts. “No one will volunteer due to the fear of consequences,” said Martin Indyk, who dealt with Iraqi defectors while on the National Security Council during the Clinton administration.
The White House is responsive to concerns that Iraqi scientists could be seen as traitors if they cooperate, especially if U.S. intelligence is overseeing the effort, U.S. officials and former inspectors said. By working with the United Nations, however, the scientists could be seen as trying to save Iraq, they said.
“Iraqi scientists are not going to go to the CIA. If they do, they’re done as Iraqis. They might as well just plan to move to Detroit and open a 7-Eleven,” a U.S. official said. “Those who believe in Iraq and want to help in a post-Saddam Iraq will want to go to the U.N. and be able to say they didn’t betray their country,” the official added (Robin Wright, Los Angeles Times, Dec. 11).
Goods Review List
At the United Nations, meanwhile, the United States has called for several new additions to the U.N. Goods Review List of items that Iraq must not import without Security Council approval, including new types of antibiotics, smaller trucks and fast work boats, according to the Financial Times (see GSN, Dec. 5).
The proposed changes would include antibiotics such as ciproflaxacin and doxycycline, which are used in the event of exposure to anthrax. The United States has also proposed changing the parameters under which Iraqi orders are subject to review, the Times reported. Debate over the proposals should end in about two weeks, experts said.
One U.N. diplomat, however, has criticized the proposals, the Times reported.
“For the first time we are presented with a proposal to put medicine on the list — which has never been under embargo,” the diplomat said. “The GRL had been presented as a generous offer which shifted the blame for the humanitarian situation from the UN to the Iraqi government. This proposal is another nail in the coffin; it will raise problems,” the diplomat added (Mark Turner, Financial Times, Dec. 11).
For further information, see:
UNMOVIC
U.N. Resolution 687 (Sanctions Regime)
U.N. Resolution 1409 (“Smart Sanctions”)
U.N. Resolution 1441
IAEA Iraq Action Team
Inspectors from the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency have now visited dozens of sites in the round of post-Gulf War inspections that resumed Nov. 27 after a four-year lapse. The following chart summarizes some of their reported activities.
| Date | Site | Activity | | Dec. 11 | Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center, located south of Baghdad | Inspectors continued inventory work (see GSN, Dec. 11). See the entries below on Dec. 4, 9 and 10. | | Ashakat phosphate mining facility, 250 miles west of Baghdad | See the Dec. 10 entry below. | | Amariyah Serum and Vaccine Institute, west of Baghdad at Abu Ghraib | See the Dec. 10 entry below. | | Al-Fateh chemical site, on the outskirts of Baghdad | | | Bin Sina nuclear site, located in Tarmiya, 20 miles northwest of Baghdad | | Dec. 10 | Al-Sumood factory at the al-Karama complex | Inspectors worked to determine current activities and to learn more about the use of various previously known equipment (see GSN, Dec. 11). | | Al-Fatah Company at the al-Karama complex | | Military Industrialization Committee stores at the al-Karama complex | | Saddam Center for Biotechnology | Inspectors gathered information to set a baseline for future inspections (see GSN, Dec. 11). | | National Project for Controlling Brucellosis and Tuberculosis | Inspectors worked to reset a baseline in accordance with information that Iraq submitted in October (see GSN, Dec. 11). | | Ashakat phosphate mining facility | Inspectors compared current operations with what inspectors learned about uranium activities in the 1990s (see GSN, Dec. 10). | | Veterinary medical site at Abu Ghraib, just west of Baghdad | The site is probably the Amariyah Serum and Vaccine Institute, where Iraq conducted biological weapon-related research in the 1980s. The United States has argued that it has too much storage capacity for legitimate research (see GSN, Dec. 10). See also the Dec. 11 entry above. | | Al-Furat Chemical Industries General Company, 40 miles south of Baghdad | | | Bin al-Haitham research facility, in the northern Baghdad suburb of Wazireyah | | Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center | Additional nuclear inspections (see GSN, Dec. 10). See also the entries below on Dec. 4 and 9. | | Dec. 9 | Ash Shakyli | IAEA inspectors visited buildings and took samples to detect the presence of radiological materials (see GSN, Dec. 10). | | Al-Qaqaa company, south of Baghdad | IAEA experts began preparing an inventory of known explosive materials from Iraq’s previous nuclear weapons program (see GSN, Dec. 10). See also the Nov. 30 entry below. | | Fallujah 2 site of the al-Tariq Company, 100 kilometers west of Baghdad | The site consists of the company’s headquarters and a factory area, but UNMOVIC inspectors only visited the factory, which contains several previously tagged dual-use items that inspectors reconfirmed (see GSN, Dec. 10). | | Fallujah 3 site of the al-Tariq company, 100 kilometers west of Baghdad | UNMOVIC inspectors visited the site for the second day in a row (see GSN, Dec. 9). See the Dec. 8 entry below. | | Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center | More nuclear inspections (see GSN, Dec. 9) — at the large site which the IAEA has monitored for the past 10 years as Iraq’s main nuclear facility (see GSN, Dec. 4) — to begin a physical inventory of the site’s nuclear materials (see GSN, Dec. 10). | | Dec. 8 | Fallujah 3 site of the al-Tariq company | UNMOVIC inspectors accounted for several previously tagged dual-use items at the pesticides and insecticides factory (see GSN, Dec. 9). | | State Company for Geological Survey and Mining, in Baghdad | An IAEA team spent two hours at the site, at which uranium processing could have produced weapon-grade materials (see GSN, Dec. 4). | | Dec. 4 | Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center | See the Dec. 9 entry above. | | Al-Muthanna State Establishment, 45 miles north of Baghdad | UNMOVIC inspectors checked for resumed chemical and biological weapons activity after materials were destroyed in the 1990s. They confirmed the presence of mustard-filled artillery shells tagged by previous U.N. inspectors (see GSN, Dec. 5). | | Dec. 3 | Al-Sajoud palace | Inspectors were quickly admitted but appeared to have found nothing, according to the Associated Press. | | Dec. 2 | Three distilleries near Bakuba, north of Baghdad (first previously unvisited site) | IAEA inspectors did not explain why they visited the distilleries, but possibly searched for hidden nuclear equipment (see GSN, Dec. 3). | | Waziriyah ballistic missile development site at the al-Karama General Company, outside of Baghdad | Several things tagged in 1998 are now missing, according to the IAEA (see GSN, Dec. 3). Iraq said new locations of the equipment are in an October declaration (see GSN, Dec. 4). | | Dec. 1 | Khan Beni-Saad cropdusting facility, 35 kilometers north of Baghdad | Satellite information “called for a specific investigation of modified aircraft fuel tanks,” a U.N. spokesman said. UNMOVIC inspectors stayed five hours, taking samples from tanks and downloading computer files (see GSN, Dec. 2). | | Al-Taji complex with the bin Firnas and al-Quds missile factories | “We gave the inspectors every assistance and answered all their questions,” bin Firnas director Brahim Hussein said (see GSN, Dec. 2). | | Nov. 30 | Balad Chemical Defense Battalion, where troops train to defend against WMD attacks | Inspectors spent five hours examining storage sheds, opening ordnance crates and operating handheld sensors (see GSN, Dec. 2). | | Um al-Maarik factory | Iraqi officials said the facility only produces parts for light machinery and vehicles (see GSN, Dec. 2). | | Al-Qaqaa | A small group of inspectors repaired an air sampling system installed during previous inspections, according to Iraqi officials (Iraqi government report, Nov. 30). See also the Dec. 9 entry above. | | Al-Meelad equipment factory, formerly known as al-Furat, where centrifuges have been developed | Recent satellite imagery has indicated that construction has taken place at the site since 1998 (see GSN, Dec. 2). | | Nov. 28 | Al-Dawrah Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Production Laboratory | Following four hours of inspection, U.N. experts concluded that the plant is no longer operational (see GSN, Dec. 2). Inspectors noticed a missing fermenter (see below). | | Veterinary medicine facility | Iraqi officials led inspectors to a veterinary facility north of Baghdad, where a fermenter — missing from al-Dawrah — was being kept (see above; John Burns, New York Times, Nov. 29). | | Thu al-Fiqar factory | Inspectors searched the potential dual-use site — which was once used to produce ballistic missiles, according to London’s International Institute for Strategic Studies — to search for signs that Iraq was producing equipment for uranium enrichment, IAEA team leader Jacques Baute said (Kim Ghattas, Financial Times, Nov. 29) | | Al-Nasr industrial complex, where centrifuge rotors and missile engine parts were once made | A new building that the United States said is suspicious appeared to be inactive, said IAEA team leader Jacques Baute (see GSN, Dec. 2). | | Nov. 27 | Al-Tahidi Scientific Research Center | IAEA inspectors spent three hours examining papers and removing an air sampler installed in 1998 (see GSN, Dec. 2). | | Al-Rafah graphite production facility | Graphite can be used in missile components (see GSN, Dec. 2). | | Al-Rafah missile test stand | UNMOVIC inspectors looked for information indicating range of missiles tested here (see GSN, Dec. 2). |
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Potential terrorists could easily obtain lethal pathogens just by signing up for certain research courses at British universities, members of the British House of Commons said today.
The current voluntary system for screening students from overseas needs to be strengthened, the Commons Foreign Affairs Committee said, urging the government to create a central authority to control all of the country’s dangerous biological materials (see GSN, Dec. 4).
“Our anxiety is that a fully qualified research scientist, who unknown to the authorities was a supporter of a terrorist group, could be admitted to a postgraduate or other research institution within the U.K. to pursue an approved program of research,” the committee said.
“Such a scientist could thus gain unhindered access to the dangerous materials or pathogens,” it added.
Officials do not believe that any terrorist groups that currently threaten the United Kingdom have obtained biological weapons, according to the Press Association. A recent report from the Foreign Office, however, estimates that terrorists could possibly kill up to 3 million people by releasing 100 kilograms of anthrax from a tall building, the Press Association reported (Gavin Cordon, Press Association, Dec. 11).
For further information, see:
Biological Weapons Green Paper (British Foreign Affairs Committee)
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Maryland environmental officials yesterday approved a proposal to shorten the process of destroying mustard gas stockpiles at Aberdeen Proving Ground (see GSN, Jan. 10). The Maryland Environment Department has given the Army permission to remove the agent from storage containers manually, instead of using robots, Aberdeen spokesman Jeff Lindblad said.
“There is no change in the technology, but what we will be doing is skipping a step in the process of destroying the mustard agent,” Lindblad said.
The facility plans to begin disposing of the gas in March, Lindblad said. Before the effort begins, Maryland officials will test the disposal facility’s design and operational procedures, he added. Empty mustard gas agent storage containers are to be decontaminated by September 2004, Maryland officials said (Joe Nawrozki, Baltimore Sun, Dec. 11).
For further information, see:
U.S. Army Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization
The Russian Health Ministry has refused to release information on the composition of the gas used in October to end the takeover of a Moscow theater by Chechen rebels, Agence France-Presse reported yesterday (see GSN, Nov. 26). The ministry has “no right” to release the information because it is a “state secret,” Russian Health Minister Yuriy Shevchenko said in a letter to the parliamentary health committee.
The Russian news service Interfax reported yesterday that the State Duma, the lower house of the Russian Parliament, recently requested that the health and security parliamentary committees determine whether it is legal to classify information related to the gas as secret (Agence France-Presse, Dec. 11).
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The United States and Spain seized a North Korean ship traveling to Yemen early Monday loaded with a dozen or more disassembled Scud ballistic missiles. Following Yemeni protests today, however, it appeared that the United States would probably allow the ship to continue its journey, U.S. officials said (Trotta/Sudam, Reuters, Dec. 11).
The U.S. Navy and intelligence satellites have monitored the ship, the So San, since it left port last month, U.S. officials said yesterday (see GSN, Dec. 2). U.S. and Spanish troops boarded the ship in international waters 600 miles southeast of Yemen, a U.S. official said. The ship tried to evade capture, resulting in a hostile boarding action by Spanish special forces, according to the Washington Post (Ricks/Slevin, Washington Post, Dec. 11).
U.S. Defense Department officials said that Spanish warships had the right to stop the North Korean ship because it was not flying a flag and had its official markings obscured by paint.
“It appeared as a lawless, stateless vessel,” a Pentagon official said (Shanker/Neilan, New York Times, Dec. 11).
The decision to seize the ship was approved “at the highest levels of the administration,” a U.S. official said.
After searching the ship, the United States questioned its legal status, officials said. For example, the original name of the ship had been painted over and its registry papers were not in order, they said (Ricks/Slevin, Washington Post).
“It is a Cambodian vessel improperly registered. It had a name of So San, and it was painted over the original name. There was also paint over its ID number,” a Bush administration official said.
The crew on the ship appeared to be North Korean, and when the ship refused the Spanish request to stop, it signaled to Pyongyang, the official said (Bill Gertz, Washington Times, Dec. 11).
Spanish troops found the Scud parts when they opened containers that were partially hidden by sacks of cement, at which point they called in U.S military explosives experts, the Washington Post reported (Ricks/Slevin, Washington Post). The ship also carried containers of a chemical called inhibited red fuming nitric acid, which is used as an oxidizer in Scud missile fuel (Gertz, Washington Times).
Yemen apparently had purchased the missile components to help upgrade the small number of Scuds it already possesses, a U.S. intelligence official said. In recent months, however, Yemeni officials have repeatedly pledged that they would not purchase missiles or missile components, an official said.
“We keep catching them with their hand in the cookie jar,” the official added (Ricks/Slevin, Washington Post).
Yemen today said the Scuds were meant for its army and issued a formal protest over the seizure of the ship, according to the official Yemeni news agency Saba.
“The shipment is part of contracts signed some time ago,” Foreign Minister Abubakr al-Qirbi said. “It belongs to the Yemeni government and its army and meant for defensive purposes,” he added.
Al-Qirbi has summoned the U.S. ambassador to the capital of Sanaa to lodge a formal protest over the seizure, Saba said.
The ship has been transferred to the United States and is now traveling to Diego Garcia, a U.S. base in the Indian Ocean, Spanish Defense Minister Federico Trillo said (Shanker/Neilan, New York Times). According to Reuters, however, Yemen announced today that the United States has agreed to release the ship and its cargo.
Officials will give the missiles on the ship to Yemen if it purchased them from North Korea, a U.S. defense official said.
“Right now, the ship is carrying ‘undeclared cargo,’” the official said. “But if they (the missiles) become legal cargo, there is not much we can do. Weapons sales between two countries are not against the law. Only Iraq is forbidden (under U.N. sanctions) to buy weapons,” the official added (Trotta/Sudam, Reuters, Dec. 11).
U.S. Response
The United States had expected the seizure of the ship and its cargo of components for 15 Scud missiles, and the action will have little impact on U.S. policy toward North Korea, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage said.
“Obviously, this was expected by American authorities for some time,” he said during a press conference in Beijing today. “I don’t think there’s any change (in U.S. policy),” he added.
The shipment helps prove that North Korea is still a top missile proliferator, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said.
“They continue to be the single largest proliferator of ballistic missile technology on the face of the Earth, and they are putting into the hands of many countries the technologies and capabilities which have the potential for killing hundreds of thousands of people,” he said (NBC News/MSNBC, Dec. 11).
South Korea
South Korea has said it would continue to closely consult with the United States regarding the missile shipment.
“The government will enter close consultations with the United States,” a senior South Korean Foreign Ministry official said. “The United States has a position that it will closely cooperate with its allies before deciding on next steps,” the official added.
Some South Korean experts questioned whether the seizure was legal.
“I don’t understand on what legal grounds the United States has seized the ship,” Chung In-seop, a professor of international law at Seoul National University said, noting that North Korea has not joined the Missile Technology Control Regime, which regulates missile exports. “The burden of proof rests with the United States to show that the ship was headed for a destination like Iraq or other regions like Somalia engulfed in armed conflicts,” he added (Agence France-Presse/Yahoo.com, Dec. 11).
For further information, see:
Missile Technology Control Regime (U.S. State Department)
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The U.S. Missile Defense Agency unsuccessfully tested a missile interceptor last night when the interceptor failed to separate from the rocket used to propel it into space (see GSN, Nov. 22).
Officials for the Ground-based Midcourse Defense program, which conducted the test, plan to review data from the test to determine what went wrong, the agency said in a press release. They might be able to announce preliminary results in several days or more, according to the release.
All other GMD elements that technicians tested — including sensors, radars, and command, control and communication technology — appeared to work properly, the agency said (see GSN, Sept. 10). An infrared laser in a Boeing 747 airplane modified for the Airborne Laser program successfully detected and tracked the boosting target missile as it launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California, according to the release (see GSN, Dec. 10). Aegis cruiser USS Lake Erie successfully tracked the missile after it launched (see GSN, Sept. 25).
The test, the eighth in a series in the program, was the last in which officials had planned to use a surrogate booster that had been designed for other purposes, the agency said (see GSN, Oct. 30). Contractors are designing two alternative boosters that they plan to begin flight-testing in the spring, according to the agency (see GSN, July 22 and Dec. 9).
A booster separation problem had spoiled the third GMD test in July 2000 (U.S. Defense Department release, Dec. 11). Additionally, problems with a booster rocket delayed a missile defense test earlier this year, prompting U.S. officials to deny part of a potential bonus to defense contractor Boeing, according to Bloomberg.com (see GSN, Aug. 21).
Meanwhile, builders at Ft. Greely in Alaska have made progress on another component of the GMD program (see GSN, Aug. 19). They have finished digging six holes for interceptor missile silos, but the holes have not yet been hardened with concrete, Bloomberg.com reported yesterday (Tony Capaccio, Bloomberg.com, Dec. 10).
By David Ruppe
Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — The British Defense Ministry released a paper Monday arguing in favor of British participation in a proposed U.S. missile defense plan to defend the United States and Europe, and supported the controversial idea of basing missile interceptors, along with missile-tracking radars, in Europe (see GSN, Nov. 26)
The paper signals the most candid government indication so far of what such a trans-Atlantic system, which has been aggressively promoted by Bush administration officials, might involve.
The paper said U.S. and British missile defenses would be “greatly enhanced” by upgrading existing radar facilities at the Royal Air Force Fylingdales base, already a site under consideration for inclusion in the plan.
It further said, “Additional interceptor sites, perhaps in the Northeast United States and in Northwest Europe, would greatly enhance the defense of the U.S., and the latter could also provide protection for part of Europe.”
“The $64,000 issue is that the United States wants land-based batteries in Europe,” said Dan Plesch, a senior research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies in London. “They’re trying to get this through by offering industrial sweeteners and so-on.”
The paper did mention “real opportunities” for British employment as a benefit of participation, though not in the context of any quid pro quo on deployment.
Defense Minister Geoffrey Hoon in comments before Parliament Monday indicated Fylingdales was a possibility and also that an early warning Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) receiver system at RAF Menwith Hill station could be used in such a system.
Hoon declined to discuss further what and how British sites might be used, saying the potential system’s “architecture” was not yet decided.
Strong Sign of Support
The so-called “discussion paper,” is the clearest indication to date that the Prime Minister Tony Blair is privately inclined to support, or at least not to reject, collaborating with the United States on its ballistic missile defense program.
Although U.S. officials have discussed expanding U.S. deployments with their British and Danish counterparts, they so far have made no formal requests for basing or cooperation. Nor has either European government yet announced it will agree to help.
There has been strong opposition to the idea inside and outside the British government.
Member of Parliament Malcolm Savidge asked Hoon during his Monday appearance before House of Commons whether the document indicated the government was acting “servilely subservient” to the “ideological obsessions of the Bush administration,” observing the government had not declared missile defense a national priority in a White Paper earlier this year. Hoon denied the charge.
The latest paper said the United Kingdom does not currently face a strategic ballistic missile threat but might do so in the future.
“There are an increasing number of potential threats to the security of the U.K. and her Allies in the world today. To choose only to tackle some of these and hope others never materialize would be a dangerous approach,” it said.
Criticisms Dismissed
Hoon said the paper was intended “to inform debate” on the issue.
While the paper did not present any final conclusions on whether the United Kingdom should team up, it did, however, attempt to dismiss a range of criticisms that have been raised regarding British participation, including from within Blair’s own party.
It said recent testing suggests that the U.S. system could be effective at stopping enemy ballistic missiles, that participation would not make the Fylingdales base or the country in general any more vulnerable than it already is for attacks as a close U.S. ally, and that the system would not provoke an arms race by undermining the nuclear deterrence capability of the Russian or Chinese nuclear arsenal.
The paper further argued Britain would be better positioned to intervene in conflicts around the world having a missile defense system in place to protect against threats to its homeland.
“We believe that a potential aggressor would be more likely to be deterred if he knew that he could not threaten the homelands of key states in the international community in this matter,” it said.
Though it raised the possibility that missile defense might lead potential aggressors to improve their ballistic missile capabilities, it ultimately dismissed the idea, concluding, “The proliferation threat is not new; missile defense is a response to, not the cause of, the problem.”
Value, Not Cost
The inability of the United Kingdom or other European governments to afford a strategic missile defense also has been a prominent concern raised by critics.
The discussion paper said the cost of such a system to Britain could not yet be determined.
“There is no doubt missile defense is an expensive capability. It is too early to estimate the cost of acquiring missile defense protection for U.K. territory at the present time — system architectures and technologies are still under development and the ways in which the U.K. might participate in any future program remain to be determined.”
It said that economic “value” might be gained from British industrial participation in the program, for which the United States is expected to spend many tens of billions of dollars.
“Missile defense is a massive technological undertaking, invoking research and development of high value, cutting-edge systems. The U.K.’s defense industry is well placed to participate in and benefit from the enterprise, an enterprise which also has real opportunities for the creation of highly skilled employment in this country,” it said.
The paper said London was considering creating a Missile Defense Technology Center, jointly funded by government and industry, to focus missile defense work and discussing with U.S. officials bilateral exchanges, technical partnerships between industries and arrangements for technology transfers.
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