As the third week of U.N. weapons inspections in Iraq began, inspectors today visited six sites believed to have been connected with Iraq’s efforts to develop ballistic missiles and nuclear and biological weapons (see GSN, Dec. 11).
A team of International Atomic Energy Agency experts visited the al-Nidaa Public Company in a suburb of Baghdad. Managed by the Iraq Military Industrialization Committee, the site had been destroyed by a cruise missile strike in 1993 and later reconstructed. It currently produces metal molds, according to Reuters (Alistair Lyon, Reuters/MSNBC, Dec. 12). Before the 1991 Gulf War, the site was believed to have been involved developing al-Hussein ballistic missiles, according to U.N. reports (Lamia Radi, Agence France-Presse, Dec. 12).
IAEA teams also visited the Mu’tassim factory, 25 miles south of Baghdad in Jurf Sakhr, and revisited the bin Sina former uranium enrichment facility, Reuters reported.
Near Suweirah, 40 miles southeast of Baghdad, a U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission team visited an abandoned factory owned by the Arab Company for Antibiotics, Iraqi officials said.
In other visits, U.N. teams inspected a factory called al-Rasheed and a missile test pad near Ramadi, 75 miles northwest of Baghdad, according to Reuters (Reuters, Dec. 12).
Yesterday, inspectors visited several new sites and finished work at others, the International Atomic Energy Agency said in a press release.
IAEA experts visited the Saddam GE site and its adjacent Amir Factory, which have been involved in Iraq’s missile development efforts, according to the agency release. While there, inspectors worked to verify activities conducted at the site since 1998 and to review the use of previously identified dual-use equipment.
IAEA teams yesterday completed an inventory of remaining nuclear materials at the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center and finished inspections of a uranium-extraction plant at the al-Qaim phosphate mining facility in Ashakat.
An UNMOVIC team visited a previously declared facility in al-America known as the al-Razi Research Center, which produces small amounts of diagnostic reagents for some human and animal diseases. To verify the declaration of the site’s materials and activities, the team fully inspected the site’s buildings, several of which had been built in 1999, according to the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency release, Dec. 11).
Currently, more than 70 U.N. inspectors are operating in Iraq, up from an initial group of 17. The total number of inspectors in Iraq is expected to reach 100 before Christmas, according to the New York Times.
So far, inspectors have taken a cautious approach in releasing information on their activities, the Times reported. They have said time is needed to determine whether Iraq has resumed any of its weapons of mass destruction programs.
“We haven’t disclosed anything, but that doesn’t mean that we haven’t found any trace of evidence to suggest to our inspectors that there may be something” that indicates new Iraqi work on banned weapons, said a U.N. official with access to inspectors’ reports. “It’s just that we cannot tell you anything yet,” the official added.
UNMOVIC chief Hans Blix and IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei have until Jan. 25 to provide an initial inspections report to the U.N. Security Council. That deadline will probably be the first time that information on the inspectors’ findings is made public, unless Blix and ElBaradei “feel they have something they need to say before that,” U.N. spokesman Hiro Ueki said (John Burns, New York Times, Dec. 12).
Declaration Is Based on Repeats, Officials Say
In Washington, the CIA delivered its initial assessment of the 12,000-page Iraqi WMD document to the White House yesterday, according to the Los Angeles Times. Much of the information in the declaration appears to be repeated from past declarations, officials said.
For example, the more than 2,000 pages of the declaration that comprise reports on the Iraqi nuclear weapons program appear to mostly duplicate declarations submitted to the United Nations in 1996 and 1997, officials said. The declaration’s information on Iraq’s biological and chemical programs also appears to be copies of reports that the United Nations rejected as incomplete between 1995 and 1997, they added.
“The initial conclusion is there’s nothing really new,” said a U.S. official assisting in the review of the declaration. “What I’m hearing is it’s all recycled and (Iraqi claims that) it didn’t do anything wrong,” the official added.
Analysts have finished translating from Arabic several sections of the declaration, including 300 pages concerning nuclear-related facilities. Those sections are undergoing a “line-by-line review to see if (Iraq) inserted something that wasn’t in previous reports,” the official said. “Nothing has emerged yet,” the official added (Bob Drogin, Los Angeles Times, Dec. 12).
U.S. Prepares Plans to Interview Scientists
The Bush administration has ordered the CIA, the Pentagon and the State Department to develop a plan to remove several Iraqi scientists from the country — either through an offer of asylum or through requests akin to subpoenas — to interview them about WMD programs, White House officials said.
The orders for the plan, which originated with national security adviser Condoleezza Rice, are supported by top civilian Pentagon officials who want to speed up an inspections process they fear could remain inconclusive for months or years, according to the Washington Post.
A senior White House official said yesterday that the preliminary assessment of the Iraqi WMD declaration has made such interviews “essential.” The declaration is “almost the opposite of full disclosure. It’s full nondisclosure,” the official said.
Under the new U.N. inspections regime, Iraq is required to identify all current and former personnel associated with its WMD programs, and to give inspectors the right to interview them. If Iraq failed to ensure that the scientists cooperated with inspectors, it could amount to a “material breach” of U.N. Resolution 1441, the Post reported.
The inspectors’ new authority to interview Iraqi scientists is “the most significant authority contained in the resolution” and “the one thing that is most likely to produce overt Iraqi opposition,” the senior White House official said. Because of that, “it can’t be a voluntary program,” the official said, comparing an interview summons to a grand jury subpoena.
Under this approach, if a scientist refuses to provide information, it could be considered a material breach of the resolution. Any new discoveries of WMD stockpiles made through information obtained in interviews could also be considered a material breach, the Post reported.
Some in State and the CIA, however, are concerned about the speed with which an interview plan is being prepared, Bush administration officials said. Those agencies and some officials in other countries and the United Nations have said that a hastily prepared plan could endanger the lives of Iraqi scientists and their families, as well as undermine the inspections process as a whole, according to the Post.
“I know they want to move quickly,” said an informed source, referring to those who favor the new plan. “But there is a tradeoff here between moving quickly ... and not putting so much pressure on Blix that you have an open rift between him and one or more members of the Security Council. ... You don’t want an open rebellion from UNMOVIC on this,” the source added.
Some CIA officials that have supported giving Iraqi scientists asylum and want to work with the inspectors conducting the interviews have said that White House officials who favor a hasty interview plan have not thought about all of the potential consequences.
“It’s more difficult than people believe,” said another official with knowledge of the plan. “Getting the list of names is easy, but getting folks together” in families inside Iraq, “and deciding who knows what is the real problem. The mechanics of pulling this off is still being looked at,” the official said.
Planners have taken those problems and others into consideration, the senior White House official said.
“I don’t think it’s complicated,” the official said. “It’s a little brutal. It’s a little rough, [but], it has always been a dangerous thing (for Iraqis) to be inside that (weapons of mass destruction) program,” the official added (DeYoung/Pincus, Washington Post, Dec. 12).
For further information, see:
U.N. Resolution 1441
UNMOVIC
IAEA Iraq Action Team
Inspectors from the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency have now visited dozens of sites in the round of post-Gulf War inspections that resumed Nov. 27 after a four-year lapse. The following chart summarizes some of their reported activities.
| Date | Site | Activity | | Dec. 12 | Al-Nidaa Public Company, in a suburb of Baghdad | Industrial facility formerly involved with ballistic missile development (see GSN, Dec. 12). | | Mu’tassim factory, 25 miles south of Baghdad in Jurf Sakhr | | | Bin Sina former uranium enrichment facility, 20 miles northwest of Baghdad in Tarmiya | See the Dec. 11 entry below. | | Abandoned factory owned by the Arab Company for Antibiotics, 40 miles southeast of Baghdad near Suweirah | | | Al-Rasheed factory | | Ramadi missile test pad, 75 miles northwest of Baghdad | | Dec. 11 | Saddam GE site | IAEA inspectors worked to verify activities conducted since 1998 and to review the use of formerly known dual-use equipment believed to be connected to Iraq’s missile program. | | Amir Factory, owned by Saddam GE | | Al-Razi Research Center, in al-America | UNMOVIC experts fully inspected buildings, several of which had been built in 1999, to verify declarations of materials and activities at the site, which produces diagnostic reagents for some human and animal diseases. | | Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center, located south of Baghdad | Inspectors completed inventory work (see GSN, Dec. 12). See also the entries below on Dec. 4, 9 and 10. | | Al-Qaim phosphate mining facility, 250 miles west of Baghdad in Ashakat | Inspectors completed inventory work (see GSN, Dec. 12). See also the Dec. 10 entry below. | | Amariyah Serum and Vaccine Institute, west of Baghdad at Abu Ghraib | See the Dec. 10 entry below. | | Al-Fateh chemical site, on the outskirts of Baghdad | | | Bin Sina nuclear site, located in Tarmiya, 20 miles northwest of Baghdad | | Dec. 10 | Al-Sumood factory at the al-Karama complex | IAEA inspectors worked to determine current activities and to learn more about the use of various previously known equipment (see GSN, Dec. 11). | | Al-Fatah Company at the al-Karama complex | | Military Industrialization Committee stores at the al-Karama complex | | Saddam Center for Biotechnology | UNMOVIC inspectors gathered information to set a baseline for future inspections (see GSN, Dec. 11). | | National Project for Controlling Brucellosis and Tuberculosis | UNMOVIC inspectors worked to reset a baseline in accordance with information that Iraq submitted in October (see GSN, Dec. 11). | | Al-Qaim phosphate mining facility, 250 miles west of Baghdad in Ashakat | IAEA inspectors compared current operations with what inspectors learned about uranium activities in the 1990s (see GSN, Dec. 10). | | Veterinary medical site at Abu Ghraib, just west of Baghdad | The site is probably the Amariyah Serum and Vaccine Institute, where Iraq conducted biological weapon-related research in the 1980s. The United States has argued that it has too much storage capacity for legitimate research (see GSN, Dec. 10). See also the Dec. 11 entry above. | | Al-Furat Chemical Industries General Company, 40 miles south of Baghdad | | | Bin al-Haitham research facility, in the northern Baghdad suburb of Wazireyah | | Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center | Additional nuclear inspections (see GSN, Dec. 10). See also the entries below on Dec. 4 and 9. | | Dec. 9 | Ash Shakyli | IAEA inspectors visited buildings and took samples to detect the presence of radiological materials (see GSN, Dec. 10). | | Al-Qaqaa company, south of Baghdad | IAEA experts began preparing an inventory of known explosive materials from Iraq’s previous nuclear weapons program (see GSN, Dec. 10). See also the Nov. 30 entry below. | | Fallujah 2 site of the al-Tariq Company, 100 kilometers west of Baghdad | The site consists of the company’s headquarters and a factory area, but UNMOVIC inspectors only visited the factory, which contains several previously tagged dual-use items that inspectors reconfirmed (see GSN, Dec. 10). | | Fallujah 3 site of the al-Tariq company, 100 kilometers west of Baghdad | UNMOVIC inspectors visited the site for the second day in a row (see GSN, Dec. 9). See the Dec. 8 entry below. | | Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center | More nuclear inspections (see GSN, Dec. 9) — at the large site which the IAEA has monitored for the past 10 years as Iraq’s main nuclear facility (see GSN, Dec. 4) — to begin a physical inventory of the site’s nuclear materials (see GSN, Dec. 10). | | Dec. 8 | Fallujah 3 site of the al-Tariq company | UNMOVIC inspectors accounted for several previously tagged dual-use items at the pesticides and insecticides factory (see GSN, Dec. 9). | | State Company for Geological Survey and Mining, in Baghdad | An IAEA team spent two hours at the site, at which uranium processing could have produced weapon-grade materials (see GSN, Dec. 4). | | Dec. 4 | Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center | See the Dec. 9 entry above. | | Al-Muthanna State Establishment, 45 miles north of Baghdad | UNMOVIC inspectors checked for resumed chemical and biological weapons activity after materials were destroyed in the 1990s. They confirmed the presence of mustard-filled artillery shells tagged by previous U.N. inspectors (see GSN, Dec. 5). | | Dec. 3 | Al-Sajoud palace | UNMOVIC and IAEA inspectors were quickly admitted but appeared to have found nothing, according to the Associated Press. | | Dec. 2 | Three distilleries near Bakuba, north of Baghdad (first previously unvisited site) | IAEA inspectors did not explain why they visited the distilleries, but possibly searched for hidden nuclear equipment (see GSN, Dec. 3). | | Waziriyah ballistic missile development site at the al-Karama General Company, outside of Baghdad | Several things tagged in 1998 are now missing, according to the IAEA (see GSN, Dec. 3). Iraq said new locations of the equipment are in an October declaration (see GSN, Dec. 4). | | Dec. 1 | Khan Beni-Saad cropdusting facility, 35 kilometers north of Baghdad | Satellite information “called for a specific investigation of modified aircraft fuel tanks,” a U.N. spokesman said. UNMOVIC inspectors stayed five hours, taking samples from tanks and downloading computer files (see GSN, Dec. 2). | | Al-Taji complex with the bin Firnas and al-Quds missile factories | “We gave the inspectors every assistance and answered all their questions,” bin Firnas director Brahim Hussein said (see GSN, Dec. 2). | | Nov. 30 | Balad Chemical Defense Battalion, where troops train to defend against WMD attacks | UNMOVIC inspectors spent five hours examining storage sheds, opening ordnance crates and operating handheld sensors (see GSN, Dec. 2). | | Um al-Maarik factory | Iraqi officials said the facility only produces parts for light machinery and vehicles (see GSN, Dec. 2). | | Al-Qaqaa | A small group of IAEA inspectors repaired an air sampling system installed during previous inspections, according to Iraqi officials (Iraqi government report, Nov. 30). See also the Dec. 9 entry above. | | Al-Meelad equipment factory, formerly known as al-Furat, where centrifuges have been developed | Recent satellite imagery has indicated that construction has taken place at the site since 1998 (see GSN, Dec. 2). | | Nov. 28 | Al-Dawrah Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Production Laboratory | Following four hours of inspection, U.N. experts concluded that the plant is no longer operational (see GSN, Dec. 2). Inspectors noticed a missing fermenter (see below). | | Veterinary medicine facility | Iraqi officials led inspectors to a veterinary facility north of Baghdad, where a fermenter — missing from al-Dawrah — was being kept (see above; John Burns, New York Times, Nov. 29). | | Thu al-Fiqar factory | Inspectors searched the potential dual-use site — which was once used to produce ballistic missiles, according to London’s International Institute for Strategic Studies — to search for signs that Iraq was producing equipment for uranium enrichment, IAEA team leader Jacques Baute said (Kim Ghattas, Financial Times, Nov. 29) | | Al-Nasr industrial complex, where centrifuge rotors and missile engine parts were once made | A new building that the United States said is suspicious appeared to be inactive, said IAEA team leader Jacques Baute (see GSN, Dec. 2). | | Nov. 27 | Al-Tahidi Scientific Research Center | IAEA inspectors spent three hours examining papers and removing an air sampler installed in 1998 (see GSN, Dec. 2). | | Al-Rafah graphite production facility | Graphite can be used in missile components (see GSN, Dec. 2). | | Al-Rafah missile test stand | UNMOVIC inspectors looked for information indicating range of missiles tested here (see GSN, Dec. 2). |
Officials at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California announced a major reorganization of the facility Tuesday to prepare for a role in the newly created U.S. Homeland Security Department (see GSN, Nov. 19).
The laboratory’s new organization will help it better coordinate $50 million in research funds that it expects to receive from the new department in its first year, according to the Contra Costa Times. Wayne Shotts, now head of Lawrence Livermore’s nonproliferation, arms control and international security division, has been chosen to head the facility’s new Homeland Security Organization.
“We are very pleased that Lawrence Livermore has organized itself to respond to this challenge,” said Parney Albright, senior director for research and development in the White House Homeland Security Office. “We expect to have a very, very powerful capability,” Albright added.
Because of its research capabilities, Lawrence Livermore will house a majority of the 500 scientists expected to work for the new department, Albright said. “When these people go home at night, we want them to tell their wives and kids they work for Homeland Security,” he added (Andrea Widener, Contra Costa Times, Dec. 11).
On Monday, Los Alamos National Laboratory announced the creation of its Center for Homeland Security, to be headed by 11-year laboratory veteran Thomas Meyer. Meyer most recently has worked in Washington as director of the Advanced Technologies office at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the laboratory said.
“The development and staffing of our Center for Homeland Security allows the laboratory to present a cohesive, action-oriented approach to our homeland security work,” said Los Alamos Director John Browne. “The laboratory’s long history of achievements in the science, technology and analysis related to the nation’s security will be focused through this center, ensuring that government agencies needing our assistance are immediately connected with the right people,” he added.
The new center will specialize in infrastructure protection, radiological and nuclear issues, chemical and biological programs and simulation technologies, according to a Los Alamos release (Los Alamos release, Dec. 9).
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In response to a suspension in fuel aid, North Korea announced today that it plans to restart a nuclear reactor that has been inactive since at least 1994 when Pyongyang signed the Agreed Framework with the United States (see GSN, Dec. 4).
The Agreed Framework promises fuel aid in exchange for a freeze on suspected North Korean nuclear activities, but international officials suspended fuel shipments in November after the United States alleged that Pyongyang was working to enrich uranium to develop nuclear weapons (see GSN, Nov. 15).
“The prevailing situation compelled the D.P.R.K. government to lift its measure for nuclear freeze taken on the premise that 500,000 tons of heavy oil would be annually supplied to the D.P.R.K. under the D.P.R.K.-U.S. Agreed Framework and immediately resume the operation and construction of its nuclear facilities to generate electricity,” the North Korean Foreign Ministry said in a statement released by the Korean Central News Agency.
The move appears to be an effort to draw the United States back to negotiations, analysts said. Comments from the ministry might support such a theory.
“Whether the D.P.R.K. refreezes its nuclear facilities or not hinges upon the U.S.,” the ministry statement says (Paul Eckert, Reuters, Dec. 12).
North Korea said that its purpose in restarting its Soviet-era nuclear reactor and resuming construction on several other nuclear projects is to generate much needed power.
“Our country faced an immediate problem in electricity generation because the United States has virtually abandoned its obligations,” the ministry said.
Experts said, however, that technicians could also extract plutonium from the fuel in the reactors (Christopher Torchia, Associated Press, Dec. 12).
International Response
After a national security meeting today, South Korean officials expressed “strong regret and concern about the North’s declaration.” Pyongyang should abide by its treaty obligations, said South Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman Sok Dong-yon (Xinhua.net, Dec. 12).
U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, who was in Beijing today, said that “China shares the same concern,” as the United States on Pyongyang’s announcement. Armitage said he is “sure the Chinese will be urging some different behavior” from North Korea, but China has released no official statement (Don Kirk, New York Times, Dec. 12).
Japan urged a restrained response, Reuters reported.
“If you read the North Korean announcement carefully, their consistent stance is to seek a peaceful resolution,” Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi said.
North Korea Blames United States
Pyongyang maintained that it is the United States that violated the Agreed Framework first, adding that U.S. Assistant Secretary Of State James Kelly “arbitrarily made up” a report of contentious negotiations between the two countries (see GSN, Oct. 17).
North Korea has “consistently maintained a position to resolve the nuclear issue in a peaceful manner,” and the United States “abandoned the Agreed Framework,” Pyongyang said (Kirk, New York Times).
“The U.S. cannot escape its responsibility for utterly trampling on the terms and spirit of the Agreed Framework by designating us as an ‘axis of evil’ and target of pre-emptive nuclear attacks,” the Foreign Ministry said (Eckert, Reuters).
Committees of the Russian State Duma, the lower house of the country’s Parliament, are set to discuss the U.S.-Russian Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty next week, Nikolai Bezborodov, deputy chairman of the Duma defense committee said Tuesday (see GSN, Dec. 10).
The international affairs and defense committees plan to discuss the treaty’s military and political aspects, Bezborodov said. The defense, security and industry committees will discuss the treaty’s technical aspects, he added.
“I am sure the treaty will be ratified by the Duma without any special problems,” Bezborodov said (Ivan Novikov, ITAR-Tass, Dec. 10, in FBIS-SOV, Dec. 10).
International Affairs Committee Chairman Dmitry Rogozin said Tuesday that he and Andrei Nikolayev, chairman of the Defense Committee, have asked the Defense and Foreign ministries as well as the Kremlin to clarify several points in the treaty. The date of ratification will depend on when the ministries respond to the request, Rogozin said (Interfax, Dec. 10 in FBIS-SOV, Dec. 10).
Meanwhile, members of the Federation Council, the upper house of the Parliament, have said they believe that the treaty will be easily ratified by all of the Parliament, ITAR-Tass reported.
“The chances that the State Duma and the Federation Council will ratify the treaty are quite big,” said Federation Council speaker Sergei Mironov.
The Moscow Treaty is an important achievement in Russian diplomacy, said Mikhail Margelov, chairman of the Federation Council’s international committee. “The document confirms the Russian and U.S. obligations as the depository countries of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and enhances the nonproliferation regimes,” he said (Lyudmila Yermakova, ITAR-Tass, Dec. 10 in FBIS-SOV, Dec. 10).
For further information, see:
U.S.-Russia Nuclear Reduction Treaty Text (U.S. State Department)
Bush Announces Moscow Treaty
U.S. State Department Fact Sheet on Moscow Treaty
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By David Ruppe
Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — New federal regulations announced Tuesday to tighten controls on biological agents and toxins have received mixed reviews from microbiologists (see GSN, Dec. 4).
Experts said the regulations, intended to keep dangerous biological materials out of terrorists’ hands and mandated by a law passed this year, go too far in some areas and not far enough elsewhere. The regulations affect the possession and transfer of “select agents” and toxins such as the anthrax bacteria and the smallpox and Ebola viruses, as well as lesser-known pathogens.
The new regulations, consisting of two sets of rules issued in tandem by Health and Human Services and Agriculture departments, are to take effect Feb. 7, pending public comments.
Richard Ebright, laboratory director at Rutgers University’s Waksman Institute of Microbiology, faults the regulations, for instance, for not requiring specific access-control and monitoring measures at facilities.
Ronald Atlas, president of the American Society for Microbiology, however, believes the new security requirements could dampen enthusiasm for work with select agents.
“If I had select agents in my lab, I think I’d have to give serious consideration in the morning as to whether I really want to do this or not,” he said in an interview yesterday.
“Which is not to say they [the new regulations] are wrong. They might represent the right, essential steps,” Atlas added. “But, they represent a significant culture change to at least how some of us in academia run laboratories,” he said.
Some of the paperwork requirements are “nothing short of draconian,” said Steven Block, a Stanford University biophysicist. According to one key requirement, nongovernmental facilities are required to obtain a risk assessment from the Justice Department before they can receive, possess, use, or transfer any select agent.
“All these regulations in the end will be an enormous burden for those people trying to implement them,” said Block, who argued such restrictions on select agents ultimately “won’t stop the bad guys.”
With the exception of the smallpox virus, most agents and toxins are widely available around the world as is the information to weaponize them, he said.
Promoting the new rules in an announcement this week, HHS Secretary Tommy Thompson said, “Protecting the health of Americans is paramount, and this new rule strengthens our ability to ensure that essential research on these agents continues while making certain they don’t fall into the wrong hands.”
The regulations require laboratories handling select agents to be registered with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention or the Agriculture Department, depending on the agent.
Previously, facilities had only to report transfers of such materials to federal authorities. So far, 817 of an estimated 1,167 academic, commercial and government facilities have registered, according to the CDC.
The regulations also restrict access to such agents by certain groups of people. To accomplish that requirement, laboratories must first submit names of people chosen to handle select agents to the Justice Department for screening using numerous databases.
The CDC anticipates an estimated 20,000 staff will be subjected to such “risk assessment” screening.
As required by the law, select agents, toxins or delivery systems can be possessed only if possession can be “reasonably justified” for specific “bona fide” research or other peaceful purposes, which has raised concerns biologists can no longer preserve specimens unspecific future use.
Security Risk Assessment
The classes of restricted people include aliens from a country on the State Department’s list of terrorism sponsors, admitted or convicted users of a controlled substance, persons indicted or convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, dishonorably discharged veterans, fugitives from justice, illegal aliens, and persons adjudicated as mentally defective or committed to a mental institution.
HHS also may bar people suspected of involvement or association with organizations suspected of involvement in terrorism.
Violations can be punished with up to a $10,000 fine, 10 years imprisonment or both. The regulations were published independently by the Health and Human Services and Agriculture departments, to implement requirements of the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 signed into law last June and the USA Patriot Act signed October 2001 in the wake of the Sept. 11 attacks and anthrax mail attacks (see GSN, June 12 and Oct. 26, 2001).
“The [bioterrorism preparedness] act bolstered the authority to protect against misuse of select agents and toxins whether inadvertent or the result of terrorist acts against the United States homeland (such as the recent terrorist acts involving anthrax) or other criminal acts,” HHS said in a statement on the regulations.
Areas for Tightening Suggested
Ebright said the regulations represent an “important first step” in securing research laboratories with pathogens relevant to bioterrorism.
In a letter sent to the CDC yesterday, however, he called for strengthening the new rules in a number of areas. He said the regulations should be more specific in describing how to control access to biological facilities and how to monitor security. The new regulations leave those decisions to individual facilities, but Ebright said video surveillance and, in some cases, security personnel should be required.
Atlas said there was some merit to that idea, that the lack of specified measures “creates a certain angst for me and the community to know, ‘how do we know we did the right thing?’”
Ebright also recommended restricting additional types of research, such as efforts to make select agents resistant to vaccines, to make them more environmentally stable or to powderize or aerosolize them.
Atlas said such restrictions would need to be carefully scrutinized to prevent unnecessary limits on research into new vaccine delivery methods, or even something as common as deodorants.
U.S. President George W. Bush plans to announce tomorrow that military personnel and emergency workers will soon begin receiving smallpox immunizations, the New York Times reported today. The vaccine will be available in 2004 to all U.S. residents who want it, administration officials said (see GSN, Nov. 25).
“I think it ought to be a voluntary plan,” Bush said in an ABC News interview broadcast yesterday. “In other words, I don’t think people ought to be compelled to make the decision which they think is best for their family. And what’s going to be very important is for us to make sure that there’s ample information for people to make a wise decision,” he added.
The United States plans to immunize up to 1 million military and emergency personnel in the first wave of vaccinations, which might begin in the next few weeks, administration officials said following the broadcast.
The television report seemed to surprise at least some top government health officials.
“We have no confirmation of the policy decision yet,” said Julie Gerberding, the director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The CDC is currently evaluating smallpox immunization plans that states and large cities have submitted, she said (see GSN, Dec. 10).
“We have almost all the states’ plans and we are very pleased with the preliminary evaluation of them,” Gerberding said.
The administration has not decided, however, what to do about public demand for smallpox vaccine before sufficient stocks are licensed. Officials can simply withhold the vaccine until 2004 — when sufficient amounts are expected to be available — or they can label the vaccine as an “investigational new drug” and make it available only to those who have a compelling need, according to the Times.
“The question is what do you do about John Q. Public between now and when licensed vaccine is widely available,” said a source familiar with the administration’s smallpox policy debate. “That’s what the president hasn’t decided,” the source added (Stevenson/Altman, New York Times, Dec. 12).
“Preparing the emergency response teams is the highest priority,” an administration official said. “Americans who feel they would like to be vaccinated will have access to it,” the official added.
Bush and his wife, Laura Bush, briefly addressed concerns about the vaccine’s side effects and said they would be comfortable having their 21-year-old twin daughters inoculated.
“If the vaccine were available, which I think it will be, I would feel like that was certainly safe for them to do,” Laura Bush said. “I know there’s a slight risk. That’s what people weigh when they make the decision whether or not to have their children vaccinated,” she added.
Meanwhile, the administration has come under fire for signing the Homeland Security Bill, which protects vaccine producers from lawsuits, without creating a compensation fund for those who suffer side effects from immunization, according to the Washington Post.
“Forcing people who are trying to do the right thing for the country to take care of themselves is wrong,” said Vermont Governor Howard Dean, a doctor and a Democratic presidential contender (Ceci Connolly, Washington Post, Dec. 12).
After preparing for almost a year, U.S. officials are expected to begin fully decontaminating the anthrax-tainted Brentwood Road postal facility in Washington this weekend (see GSN, Nov. 25).
During a community meeting yestereday, U.S. Postal Service officials provided details on the plan to sanitize the facility using chlorine dioxide gas. Technicians plan to pump 2,000 pounds of gas into the facility starting Saturday, the Washington Post reported. Scrubbers will then operate for 20 hours Monday to neutralize the gas, officials said.
Technicians are scheduled to enter Brentwood later in the week to collect thousands of spore strips and samples to determine whether the decontamination effort was a success. A committee of Washington Health Department and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency specialists are expected to meet 30 days later to determine what, if any, further action is needed.
During yesterday’s meeting, postal officials told Brentwood-area residents and postal employees that the chlorine dioxide gas poses little risk. Several safety measures have been established, including the installation of 26 air monitors around the facility and the establishment of a safety perimeter of 282 yards, officials said. Additionally, technicians from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency plan to patrol the area in a specially equipped bus and monitor air quality during the decontamination, the Post reported.
Several area residents and postal employees expressed concerns over the plan and criticized postal officials, the Post reported.
“Last year, they were ignorant (about how to respond to an anthrax attack), but this year, they’re experts,” said James Harper, a Brentwood worker and member of Brentwood Exposed, an employee support group (see GSN, Dec. 9; Manny Fernandez, Washington Post, Dec. 12).
For further information, see:
CDC Frequently Asked Questions About Anthrax
Journal of the American Medical Association Background on Anthrax
GSN Anthrax Attack Chronology (Dec. 12, 2001)
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A report, circulating in the U.S. intelligence community, says Islamic extremists allied with the al-Qaeda terrorist organization received chemical weapons, possibly VX nerve gas, in a transfer that took place in Iraq during the last two months, the Washington Post reported today (see GSN, Nov. 4).
The intelligence report suggests that the chemical agent was smuggled out of Iraq through Turkey, possibly last month (Barton Gellman, Washington Post, Dec. 12).
Senior U.S. officials, however, sought to play down the report, with one official cited by CNN saying the Post story was “far too conclusive-sounding” (John King, CNN.com, Dec. 12).
The report could be used by the Bush administration to refute Iraq’s recent declaration that it had destroyed all of its chemical weapons, but information on the intelligence report was leaked without White House consent, the Post reported.
The source of the intelligence report gave the information credibility in the eyes of U.S. officials, a U.S. source said.
“The way we gleaned the information makes us feel confident it is accurate,” the official said, “I throw about 99 percent of the spot reports away when I look at them. I didn’t throw this one away.”
The report is not backed up with hard evidence, officials cautioned.
Another official said that the government is concerned with the information and is “ramping up opportunities to collect more, to figure out what would be the routes, where would they be taking the material, how would they deploy it, how are they transporting it, what are the personnel.”
“We’re not just sitting back and waiting for something to happen,” the official added.
The government generally held back on official comments regarding the report.
“We are concerned because of al-Qaeda’s interest in obtaining and using weapons of mass destruction, including chemical, and we continue to seek evidence and intelligence information,” Gordon Johndroe, spokesman for Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge, said.
“Have they obtained chemical weapons?” Johndroe asked. “I do not have any hard, concrete evidence that they have,” he said (Gellman, Washington Post).
“Some of this stuff turns out to be right, and a lot of it turns out to be wrong or exaggerated or wishful thinking on the part of those | |
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