U.S. Response:  New Bush WMD Strategy Marks a Significant Departure, Experts Say

By Bryan Bender
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — The newly unveiled Bush administration strategy for combating weapons of mass destruction marks a significant departure from long-standing U.S. policy by publicly advocating a nuclear response in the face of a chemical or biological attack, according to government officials and private analysts (see GSN, Dec. 11).

The document is considered a step forward by those who believe a revised policy, coupled with a strong declaration about the potential consequences of attacking the United States with weapons of mass destruction, is urgently needed to deter potential adversaries in an era in which traditional deterrence might not be sufficient.  The new policy was quickly criticized from several quarters, however, as unnecessarily eroding international arms control. 

These critics also contend that the Bush administration is being far too public about its intentions at the expense of U.S. credibility in future debates about stemming the spread of nuclear weapons.

The six-page strategy, sent to the U.S. Congress on Wednesday, threatens overwhelming retaliation — implying the use of nuclear weapons — in response to a WMD attack, in an effort to persuade potential adversaries to refrain from unleashing chemical or biological weapons against the United States or its allies.

“The United States will continue to make clear that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force — including through resort to all of our options — to the use of WMD against the United States, our forces abroad, and friends and allies,” the document says.

It also calls for the development of new military and civilian capabilities to defeat WMD-armed adversaries, the strengthening of nonproliferation treaties and arms control regimes, and preparations to reduce the potentially catastrophic consequences of a successful WMD attack against the United States or its allies.

Breaking with the Past

Some expert observers contend, however, that although the United States has always reserved the right to use nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear threat, it has never said so explicitly and has refrained from applying the policy to chemical or biological weapons. 

A 1978 executive order said the United States would not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states.  Following a renouncement of that policy by U.S. Undersecretary of State John Bolton in February (see GSN, Feb. 22), the Bush administration quickly reaffirmed it (see GSN, Feb. 27).

The new strategy may also contradict international agreements, according to one interpretation.

“Until now we have not been explicit about” responding to a WMD attack with nuclear weapons, said Robert Einhorn, former assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation.  “This statement takes one additional layer of ambiguity away by saying we would use any option.  They are clearly saying nuclear weapons without saying so.”

“It essentially nullifies the last 50 years,” said Senate Foreign Relations Committee member Chuck Hagel (R-Neb.) in a Wednesday speech.

Experts said the policy comes in response to the growing threat from chemical and biological weapons, which, in the wake of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, are considered an imminent threat to U.S. national security — even more so in light of a possible war with Iraq to disarm its suspected WMD stockpile.

Yet the new policy also raises international legal questions.  According to Corey Hinderstein, an arms control expert at the Institute for Science and International Security, the new policy may conflict with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in particular.

“It is some sensitive ground for international law,” she said.  “It doesn’t jibe with some of the interpretations of our legal right to [use nuclear weapons]” under the NPT, she said.

“The first thing that strikes me is what appears to be completely unrealistic references to the NPT, the essential mechanism for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons,” Morten Maerli, nuclear security expert at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, told GSN today.  “The U.S. is neglecting the 13 steps to implement article VI from the 2000 Review Conference that can only hurt the future of the treaty,” Maerli said, referring to the treaty commitment undertaken by nuclear powers to move “in good faith” toward nuclear disarmament.

Too Assertive?

Any policy departures or legal questions aside, critics charge that if such a new deterrent strategy is required to address the threats posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the White House would be better to remain silent, continuing its long-standing policy of nuclear ambiguity, rather than advertise its possible responses.

“It is very dangerous to be talking too much about these kinds of responses that the United States would take or actions in anticipation of another nation’s actions,” Hagel said.  Overasserting the U.S. right to use nuclear weapons, he said, brings a “mucky schizophrenia” to the long-standing U.S. policy of nuclear restraint.

“What the administration chose to do was to put forward a very muscular version of this, unnecessarily muscular in my view because it alarmed the hell out of a lot of the people we need most to forge the kind of coalition we have to put together against Saddam Hussein,” former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Richard Holbrooke said Wednesday in a television interview.

The strategy “reflects the changing reality,” prospective Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) told Global Security Newswire earlier today.  The administration “could have maybe been more artful in saying it,” he said.

Holbrooke, while critical of the Bush language, said he believes the policy itself is not very different from the past.  In the past, however, it was not part of the political rhetoric.

“This is just the more muscular form of a long-standing policy.  At least four times in the last half-century, [former U.S. Presidents Dwight] Eisenhower in Korea, [Richard] Nixon in Vietnam, [George H.W.] Bush against [Iraqi President] Saddam [Hussein] in ’91, and [John] Kennedy in the missile crisis in ’62, we have said the same sort of thing,” he said. “We reserve the right to use any means we have, including nuclear weapons,” Holbrooke said.

Possible International Consequences

Yet, experts worry that it may be too late to offset the potential harmful consequences of such an assertive policy.

“I think its effect will be profound in some states,” Hinderstein said.  “Pakistan is very fearful that the U.S. is intent on destroying its nuclear capability.  If the U.S. establishes a pattern of taking excessive military action, they feel like they might be on that list.”

Added Hagel, “It sets in motion a series of uncontrollable actions that could be taken by China, by Russia, by Israel, Pakistan, India, North Korea.”

According to John Isaacs of the Council for a Livable World, the new strategy to combat weapons of mass destruction only adds to a series of Bush administration actions in the nuclear arena that he believes will prove destabilizing in coming years.

“Dr. Strangelove is alive and well in the Bush administration,” Isaacs said in a statement Thursday.  “The administration’s new strategy, its quest to explore building new nuclear weapons such as a ‘nuclear bunker buster,’ and its refusal to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty signal to the world that the U.S. has extensive plans to build and use nuclear weapons in the future,” he said.

Supporters Applaud Comprehensive Strategy

Despite concerns about some of the language in the new strategy and its possible consequences, the Bush policy was applauded by experts who believe a new deterrent policy was long overdue and describe the plan as the kind of comprehensive strategy required to combat the growing threat of weapons of mass destruction.

“It really is a step forward,” said Jack Spencer, a Heritage Foundation defense analyst.  “If we are going to have a chance, albeit a slim one, to address the proliferation problem, we are going to have to take a comprehensive approach to this widespread danger.  We can’t rely solely on arms control.  Arms control is important, but so is deterrence and persuasion.”

The document is “a nonproliferation tool box,” he added.  “It gives us the tools to address this very complex problem.”  As for whether it may contradict previous arms control regimes, he said the new threats might require the international community to revisit past treaties to ensure they remain relevant.

The White House will need to continue to explain the new strategy to ensure international support for nonproliferation efforts, experts say. 

“They are walking a fine line between an assertive policy they need to commit to but at the same time recognizing that we can’t be a nuclear cowboy in the world,” Hinderstein said.

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Iraq I:  United States, Russia Recommend Deletions in Declaration

The United States and Russia yesterday submitted recommendations on what information should be from Iraq’s WMD declaration before it is circulated to the nonpermanent members of the U.N. Security Council (see GSN, Dec. 12).  French and British diplomats said they hoped to submit recommendations today, according to the Associated Press.

Security Council President Alfonso Valdivieso of Colombia said he plans to give an sanitized version of the declaration to the 10 nonpermanent members of the council by Tuesday.  Sections of the edited declaration are expected to be made publicly available, AP reported (Edith Lederer, Associated Press/TBO.com, Dec. 12).

Meanwhile, International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Mohamed ElBaradei released more details today about the section of the declaration that covers Iraq’s nuclear weapons, according to a CNN television broadcast (see GSN, Dec. 10).  The section is 2,400 pages long, 2100 of which are copies of previously submitted reports, ElBaradei said.  Some of the remaining 300 pages, now being translated from Arabic, however, contain “some new additional information,” he added (CNN, Dec. 13).

Inspections

In Iraq today, U.N. experts continued inspecting suspected weapons-related sites, visiting a ballistic missile production facility and a disease control center.

A team from the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission visited the bin al-Haitham missile center in the northern Baghdad suburb of Kadhimiya, according to Reuters.  The facility was built in 1982 to help develop the short-range al-Sumoud ballistic missile, according to a report by the International Institute of Strategic Studies.

A second UNMOVIC team visited the Center for the Control of Communicable Diseases in Baghdad.  The Iraqi Health Ministry operates the center, Reuters reported (Hassan Hafidh, Reuters, Dec. 13).

While at the center, inspectors needed to summon top Iraqi and U.N. monitoring officials to gain access to several rooms at the site, according to CNN.  None of the center’s employees were on site because Friday is a Muslim holy day.  After being summoned, Hossam Mohammed Amin, head of the Iraqi National Monitoring directorate, arrived at the center with his U.N. counterpart and the situation was resolved, CNN reported.  Inspectors tagged the rooms they could not enter for later inspections and left the facility several hours later (CNN.com, Dec. 13).

Yesterday, an UNMOVIC team attended the test launch of an Iraqi short-range ballistic missile variant at the Ramadi missile test pad, the International Atomic Energy Agency said in a press release.  Missiles with short ranges are allowed under previous U.N. resolutions, the agency said.  Iraqi officials allowed the UNMOVIC team to verify the missile’s configuration before the launch.

An IAEA team, meanwhile, visited the al-Zawraa electronics fabrication facility near Baghdad, according to the agency.  The inspectors worked to review the activities of the site since 1998 and to review the use of formerly known dual-use equipment.  The team also visited the al-Hatteen firing range to inventory previously monitored equipment, the agency said.

The number of inspectors in Iraq almost reached 100 yesterday with the arrival of 28 additional UNMOVIC experts, the IAEA said.  Out of the 98 inspectors currently inside Iraq, 71 are assigned to UNMOVIC, which primarily focuses on biological and chemical weapons, and 27 to the IAEA, which focuses on nuclear weapons (International Atomic Energy Agency release, Dec. 12).

Amin yesterday praised the “professionalism” of the inspectors.  If they can resist U.S. and British pressure, it “will be hard to be pessimistic” about the chances of finishing inspections and avoiding war, he said.

“We appreciate the professionalism with which the inspections are undertaken,” Amin said.  Inspectors have “shown respect for our traditions and values,” suspending work for two days last week during the Muslim holiday of Id al-Fitr, and have avoided the “silly questions” posed by earlier inspections teams in the 1990s, he added (John Burns, New York Times, Dec. 13).

Declaration Might Include U.S. Companies

The Iraqi WMD declaration contains the names of U.S. companies that provided Iraq with materials for its chemical and biological weapons efforts during the 1980s, according to a senior Iraqi official.  The official refused to name the companies or discuss how much information the declaration provides on them.

A White House official refused to comment on the possible listing of U.S. companies in the declaration or the possible consequences of releasing such information.

“The issue is not so much who the suppliers are.  The issue is really Iraq’s program and making sure that Iraq declares what it has,” the White House official said (Newsday/Philadelphia Inquirer, Dec. 13).

For further information, see:

UNMOVIC

IAEA Iraq Action Team

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Iraq II:  Summary of Inspections

Inspectors from the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency have now visited dozens of sites in the round of post-Gulf War inspections that resumed Nov. 27 after a four-year lapse.  The following chart summarizes some of their reported activities.

Date	Site	Activity
Dec. 13	Bin al-Haitham missile center in the northern Baghdad suburb of Kadhimiya	UNMOVIC inspectors visited the facility, which was built in 1982 to help develop the short-range al-Sumoud ballistic missile, according to a report by the International Institute of Strategic Studies (see GSN, Dec. 13).
	Center for the Control of Communicable Diseases in Baghdad	The UNMOVIC team that visited the center — which the Iraqi Health Ministry operates — had to summon top Iraqi and U.N. monitoring officials to gain access to several rooms (see GSN, Dec. 13).
Dec. 12	Ramadi missile test pad	UNMOVIC team attended test launch of a short-range ballistic missile.  Iraqi officials allowed inspectors to verify the missile’s configuration before the launch (see GSN, Dec. 13).
	Al-Zawraa electronics fabrication facility near Baghdad	IAEA inspectors worked to review activities since 1998 and the use of formerly known dual-use equipment (see GSN, Dec. 13).
	Al-Hatteen firing range	An IAEA team inventoried previously monitored equipment (see GSN, Dec. 13).
	Al-Nidaa Public Company, in a suburb of Baghdad	Industrial facility formerly involved with ballistic missile development (see GSN, Dec. 12).
	Mu’tassim factory, 25 miles south of Baghdad in Jurf Sakhr
	Bin Sina former uranium enrichment facility, 20 miles northwest of Baghdad in Tarmiya	See the Dec. 11 entry below.
	Abandoned factory owned by the Arab Company for Antibiotics, 40 miles southeast of Baghdad near Suweirah
	Al-Rasheed factory
Dec. 11	Saddam GE site	IAEA inspectors worked to verify activities conducted since 1998 and to review the use of formerly known dual-use equipment believed to be connected to Iraq’s missile program.
	Amir Factory, owned by Saddam GE
	Al-Razi Research Center, in al-America	UNMOVIC experts fully inspected buildings, several of which had been built in 1999, to verify declarations of materials and activities at the site, which produces diagnostic reagents for some human and animal diseases.
	Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center, located south of Baghdad	Inspectors completed inventory work (see GSN, Dec. 12).  See also the entries below on Dec. 4, 9 and 10.
	Al-Qaim phosphate mining facility, 250 miles west of Baghdad in Ashakat	Inspectors completed inventory work (see GSN, Dec. 12).  See also the Dec. 10 entry below.
	Amariyah Serum and Vaccine Institute, west of Baghdad at Abu Ghraib	See the Dec. 10 entry below.
	Al-Fateh chemical site, on the outskirts of Baghdad
	Bin Sina nuclear site, located in Tarmiya, 20 miles northwest of Baghdad
Dec. 10	Al-Sumood factory at the al-Karama complex	IAEA inspectors worked to determine current activities and to learn more about the use of various previously known equipment (see GSN, Dec. 11).
	Al-Fatah Company at the al-Karama complex
	Military Industrialization Committee stores at the al-Karama complex
	Saddam Center for Biotechnology	UNMOVIC inspectors gathered information to set a baseline for future inspections (see GSN, Dec. 11).
	National Project for Controlling Brucellosis and Tuberculosis	UNMOVIC inspectors worked to reset a baseline in accordance with information that Iraq submitted in October (see GSN, Dec. 11).
	Al-Qaim phosphate mining facility, 250 miles west of Baghdad in Ashakat	IAEA inspectors compared current operations with what inspectors learned about uranium activities in the 1990s (see GSN, Dec. 10).
	Veterinary medical site at Abu Ghraib, just west of Baghdad	The site is probably the Amariyah Serum and Vaccine Institute, where Iraq conducted biological weapon-related research in the 1980s.  The United States has argued that it has too much storage capacity for legitimate research (see GSN, Dec. 10).  See also the Dec. 11 entry above.
	Al-Furat Chemical Industries General Company, 40 miles south of Baghdad
	Bin al-Haitham research facility, in the northern Baghdad suburb of Wazireyah
	Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center	Additional nuclear inspections (see GSN, Dec. 10).  See also the entries below on Dec. 4 and 9.
Dec. 9	Ash Shakyli	IAEA inspectors visited buildings and took samples to detect the presence of radiological materials (see GSN, Dec. 10).
	Al-Qaqaa company, south of Baghdad	IAEA experts began preparing an inventory of known explosive materials from Iraq’s previous nuclear weapons program (see GSN, Dec. 10).  See also the Nov. 30 entry below.
	Fallujah 2 site of the al-Tariq Company, 100 kilometers west of Baghdad	The site consists of the company’s headquarters and a factory area, but UNMOVIC inspectors only visited the factory, which contains several previously tagged dual-use items that inspectors reconfirmed (see GSN, Dec. 10).
	Fallujah 3 site of the al-Tariq company, 100 kilometers west of Baghdad	UNMOVIC inspectors visited the site for the second day in a row (see GSN, Dec. 9).  See the Dec. 8 entry below.
	Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center	More nuclear inspections (see GSN, Dec. 9) — at the large site which the IAEA has monitored for the past 10 years as Iraq’s main nuclear facility (see GSN, Dec. 4) — to begin a physical inventory of the site’s nuclear materials (see GSN, Dec. 10).
Dec. 8	Fallujah 3 site of the al-Tariq company	UNMOVIC inspectors accounted for several previously tagged dual-use items at the pesticides and insecticides factory (see GSN, Dec. 9).
	State Company for Geological Survey and Mining, in Baghdad	An IAEA team spent two hours at the site, at which uranium processing could have produced weapon-grade materials (see GSN, Dec. 4).
Dec. 4	Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center	See the Dec. 9 entry above.
	Al-Muthanna State Establishment, 45 miles north of Baghdad	UNMOVIC inspectors checked for resumed chemical and biological weapons activity after materials were destroyed in the 1990s.  They confirmed the presence of mustard-filled artillery shells tagged by previous U.N. inspectors (see GSN, Dec. 5).
Dec. 3	Al-Sajoud palace	UNMOVIC and IAEA inspectors were quickly admitted but appeared to have found nothing, according to the Associated Press.
Dec. 2	Three distilleries near Bakuba, north of Baghdad (first previously unvisited site)	IAEA inspectors did not explain why they visited the distilleries, but possibly searched for hidden nuclear equipment (see GSN, Dec. 3).
	Waziriyah ballistic missile development site at the al-Karama General Company, outside of Baghdad	Several things tagged in 1998 are now missing, according to the IAEA (see GSN, Dec. 3).  Iraq said new locations of the equipment are in an October declaration (see GSN, Dec. 4).
Dec. 1	Khan Beni-Saad cropdusting facility, 35 kilometers north of Baghdad	Satellite information “called for a specific investigation of modified aircraft fuel tanks,” a U.N. spokesman said.  UNMOVIC inspectors stayed five hours, taking samples from tanks and downloading computer files (see GSN, Dec. 2).
	Al-Taji complex with the bin Firnas and al-Quds missile factories	“We gave the inspectors every assistance and answered all their questions,” bin Firnas director Brahim Hussein said (see GSN, Dec. 2).
Nov. 30	Balad Chemical Defense Battalion, where troops train to defend against WMD attacks	UNMOVIC inspectors spent five hours examining storage sheds, opening ordnance crates and operating handheld sensors (see GSN, Dec. 2).
	Um al-Maarik factory	Iraqi officials said the facility only produces parts for light machinery and vehicles (see GSN, Dec. 2).
	Al-Qaqaa	A small group of IAEA inspectors repaired an air sampling system installed during previous inspections, according to Iraqi officials (Iraqi government report, Nov. 30).  See also the Dec. 9 entry above.
	Al-Meelad equipment factory, formerly known as al-Furat, where centrifuges have been developed	Recent satellite imagery has indicated that construction has taken place at the site since 1998 (see GSN, Dec. 2).
Nov. 28	Al-Dawrah Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Production Laboratory	Following four hours of inspection, U.N. experts concluded that the plant is no longer operational (see GSN, Dec. 2).  Inspectors noticed a missing fermenter (see below).
	Veterinary medicine facility	Iraqi officials led inspectors to a veterinary facility north of Baghdad, where a fermenter — missing from al-Dawrah — was being kept (see above; John Burns, New York Times, Nov. 29).
	Thu al-Fiqar factory	Inspectors searched the potential dual-use site — which once might have been used to produce ballistic missiles — to search for signs that Iraq has been producing equipment for uranium enrichment, IAEA team leader Jacques Baute said (Kim Ghattas, Financial Times, Nov. 29)
	Al-Nasr industrial complex, where centrifuge rotors and missile engine parts were once made	A new building that the United States said is suspicious appeared to be inactive, said IAEA team leader Jacques Baute (see GSN, Dec. 2).
Nov. 27	Al-Tahidi Scientific Research Center	IAEA inspectors spent three hours examining papers and removing an air sampler installed in 1998 (see GSN, Dec. 2).
	Al-Rafah graphite production facility	Graphite can be used in missile components (see GSN, Dec. 2).
	Al-Rafah missile test pad	UNMOVIC inspectors looked for information indicating the range of missiles tested (see GSN, Dec. 2).

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North Korea:  Remove IAEA Seals From Nuclear Sites, Pyongyang Says

North Korea called on the International Atomic Energy Agency yesterday to remove monitoring equipment and seals from all North Korean nuclear facilities — a move one step closer to fully resuming the country’s nuclear program (see GSN, Dec. 12).

In a letter to IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, the director general of North Korea’s General Department of Atomic Energy, Ri Je Son, announced that his country would lift a freeze today on its nuclear facilities.  Previously, it had agreed to maintain the freeze in exchange for energy assistance under the 1994 Agreed Framework with the United States.

“Accordingly, the IAEA is requested to take necessary measures to remove the seals and monitoring cameras on all of our nuclear facilities,” Ri wrote in the letter. 

“If the IAEA fails to expeditiously take measures to meet our request, we would like to take necessary measures unilaterally,” Ri wrote (Mike Nartker, Global Security Newswire, Dec. 12).

ElBaradei yesterday called on North Korea to act with restraint, saying it is “essential” that the seals and monitoring equipment remain in place.

“It is essential that the containment and surveillance measures which are currently in place continue to be maintained, and that the D.P.R.K. not take any steps unilaterally to remove or impede the functioning of such seals or cameras,” ElBaradei said.  “Any such action would not be in compliance with the requirements of the IAEA-D.P.R.K. Safeguards Agreement,” he added.

ElBaradei has asked North Korea to agree to an urgent technical meeting to discuss how Pyongyang’s nuclear program would progress to full operation and how the IAEA would continue to fulfill its verification requirements under the safeguards agreement (International Atomic Energy Agency release, Dec. 12).

The IAEA inspectors currently inside North Korea have not yet been asked to leave, ElBaradei said today on CNN television.  “I think this is a good sign,” he added (CNN, Dec. 13).

The call to remove the IAEA equipment from North Korean nuclear facilities indicates that Pyongyang is pursuing “illicit activities,” said L. Gordon Flake, a North Korean expert and director of the Mansfield Center for Pacific Affairs.

“The dangerous thing about the request to remove the cameras is, it comes pretty close to a clear admission that they are indeed doing illicit activities,” Flake said.  “If you’re not doing anything wrong ... why do you care about the cameras?” he added (Los Angeles Times, Dec. 13).

U.S. Response

The United States considers the decision to restart nuclear facilities “regrettable,” and is calling on Pyongyang to end its suspected nuclear weapons program, U.S. National Security Council spokesman Sean McCormack said yesterday.

“We believe that this announcement really flies in the face of international consensus, that the North Korean regime must fulfill all of its commitments, and in particular dismantle its nuclear weapons program,” McCormack said (Federal News Service transcript, Dec. 12).

Some U.S. officials said that while they are not surprised by North Korea’s decision, it poses a major challenge — albeit one that would be handled after the situation in Iraq had been resolved.

“One rogue state crisis at a time,” a senior White House official said, describing U.S. President George W. Bush’s strategy (French/Sanger, New York Times, Dec. 13).

Japanese Response

Japan announced today that it would attempt to relaunch stalled talks with North Korea.  It is even more important now to restart the talks, which have been stalled since October “to keep this kind of thing from happening,” Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda said (Agence France-Presse, Dec. 13).

Yongbyon Status

North Korea’s 5-megawatt nuclear reactor — which is located 55 miles north of Pyongyang at the Yongbyon complex and cannot generate significant amounts of electricity but can produce weapon-grade nuclear materials — could be started within two months, South Korean sources said.

Other analysts, however, doubted that the reactor is even capable of operating, the Times reported (Los Angeles Times).  For example, the three-story crane used to load fuel into the reactor is broken, said Kenneth Quinones, who helped set up the IAEA inspection program in North Korea in 1994.  If the crane can be repaired, however, the site could begin operations within six months, he said (Doug Struck, Washington Post, Dec. 13).

Even if the reactor could be started, it is too small to produce the electricity needed to get the country through the winter, according to the Los Angeles Times.  “But it can produce plutonium,” an IAEA official said.

North Korea also has two nuclear reactors still unfinished since 1994 — a 50-megawatt reactor at Yongbyon and a 200-megawatt reactor at Taechon.  It would take two years to finish building those reactors, an IAEA official said.

Possible Negotiation Tactic

Some experts have said that North Korea’s decision to restart its nuclear facilities could be a tactic to pressure the United States into entering negotiations.

“Their objective is to get us to negotiate with them,” said Michael O'Hanlon of the Brookings Institution.  “They know right now that we don’t want to think about them more than necessary, and not talk to them for a while. ... And here is their one way of saying ... ‘You have to deal with us now,’” he added (Los Angeles Times).

While the United States has indicated its willingness to pursue a dialogue with North Korea, it will not respond to “threats or broken commitments,” McCormack said yesterday.

“The United States has always ... been open to dialogue in principle and was prepared for a comprehensive approach to improving U.S.-North Korean relations before the disclosure of North Korea’s clandestine uranium enrichment program,” McCormack said.  “However, we have to make it very clear that the United States will not enter into a dialogue in response to threats or broken commitments, and we will not bargain or offer inducements for North Korea to live up to the treaties and agreements it has already signed,” he added (Federal News Service).

Joel Wit, a former U.S. State Department official, said North Korea would not respond favorably to a hard-line U.S. position.

“North Korea is not going to capitulate on issues of vital national security for them,” said Wit, now with the Center for Strategic and International Studies.  “We do have to be tough with them, but we have to use every measure available to us to resolve the situation.  That means at some point we are going to have to sit down with them,” he added (Los Angeles Times).

For further information, see:

Agreed Framework Text

KEDO

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Iran:  Photos Show Building at Nuclear Sites, Group Says

According to satellite photographs, Iran is working at two sites to construct nuclear facilities that could be used to develop nuclear weapons, the Institute for Science and International Security said in a report released yesterday (see GSN, Nov. 20).

By interpreting satellite imagery, the institute has determined that one of the sites, located near the city of Arak, appears to be a heavy-water production facility under construction, the report says.  The existence of such a facility increases concerns that Iran might also be building a nuclear reactor moderated by heavy water, ISIS said, adding that no signs of such a reactor have been located.

The Bushehr nuclear reactor, which Iran is currently building with aid from Russia, does not use heavy water, the report says (see GSN, Oct. 22).  Furthermore, Iran’s existing research reactors do not use enough heavy water to justify creating a heavy-water plant, it adds.

Meanwhile, the satellite imagery appears to contradict claims made by the Iranian opposition group National Council of Resistance of Iran, which has said that Tehran is building a nuclear fuel fabrication facility at a site called Natanz, 25 miles southeast of the city of Kashan, the institute said (see GSN, Aug. 15).  Construction at Natanz appears to be for a uranium enrichment plant, possibly employing gas centrifuge technology, the ISIS report says, adding that the facility does not appear to be in operation.

IAEA

Under a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, Iran does not have to open any new nuclear facility to agency inspections until six months before introducing nuclear materials, the ISIS report says (Institute for Science and International Security release, Dec. 12).  

The agency learned of the new facilities in August from satellite imagery, according to IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, and Iranian officials confirmed their existence in September to ElBaradei.  At that time, they invited ElBaradei to visit the sites this week, but that visit was postponed until February, when ElBaradei will visit with a team of technical experts, he said on CNN this morning (Greg Webb, GSN, Dec. 13).

Iranian Response

In an interview with CNN yesterday, Iran’s U.N. Ambassador Javad Zarif said that his country is not developing nuclear weapons.

“No.  Absolutely not,” Zarif said in response to a question on whether Iran is developing a nuclear weapons program.  “Iran is a member of the [Nuclear] Nonproliferation Treaty.  We have safeguard agreements with the IAEA.  Nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction do not have a place in our defense doctrine.  We have stated that clearly.  And we have shown it,” he added.

Iran has the right to develop a peaceful civilian nuclear program, Zarif said.

“We do have a right to have nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.  And that we have asserted very forcefully,” Zarif said.  “And we will continue to carry out our research and our activities in the area of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes,” he added.

Zarif dismissed suggestions that Iran might be working to develop a clandestine nuclear program.

“There is nothing hidden about it,” Zarif said.  “Because if we wanted to have sort of a clandestine nuclear program, we wouldn’t come out in public and stating it is our right and this is our policy to pursue a nuclear program for peaceful purposes,” he added (CNN.com, Dec. 13).

For further information, see:

NPT Text

States Parties to the NPT (U.N.)

U.N. Background on NPT

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Smallpox I:  Bush Formally Introduces U.S. Vaccination Plan

By Greg Webb
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — Formally announcing the U.S. smallpox vaccination policy today, U.S. President George W. Bush said he was ordering certain members of the U.S. military to receive the vaccine and, in a move to demonstrate solidarity, said he too would receive the vaccination (see GSN, Dec. 12).

In addition, the U.S. Health and Human Services Department will encourage state and local governments to form volunteer civilian teams to respond to any smallpox attack, Bush said, and team members would be asked to voluntarily receive the vaccination.

In the military, vaccinations will be administered to smallpox response teams, hospital and clinic workers, and “other designated forces having critical mission capabilities,” according to a Pentagon release issued today

The U.S. military has relatively recent experience with vaccine, which the general U.S. population stopped receiving in 1972.  Although the World Health Organization declared smallpox eradicated from the world in 1980, U.S. military recruits continued to receive the vaccine until 1990, according to the Pentagon release.

Explaining his decision, Bush said the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks were forcing the United States to evaluate “old threats in a new light.  Our government has no information that a smallpox attack is imminent.  Yet it is prudent to prepare for the possibility that terrorists who kill indiscriminately would use diseases as a weapon.”

Furthermore, “we believe that regimes hostile to the United States may possess this dangerous virus,” Bush said.

Bush said he would also be vaccinated.  “As commander in chief, I do not believe I can ask others to accept this risk unless I am willing to do the same.  Therefore, I will receive the vaccine along with our military,” Bush said.

His family, however, will not.  “Neither my family nor my staff will be receiving the vaccine, because our health and national security experts do not believe vaccination is necessary for the general public,” Bush said.

Though not recommended, the vaccine will be made available to the U.S. public.  “HHS is in the process of establishing an orderly process to make unlicensed vaccine available to those adult members of the general public without medical contraindications who insist on being vaccinated either in 2003, with an unlicensed vaccine, or in 2004, with a licensed vaccine,” according to a White House fact sheet.

Under the White House plan, about 1 million people will probably receive the vaccination, including 500,000 civilian emergency responders and health care workers and 500,000 military personnel.

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Anthrax:  FBI Searches Forest for Clues to 2001 Attacks

FBI investigators began searching a section of forest near Frederick, Md., yesterday in an apparent attempt to obtain more clues in the investigation into the last year’s anthrax attacks (see GSN, Nov. 11).

FBI agents told local police officials that they would be conducting a search of the City of Frederick Municipal Forest, 10 miles south of Camp David, over the weekend, according to the Baltimore Sun.  So far, investigators have excavated part of a clearing in the area and have searched several small ponds, the Sun reported.

An FBI press statement suggested that investigators have begun sampling for anthrax in the area.

“It is important to note that based on water, soil and sediment testing already conducted, there is no indication of any risk to the public health or safety,” the statement said.

FBI agents are apparently searching the area because of a tip that former U.S. Army biologist Steven Hatfill, who has been the public focus of the bureau’s investigation into last fall’s attacks, was seen there, said Patrick Clawson, Hatfill’s spokesman.  Clawson said Hatfill told him yesterday that he had been in the area only as a volunteer with a Boy Scout troop.

This latest search will find nothing to connect Hatfill to the anthrax attacks, Clawson said.

“The FBI can search the planet until hell freezes over, but it will find that Steve Hatfill was never involved in the anthrax attacks,” Clawson said.  “We’d just like to know how many searches it takes to get his reputation and employment restored,” he added (Scott Shane, Baltimore Sun, Dec. 13).

Hatfill’s attorney Victor Glasberg yesterday refused to comment on the search.  “I know nothing about it, zero about it,” he said (Kate Leckie, Frederick News-Post, Dec. 13).

Meanwhile, the U.S. Justice Department has said that it did not intend for Hatfill to come under such intense media scrutiny by describing him has a “person of interest” in the anthrax investigation, according to department letters sent to Senator Charles Grassley (R-Iowa), which were released yesterday.

The department sent the letters in reply to inquiries that Grassley made after Hatfill was fired from his position at Louisiana State University and after the FBI searched Hatfill’s apartment three times (see GSN, Sept. 19).  Grassley had asked Attorney General John Ashcroft to explain the dismissal from the university and to define the term “person of interest.”

The department did not intend to cause any harm to Hatfill when it described him as a person of interest, Assistant Attorney General Daniel Bryant said in one of the letters.  Instead, the department meant “to deflect media scrutiny” and “explain that he (Hatfill) was just one of many scientists” who had cooperated with the FBI investigation, Bryant said.

In another letter, Bryant said that, as the main source of funding for the university’s National Center for Biomedical Research where Hatfill was employed, the department was entitled to “substantial involvement” in “the selection of key personnel” (see GSN, Sept. 5).  Bryant provided no further details on the reasons for Hatfill’s dismissal, according to the Washington Post.

Grassley said yesterday that he appreciates the department’s replies to his inquiries.

“I also appreciate the department’s candidness that the action regarding Mr. Hatfill and his employment is unprecedented,” Grassley said in a statement, and that “there is no ... formal definition for the term ‘person of interest’” (Gugliotta/Lengel, Washington Post, Dec. 13).

For further information, see:

CDC Frequently Asked Questions About Anthrax

FBI Amerithrax Investigation

Journal of the American Medical Association Background on Anthrax

GSN Anthrax Attack Chronology (Dec. 12, 2001)

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Smallpox II:  Terrorist Attacks Involving Disease Unlikely to Succeed, Experts Say

Experts have said that a smallpox attack on the United States, either conducted through a suicidal self-infected terrorist or the use of a smallpox bomb, is not likely because such attacks would be too prone to failure, the Los Angeles Times reported today (see GSN, Dec. 12).

One fear is that terrorists would attempt to launch a smallpox outbreak by infecting themselves with the disease and moving through a crowded public place such as an airport, according to the Times.  Smallpox, however, is contagious for no more than a day before the onset of the disease’s telltale rash, which would identify an infected person, said Clarence Peters, director of the Center of Biodefense at the University of Texas medical center in Galveston.

Before a terrorist could infect others with smallpox, the disease’s painful flu-like symptoms would have begun, making it difficult to move easily, Peters said.  After an incubation period of up to 17 days, a smallpox-infected person experiences symptoms such as body aches, fever, severe abdominal pain and delirium, according to the Times.  The person would not be contagious, however, until the onset of a rapidly spreading rash, according to experts.

“The guy is going to feel terrible; he is going to be walking around, not shedding virus until maybe the day before, or the day of the rash,” Peters said.  “He may be obviously ill, a fever, a flushed face and bumps on his face,” he added.

There have been a few cases of single-source outbreaks such as one that started in Yugoslavia in 1972 after a single infected individual caused 150 smallpox cases before the outbreak was stopped.  Such outbreaks are rare, however, because smallpox is harder to spread than other infectious diseases, according to the Times.  To contract the disease, a person must be exposed directly to viral particles shed from pustules on the skin, or from the mouth and throat, the Times reported.  The smallpox virus cannot survive in an open environment for extended periods of time except in cool, dry conditions, experts said.

A lone infected terrorist or a small group “could certainly do some damage,” Peters said.  “But he’s not going to cruise through (John F.) Kennedy (International) Airport and leave hundreds of people infected behind him.  This whole scenario that there’s going to be massive spread by people that nobody notices is not realistic,” he added.

Smallpox Bomb

Scientific and technical challenges would also prevent terrorists from creating a smallpox bomb, said Jonathan Tucker, the author of Scourge: The Once and Future Threat of Smallpox.

The virus must be grown in living cells, Peters said.  Technicians must make the resultant protein into a liquid or fine powder and package it into a bomb or other dissemination device that could release viral particles without destroying them, he said.  Even if a terrorist group could develop a workable weapon, it would have to contend with the fear accidentally releasing the disease, according to the Times.

“It’s still quite unlikely that smallpox would be used as a weapon,” Tucker said (Charles Piller, Los Angeles Times, Dec. 13).

For further information, see:

CDC Smallpox Information

Journal of the American Medical Association Background on Smallpox

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United States:  Technician Drops Sarin Vials at Umatilla

Diluted sarin nerve agent spilled at the U.S. Army’s Umatilla Chemical Depot in Oregon Dec. 3 when a laboratory technician dropped several small glass vials that shattered on the floor, the Associated Press reported yesterday (see GSN, Sept. 3).

Three employees at the laboratory promptly put on gas masks and poured water and bleach on the floor to further dilute the agent, which already had been diluted 500-to-1 in rubbing alcohol, according to AP.

“It’s diluted enough that you would not normally have an exposure from it,” Army spokesman Jim Hackett said.  “We would say that’s a minor lab incident.”

No one was hurt, and medical tests indicated that there was no sarin in the workers’ blood, Hackett said.  The technician dropped 18 thumb-sized vials, breaking 13, he added.

The Army informed authorities in surrounding communities of the incident, AP reported (see GSN, April 10; Andrew Kramer, Associated Press, Dec. 12).

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Czech Response:  Ministry Develops Plan for Anti-Chemical Unit

Czech Defense Minister Jaroslav Tvrdik has said that Monday he will announce a plan to keep the Czech anti-chemical weapons unit in Kuwait, CTK National News Wire reported yesterday (see GSN, Nov. 13).

Officials previously had proposed to withdraw 200 of the 250 anti-chemical warfare troops — which have been deployed in Kuwait for nearly a year — to save funds, according to CTK (see GSN, Jan 9).  Reports surfaced last month that Kuwait had offered to pay to keep the full unit in place, but such reports have not been confirmed, the newswire reported.

“On Monday I will present to the government a solution I have accepted,” Tvrdik said yesterday.

The full unit is expected to stay in Kuwait, according to CTK.

Meanwhile, morale has weakened within the unit, CTK reported.  Tensions have arisen between the commander of the health section of the troops and his subordinate, and one logistics major recently caused a theft scandal, according to the newswire (CTK National News Wire, Dec. 12).

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North Korea:  Pyongyang Demands Apology for Ship Seizure

North Korea demanded an apology today from the United States for its role in seizing a North Korean ship this week carrying 15 Scud ballistic missiles to Yemen (see GSN, Dec. 12).

“The United states should apologize for its high-handed piracy committed against the D.P.R.K.’s trading ship and duly compensate for all the mental and material damage done to the ship and its crew,” the North Korean Foreign Ministry said in a statement reported by the official Korean Central News Agency.

North Korea also criticized Spain for its role in the joint operation to search and seize the ship, which was ultimately released.

“It is something very regretful and disappointing that Spain which has normal state relations with the D.P.R.K. blindly acted as a servant of the U.S. pirate, unbecoming its status,” the North Korean Foreign Ministry statement said (Financial Times, Dec. 13).

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