Threat Assessment:  Nuclear Plants Can Survive Jetliner Crash, Study Says

By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — U.S. nuclear power plant structures that house radioactive materials, such as reactor containment buildings and spent-fuel storage sites, could withstand a terrorist attack involving a hijacked commercial airliner, according to a study released this month by the Nuclear Energy Institute, the main lobbying group of the U.S. nuclear industry (see GSN, Sept. 20).

The study, conducted by the Electric Power Research Institute on NEI’s request, found that nuclear plant structures could withstand a direct hit by an airliner with only minor damage.  Such an attack would not breach the structures examined — reactor containment structures, spent fuel storage pools, dry spent fuel storage facilities and spent fuel transportation containers — and would not release radioactive materials into the environment, according to the study.

“The results of this study validate the industry’s confidence that nuclear power plants are robust and protect the fuel from impacts of a large commercial aircraft,” Joe Colvin, NEI president and chief executive officer, said in a press release.  “Clearly an impact of this magnitude would do great damage to a plant’s ability to generate electricity.  But the findings show, far more importantly, that public health and safety would be protected,” he added.

The study’s analyses were based on a simulated crash of a Boeing 767 into the various nuclear power plant structures at a speed of 350 miles per hour — the speed at which a hijacked airliner crashed into the Pentagon during the Sept. 11 attacks, according to the NEI release.  The Boeing 767 is the most widely used “wide body” aircraft in U.S. skies, the study says.  While the airliner has the ability to hit plant structures at higher speeds than 350 miles per hour, pilots have said that ground-level precision flying at greater speeds is more difficult and lesser-experienced pilots would have difficulty controlling the aircraft, according to the study.

Anti-nuclear activists have criticized the study for being designed to confirm conclusions predetermined by the nuclear industry (see GSN, Sept. 23).  Edwin Lyman, president of the Nuclear Control Institute, said that while the study was released this month, NEI began circulating a set of talking points regarding the study’s conclusions in August.

“They knew the answers they wanted and worked backwards,” Lyman was quoted by the Washington Post last week as saying.  “We can’t take anything the industry says at face value,” he added.

The industry talking points on the study noted that terrorists could use a hijacked airliner to destroy a nuclear power plant’s auxiliary buildings, Lyman said.  That information, however, was not included in the released version, he said.  Such an attack, when combined with the loss of power to a nuclear plant caused by outside terrorists, could result in a meltdown, Lyman said.

Lyman also criticized the study for failing to consider potential worst-case scenarios.  For example, the jet speed and containment wall thickness examined were not conservative enough, he said, noting that a 767 is capable of higher speeds.  The effects of an airliner fuel explosion and the resultant fire were also not considered, Lyman said, charging the nuclear industry with using “tunnel vision” to limit the scenarios that were examined in the study.

Lyman said he was concerned that the newly created Homeland Security Department will not have the ability to independently assess nuclear power plant security information.  Instead, the new department will rely on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which Lyman said is “a captive of the [nuclear] industry right now.”

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Iraq:  Inspectors Receive List of Scientific Experts

Iraqi officials delivered a list of more than 500 experts to U.N. inspectors in Baghdad Saturday, meeting a deadline to identify personnel with knowledge of Iraq’s ballistic missile, nuclear, chemical or biological weapons programs, the New York Times reported (see GSN, Dec. 20).

The list is a requirement of U.N. Security Council’s Resolution 1441 but the first two interviews of Iraqi officials have proven contentious, according to the Times.  The list was typed in Arabic and sent to New York and Vienna for translation and study.

Last week inspectors requested an interview with Kadhim Mijbel — a British-educated metallurgist who works with light rockets — through Iraq’s National Monitoring Directorate, but the scientist refused to go to U.N. headquarters.  Mijbel instead requested a neutral site, the state-owned al-Rasheed hotel, and insisted that a government official attend his hour-long interview Friday with U.N. inspectors Robert Kelly, and Ahmed Gebaly (Neil MacFarquhar, New York Times, Dec. 29).

A scientist that inspectors attempted to interview without prior notice, Sabah Abdul Nour, also requested that a government official be present during the interview.

Inspectors said that the interview with Mijbel was useful and that they had obtained “technical details of a military program” that “has attracted considerable attention as a possible prelude to a clandestine nuclear program.”  Mijbel, however, emphatically denied that he had been any help to the inspectors.

“I told him that I don’t have any relationship, near or far, with this program and I didn’t have any relationship with the previous programs related to nuclear, biological or chemical (weapons),” Mijbel said during a government-organized press conference.  “As a matter of fact, I don’t know anything about this,” he added.

Inspectors later said that Mijbel was not involved in Iraq’s past nuclear efforts and that he had given only “nonclassified information.”

Mijbel also called on his fellow scientists to resist U.S. and U.N. efforts to take Iraqis and their families out of the country to conduct interviews.

“How can an Iraqi man leave Iraq?” Mijbel said.  “I advise my colleague scientists and researchers to take representatives with them from the National Monitoring Directorate to protect their rights and to be witnesses,” he said (Peter Baker, Washington Post, Dec. 29).

Mijbel said that he had not been asked to leave the country for his interview (MacFarquhar, New York Times, Dec. 29).

Iraqi officials, meanwhile, said that leaving the country for an interview was a “personal decision” but authorities made it clear that the government would prefer them to stay.

“It’s not necessary to meet scientists outside of Iraq,” said Gen. Hussam Mohamed Amin, head of the National Monitoring Directorate.

“It’s up to them.  You can ask the scientists one by one,” Amin said.  “I’m one of them.  I can answer you on my case only.  I will not go,” he added.

Amin said that he does not want to conduct an interview elsewhere “because I don’t like to leave my country.  If there is any important question to be addressed to me, let them address it to me here in Iraq.  Why this complicated procedure?  I don’t believe in this complicated procedure” (Peter Baker, Washington Post, Dec. 27).

A senior Cypriot government official, meanwhile, said that Cyprus would be willing to house Iraqi scientists for interviews beyond the reach of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.

“Cyprus has no problem in providing further facilities to the U.N. Iraqi weapons inspectors team … provided the scientists do not remain in Cyprus on a permanent basis,” the senior official said.  U.N. officials are also considering holding interviews in Jordan and Turkey, according to United Press International (United Press International, Dec. 28).

U.S. Pressured Iraqi Officials to Defect

Earlier this year, the United States attempted to persuade the founder of Iraq’s nuclear weapons program, Jaffar Dhia Jaffar, to defect and reveal secrets to Iraq’s clandestine weapons programs, the Washington Post reported Saturday.

While traveling to New York for talks on U.N. inspections in Iraq, Jaffar was held up at the U.S. embassy in Amman, Jordan, the Post reported.

Iraqi diplomats alleged that U.S. officials had offered money to Jaffar and other Iraqi officials to encourage defections.

The United States also targeted Gen. Amir Saadi, a senior adviser to Hussein, and Mehdi Labidi, a midlevel technician, according to Iraqi officials.

Jaffar would have been a natural target for U.S. officials, according to David Albright, head of the Institute for Science and International Security.

“He’s extremely significant.  He knows more than anybody else, because he is trusted by the top level and he was very involved in all the different programs,” Albright said.  “He also should have known about all the chemical, biological and missile programs,” he added.

Before agreeing to assist Hussein’s weapons efforts, Jaffar was tortured and imprisoned by the Iraqi dictator, Albright said.

“Here’s a guy who they tortured to force him to work in the program.  I don’t see him having a tremendous loyalty to them if he had a choice,” Albright said.

U.S. efforts to encourage defection, however, could endanger scientists and their families in Iraq, according to Khidhir Hamza, a former aide to Jaffar who defected to the United States.

“Talking to scientists with minders is meaningless; without minders it is an endangerment,” Hamza said (Colum Lynch, Washington Post, Dec. 27).

The U.N. inspections continued in Iraq today, and there are currently 105 inspectors in the country now, according to a U.N. release.

Of the inspectors, 99 are from the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission and six are from the International Atomic Energy Agency (U.N. release, Dec. 29).

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Export Controls: United States Pushing Out the Borders

by William New

National Journal

In its energetic effort to reduce U.S. vulnerability to attack from weapons of mass destruction, the Bush administration is reaching out worldwide through a variety of security initiatives involving international trade.  Among those efforts is a heightened focus on trade in sensitive items that, when passing through the world’s key shipping hubs, are diverted for illicit purposes.

“State sponsors of terrorism and terrorist organizations increasingly are attempting to exploit the less-stringent controls that exist in the world’s transshipment hubs — often by diverting legitimate trade or through front companies posing as honest brokers,” said John Schlosser, director of the Office of Export Control Cooperation at the State Department’s Bureau of Nonproliferation.  He made his remarks this month at a regional forum on transshipment controls in Bangkok.

“Unless transshipment countries — like those you represent here today — catch up with these supplier states and similarly strengthen their export-control systems, they will remain an attractive target for this kind of predatory trade,” Schlosser told the gathering.

The United States controls its exports of munitions, as well as commercial goods that could have a dual, or military, use.  Dual-use items include chemicals and biological toxins; machine tools that can be used to manufacture missile parts; lasers and sensors; and electronics and high-performance computers. The government also follows several multilateral export control agreements, such as the Wassenaar Arrangement.

Now the administration is trying to persuade other governments, especially those with major shipping centers, to adopt similar controls.  Officials say the ultimate risk of failure could be a massive attack on innocent civilians.

“The problem arises when these items, which can be extremely dangerous in the wrong hands, don’t end up where they are supposed to,” Karan Bhatia, deputy undersecretary of commerce for industry and security, said in a speech this month in Bangkok.  The threat to global commerce “is the more insidious threat that through normal channels ... end-users `of concern’ will be able to acquire illicitly the most dangerous of items needed to build weapons of mass destruction or perpetrate acts of violence.”

In so doing, he added, “they threaten the public’s confidence and trust in international trade generally, and specifically in the commercial hubs that facilitate such traffic.”

John Bolton, undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, told the Fourth International Conference on Export Controls in Warsaw on Sept. 30, “In an effort to plug the holes in this system, we are encouraging countries around the world to adopt export controls that conform to international standards, to put in place effective licensing procedures and practices, and to back them up with capable enforcement mechanisms.” This is being accomplished through the State Department’s Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance program, under which the United States is “helping other countries to control the movement of goods and technology through their borders,” Bolton said.

“The whole administration is focusing more on transshipment countries,” a State Department official said this month.  For years, the focus was on “source” countries, such as Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, that had technologies and components needed to produce weapons of mass destruction.  In the past few years, however, those countries have tightened their export control laws and improved their enforcement capabilities, according to Schlosser.

The so-called transshipment countries the United States either is working with or wants to work with include Cyprus, Malta, Panama, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, the United Arab Emirates, and Vietnam. The goal is to persuade countries to adopt and effectively enforce controls on their transshipment trade. The preference is for countries to set up automated systems with “red flags.” Such flags could be a company’s name on a watch list, or an unusual quantity of controlled items that appear unsuited for the type of company the goods are going to.

Among the administration’s efforts is the Transshipment Country Export Control Initiative, led by the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security.  “It’s all part of the post-9/11 [administration] initiative of pushing our borders out,” said Bhatia. TECI has two main branches: government-to-government initiatives and government-to-private sector initiatives.

BIS operates at the crossroads of trade and security and is focusing on helping global hubs develop policies to manage controlled items while allowing goods to reach their destinations on time.

“In each of these countries, it’s a process of developing expertise in areas such as export control laws and regulations, enforcement capabilities, and data collection and information-sharing,” said BIS head Kenneth Juster in an interview.  “The goal is to enhance security while at the same time promoting trade.  We can do this by focusing our efforts on that small component of trade that appears to present security problems.”

The Commerce team has become increasingly aware of the problem of transshipment, Bhatia said in an interview.  Recently, there has been “an increased sense of urgency” as evidence of illicit diversion has piled up, he added.  The initiative was driven by Commerce Secretary Donald Evans as part of the administration’s overall security plan.

The State Department chairs the formal interagency committee on export controls and handles day-to-day decisions on the issue, the State official said. Issues can rise to the level of the National Security Council, which coordinates committees at the deputy and assistant secretary levels.

The State Department manages funding for several of the initiatives.  Funding for export controls has averaged nearly $40 million annually since 2001, up from $3 million in 1998, the State official said.  The White House request for fiscal 2003, included in the foreign operations appropriations bill still before Congress, is $36 million.  Last year, an additional $25 million was provided for export controls under emergency supplemental spending.  For fiscal 2004, the administration will continue to seek a “good level of support” for the program, the official said.

Transshipment countries pose special risks for several reasons, according to Bhatia.  For one, a massive amount of trade flows through them, making them attractive targets.  For instance, the equivalent of more than 50 million containers a year has passed through the major ports of Southeast Asia in recent years.

Transshipment countries also have extensive shipping-related infrastructure that can be misused.  For example, these countries are often home to export-import businesses, brokerages, trading houses, free-trade zones, reprocessing zones, and other establishments, Bhatia said.  These countries also typically lie near countries or end users “of concern,” he said.  Finally, the transshipment countries often have looser export licensing requirements since they are not problem countries themselves.  For instance, under U.S. law, these countries typically receive favorable status for licensing requirements.

Bhatia said the increasing evidence of illicit transshipment comes from intelligence reports, the outcome of export verification visits, and lawsuits brought by government agencies.  Bhatia summarized a recent case he oversaw.

A U.S. manufacturer exported a device requiring an export license for shipment to higher-risk countries — but not to most transshipment countries.  After about five months, the manufacturer received a call from the user of the product complaining that it was malfunctioning.  The exported item had been calibrated for use at sea level, but it became clear that the user was at the altitude of the capital city of a nearby country — a well-known state sponsor of terrorism.

By tracking down shipping records and other evidence, Commerce was able to obtain a judgment against the trading company, which is now barred from doing business in U.S.-manufactured goods, Bhatia said.  The transshipment initiative involves building public-private partnerships with all players involved in moving a product.  That includes forwarders, integrators, airlines, shipping lines, airport and port facilities, trucking companies, brokers, and warehouses, as well as importers, exporters, and consignees.  The goals of the TECI program are to build awareness of the problem of diverted goods, develop channels of communication between industry and government, and create best practices.

For outreach, U.S. agencies are holding a series of meetings similar to the one held in Bangkok this month.  A meeting was also held in Barcelona, Spain, in May to address export controls in the Middle East.  This month’s three-day forum in Bangkok brought together law enforcement, trade, and customs officials with industry executives from major airlines, shipping companies, and other related service providers.  Governments represented included those of Australia, Cambodia, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Macao, Malaysia, Singapore, Sweden, Taiwan, Thailand, the United States, and Vietnam.

Bhatia said that at the conference, the United States got “buy in” from more than 35 companies, including some multinational ones like UPS.  “These people really are our front lines,” he said.  Getting buy-in from governments can be harder when they are not the originating or destination country, officials said.

The TECI program was announced in October by Juster, who traveled to Asia at the time promoting it.  Among other administration efforts, the U.S. Customs Service is heading a container security initiative to check shipments heading to the United States before they leave the country of origin (see GSN, Nov. 11).

Other initiatives, which involve the Coast Guard and Transportation Department, address the security of the world’s major ports and shipping lanes.  Still others, such as the Transportation Security Administration’s “known shippers” program, focus on screening cargo.  In October these initiatives and others received the endorsement of the leaders of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation organization.

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North Korea:  IAEA Inspectors to Leave Yongbyon Tomorrow

International Atomic Energy Agency Inspectors are scheduled to leave North Korea tomorrow after the country demanded their departure in a letter Friday to IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei (International Atomic Energy Agency release, Dec. 28).  One of the three IAEA inspectors at the Yongbyon nuclear site left North Korea Saturday, the agency said (see GSN, Dec. 16).

ElBaradei said Saturday that he would submit a report today to the agency’s executive board outlining how North Korea has violated the 1994 Agreed Framework.  The board is then expected to consider how to respond during a meeting scheduled for Jan. 6 in Vienna, he said.  ElBaradei said that he would urge the board to demand that North Korea allow inspectors to resume monitoring the Yongbyon site.  If that failed, the IAEA would “have an obligation to refer the matter to the [U.N.] Security Council,” he added (Peter Goodman, Washington Post, Dec. 29).

The IAEA received North Korea’s request to remove its inspectors in a letter Friday, according to an agency press statement.  In his response, ElBaradei said the inspectors were needed to install monitoring equipment and to oversee the restarting of North Korea’s nuclear facilities.

“Together with the loss of cameras and seals, the departure of inspectors would practically bring to an end our ability to monitor D.P.R.K.’s nuclear program or assess its nature,” ElBaradei said.  “This is one further step away from diffusing the crisis,” he added (IAEA release, Dec. 27).

NPT

Meanwhile, North Korea today renewed its long-standing threat to withdraw completely from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.  North Korea has claimed a “special status” in the treaty, which allows it to delay implementation of its IAEA safeguards agreement until the delivery of components for two light-water nuclear reactors, as called for under the Agreed Framework.

Considering recent events, however, “even our special status is now in peril,” the North Korean Foreign Ministry said in a press statement (BBC Monitoring, Dec. 30).

Escalation

The withdrawal of the IAEA inspectors and North Korea’s threats to withdraw from the NPT are the latest in a recent series of escalating moves centered on Pyongyang’s decision to restart its nuclear program.  North Korea began moving new fuel rods into the 5-megawatt reactor located at Yongbyon last week, placing 2,000 into a storage facility at the site by Friday, IAEA spokeswoman Melissa Fleming said.  The reactor would need about 8,000 fuel rods for operation, she added (Associated Press/Yahoo.com, Dec. 27).

North Korea also last week removed IAEA seals and monitoring equipment at three facilities at Yongbyon — the 5-megawatt reactor and its associated spent-fuel storage pond, a fuel rod production plant and a spent fuel reprocessing facility, according to an IAEA press statement (IAEA release, Dec. 24). 

“The reprocessing plant is the important one, because that’s where they extract the plutonium from the spent fuel,” said IAEA spokesman Mark Gwozdecky.  “If we don’t have our monitoring equipment in place, we’re not in a position to assure anybody that this material is not being diverted for weapons,” he added.

The storage pond contains about 8,000 spent fuel rods, the New York Times reported (Richard Stevenson, New York Times, Dec. 24).  The United States is concerned about the status of the spent fuel rods because of their potential use in developing nuclear weapons, U.S. State Department spokesman Louis Fintor said last week.

“The 8,000-odd spent fuel rods are of particular concern because they could be reprocessed to recover plutonium for nuclear weapons,” Fintor said.  “They have no relevance for the generation of electricity,” he added (Sanger/Dao, New York Times, Dec. 23).

U.S. Plans

The United States is attempting to begin informal communications with North Korea in order to resolve the nuclear issue and has no plans to conduct a military attack, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell said yesterday. 

“We are looking for ways to communicate with the North Koreans so some sense can prevail,” Powell said on NBC’s Meet the Press.  There are “channels open” and “ways of communicating,” but the United States would not respond to North Korea’s moves by saying, “Let’s have a negotiation because we want to appease your misbehavior,” Powell added.

Powell said that James Kelly, assistant secretary of state for East Asia, would travel to South Korea within the next two weeks.  There are no plans, however, for Kelly to meet with North Korean officials, Powell said.

The White House is also ending a Clinton administration policy calling for a military attack on North Korea if it resumed producing nuclear weapons, Powell said. 

“In fact, the Clinton administration did have a declaratory policy that if anything else happened at Yongbyon, they would attack it,” Powell said on ABC’s This Week.  “We don’t have that policy.  We don’t — we’re not saying what we might or might not do.  We think it’s best to try to use diplomacy,” he added.

The United States would take some sort of action, however, if it was determined that North Korea was transferring completed nuclear weapons to other countries, Powell said on Meet the Press.  “This, I think, would be a red line that would definitely be crossed,” he said (Dana Milbank, Washington Post, Dec. 30).

While the United States is seeking an informal dialogue with North Korea, plans are also being developed to increase political and economic pressure on Pyongyang to end its nuclear weapons efforts, according to senior Bush administration officials.

The plan calls for North Korea’s neighbors, such as South Korea and China, to reduce their economic links to Pyongyang, according to the New York Times.  The U.N. Security Council could also threaten to implement economic sanctions and the United States might use military force to intercept missile shipments to deprive North Korea of needed income, the Times reported.

The threat of economic isolation is the best way to force North Korea to end its nuclear weapons efforts, or to ultimately bring down the Kim Jong Il regime, Bush administration officials said.  Under the plan, called “tailored containment,” the United States is willing to negotiate with North Korea, but only if it first gives up its weapons program, they said.

“It is called ‘tailored containment’ because this is an entirely different situation than Iraq or Iran,” a senior administration official said.  “It is a lot about putting political stress and putting economic stress.  It also requires maximum multinational cooperation,” the official added (Michael Gordon, New York Times, Dec. 29).

Economic pressure might be an effective tool against North Korea because Pyongyang’s economy is dangerously weak, according to the Wall Street Journal.  Economic reforms introduced in July have led to increased food prices and if effective sanctions were implemented, even senior North Korean Communist Party members would face difficulty getting food, diplomats, businessmen and defectors said.

North Korea’s large-scale economic problems and food shortages, however, could make it more difficult for the United States to persuade other countries to join an economic campaign, diplomats and analysts in Asia said.  For example, China and South Korea are both concerned about greater instability in the region, which could be caused by North Korea’s economic collapse, they said (Soloman/Cooper, Wall Street Journal, Dec. 30),

International Diplomacy

North Korea’s neighbors — South Korea, Japan, China and Russia — have begun planning their own diplomatic moves to help reduce tensions and resolve the North Korean nuclear issue, according to reports. 

Japan and Russia are expected to pledge to seek a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula in a plan to be adopted in a Jan. 10 meeting between the leaders of the two countries, Japanese government sources said.  Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi is scheduled to begin a three-day visit to Moscow on Jan. 9 and to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin the following day to discuss North Korea, according to the Japan Times (Japan Times, Dec. 30).

South Korea said Sunday that it would send representatives to China and Russia — North Korea’s two main allies — “at the earliest possible date” in an effort to help convince North Korea to end its nuclear weapons efforts (The Straits Times, Dec. 29).

China said Saturday that it was still pursuing a diplomatic solution “to ease [the] tension” that had developed from North Korea’s decision to restart its nuclear program.  China still considers the Agreed Framework to be “conducive to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” said Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao said.  Both North Korea and the United States still have a responsibility to “abide by the agreement,” Liu said (P.S. Suryanarayana, The Hindu, Dec. 30).

Smuggling

Pakistan is suspected of having smuggled materials needed to construct a gas centrifuge, which is used to enrich uranium for use in nuclear weapons, to North Korea in 1998 in the coffin of the murdered wife of a North Korean diplomat, the Japanese newspaper Manichi Shimbun reported yesterday. 

Pakistan is believed to have placed a sample centrifuge, blueprints and other materials into the coffin.  North Korea then arranged a special fight from Islamabad to Pyongyang under the pretext of transporting the body, according to the Japanese newspaper (Takayuki Kasuga, Manichi Shimbun/BBC Worldwide Monitoring, Dec. 29).

For further information, see:

Agreed Framework Text

KEDO

NPT Text

States Parties to the NPT (U.N.)

U.N. Background on NPT

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Pakistan:  Musharraf Cautions India With Unconventional War

Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf said today that he warned India earlier this year that Pakistan was not afraid to use unconventional weapons if attacked (see GSN, April 8).

“In my meetings with various world leaders, I conveyed my personal message to Indian Prime Minister [Atal Behari] Vajpayee that the moment Indian forces cross the line of control and the international border, then they should not expect a conventional war from Pakistan,” Musharraf said.

Musharraf made his revelation at an army function today in Karachi, but he did not specifically mention Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.

“I believe my message was effectively conveyed to Mr. Vajpayee,” he said (Agence France-Presse, Sydney Morning Herald, Dec. 31).

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Russia:  Converted ICBM Carries Satellites Into Space

Russia launched a converted SS-18 intercontinental ballistic missile into space Dec. 20 carrying five satellites and a prototype of a Russian lunar-orbiting vehicle, the Associated Press reported (see GSN, Nov. 27).  The Dnepr-1 rocket was launched from the Baikonur cosmodrome in Kazakhstan.

The Dnepr is built as a joint venture between Russia and the Ukraine (Associated Press, Dec. 20).

The launch carried Italian, Argentine, Saudi Arabian and German satellites.  The first launch in the conversion program was in April 1999 and successfully carried a British satellite into orbit, Interfax reported this month.  The second, in September 2000, successfully placed Saudi Arabian, Italian and Malaysian satellites into orbit (Interfax, Dec. 10 in FBIS-SOV Dec. 10).

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Smallpox:  Israel Avoids Nationwide Immunizations

Israel has decided not to implement a nationwide immunization effort after officials there determined the threat of a smallpox biological terrorist attack is low, the New York Times reported last week (see GSN, Dec. 10).

“Intelligence reports are saying there is no immediate threat, and we don’t see the possibility of Iraq attacking us with smallpox,” said Yehuda Danon, a professor of immunology and pediatrics at Tel Aviv University.  “But everything would change once we have the first case,” he added.

Israeli officials announced, however, that they plan to expand the immunization program to cover about 40,000 emergency workers and health care first responders, the Times reported.  A greater emphasis will also be placed on developing a plan to respond to a smallpox outbreak.  Israeli officials said they might be able to immunize the nation of 6 million people in about four days.

“The first single case of smallpox would change the daily life of the whole country and probably the whole world,” Danon said.  “Air and sea transportation would stop.  We have to make sure that we have a population who can treat the sick people and immunize the healthy people,” he added (Dexter Filkins, New York Times, Dec. 26).

So far, Israel has inoculated 15,000 emergency personnel and only four people have been hospitalized for side effects, according to Health Ministry spokesman Ido Hadari.  Two of those who have been hospitalized were family members of health workers who received the inoculation, Reuters reported.  They reportedly came in contact with the inoculation site and developed blisters and a fever (Reuters, Dec. 19).

U.S. Plan Could Hurt Local Health Programs

In the United States, meanwhile, state health officials are concerned that the White House plan to immunize up to 10 million health care workers against smallpox could be prohibitively expensive and might draw funds from other health or biological defense programs, the Washington Post reported last week (see GSN, Dec. 16).

The plan, put forward by U.S. President George W. Bush, is “the ultimate unfunded federal mandate,” said George Hardy, executive director of the Association of State and Territorial Health Officials.  “We can’t afford to do this at the expense of all other preparedness,” he added.

Officials expect the plan to cost between $600 million and $1 billion, the Post reported.  The United States has already spent more than $862 million to acquire the smallpox vaccine.

“States and localities are diverting significant resources to smallpox vaccination and there is no end in sight,” said Patrick Libbey, executive director of the National Association of County and City Health Officials.  “We urge that the program be kept at minimal levels and grow only as rapidly as threat assessments demand, so as not to disrupt other basic community health protections or cause unnecessary harm,” he added.

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, which is coordinating the immunization effort, said that some of the $918 million that was sent to state governments last spring to improve biological defense measures could be used for the immunizations.

“We’re absolutely committed to working with the states to make this work efficiently and safely,” said CDC spokesman Tom Skinner.  “There are a lot of dollar figures out there, some of which I believe do not take into account the infrastructure that’s been put in place,” he added.

Some state officials, however, said the money allocated last spring was not directed to smallpox-related efforts.

“The word smallpox wasn’t even mentioned,” said Michael Richardson, acting health director for the District of Columbia.

Congress will most likely send $940 million to help states improve their biological defense infrastructures, according to Bill Pierce, spokesman for the Department of Health and Human Services (Ceci Connolly, Washington Post, Dec. 24).

Bush privately received his own smallpox vaccination Dec. 21, the Post reported.

The president did not display any immediate side effects, the White House reported (Mike Allen, Washington Post, Dec. 22).

For further information, see:

CDC Smallpox Information

Journal of the American Medical Association Background on Smallpox

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Anthrax:  FBI Increasing Surveillance, Hatfill Says

Steven Hatfill, the former U.S. Army biologist who has been the public focus of the FBI’s investigation into last year’s anthrax attacks, has said the FBI has recently increased its surveillance of him, United Press International reported last week (see GSN, Dec. 19).

Beginning Dec. 17, after the FBI completed a search of a section of forest near Frederick, Md., the bureau began a day-and-night surveillance operation using unmarked vehicles, Hatfill told UPI.  He said that several times FBI agents came close to running into his car as they followed him. 

“The cars were on my bumper,” Hatfill said.

Hatfill said he did not know why the FBI had recently increased its surveillance of him.  Hatfill spokesman Patrick Clawson said he believes the FBI’s actions amount to harassment.

The FBI refused to comment last week on the increased surveillance of Hatfill or its search of the Maryland forest, which is also believed to be linked to Hatfill (Divis/Horrock, United Press International, Dec. 23).

Brentwood Decontamination

Meanwhile, U.S. Postal Service officials have said they will not dismantle the equipment used to decontaminate the anthrax-tainted Brentwood Road postal facility in Washington until it is determined that the decontamination was successful (see GSN, Dec. 18).  Officials are awaiting the results of tests conducted on 4,000 samples and 8,000 test strips removed from the facility, according to the Baltimore Sun.

“You don’t want to take down all the equipment and then find out you hadn’t killed all the spores,” said Thomas Day, Postal Service vice president of engineering.  “You don’t want to start all over again,” he added (Scott Shane, Baltimore Sun, Dec. 27).

For further information, see:

CDC Frequently Asked Questions About Anthrax

FBI Amerithrax Investigation

Journal of the American Medical Association Background on Anthrax

GSN Anthrax Attack Chronology (Dec. 12, 2001)

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Italy:  Records Show No Abandoned Chemical Weapons In Ethiopia

By Bryan Bender
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — Italy has concluded its military forces did not abandon chemical weapons in Ethiopia during its 1935-36 conflict with what was then called Abyssinia (see GSN, Dec. 10).

“According to our records in Rome, at the end of the 1935-1936 war between Italy and Ethiopia, no deposits of chemical armaments were left in the country,” the Italian government press office said this month in a written response to questions from Global Security Newswire.

Ethiopia, where Italy is believed to have used chemical weapons, has been cited by arms control experts as an example of the difficulties of identifying ownership of so-called abandoned chemical weapons and reaching agreement on how they are to be disposed of when located.

Abandoned chemical weapons are defined by the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention as being manufactured after 1925 and left on the territory of another state.  The abandoning party is responsible for them under the provisions of the chemical weapons treaty.

Ethiopia last year claimed that Italy was breaking international law by not disclosing the location of chemical weapons depots built during the occupation of the area. The discovery in May 2001 of live ammunition and grenades renewed fears that poison gas and other weapons were left behind. 

Moreover, at a recent meeting of the U.N. disarmament fellows, an academic gathering described to Global Security Newswire by an official who attended, Ethiopia’s representative expressed frustration with Italy’s failure to acknowledge ownership of any abandoned weapons, provide documentation, or otherwise take steps toward locating any leftover stockpiles with the intent to destroy them.

“Ethiopia is unhappy with the destruction of chemical weapons as called for under the CWC,” said Jonathan Tucker of the U.S. Institute for Peace said earlier this month.  “In 1936 (former Italian dictator Benito) Mussolini conquered Ethiopia and used mustard gas but apparently the Italians are challenging the fact that they have ownership,” Tucker said.

Italy responded to such claims earlier this month by saying that it has no record of abandoned chemical weapons in Abyssinia, where its military forces are believed to have brought as many as 80,000 tons of chemical munitions.

“Following the Paris convention [the CWC] which prohibits chemical weapons, and [Ethiopia] having [found] unexploded artillery projectiles and bombs … Italy sent a technical delegation headed by the ‘Military Defense Installation NBC’ from Nov. 12 until Nov. 16, 2001,” according to the statement.

“The delegation was accompanied by Ethiopian experts and military personnel,” it added.  “According to the final report issued at the end of the mission, the examined materials consisted only of weapons with conventional loading, and not referable to chemical weapons.”

Italy, meanwhile, has also offered to train Ethiopians “to be able to detect and examine any further suspicious materials,” according to the statement.

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France:  More Terrorism Suspects Found With Chemical Links

French officials arrested five more people last week from a terrorist cell that reportedly was seeking to acquire chemical weapons materials and planned to attack the Russian embassy in Paris, the New York Times reported Friday (see GSN, Dec. 19).

“This cell had decided to hit Russian targets in France,” an Interior Ministry statement said Saturday.

Four suspected militants were arrested in a suburb of Paris Dec. 16 and a fifth man, Nourredine Merabet, was arrested five days later on the French-Spanish border.  Four more people were arrested last week in Romainville, another Parisian suburb, including a trained chemist who has been to Afghanistan and Menad Ben Chellali, whose brother is being held at Guantanamo Bay U.S. Naval Base in Cuba, the Times reported.

During the Romainville arrests, French authorities discovered a list of chemicals needed to make a gas related to cyanide, officials said.  The list also contained quantities and prices for the components, the Times reported.

Some of those arrested have also spent time in militant training camps in the Caucasus Mountains along Chechnya’s border with Georgia where they met with senior al-Qaeda members who specialized in dangerous toxic materials, according to the French Interior Ministry (Craig Smith, New York Times, Dec. 28).

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Israel:  United States Begins Deploying Patriots as Part of Joint Exercise

The United States has begun deploying about 1,000 troops and a number of Patriot missile interceptor batteries in Israel as part of a joint missile defense exercise, the London Guardian reported Saturday (see GSN, Dec. 12). 

The exercise, designed to integrate the U.S. Patriots with the Israeli Arrow missile interceptor, is scheduled to begin next week and last for two weeks, according to the Guardian.  The exercise is also expected to involve the use of a U.S. Aegis destroyer.  The U.S. forces are expected to remain once the exercise is completed to help defend Israel in the event of a U.S.-led war on Iraq, the Guardian reported.

If Iraq launches ballistic missiles against Israel, civilians will receive a seven-minute warning — twice as long as those issued during the 1991 Gulf War, according to the Israeli homefront command (see GSN, Dec. 19).  The increased warning time is the result of new satellite technology and improved missile tracking capabilities, Israeli officials said (Chris McGreal, London Guardian, Dec. 28).

For further information, see:

MDA Terminal Defense Segment

Federation of American Scientists Background on Arrow

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