United States:  Lee Wants Apology

Former U.S. nuclear weapon scientist Wen Ho Lee said the classified files he illegally downloaded did not contain any information vital to national security, the Associated Press reported Saturday (see GSN, Jan. 4).  In his newly published book, My Country Versus Me, Lee defended himself and said U.S. investigators tried to intimidate him.

U.S. authorities arrested Lee in December 1999 and charged him with 59 felony counts, claiming he copied information about nuclear weapons from a classified computer at Los Alamos National Laboratory onto portable computer tapes.  Authorities held Lee in solitary confinement for nine months but never officially charged him with spying, according to the Associated Press.

Lee eventually pleaded guilty to downloading classified information, but he claimed in his new book that the information was trivial to security, not the “crown jewels” of nuclear secrets as a senior scientist called the information.

The files contained information necessary for designing computer simulations of nuclear explosions.  Lee said he copied the files because he was worried the computer system could crash and lose his work, so he wanted backup files (Richard Burke, Associated Press/Philadelphia Inquirer, Jan. 12).

Agents Crossed the Line

Judge James Parker, who ordered Lee released in September 2000 after he pleaded guilty to one felony, said Justice and Energy Department officials had overstated the evidence and “embarrassed our nation.”  Top Justice Department officials expressed concern about the investigation from the beginning, according to new documents Newsweek obtained from Lee’s lawyers.

Investigators’ actions suggested “that the government intentionally revealed facts about the investigation to the news media in order to pressure Lee to confess, or out of vindictiveness toward Lee for not confessing,” John Dion, chief of the Justice Department’s internal-security section, wrote in an internal memo.  An FBI agent threatened Lee with public humiliation and the death penalty, according to a transcript of an interrogation of Lee, Newsweek reported.

Lee Not Blameless

Despite the controversy surrounding the government’s treatment of Lee, the scientist was not completely innocent, according to Newsweek.  Lee pleaded guilty to improperly downloading classified material and storing the information on an unclassified computer.  When the investigation against him heated up in December 1998, Lee erased the information from the unclassified computer.  Investigators never found the classified tapes, which Lee claimed he threw in a garbage bin. 

Lee visited Asiatek, a high-tech company in Taiwan with alleged close ties to the Taiwanese Defense Ministry, despite being denied permission to go, according to a recently published book called A Convenient Spy:  Wen Ho Lee and the Politics of Nuclear Espionage by Dan Stober and Ian Hoffman.  Lee told Newsweek he was interested in a future job with Asiatek.  Stober and Hoffman said Lee kept the nuclear files to help him find a future job — a claim Lee denied (Michael Isikoff, Newsweek, Jan. 21).

Discrimination?

Lee, who was born in Taiwan and has been a U.S. citizen since 1974, said investigators targeted him due to his Chinese ethnicity.

“Had I not been Chinese,” he said, “I never would have been accused of espionage and threatened with execution.”  Lee is suing the U.S. government for defamation.

Former energy secretary Bill Richardson said in a deposition made public last week that ethnicity was not a factor in the investigation against Lee or the decision to fire him from his job (Burke, Associated Press/Philadelphia Inquirer, Jan. 12).

Lee Seeks U.S. Apology

Meanwhile, in addition to suing the government, Lee said he wanted a pardon from the president for the felony to which he pleaded guilty.

“I think I should get a pardon from the president … I think the government owes me an apology,” he told Newsweek (Isikoff, Newsweek, Jan. 21).

Click here to read an excerpt from Lee’s book provided to Newsweek.

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U.S.-Russia:  Officials Begin Nuclear Reduction Meetings

U.S. and Russian defense officials were expected to meet today in Washington to discuss planned nuclear weapon reductions (see GSN, Dec. 18, 2001).  U.S. Defense Undersecretary Douglas Feith was scheduled to meet with a Russian team, led by Col. Gen. Yuri Baluyevsky, for two days.

The meeting comes after announcements by the two countries’ leaders to cut their deployed nuclear arsenal by about two-thirds over the next 10 years (see GSN, Dec. 17, 2001) and recent announcements that the United States would store many of its warheads rather than destroy them (see GSN, Jan. 10).

Russia has expressed opposition to the U.S. plan to store weapons (see GSN, Jan. 10).  Despite that disagreement, a senior U.S. diplomat said the two sides were likely to agree to a deal (see GSN, Jan. 11).

“The Russians have fired their opening salvo on the issue, but I think we’ll be able to wrestle it to the ground,” the diplomat said Friday.

“The forthcoming Russian-U.S. consultations will focus on drafting of a strategic offensive arms agreement,” Baluyevsky said Sunday.  The two countries would draft an agreement by later this year that would include guidelines for future arms reductions and verification measures, Baluyevsky said, adding that the U.S. decision to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty would also enter into the discussions (see GSN, Dec. 13).

Russian and U.S. officials would also discuss inspecting additional storage sites and exchanging information to account for stored weapons, the U.S. diplomat said (Charles Aldinger, Reuters/Environmental News Network, Jan. 15).

Officials would discuss preventing terrorist attacks and conducting joint military exercises, a senior Bush administration official said.

The United States would be willing to assist Russia in anti-missile activities, such as providing technology, another senior U.S. official said last week (see related GSN story, today).

The United States and Russia still disagree on some issues, despite increased emphasis on cooperation between the two former adversaries.  The United States continues to worry about Russian technology transfers to Iran (see related GSN story, today), which U.S. officials believe could help Iran develop nuclear weapons, the Bush administration official said (Barry Schweid, Associated Press/Yahoo.com, Jan. 15).

Russian military and diplomatic sources said the two countries would hold more nuclear weapons talks in Washington later this month.  Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Mamedov is to lead the Russian delegation (Aldinger, Reuters/Environmental News Network, Jan. 15).

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China:  PLA Modernizing Forces

The Chinese military wants to modernize its forces, including its nuclear capabilities, the India Statesman reported today.

The Chinese military is looking to move away from relying on mass amounts of manpower to increasing use of technology and advanced weapons, according to the Statesman.  To that end, the People’s Liberation Army has focused on developing new technologies in several areas, including nuclear weapons, computers and space technologies.

China’s elite nuclear unit, the Second Artillery, recently acquired a microwave communications system, the Statesman reported.  The system provides all-weather encrypted communications to the unit’s missile launchers (India Statesman, Jan. 15).

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BWC:  U.S. Pushing Countries to Drop Negotiations

By Greg Seigle

Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — The United States considers further negotiations on the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention “fruitless” and is preparing to lobby other countries to instead focus on self-compliance, according to Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton.

U.S. officials plan to embark on bilateral meetings, beginning in coming weeks, with counterparts from various nations in an attempt to convince them to skip further negotiations and concentrate on enforcement within their own borders. The diplomatic action follows the December collapse of the treaty’s review conference in Geneva, which ended without agreement in large part because the Bush administration is unwilling to allow outside inspections of its biological facilities (see GSN, Dec. 10, 2001).

“We’re about to make a big push,” one of Bolton’s aides told GSN this morning, adding that such talks should commence in a couple weeks. “After the [Geneva] conference tensions are high. Everyone needs a little breather before we start up again.”

The United States is not going to proceed with the draft protocol, Bolton told a group of analysts and diplomats Friday (see GSN, Jan. 11), referring to a proposed, long-debated amendment to the treaty that would demand that each of the 144 parties allow outside inspections. Instead the United States wants each country to pass — and enforce — its own laws to verify compliance.

“The process we’ve followed these past seven years of [negotiating outside inspections] has led us to a ditch. And it’s time we realized that and start thinking about other ways of moving ahead,” Bolton said.

“We’re looking for alternative processes,” he added. “We are willing to consider other possibilities … We’ve done so in [interagency meetings] the past couple weeks after the holidays and we’ll be doing so in the future” with foreign counterparts.

While the United States has been publicly criticized for refusing to allow outside inspections or other measures proposed by the verification protocol, officials from other countries have privately confided that they consider the protocol “flawed,” Bolton said.

Noting that even the most intrusive, aggressive inspections by the U.N. Special Commissions in Iraq during much of the 1990s failed to completely uncover Iraq’s past chemical or biological weapons programs or deter future development.  Bolton said the types of staged inspections proposed by the protocol are “pale shadows” of UNSCOM that would have officials “pursuing an illusion” of safety.

Naming Names

In a November speech before conferees in Geneva Bolton took the unusual step of naming six countries the United States strongly suspects of operating offensive biological weapons programs.

By identifying Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya, Syria and Sudan, Bolton hoped to steer the focus of participants away from negotiations and toward compliance.

Holding future review conferences on the biological weapons treaty without seriously examining the consequences of noncompliance is like the U.N. Human Rights Commission holding its annual meeting without officials identifying the world’s worst offenders, he observed.

“It would be difficult to imagine a meeting of the Human Rights Commission where you didn’t talk about particular countries and allegations of human rights violations,” Bolton said Friday. “So what is it about the biological weapons conference that makes it different? I don’t find the answer. I think that it is particularly important to talk about those states which we know are not in compliance and to get people focused on what the real problem is.”

Bolton made it clear that the United States is not going to budge from its position during upcoming talks. The goal is to get conferees to spend the next conference in November to focus on compliance issues and not further negotiations, he said.

“Instead of a focus on negotiation, a focus on compliance and on exerting international pressure on noncompliant states to bring themselves into compliance or face the consequences is really, over time, a lot more likely to be productive,” Bolton said.

“It’s not simply a question of finding more steps to get people to agree on, but getting people to comply with what they’ve already agreed to,” he added. “I think it was a major step forward this past November to get people to begin to acknowledge that instead of the endless treadmill of negotiations on the draft protocol, that it’s time to recognize that that process is finished, that the protocol is never going to come into force and that further negotiations are going to be fruitless.”

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Anthrax:  Vaccine Production Moves Closer to Approval

Bioport, the sole U.S. anthrax vaccine producer, is closer to obtaining full U.S. Food and Drug Administration approval to restart production, the Chicago Tribune reported today (see GSN, Dec. 20, 2001).  Meanwhile, investigators are trying to jump start the “Amerithrax” investigation, according to reports.

Bioport is only awaiting FDA approval of its partner Hollister-Stier Laboratories, which places the anthrax vaccine into vials, according to the Tribune.  Hollister-Stier has to respond to a small number of “minor issues” found by FDA inspectors last week, said a company spokeswoman.

“We believe they can quickly resolve them,” said an FDA spokeswoman.  “It’s a high priority.”

Once full FDA approval is obtained, Bioport will produce the anthrax vaccine only for the U.S. Defense Department, the Tribune reported.  Some of the vaccines doses produced for testing purposes will be “immediately available for release,” said Bioport spokeswoman Kim Brennen Root (Sue Ellen Christian, Chicago Tribune, Jan. 15).

Canada Reviews Forced Vaccinations for Soldiers

A retired Canadian air force sergeant could face a new trial on charges resulting from his refusal of the anthrax vaccine during the Gulf War, the Globe and Mail reported today.

The Court Martial Court of Appeal ruled that Mike Kipling should not have been acquitted for refusing to be inoculated.  Members of the Canadian armed forces generally must be inoculated if their commanders order it, according to the National Defense Act.

The verdict is seen as a victory for the Canadian military because it effectively stops other soldiers from refusing inoculation, according to the Globe and Mail. 

“If the military is intent on prosecuting Mike Kipling, we will seek leave to go to the Supreme Court,” said Kipling’s lawyer.  “If a soldier legitimately believes that a vaccine will be harmful, he should not have to wait for a trial to determine whether he made the right decision” (Krista Foss, Globe and Mail, Jan. 15).

Investigation Developments

Officials are likely to double the current $1.4 million reward in the anthrax investigation, authorities said yesterday.  The case has slowed since the attacks began last October and public tips have almost completely stopped, officials said (Kevin Johnson, USA Today, Jan. 15).

Federal investigators last week examined photocopiers at Rutgers University in New Jersey for any possible connection to the mailer of the tainted letters, a Rutgers scientist said (see GSN, Dec. 10, 2001). The anthrax-tainted mailings contained photocopied handwritten notes along with the spores.  Photocopiers can leave behind small clues on the paper that can help narrow down where the letters were copied, according to scientists. 

“The authorities clearly still are investigating possible university links,” said Richard Ebright, a Rutgers biologist.  “It’s hard to imagine that they would be expending so much effort at universities if they had settled on a suspect in the military lab or military contractor.”

The four tainted letters were postmarked from New Jersey.  Rutgers spokesman Joseph Blumberg said the university has no supplies of anthrax (William Broad, New York Times, Jan. 15).

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CWC:  OPCW Wants Unpaid Dues

More than 100 member states of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons have failed to pay their dues yet this year, the organization said Thursday.

Only 40 of the 145 member states have sent in their financial contributions, due Jan. 1, for the current fiscal year.  The collected dues amount to only 17 percent of the OPCW’s 2002 budget, the organization said. 

The amount of money each member state owes the OPCW is based on an adjusted United Nations scale.  The contributions are essential for the organization to effectively conduct its activities to verify the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the OPCW said.  Since the treaty went into force in 1997, the OPCW has carried out more than 1,100 inspections of civilian and military facilities in 49 states, the organization said. 

Member states that have paid their dues include Australia, Canada, China, India, Pakistan, South Africa and the United Kingdom (OPCW press release, Jan. 10).

Member states that had not paid their dues by Jan. 10 included France, Germany, Iran, Japan, South Korea and the United States (OPCW member states list, Jan. 15).

Activist Criticizes U.S. Refusal to Pay Dues on Time

U.S. refusal to pay dues on time and to increase the OPCW’s budget is probably what has led to a cash shortage that has significantly decreased the organization’s ability to inspect chemical stockpiles, said Douglas Scott, president of the Markland Group, a Canadian arms control organization.  The OPCW completed only 61 percent of its planned inspections in 2001, Scott said, according to the Ottawa Citizen (see GSN, Oct. 5).

Scott suggested that member states end the current system that requires consensus in the budget-making process.  Member states should vote on the budget to decrease the ability of one country, such as the United States, to dominate, he said.

“In the current funding crisis within the OPCW, it is no easy thing for the parties favoring increased funding to abandon consensus and exercise their right to call for a vote,” Scott wrote in the current issue of the Canadian Council for International Law Bulletin.

Currently, one member state can do significant damage because the system allows “a single country to unilaterally control the implementation of the convention to such an extent that it has succeeded in reducing inspections to an intolerable level,” Scott said.

Canada tried to relieve some of the organization’s budget difficulties by paying its 2002 dues in advance, Scott said.  The organization’s annual budget is about $55 million, the Citizen reported.

The OPCW’s resources are exhausted, even though the organization recently established an anti-terrorism working group (see GSN, Dec. 13), OPCW Director General Jose Mauricio Bustani said last month, according to the Citizen (Juliet O’Neill, Ottawa Citizen, Jan. 15).

“The 2001 programme and budget of the OPCW … has already been adversely affected owing — to a significant degree — to non-payments and delays in payments” by treaty parties, Bustani said in October.

“Programs and activities which have been approved by the conference either have not taken place at all, or are taking place at a substantially reduced level,” Bustani said, “because actual income for any given financial period has proved to be significantly less than income due for the same period” (OPCW release, Oct. 11, 2001).

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Iran:  Value of Aid From Russia and North Korea Questioned

Russian and North Korean aid to Iranian ballistic missile development might not be as extensive or effective as previously believed, the Washington Post reported Sunday.

Iran has been slow to perfect its Shahab-3 intermediate-range missile and has shown little interest in an intercontinental ballistic missile program, according to experts.

“The Iranian program is not developing as quickly as the Iranians have claimed and Israeli and American assessments expected,” said Gerald Steinberg of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.  The Shahab-3, when perfected, could hit targets within Israel but poses little threat to the United States itself, Steinberg said.

“A missile remains the least likely delivery vehicle for a weapon of mass destruction,” said Joseph Cirincione of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

“The September 11^th events have shown that people can inflict mass casualties on the U.S. with cutting knives and imagination,” Cirincione said.  “There are many cheaper, more reliable, but still very destructive means of attacking America that don’t require the expense, technical sophistication and exposure that come with a ballistic missile.”

The Role of Russian Know-How

The Shahab-3 is based on the North Korean No Dong missile, a variation on the Soviet Scud missile, according to U.S. officials.  By modifying the Scud, the most widely proliferated missile in history, states have improved its range, the Post reported.

Iranian officials sought Russian aid to build their own version of the No Dong, according to CIA analysts.  Any Russian assistance to Iran would be a violation of the 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime, the Post reported.

Russian aid to Iran, however, has been limited by Iranian paranoia, said Vadim Vorobei, head of the faculty of engine production at the Moscow Aviation Institute.

“They wanted to receive information from us, but at the same time they were not willing to tell us everything they were doing,” he said.  “That made it difficult to help them.”

Many of the Russian scientists who traveled to Iran were professors, instead of missile design experts, the Post reported.

“It’s meat-and-potatoes stuff,” said Steven Zaloga, a U.S. expert on the Russian missile program.  “These guys are useful at the level of basic research, not advanced development.”

Vorobei and other Russian scientists said they only helped Iran develop its general scientific base, and did not give Iran information banned by international agreements.

“It is one thing to learn rocketry in theory, and quite another to move to actual production,” said Yevgeny Mishelov, dean of the Moscow Aviation Institute metallurgy department. 

Although the United States has said that Iran could develop an ICBM in five to 10 years, Vorobei said he doubts that estimate.

“Their progress is very slow,” he said.  “In order to build missiles, you need a strong resource base.  You need steel, aluminum, not to mention composite materials, a machine tool industry.  Iran has very little of this.”

How Much Russian Technology Made It to Iran?

Even though some Russian missile technology has made its way to Iran, it has not been at the level previously believed, the Post reported.  Analysis of missile component transfers indicates they have been sporadic and mainly limited to dual-use materials meant for missile construction, rather than missile systems.

“Our American partners have not presented us with concrete facts [of proliferation],” said Sergei Yekimov, chief enforcer of Russian export controls.  “Their allegations are usually based on emotions and suspicions rather than corroborated evidence.”

U.S. officials said they have provided Russia some information on alleged transfers of missile components, but refused to give greater detail for fear of compromising intelligence sources.  Russia has appeared more interested in finding the source of information rather than investigating transfers, they said.

“It seems to me there has been a drop-off in the more egregious types of assistance,” said Robert Gallucci, former U.S. special envoy on nonproliferation issues.  “This could mean that we did a good job … or it could mean that the character of assistance has moved to different areas that are harder to detect, and harder to control.”

In the past, U.S. intelligence has been mistaken, according to the Post.  Austria, acting on U.S. and Israeli information, intercepted two tons of basalt fiber, which the U.S. said was a heat-resistant material that could be used to coat a missile warhead.  After analyzing and impounding the fiber, Austria said the U.S. claim “ was not plausible” and returned the fiber to its Russian shipper.  U.S. officials continued to say that the fiber could be used in a missile, according to the Post.

“Intelligence information can sometimes be very good, but sometimes I truly wonder how they come up with such information,” said Helmut Krehlik, head of the export control department of the Austrian Ministry of Trade.

North Korean Involvement

Since 1985, North Korea has provided missile development assistance to Iran, including entire missile systems, single components and transporter launchers for short-range missiles, the Post reported.  Iran, however, has often complained about the poor quality and high prices of North Korean components and has tried to produce better ones independently.

“The Persians were indignant with the North Koreans,” Vorobei said.  “They complained that the Koreans were selling their technology very expensively.  The Iranians would take it to pieces, and then reassemble it.”

Can — or Will — Iran Do It?

Despite the slow development of the Iranian missile program, most experts have said Iran will perfect and deploy the Shahab-3.  What remains unknown is whether Iran will attempt to develop longer-range missiles, according to the Post.  Some evidence of an attempt to do so has come from statements by Iranian officials concerning a Shahab-4 and Shahab-5, which would be follow-ups to Shahab-3.

Some recent statements by Iranian officials, as well as missile tests, have shown that Iran may be working instead to develop short-range solid fuel missiles.  This would fit in with analysis of the threat to Iran, which deals more with countries such as Iraq and Israel rather than a long-range U.S. or European threat, according to the Post.

“There is a big difference between Iranians trying to cover the region, and developing a system that will allow them to attack the U.S.,” said Gary Samore of the International Institute for Strategic Studies.  “I don’t think the Iranians have yet made a fundamental decision about an ICBM capability” (Michael Dobbs, Washington Post, Jan. 13).

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North Korea:  No Signs of Testing, South Korea Says

South Korea said there are no signs that North Korea is preparing to test-fire its Taepo Dong-2 ballistic missile, contrary to U.S. claims, the South Korean news agency Yonhap reported last week.

A U.S. intelligence report on foreign missile development released last week said the Taepo Dong-2 could be ready for flight-testing (see GSN, Jan. 10).  The missile could reach targets in some parts of the United States with nuclear weapons, and with further development could hit targets within the entire country, the National Intelligence Estimate said.  North Korea, however, has agreed to extend its self-imposed testing moratorium until 2003, according to the report.

“I understand that there is no specific information or signs of the possibility of North Korea test-firing a Taepo Dong-2 missile,” a South Korean official said (Yonhap, Jan. 10, in FBIS-EAS, Jan. 10).

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India:  Israel Delays Sale of Anti-Missile System

Under U.S. pressure, Israel has agreed to delay the sale of an anti-tactical ballistic missile system to India, the Times of India reported today (see GSN, Jan. 9).

The United States wants Israel to hold off on the sale of the Arrow anti-tactical ballistic missile system and the Phalcon airborne warning and control system because of tensions in South Asia, according to the Times.

The United States and Israel jointly developed the Arrow system, and therefore U.S. approval is needed before Israel sells it to a third party.  The Arrow sale would also violate the Missile Technology Control Regime, according to U.S. claims.

A senior U.S. official told Reuters there were questions “why anybody would sell anything — either to the Indians or the Pakistanis — other than chewing gum,” at the present time, the Times reported (Chidanand Rajghatta, Times of India, Jan. 15).

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U.S.-Russia:  U.S. Encourages Russia to Build Own System

The United States wants Russia to develop its own missile defense system, the Associated Press reported last week.  A senior U.S. official said U.S. troops could benefit from a Russian missile shield when taking part in peacekeeping missions alongside Russian forces, according to the AP.  The official added that the United States might be willing to aid Russia in such a plan.

Russian arms specialists were scheduled to meet yesterday and today (see related GSN story, today) with a U.S. delegation led by Defense Undersecretary Douglas Feith, the AP reported (Associated Press/South China Morning Post, Jan. 12).

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Nuclear Waste:  Abraham Explains Yucca Mountain Decision

Sound science supports U.S. Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham’s decision to recommend Yucca Mountain as the site for the U.S. nuclear waste repository, the secretary said last week (see GSN, Jan. 11).

In a letter to Nevada Governor Kenny Guinn, Abraham said he decided to recommend the site because the “science behind the project is sound.”  He cited several “compelling national interests,” for the recommendation including:

*         Advancing U.S. nonproliferation goals by developing a safe place to dispose of spent power reactor fuel and waste products from decommissioned nuclear weapons;

*         Protecting nuclear waste from terrorist attacks by consolidating U.S. waste in one underground location away from populated areas;

*         Ensuring that nuclear power, which accounts for 20 percent of the U.S. energy supply, remains a viable energy source; and

*         Protecting the environment through the cleanup of defense waste sites and the safe disposal of nuclear waste (U.S. State Department release, Jan. 11).

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