Iran:  U.S. and Israeli Officials to Discuss Weapons Proliferation

A U.S. delegation of a dozen diplomats, defense experts and intelligence officials, led by Undersecretary of State John Bolton, was expected to arrive in Israel today to discuss Iranian efforts to acquire nuclear technology and enhance its conventional arsenal.  Israeli participants will include Minister Dan Meridor, National Security Adviser Uzi Dayan and Gideon Franks, head of the Atomic Energy Agency.

The discussions are to focus on Russian nuclear assistance to Iran, which the United States has attempted to persuade to Russia to end.

“The main purpose is to talk about where we are with the Russians and the Iranians,” said a senior Israeli administration official.  The United States and Israel want to work to “deepen our coordination about how to deal with the problem” of Russian assistance to Iran, the official said.

The recent discovery of a boat carrying weapons which, Israel said, came from Iran and were bound for the Palestinian Authority, made the issue of Iranian military capability especially important, the official said.

“The issue of Iranian conventional weapons, advanced conventional weapons, nuclear missiles is even more timely than it has been,” the official said.

Meanwhile, a report in the Washington Post this week said Iran has encountered problems developing its Shahab-3 missile and that some experts had overstated Russia’s weapons contribution to Iran (see GSN, Jan. 15).  According to the article, some intelligence reports that expressed concern over Iran’s capabilities had been misguided by efforts from the U.S. Republican party and Israel to focus attention on Russian missile technology transfers to Iran, the Jerusalem Post reported.

The Israeli and U.S. officials also plan to discuss issues involving Syria, Libya, Sudan and Iraq, the Jerusalem newspaper reported.  Syria is working to develop nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, the Israeli official said (Janine Zacharia, Jerusalem Post, Jan. 16).

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Iraq:  Russia Tops Oil Importers

Russia is the top importer of Iraqi oil under the U.N. “oil-for-food” program, the Washington Post reported today.

Russian firms have signed contracts worth more than $4 billion with Iraq as part of the U.N. program, according to the Post.  In the last six months since Russia blocked U.S. plans to tighten the embargo, Russian businesses have concluded more than $1.4 billion in trade with Iraq, U.N. diplomats said (see GSN, Dec. 3, 2001).

The rise in trade with Russia is seen as Iraq’s way of rewarding countries that help in its fight against the U.N. embargo, the Post reported.  Last year, Iraq enacted billions of dollars in trade with countries that fought U.S. efforts to increase sanctions.

Proposed U.S. changes to the sanctions were “a major threat to Russian trade and economic interests,” said Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov.  “We cannot allow it to pass.”

Even though Iraq, under the U.N. program, can export oil to purchase food and other essential supplies, the United States and other U.N. Security Council members can block contracts for suspected military items.  The United States has blocked $900 million in Russian contracts, according to the Post.

Last month the United States agreed to release $200 million in Russian contracts as part of an effort to obtain Russian support for tightening the sanctions, a senior U.S. official said.  The United States is also attempting to gain Russian endorsement of a list of items that will need U.N. Security Council approval before they can be sold to Iraq, the Post reported.

“The Russians will be rewarded by the Americans if they accept the goods review list,” said a council diplomat.  “But if they do, they will probably be punished by the Iraqis” (Colum Lynch, Washington Post, Jan. 16).

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U.S.-Russia I:  Uranium Deal May Be in Jeopardy

The U.S.-Russian agreement to buy uranium removed from Russian nuclear weapons may collapse because of contract disputes between Russia and the U.S. purchaser, the Los Angeles Times reported today (see GSN, Nov. 30, 2001).  The pricing dispute has delayed the 2002 shipment of three metric tons of uranium, according to the Times.

“U.S. strategic interests may be at risk if [the U.S. Enrichment Corp.] cannot ensure continuity of shipments of Russian down-blended [uranium] to the United States,” wrote U.S. Energy Undersecretary Robert Card in a letter to USEC last week.  USEC is the U.S. agent of the HEU Deal.

Russia and USEC “seem to be at loggerheads,” said a Bush administration official familiar with the dispute.  “I think [the uranium deal] is in jeopardy.  I would not characterize this as normal negotiations.”

How Much to Pay?

The dispute began in early 2000 when USEC proposed new pricing terms, which would have taken effect this month, the Times reported.  The proposed terms would lower the uranium price USEC paid to Russia by 15 percent.  Contracts are subject to both U.S. and Russian approval.

Russia, however, did not agree to the USEC proposal at an annual review last year, which is when the 2002 uranium order would have been placed, according to the Times.  Without ratification of the new pricing terms, USEC would still have to pay the same price that Russia charged in 2001.  USEC refused to place an order for 2002 until Russia agrees to lower prices through 2013, the Times reported.

USEC spokesman Charles Yulish said he expects an agreement to be reached. 

“We’re seeking a prompt resolution to this matter and that’s why we’re fully engaged with the Russians to seek mutually acceptable terms,” he said.  “They have the incentive to take the right deal and we have the incentive to offer it.  But right now it’s one of those negotiating deals that you just have to be patient with.”

Card said USEC should not delay the 2002 uranium shipment by waiting for lower long-term prices.

“Our first priority remains the continuity of shipments of down-blended Russian [uranium] in 2002,” he wrote in his letter to USEC President William Timbers. 

“I want to stress that this is a requirement for the U.S. government and that no long-term contract will be reviewed favorably unless it contains a separate mechanism to ensure 2002 deliveries,” Card said.  “Given the lack of progress on [the] negotiations, we support focusing on 2002 at this time” (Willman/Miller, Los Angeles Times, Jan. 16).

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Israel:  Scholars Debate Nuclear Ambiguity

Israel’s veil of ambiguity around its nuclear weapon capability is basically fictional, two Israeli professors said Monday (see GSN, Dec. 14).  Professors Yair Evron and Shai Feldman discussed the implications of Israel’s nuclear status and strategic policy during a symposium with colleagues at Tel Aviv University (Joshua Brilliant, United Press International, Jan. 14).

Symposium scholars debated the value of continuing to remain ambiguous about nuclear capability, but all the experts who spoke said Israel should have nuclear capability (Jack Katzenell, Associated Press, Jan. 15).

Diplomats and scholars generally agree that Israel has nuclear weapon capability, said Evron, a political scientist.  Neighboring countries also believe Israel has nuclear weapons, said Feldman, head of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies.

Feldman said Israel’s official policy of ambiguity has worked well.  It has sufficiently deterred enemies from attacking while it also prevented a confrontation with international nuclear nonproliferation efforts, he said. 

Remaining ambiguous about nuclear capability prevented difficulties regarding U.S. law that bans aid to certain countries that develop nuclear weapons, Feldman said.  He added that the policy also avoided putting pressure on Arab countries to develop nuclear arsenals.

Israel’s nuclear capability could cause problems, according to Evron.

“The Israeli society is under excessive strain, and if it were attacked, there might be public pressure to react in the harshest way,” he said.

Did Israel’s Nuclear Policy Deter Egypt?

Several scholars debated how effective Israel’s policy was in deterring its enemies.  Zeev Maoz, head of the university’s public policy school, said Israel’s official policy of ambiguity had not prevented Egypt or Syria from attacking Israel in 1973 (see GSN, Jan. 14).  Israeli nuclear policy did not contribute to advances in the Israel-Egypt peace process, either, he said, adding that Egypt agreed to negotiate in the hope that Israel would withdraw from Egyptian territory.

Zeev Schiff, the military editor for the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, disagreed.  He said Egyptian generals told him they had limited their military goals, rather than attempted to destroy Israel, because they thought Israel might use nuclear weapons if its existence was threatened (Brilliant, United Press International, Jan. 15).

Did Israel’s Nuclear Policy Deter Iraq?

Maoz also said Israel’s nuclear capability was not the reason Iraq refrained from using missiles with chemical warheads against Israel during the Gulf War in 1991.  Chemical warheads would have been ineffective because Israel took precautions, such as providing gas masks to the populations, Maoz said.

“A missile with 500 kilograms of TNT causes much more damage than one with a chemical warhead when the population is in sealed rooms and wearing gas masks,” he said.

Feldman, however, said one could not assume that Israel’s nuclear capability did not figure into Iraq’s decisions, adding that Israeli leaders at the time warned Iraq that it would face undefined consequences if it used chemical weapons against Israel (Katzenell, Associated Press, Jan. 15).

Second-Strike Capability and Dimona Reactor Safety

Yuval Neeman, a former member of the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission, said Israel’s small size could mean that second-strike capability was irrelevant.  “It is possible that a second strike is no solution,” he said.

Israel shut down its nuclear reactor at Dimona during wars, Neeman said.  The reactor posed no threat on the scale of the Chernobyl crisis in the former Soviet Union, which released widespread radiation, because the Dimona reactor was only 24 megawatts — 20-30 times smaller than the Chernobyl reactor — Neeman said (Brilliant, United Press International, Jan. 15).

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U.S.-Russia II:  Officials Discuss U.S. Storage Plan

U.S. and Russian officials yesterday completed the first of two days of talks on nuclear weapons reductions.  The talks were expected to focus heavily on U.S. plans to store warheads removed from dismantled nuclear weapons rather than destroy them, Reuters reported today (see GSN, Jan. 15).

The two delegations, led by U.S. Defense Undersecretary Douglas Feith and Russian Deputy Chief of Staff Col. Gen. Yuri Baluyevsky, are expected to discuss Russian objections to the U.S. storage plan.  No details of the talks are expected until their conclusion (Reuters/South China Morning Post, Jan. 16).

Domestic U.S. Objections

The U.S. plan to store nuclear warheads for potential future use would increase the chances that terrorists would obtain nuclear material, said U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Levin (D-Mich.), according to United Press International.

“It seems to me we are actually increasing the threat of proliferation,” Levin said Tuesday.  He has said that if the United States does not destroy its warheads, then Russia will not do so as well.  This could lead to more Russian nuclear material needing to be stored in poor security conditions.

Levin said his committee would hold hearings in an attempt to influence the Bush administration to change the plan.

“We’re trying to see if we can’t prod the administration into what we should be doing which is real reductions,” Levin said.  “The administration has shown an ability to change in security [policy] from a more unilateral position to a more cooperative position” (Pamela Hess, United Press International, Jan. 15).

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Iraq:  IAEA to Visit Iraq in Late January

International Atomic Energy Agency officials are scheduled to arrive in Iraq on Jan. 25 for its annual visit, Iraqi officials said.

“The IAEA delegation’s annual visit to Iraq falls under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty,” of which Iraq is a member, an Iraqi foreign ministry official said.  The official added that the IAEA visit is unrelated to U.N. resolutions (see GSN, Jan. 11) demanding that Iraq allow U.N. inspectors of weapons of mass destruction (Agence France-Presse, Jan. 15). 

It was unclear how long the visit would last and what sites IAEA officials would visit, the Associated Press reported (Waiel Faleh, Associated Press, Jan. 15).

The IAEA withdrew inspectors from Iraq on Dec. 16, 1998, after the U.N. Special Commission on Iraq withdrew its weapons of mass destruction inspectors (Republic of Iraq Radio/BBC Worldwide Monitoring, Jan. 15). 

An IAEA delegation visited Iraq in January 2001 to inspect Iraqi installations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.  The delegation said Iraq had kept its uranium stocks under seal, but the IAEA said in June 2001 that it could not certify that Iraq was respecting its NPT obligations (Agence France-Presse, Jan. 15).

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North Korea:  IAEA Team Arrives to Visit Isotope Facility

Three senior officials from the International Atomic Energy Agency arrived in Pyongyang yesterday to begin a visit to certain North Korean nuclear facilities, said IAEA spokeswoman Melissa Fleming (see GSN, Jan. 7). 

North Korean officials told the IAEA in November that it could send technical experts to visit an isotope production laboratory in Yongbyon, north of the capital Pyongyang.  The officials specified that the visitors must not conduct inspections.  The experts are scheduled to leave North Korea Saturday.

“This is a small but welcome step toward a return to full-fledged inspections required under North Korea’s safeguard agreement,” said IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei (see GSN, Jan. 11).

North Korea said it uses the isotope laboratory to develop nuclear materials with medical and industrial applications.  A former IAEA member until it withdrew from the agency in 1994, North Korea has allowed some IAEA officials to remain at Yongbyon to monitor some inactive facilities that could be used to divert weapon-grade nuclear materials (Vanessa Gera, Associated Press/Yahoo.com, Jan. 15).

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U.S. Response I:  CDC Lists Most Devastating Bio-Agents

By David Ruppe

Global Security Newswire

Along with anthrax and smallpox, plague, botulism, Tularemia and viral hemorrhagic fevers top the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention list of potentially most devastating bioterrorism agents.

The CDC is providing the list in the February issue of its monthly journal, Emerging Infectious Diseases.  Intended to guide domestic preparedness efforts, the list presents a systematic assessment of the potentially most devastating agents for the United States.

The February article is meant to refocus attention on the analysis, first prepared in 1999 by a collection of U.S. medical experts.

“Identifying these priority agents will help facilitate coordinating planning efforts among federal agencies, state and local emergency response and public health agencies, and the medical community,” the article’s authors said.

According to the analysis, the agents generally share a combination of characteristics that make them of particular concern, including:

*         They have the greatest potential for mass casualties;

*         They have a moderate to high potential for delivery to large populations, possibly because they are infectious;

*         They could prompt mass disruption and fear because of public perception of the particular agent; and

*         They require the most special public health preparedness, including treatment stockpiles, enhanced surveillance or diagnosis.

The agents were weighted for these four characteristics.  Smallpox was found to pose the greatest threat, followed by anthrax, plague, botulism, Tularemia and such viral hemorrhagic fevers as Ebola and Marburg.  Smallpox was found to be decisively the most contagious, followed by plague and viral hemorrhagic fevers.  Anthrax had the greatest potential for mass production and dissemination to a large population.

The CDC list is in agreement with the focus of study at the Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies at Johns Hopkins University.

“Historically, these are some of the agents that nations have used to develop biological weapons,” said center spokesperson Tim Parsons.

Jonathan Tucker, a bioterrorism expert at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, told Global Security Newswire that the list can be misleading about the dangers, because it does not evaluate the likelihood of the agents being available to and used by terrorists.

“Anthrax is the most likely threat, because it is accessible, is a widely dispersed disease in livestock, is very easy to weaponize and can be delivered through the air with the appropriate dissemination technology,” he said.

Some of the other agents like plague and Tularemia are much more difficult to weaponize because “they tend to die off rapidly,” he said.

The smallpox virus, Tucker said, is known to exist in only in a few laboratories, and independent terror groups, such as al-Qaeda, are not believed to have it.  But it warrants attention because of the potential for massive consequences, he said.

The list also does not address genetically engineered agents, because of the difficulty in predicting the nature of those agents (see GSN, Nov. 30, 2001).

The analysis also lists a secondary category of agents which have “some potential for large-scale dissemination with resultant illness, but generally cause less illness and death and therefore would be expected to have lower medical and public health impact.”  These include Q fever, Brucellosis, Glanders, Melioidosis, Encephalitis, Typhus fever, toxic syndromes, Psittacosis and food and water safety threats.

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Anthrax:  No Immediate Plans to Reopen Hart Building, Officials Say

Federal environmental officials yesterday said the Hart Senate Office Building would remain closed until the results of further testing on the success of decontamination efforts are known (see GSN, Jan. 4).  Previously, officials had said the building would likely be reopened by this time, according to the Washington Times.

“The first blush of test results were very encouraging,” said U.S. Environmental Protection Agency spokeswoman Bonnie Piper.  “But we still have only preliminary results.”

About 3,000 test strips treated with a bacteria culture more resistant to decontamination than anthrax were placed throughout the Hart building before the fumigation effort began.  Preliminary tests have shown that chlorine dioxide gas killed the bacteria on the strips.  From this, scientists believe that the gas also killed any anthrax spores within the building, according to the Times.

The tests are only preliminary, however, and there is still not enough evidence to approve reopening the Hart building at this time, Piper said. 

“Scientists now have to look at the test strips for several weeks to see if the strips regrow cultures,” she said. The end goal is to make sure there is “no detectable growth” of spores in the building since the fumigation, Piper said (Guy Taylor, Washington Times, Jan. 16).

Canada Conducts Further Studies

Canadian military scientists are studying how anthrax spores can spread throughout an office building, the Canadian Press reported Monday. Previously, Canadian scientists had conducted studies on how spores could spread soon after a tainted letter was opened (Carol Harrington, Canadian Press, Jan. 14). 

Vaccine Could Cause Birth Defects

A preliminary U.S. Navy study showed that inoculating pregnant women with the anthrax vaccine could increase the chance of birth defects, the Wall Street Journal reported today. 

The navy described the study’s results as “initial findings” and did not go into detail.  “I can’t tell you much about it because the study’s not complete yet,” said Capt. Ryland Dodge, spokesman for the navy’s medical department.  Complete analysis of the study’s results is expected by April (Laura Johannes, Wall Street Journal, Jan. 16). 

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U.S. Response II:  Plans Progress for Los Alamos Biolaboratory

The public comment period for a proposed biological research laboratory at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico ended yesterday (see GSN, Dec. 19, 2001).

The U.S. Energy Department has proposed to build a “Biosafety Level Three” facility at Los Alamos, which would allow research on pathogens such as anthrax and the plague.  The proposed laboratory would be the first at a nuclear weapons facility and the first to be run by the National Nuclear Security Administration (Albuquerque Journal, Jan. 15).

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India:  Reports Conflict Over U.S. Opposition to Arrow Sale

Reports conflicted today over whether the United States would try to prevent Israel from selling the Arrow anti-missile system — which Israel and the United States developed together — to India (see GSN, Jan. 15).

A senior Israeli diplomat said Israel remains resolved to persuade the United States to allow the sale, despite U.S. statements that it could violate the Missile Technology Control Regime, according to the Jerusalem Post.

“We can convince [the United States] the Arrow is not included in the MTCR,” the diplomat said.  “People in the [Bush] administration are not too happy to see any weapons sold to India or Pakistan right now.  It appears they are using MTCR as an excuse.”

Israeli officials said the payload and range of the Arrow are too small to fall within MTCR regulations, which impose export restrictions for systems that can carry a 500-kilogram payload for 300 kilometers or more.  The Arrow was designed for short distances, the Israeli diplomat said, adding that it could reach a 300-kilometer range but might not be able to carry a 500-kilogram load that far.  Israeli officials also noted that the Arrow system is for defensive purposes.

However, a senior U.S. administration official said “the Arrow is an MTCR category-one missile,” which would place it under MTCR export restrictions.  The Arrow could also be transformed into an offensive weapon, the official said. 

“The problem is MTCR defines the missile as having a payload capability at a given range, and when the warhead drops on your head, the fact that it says, ‘I’m really a [defensive] ABM missile’ doesn’t make things any better — especially now, given the situation in the subcontinent,” he said (Janine Zacharia, Jerusalem Post, Jan. 16).

Contrary to the Post, the Times of India reported today that the Bush administration said it would support the Arrow sale.  The Times said there was a general assumption in Washington that an anonymous U.S. State Department official quoted in yesterday’s Times as opposing the sale was only expressing his or her own views, rather than describing U.S. policy (Chidanand Rajghatta, Times of India, Jan. 16).

Phalcon AWACS

Meanwhile, the United States might try to prevent Israel from selling the Phalcon AWACS airborne surveillance system to India, despite U.S. authorization “in principle,” a U.S. administration official said, according to the Post.  U.S. State Department spokesman Philip Reeker said the United States supports transferring the system to India and plans to consult with Israel on the “capabilities and timing related to that.”

The United States blocked Israel from transferring the AWACS system to China in 2000 (Zacharia, Jerusalem Post, Jan. 16).

The Times also reported today that the White House had confirmed its support for Israel’s request to sell the AWACS system to India, although there was some U.S. concern about the timing of the sale (Rajghatta, Times of India, Jan. 16).

India to Ask United States for Anti-Missile System Assistance

India is also planning to seek U.S. assistance to develop an anti-missile system to cover India, the India Statesman reported today.  When the United States announced that it would withdraw from the ABM Treaty, U.S. officials said the benefits of a missile defense system could be shared with other countries, the Statesman reported (see GSN, Dec. 13).

“The U.S.A. has pulled out of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.  They have also spoken of sharing national missile defense technology with other countries.  We will discuss the issue with them,” a senior Indian official said. 

U.S. assistance would make developing an anti-missile system cheaper than current efforts to develop a system indigenously, officials said (Srinjoy Chowdhury, India Statesman, Jan. 16).

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Russia:  New Interceptor Nears Readiness

A new Russian missile intertceptor that can target intermediate-range ballistic missiles will become operational by late this year or early 2003, according to the Russian news agency Interfax, the Associated Press reported today (see GSN, Jan. 15).

The S-400 Triumph missile is expected to undergo testing soon, said a Russian spokesman.  The missile will have a range of 250 miles and will be able to target stealth aircraft, Russian military observers said.  The S-400 will be an improvement over the current S-300, which has a shorter range and can only target short-range ballistic missiles, according to the AP (Associated Press/Miami Herald, Jan. 16).

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