U.S. Response I:  U.S. Plans Heightened Security for Olympics

Officials have increased security for the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City, Utah, since the Sept. 11 attacks on the United States, including plans to protect against bioterrorism, at a total cost of $310 million, according to reports on Sunday and yesterday (see GSN, Jan. 11).

Mail delivery will be almost eliminated because of the anthrax incidents involving the U.S. postal system, the Boston Globe reported (see related GSN story, today).  Olympics planners have also stockpiled Cipro, the main drug used to combat anthrax, and installed air filters to detect biological attacks (Lynda Gorov, Boston Globe, Jan. 20).

The U.S. Secret Service and FBI have also increased security at an army depot that houses chemical weapons about 40 miles southwest of Salt Lake City (see GSN, Jan. 8). 

Other security measures will include:

*         Almost 300 surveillance cameras that can magnify an image 184 times so they can read an Olympics credential 10 football fields away;

*         Increased security for vendors, including limiting deliveries to early mornings;

*         A ban on handbags larger than a purse;

*         Tightened security around the Mormon Temple (AAP Newsfeed, Jan. 21);

*         Federal agents monitoring slopes on skis, snowshoes and snowmobiles;

*         2,000 Utah National Guard members patrolling the streets with rifles;

*         Surveillance planes flying overhead and F-16 fighter jets on alert;

*         A ban on all air traffic for 45 miles around the site during the opening and closing ceremonies;

*         10,000 law enforcement and emergency response agents working during the Olympics; and

*         Concrete barriers and razor-wire fences around venues and the Olympic village.

The Olympics, which last from Feb. 8-24, will be the first conducted under an overall security plan developed by the U.S. Secret Service and coordinated with 80 agencies.  The FBI will be responsible for crisis management, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency will be in charge of emergency response.  Security efforts will consume $235 million of the U.S. federal government’s $600 million contribution to the Olympics and $310 million of the total $1.3 billion Olympics budget. 

“Every aspect of terrorism has been addressed.  I believe people will be safe.  But in a world of terrorism, we live with a degree of risk which is impossible to know for certain,” said Mitt Romney, president of the Salt Lake Organizing Committee.

“The days of attracting thousands of people to an event like this without additional security are over.  We’re trying not to turn it into a security event, but it’s hard to avoid,” said Robert Flowers, Utah public safety commissioner (Gorov, Boston Globe, Jan. 20).

“This will be among the most secured places in the world,” said Utah Gov. Mike Leavitt (AAP Newsfeed, Jan. 21).

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U.S. Response II:  Bush Proposes 2003 Budget With Security Priorities

U.S. President George W. Bush’s proposed fiscal 2003 budget will focus on the war against terrorism, homeland defense and economic revival to such an extent that there will little growth in other government sectors, Bush administration officials said, according the Washington Post. 

The budget, which the White House is expected to release Feb. 4, would increase homeland defense spending from $15 billion to $30 billion (see GSN, Jan. 14).  The Pentagon would receive the second-highest budget increase with $28 billion more than the fiscal 2002 budget. 

The fiscal 2003 budget proposal would plan for deficit spending for the first time after four years of budget surpluses, estimating that the United States would spend almost $100 billion more than it would receive in revenue.  The majority of the deficit spending would go to defense and homeland security.

Some Democrats expressed concern that the proposed budget would cut into social programs at a time when demand for such services has increased as the economy contracts.  “It really seems like they are throwing fiscal restraint to the wind,” said Thomas Kahn, Democratic staff director of the House Budget Committee. 

Administration officials and some Republicans, however, said the priorities were correct.  “We’re talking about the single most important responsibility of government — the physical safety of our citizens,” said Mitchell Daniels, Bush’s budget director (Allen/Goldstein, Washington Post, Jan. 20).

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China:  U.S. Ambassador Criticizes Lack of Nonproliferation Efforts

China must do more to control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, U.S. ambassador to China Clark Randt said yesterday in Hong Kong.

“Our experience to date is that China does not have an effective export control regime for sensitive materials and items,” he said.  “I should be crystal clear on this point.  Nonproliferation is a make-or-break issue for us.”

Improvement in the sphere of nonproliferation is possible with China, Randt said, because nonproliferation is in China’s own security interests.

“Having these weapons of mass destruction — in fact a lot of them in their neighborhood, not ours — is not good for them or for anybody else,” he said.

U.S. officials have long urged China to do more to stem the spread of materials and technology for weapons of mass destruction to unstable countries.  The United States has said China gave missile technologies to Pakistan in violation of a November 2000 agreement to stop exporting dangerous technologies (see GSN, Nov. 30, 2001).  China has denied it violated the agreement.

Randt praised China for its cooperation in the war on terrorism, calling it “no less than a paradigm shift” in U.S.-Chinese relations (see GSN, Jan. 2).  He criticized China’s human rights record, however, and said that the war on terrorism would not be an excuse for China to persecute ethnic minorities (Joe Leahy, Financial Times, Jan. 21).

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U.S.-Russia:  Officials Meet for Nonproliferation Talks

U.S. and Russian officials met in Moscow yesterday and today to discuss weapons of mass destruction and nonproliferation issues, according to diplomatic sources (see GSN, Jan. 10).

The U.S. delegation met with a Russian foreign ministry team led by Mikhail Lysenko, a senior security and disarmament official.  The talks were expected to cover weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and export controls, according to the Russian Interfax news agency (see GSN, Jan 18).  The talks are separate from last week’s arms reduction talks in Washington.

John Wolf, assistant undersecretary in the U.S. State Department’s nonproliferation bureau, was expected to meet with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Mamedov and atomic energy ministry officials today before leaving Russia tomorrow, Agence France-Presse reported (Agence France-Presse, Jan, 21).

Russia-Iran

Mamedov told Wolf yesterday that Russian-Iranian cooperation does not lead to regional destabilization and does not target other countries, ITAR-Tass reported (see GSN, Jan. 15).

“The export of equipment and technology, the development of military-technical ties and technical cooperation with Iran, just like with any other country, proceed in strict compliance with the international obligations and agreements in the field of nonproliferation and export control,” Mamedov said (Dmitry Vinitsky, ITAR-Tass, Jan. 21). 

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Al-Qaeda:  Missiles and Chemical Weapons Still in Afghanistan?

U.N. monitors said in a recent report that the Taliban, al-Qaeda or their allies might be able to use missiles to deliver weapons of mass destruction (see GSN, Jan. 17).  The U.N. Monitoring Group on Afghanistan urged that authorities work to locate and monitor the weapons systems, which could be used against the International Security Assistance Force.

The report — provided as an annex to a Jan. 14 letter to the Security Council president — said information had surfaced to indicate that the Taliban could possess “stockpiles of chemical shells, Sarin and VX gas projectiles, which could be fired by the M46 130 mm gun.”

The group, which consists of five experts from the United Kingdom, Jordan, France, United States and Nepal, has been unable to confirm the locations or quantities of chemical weapons.

The Taliban might possess surface-to-surface missiles, including the Scud-B and Frog-7, which could have the ability to deliver chemical or nuclear warheads, the report said.  U.N. authorities did not know “whether these missiles are operational, or where they are located,” the report said, adding that the most recent information indicated there were “100 Scud missiles and at least four Scud mobile launch units in Afghanistan” (U.N. Security Council release, Jan. 21).

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U.S.-Russia I:  Working Groups to be Created

Russia and the United States will set up three working groups on strategic disarmament issues, Russian officials said yesterday (see GSN, Jan. 17).

The three groups will work on issues of strategic arms reduction and missile defense, military and technical cooperation and anti-terrorism efforts, said Col.-Gen. Yuri Baluyevsky, first deputy chief of staff of the Russian armed forces.

“These groups will work under my responsibility on the Russian side and under [defense undersecretary] Douglas Feith on the American side,” Baluyevsky said.

Russia and the United States are working to prepare an agreement on offensive nuclear weapons reductions that could be ready by the summer of this year, said Gen. Anatoly Kvashnin, chief of the Russian general staff, on Saturday (Agence France-Presse, Jan. 21).

Any strategic offensive weapons reductions must equally guarantee both Russian and U.S. security, Baluyevsky said Sunday.  He said his delegation at last week’s arms reduction talks in Washington outlined six principles on offensive nuclear weapons reductions:

*         The principle of the parties’ equal security;

*         Transparency of the two states’ nuclear policies;

*         Interdependence between strategic offensive and defensive weapons reductions;

*         Irreversibility of offensive reductions;

*         Control over the reduction process; and

*         Cooperation in decision-making and available funding for the elimination of reduced offensive weapons.

U.S. and Russian military experts still disagree on offensive weapons reductions, Baluyevsky said.

“The basic disagreement about the process of reducing strategic offensive weapons is that the U.S. intends to keep the nuclear weapons that are removed from delivery means in storage, and not to eliminate them,” he said. 

“Attempts are being made to change the process of radical reduction to a simple lowering of nuclear weapons readiness,” Baluyevsky said.  “I think that neither we nor the world public will understand such cuts” (Interfax, Jan. 20).

In a letter to the editor in the Washington Post, former special representative for nuclear safety and dismantlement James Goodby wrote that the United States and Russia tried once before to negotiate an agreement to ensure the irreversibility of nuclear weapons reductions.

In 1995, former U.S. and Russian Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin committed their respective governments to reciprocal monitoring of fissile materials taken from nuclear warheads, Goodby wrote.  The next year, however, Russia suspended the talks due to lack of political support for the plan, he wrote.

The new U.S.-Russian relationship, however, “may make it possible to accomplish in 2002 what could not be done in 1996,” Goodby wrote. He added that any arrangements on reductions could be made without formal treaties and monitoring would be relatively nonintrusive.

“Most important, Russia and the United States will gain valuable experience in working together to replace mutual deterrence with mutual assurance,” Goodby wrote (James Goodby, Washington Post, Jan. 21). 

Russia Changes Nuclear Forces Strategy 

Baluyevsky said Russia has radically changed the concept of its nuclear forces, Russian weekly military newspaper Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye reported yesterday.

“In our prospective plans of military construction, priority is given to the naval aspect of the triad,” said Baluyevsky.

The shift in emphasizing the naval arm of the Russian nuclear force came at the expense of ICBMs and Strategic Missile Forces, according to the weekly.  In March 2001, Russian Navy commander Vladimir Kuroyedov discussed plans to restart submarine ballistic missile production at the Makeev State Missile Center.  This year, the center is expected to use its production facilities to the full extent for this purpose, the weekly reported.

Major land-based missile cuts are expected, according to the weekly.  In July 2001, Russia submitted to the United States a document that outlined the state of Russia’s Strategic Nuclear Forces.  The memo showed there were 346 silo-based ICBMs:  166 RS-20 missiles, 150 RS-18 missiles, 6 RS-22 missiles and 4 Topol-M missiles, 36 railway-based RS-22s and 360 mobile Topols.  Only 105 RS-18 and Topol-M missiles are expected to survive the cuts, the weekly reported.

“Within the next five to seven, and probably 10 years, the state of the ground-based element of the Strategic Nuclear Forces will be fully satisfactory,” Baluyevsky said (Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, Jan. 21).

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Pakistan:  We Would Not Use Nukes First, Says Envoy

Pakistan would “not be the first to use nuclear weapons,” said Pakistani envoy Najimuddin Sheikh in Moscow yesterday (see GSN, Jan. 18).  “Our nuclear potential services only to deter a potential aggressor and is under effective control which rules out unauthorized use,” he said (Vladimir Suprun, ITAR-Tass, Jan. 21).

Meanwhile, recent diplomatic efforts have decreased the danger that Pakistan and India would fight a major war, and U.S. intelligence agencies do not consider a major Indian attack imminent, U.S. officials said.

U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell recently visited the region, urging Pakistan to crack down on Islamic militants while asking India to accept efforts by Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf to end terrorism (see GSN, Jan. 8).  The United States also asked India to avoid testing its new Prithvi missile (see GSN, Dec. 12, 2001) and asked Israel to delay delivering the Phalcon airborne surveillance system to India (see GSN, Jan. 16), U.S. officials said.

Tensions along the Pakistan-India border remain high, however, and U.S. officials remain worried about the potential consequences, the New York Times reported.  Both sides have deployed troops along the border.  India deployed its Prithvi short-range ballistic missile, and Pakistan fielded its Hatf missiles (see GSN, Jan. 14). 

“It is still dangerous because India still has a strict set of demands and because there is still a mobilization.  The situation is vulnerable to shock the next time there is a terrorist attack,” said a senior U.S. defense official.  India has refused to move its troops away from the border, despite U.S. requests, the Times reported (Michael Gordon, New York Times, Jan. 20).

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U.S.-Russia II:  HEU Deal Impasse Could Be Solved, Officials Say

Russian officials said pricing disputes in a U.S. agreement to purchase uranium removed from Russian nuclear weapons will probably not disrupt a shipment expected in March, the Moscow Times reported yesterday (see GSN, Jan. 16).  The dispute could be resolved before the due date of the uranium shipment, according to the Times.

“We are still negotiating, and I am sure that the deal will be signed,” said Nikolai Shingaryov, head of the Russian Nuclear Power Ministry’s department for information policy.

The ministry will still work with the U.S. Enrichment Corp. only and will not divert uranium sales to other companies as long as USEC remains the official U.S. purchaser, Shingaryov said.

“The nuclear fuel market is not the oil or gas market.  It is strictly regulated and all deals have to be guaranteed by the International Atomic Energy Agency,” Shingaryov said.  “Any deals on the side would simply bring more harm to Russia [than] any possible benefits.”

The pricing term dispute could be linked to Russia’s desire to have more access to the U.S. low-grade uranium market, according to the Moscow Times.  Russia’s access to U.S. markets was limited after dumping accusations in the early 1990s.  Russia could be attempting to tie the HEU deal to low-grade uranium trade limitations, said a source close to the ministry.

USEC is not related to the low-grade uranium restrictions and could have no role in any negotiations on that issue, said USEC spokesman Charles Yulish.

“[Both sides] have a mutual interest in continuing this important program, and after eight years of a successful business and working relationship, we are confident that the parties will reach agreement on new long-term financial terms,” Yulish said (Valeria Korchagina, Moscow Times, Jan. 21).

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Myanmar:  Yangon Confirms Building Nuclear Reactor

Myanmar has confirmed reports it plans to build a 10-megawatt nuclear reactor with Russian assistance, CNN reported today (see GSN, Jan. 8).  Officials said the reactor would be used for peaceful purposes, including health, agricultural and educational applications.

“I would like to stress that it is purely for peaceful purposes, purely for nuclear research, purely for training our scientists and also to meet our need for radio isotopes,” said Myanmar’s Deputy Foreign Minister Khin Muang Win.

Myanmar is openly pursuing the nuclear project in consultation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, said Khin Muang Win.  “We officially informed the IAEA director general of our idea and asked for their advice in September 2000,” he said.

According to Reuters, IAEA officials said the agency had discussions with Myanmar, CNN reported.  The reactor would probably lack the capability to produce nuclear weapons, IAEA officials said, but they expressed concern that the country may not have the ability to properly maintain the sophisticated technology.  Myanmar is one of the world’s poorest countries, and the reactor would probably cost $5 million to build, plus maintenance costs, Reuters reported, according to CNN (CNN, Jan. 22).

An IAEA team visited Myanmar after the country announced its intention to build a nuclear reactor, and the team’s report said that Myanmar’s safety standards were “well below the minimum” standards the IAEA considered acceptable, the Bangkok Post reported.  The IAEA also asked Moscow to provide details about the project.

More than 200 technicians from Myanmar have trained in Moscow over the last year, Myanmar said (Larry Jagan, Bangkok Post, Jan. 17).

Myanmar Denies Pakistani Nuclear Scientists in the Country

Meanwhile, Myanmar denied reports that two Pakistani nuclear scientists fled to Myanmar, according to Agence France-Presse (see GSN, Dec. 10, 2001).

“The Myanmar government categorically states once again that no nuclear scientists from Pakistan have been given sanctuary in Myanmar,” said Khin Muang Win (Agence France-Presse, Jan. 22).

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United Kingdom:  Sellafield Plutonium At Risk

British security experts warned that weapon-grade plutonium is stored inadequately at the Sellafield nuclear reprocessing plant, the London Observer reported Sunday (see GSN, Jan. 11).

The two buildings that contain more than 70 metric tons of plutonium are unable to resist a terrorist attack or “even a fire,” experts said.  “I have seen plans of this structure and it is not designed to withstand a major impact,” said nuclear engineer John Large.  “Its walls are very thin.” 

Security reports also showed that Sellafield is vulnerable to an attack from a hijacked airliner, according to the Observer.  An evaluation of flight paths over the facility showed that air traffic control operators would not be able to detect a diverted aircraft until it was four minutes away from the plant, which would be too late to scramble Royal Air Force fighter craft.

A security review board, made up of officials from MI5, the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate and the Atomic Energy Authority drafted the report in the wake of the Sept. 11 attacks, according to the Observer.  The reports recommended that the two storage buildings be rebuilt.  British Nuclear Fuels, which owns the Sellafield facility said last week security was under review but did not provide details (Nick Paton Walsh, London Observer, Jan. 20). 

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Uzbekistan:  Vozrozhdeniya Island Secure, But Concerns Remain

By Kerry Boyd
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — Uzbek troops are guarding buried anthrax spores from the former Soviet biological weapons program on a former island in the Aral Sea while the United States and Uzbekistan plan to decontaminate the island this year, Uzbek officials said Friday.

While security seems strong now, some experts worry that the Aral Sea’s dropping water table has made access to the former dumping grounds much easier in recent years, leading to long-term concerns over the risk of theft or even of diseased animals escaping to mainland Uzbekistan.

Uzbek troops have secured the areas with biological weapons on the Vozrozhdeniya Island, Uzbek U.S. Ambassador Shavkat Hamrakulov told a meeting at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.  The island had been left unguarded after the Soviet Union’s collapse, but now the island is so strongly guarded that it is highly unlikely that terrorists could infiltrate the area and extract material, Hamrakulov said.  He added, however, that the island could be a source of deadly materials for terrorists in the future if it is not decontaminated.

The Soviet Union used Vozrozhdeniya Island as a storage and test site for biological weapons, including strains of anthrax, plague, tularemia and other diseases, perhaps including smallpox, experts believe.  Scientists designed the strains with characteristics — including a resistance to antibiotics — to make them particularly dangerous, according to Jonathan Tucker of the Monterey Institute of International Studies.

Although Soviet authorities doused the anthrax spores with bleach and buried them in metal containers, the spores formed clumps that protected some viable spores inside, Tucker said.  Soviet scientists designed the anthrax to be particularly hardy and virulent, and the remaining viable spores could survive in the ground for decades, he said.

Soviet authorities originally chose to use the island because it was remotely located — separated from land by the Aral Sea.  In the 1960s, however, the Soviet Union began diverting Aral Sea water in a failed attempt to irrigate the surrounding area and produce cotton, Tucker said.  Over the last few decades, the sea has shrunk dramatically and the once small and remote island became part of a large emerging landmass that finally connected to the mainland last year, forming a peninsula.

Since the island became accessible many people have visited it to search for scrap metal, but it is improbable, Tucker said, that anyone extracted buried anthrax spores because few people know their location, which takes up an area smaller than a football field, he said.

Uzbekistan has received no information indicating that terrorists have been to the island, said Alla Karimova, an arms control expert with the Uzbek Foreign Affairs Ministry.

U.S.-Uzbek Decontamination Plans

Under the U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction program, Uzbekistan and the United States have signed agreements that include $6 million in U.S. funds to decontaminate the island and dismantle the biological weapons complex on the island (see GSN, Nov. 28, 2001).  The current funds may be insufficient to complete the entire project, but they are certainly enough to begin, Hamrakulov said.

The work will probably begin this spring, Tucker said, and the decontamination will probably be complete by the end of the year and then authorities would dismantle the larger biological weapons complex. 

No Information from the Soviet Union

When the Soviet Union collapsed and troops eventually left the island, Soviet authorities left no information or documents about the island, Karimova said.  Uzbek authorities learned about the existence of biological agents on the island from media reports, she said.

Immediately after the discovery of the biological agents, Uzbek authorities tried to find Uzbek citizens who may have worked on Vozrozhdeniya, but no Uzbek citizens were part of the Soviet biological weapons program on the island, Karimova said.

Could Animals Spread Disease?

Soviet scientists conducted biological warfare experiments on animals that could not escape when the island was surrounded by the Aral Sea, according to Tucker, who expressed concern that animals could now carry virulent diseases to the mainland.  There could be “an animal reservoir” of the plague on the island, Tucker said, because the Soviet Union may have conducted research with plague-infected rodents on the island.

Hamrakulov also expressed concern about living creatures, such as insects and small birds, spreading diseases from the island.

Uzbek Response to Health Risks and Anthrax Attacks in the United States

The Uzbek Health Ministry has worked to prevent diseases from reaching Uzbekistan by establishing facilities to prevent the spread of disease, creating an office to increase preparedness for infection and vaccinating populations deemed at high risk against anthrax, Karimova said. 

After anthrax began circulating through the mail in the United States (see related GSN story, today), Uzbekistan increased its anthrax vaccination program to include a total of 50,000 people per year, including those in administrative jobs, the postal service, the transportation sector and others in high-risk categories, Karimova said. 

With U.S. help, Uzbekistan also increased safeguards at water facilities, Karimova said.

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Anthrax:  U.S. Military Facility Lost Samples, Reports Say

The U.S. Army lost samples of anthrax and other pathogens in the early 1990s, the Baltimore Sun reported yesterday (see GSN, Dec. 18, 2001).  Meanwhile, scientists have detected genetic fingerprints in the anthrax strain used in the attacks, which might help determine its source, according to reports.

A 1992 U.S. Army inquiry found 27 sets of pathogen specimens missing from the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) in Fort Detrick, Md., according to the Sun.  The samples included specimens of anthrax, Ebola, simian AIDS, hantavirus and two labeled “unknown.” The samples were likely rendered harmless because of the chemicals used to prepare them for microscopic study, said an army spokeswoman.

The inquiry also found that someone at the facility appeared to be entering a laboratory late at night to conduct unauthorized research on anthrax, the Sun reported.  A numerical counter on laboratory equipment appeared to be set back and the misspelled word “antrax” was left in the counter’s memory, according to army documents obtained by the Hartford Courant.

In 1992, Lt. Col. Michael Langford, then head of USAMRIID, called for an inventory after he found there was “little or no organization” and “little or no accountability” at the facility.

“It turned out that there was quite a bit of stuff that was unaccounted for, which only verifies that there needs to be some kind of accountability down there,” Langford said in a 1992 interview with investigators.

It is yet unknown whether the anthrax strain used in the mail attacks is among those reported missing from USAMRIID, the Sun reported.  Some of the lost anthrax was not from the Ames strain, said army spokeswoman Caree Vander-Linden.  She added that one complete specimen set and samples from several others sets were located.  Incomplete records on the sample sets, however, made it difficult to provide more information, Vander-Linden said.

“In January of 2002, it’s hard to say how many of those were missing in February of 1991,” Vander-Linden said (Dolan/Altimari, Baltimore Sun, Jan. 21).

Previous genetic testing found matches between the anthrax strain used in the attacks and those kept by USAMRIID and other military research facilities, the Washington Post reported today.  Investigators hope further analysis of the spores found in a letter to Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) will help determine the source of the anthrax.

C.J. Peters, former deputy commander at USAMRIID, said the missing samples are not infectious.

“It was a very bad situation,” he said.  “But the important question is how many of these missing samples were infectious, and the answer is none.”

Experts also said it has been difficult to control the whereabouts of anthrax samples.

“If someone wanted to steal something, could they have done it?  The answer is yes,” Peters said.  “There’s no 100 percent guarantee short of putting the scientists under guard 24 hours a day” (Joby Warrick, Washington Post, Jan. 22).

Mark Wheelis, a microbiologist at the University of California said that “no matter what you do, there is not any way you can prevent a determined, skillful microbiologist from stealing traces of microbial culture that he is working with, because it takes so few microbes to start a culture.”

Until a few years ago, bioterrorism was not a major issue, Wheelis said.  “Nobody was thinking that one of these respected, trusted scientists might actually steal one of the cultures with malevolent intent” (Medical Letter on the CDC & FDA, Jan. 20).

A former USAMRIID scientist said the facility did produce small amounts of powdered anthrax, which contrasts with previous army statements, the Washington Post reported yesterday.

The process of creating wet anthrax to study caused small amounts of dry powder to form on the sides of laboratory equipment, said Ayaad Assaad.

“It dried to a powder as fine as any you could make,” Assaad said.  “You could collect some of it using a Kleenex or your finger.”

The recent details of the security and accountability at USAMRIID are detailed in court documents that are part of a 1998 discrimination suit filed by Assaad, according to the Post (Weiss/Warrick, Washington Post, Jan. 21).

Research Developments

Scientists at the Institute for Genomic Research in Rockville, Md., said they have discovered genetic fingerprints in the strain used in the attacks that might help pinpoint its source.

Institute scientists said they have found a small number of differences in the genetic makeup of the strain used in the attacks and an Ames strain standard.  The differences include single unit changes in the anthrax DNA, called Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms.  They also include variable repeats, which are sites where the same small DNA sequence is repeated several times, according to the New York Times.  The variable regions are the types of differences used in human DNA fingerprinting, the Times reported.

The new points of difference between the two strains, which are expected to be confirmed in the next two weeks, could help determine the source of the anthrax used in the attack by matching it to strains collected from about a dozen U.S. and foreign facilities, according to the Times.

The new findings “might give us the edge” in finding who is responsible, said a senior law enforcement official.  He added, however, that publicity over the findings could alert the person responsible for the attacks. 

What detectives cannot do is give the responsible person a “road map” to the case, said the senior law enforcement official.

“The person who made this stuff understands science,” he said.  “We don’t want to give him any little edge, to help him do a better job of covering his tracks” (Broad/Wade, New York Times, Jan. 22).

The Anthrax Research Project, which includes members such as Intel and Microsoft, yesterday asked people to use their home computers to help create a treatment for anthrax. 

Computer users can download a screen saver for their computer that donates the computer’s spare processing resources to build a virtual supercomputer to analyze billions of molecules in less time than a laboratory, the group said in a press release.

The screen saver runs whenever computer resources are available, according to Reuters.  Once processing is finished, the information is sent back to the group online.  A new data set is delivered when the person connects to the Internet (Reuters/New York Times, Jan. 22).

Hart Building Reopens Today

The Hart Senate Office Building will reopen today, the U.S. Capitol Police said Friday (see GSN, Jan. 18). 

The discovery last week of a bag containing protective gear in the ceiling above Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle’s (D-S.D.) office delayed the Hart building’s reopening.  Tests on the suit and the area where it was found came back negative for anthrax, according to the Washington Post. 

“Initial information indicates it is likely that the bag was inadvertently used to seal air leaks in preparation for the fumigation of [Daschle’s] suite,” said Capitol Police spokesman Lt. Dan Nichols.  “The bag is similar to other bags which were used for that purpose.”

The Senate yesterday reopened offices in the basement of the Dirksen Senate Office Building, the Post reported.  The offices had previously been closed because they shared the ventilation system with the area where the bag was found.

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency estimated the Hart building decontamination effort cost about $20 million, said a Senate Appropriations Committee spokesman.  Senator Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) yesterday said he was concerned over the cost and called for an inquiry into the hiring and payment of contractors.

“I grant you that this is a massive undertaking on your part,” wrote Grassley in a letter to EPA Administrator Christine Todd Whitman.  “And while I’m also confident that you take our safety very seriously, I am concerned about the fiscal integrity of this operation.”

Strong (and Scaly) Survivors

Two goldfish and a suckerfish belonging to Senator John Breaux (D-La.) survived the Hart building decontamination, said Breaux spokesman Brian Weiss.  The fish were left in the building after it was evacuated and closed when the Daschle letter was discovered.

“No one thought they would survive chlorine dioxide gas, only a few time-released food capsules and no change of water or filters, but they’re swimming,” Weiss said.  “They’re tough southern Louisiana fish” (Spencer Hsu, Washington Post, Jan. 19).

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U.S.-Russia:  Russia Hopes to Limit U.S. Shield, Officials Say

A senior Russian general said his country wants to negotiate agreements to limit any U.S. missile defense shield, the Associated Press reported yesterday.

“In our opinion, these agreements must put certain restrictions on the missile defense system the United States intends to build,” said Col.-Gen. Yuri Baluyevsky, first deputy chief of staff of the Russian armed forces.  

Baluyevsky led the Russian delegation at last week’s arms reduction talks in Washington (see GSN, Jan. 17).  He said he hopes new agreements can be reached before U.S. President George W. Bush visits Moscow later this year.

Military analysts said, however, that Russia has no chance to persuade the United States to accept limitations on its missile defense program.  Russia might have been able to negotiate such limits in the past, but it lost the opportunity when it steadfastly objected to any changes in the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, said Ivan Safranchuk, of the Center for Defense Information.

“Russia has no bargaining chips and can only plea that the United States limits its missile shield,” Safranchuk said (Vladimir Isachenkov, Associated Press/Yahoo.com, Jan. 21).

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