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Defenders of the ABM Treaty had earlier undermined their own position, and it was just a matter of time before the logical consequences followed.
—James Schlesinger, former U.S. defense secretary, energy secretary and CIA director, on the Bush administration’s decision to withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
By David Ruppe
Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — A group of 76 U.S. legislators, including top Democrats, last week urged President George W. Bush to oppose developing new U.S. nuclear weapons and shortening preparation time for possible resumption of nuclear testing...Full Story 
By Greg Seigle
Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — The Bush administration last week announced the creation of a new U.S. information agency designed to improve the flow of information among the various intelligence and law enforcement agencies involved in the war on terrorism...Full Story
Police in Rome yesterday arrested four Moroccans in possession of a cyanide-based chemical and a map of Rome’s water supply system (see GSN, Dec. 3, 2001)...Full Story
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Wednesday, February 20, 2002 |  | | |  |
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By Greg Seigle
Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — The Bush administration last week announced the creation of a new U.S. information agency designed to improve the flow of information among the various intelligence and law enforcement agencies involved in the war on terrorism.
Details of the new agency remain scarce, but it is headed by former National Security Adviser John Poindexter, who holds a doctorate in information technology and has long pushed for greater data flow among pertinent agencies, officials said yesterday.
The agency has several goals, among them to solve the cultural problem of getting secretive organizations such as the CIA, FBI and Defense Intelligence Agency to share information, officials said (see GSN Feb. 12).
Representatives from these organizations are currently “working like crazy” to create a new supercomputer system that would make it easier for them and the other 30 federal agencies that collect classified data to cull and share information, a U.S. official said last week.
“It’s not going as well as it could. We’re looking for ways to improve,” Special Assistant to the President Frank Cilluffo told Global Security Newswire after delivering a speech at a bioterrorism conference.
“We are coming up with ways to fuse the information so as not to jeopardize the sources and methods,” from which the data was obtained, Cilluffo said. “It’s a push-pull process. There is no easy answer.”
A major hurdle, he said, is persuading the CIA, FBI and a host of other secretive agencies to not only open up and share information, but to understand each other’s needs — hence, each other’s cultures.
Currently the U.S. Customs Service and other organizations on the front line of the war on terrorism are not linked to the databases of the CIA — a gap the new agency wants to fill to prevent more terrorists from entering the United States.
Getting the CIA, DIA and other intelligences agencies to work in harmony with the FBI, Customs and other law enforcement agencies is a difficult task due to their different mindsets, Cilluffo said.
“One wants to string [suspects] up and the other wants to string them along,” he said.
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China is prepared to address U.S. concerns about weapons proliferation this week during U.S. President George W. Bush’s visit, according to diplomats (see GSN, Jan. 31).
Government officials are ready to compromise and might publish a list banning certain exports if the United States lifts sanctions prohibiting U.S. companies from launching satellites on Chinese rockets, a Chinese official said.
“Nonproliferation is a shared objective,” the official said. “There’s no reason for either party to pretend it is on higher moral ground.”
China has not promised to meet U.S. demands, diplomats said, but it seems focused on strengthening the U.S.-China relationship, which has improved since China gave its support to the U.S. war on terrorism after the Sept. 11 attacks, according to the Washington Post.
“China is coming around to pressure from the international community not to proliferate,” said a senior Asian diplomat. “They’re realizing this is an issue the U.S. thinks is important, and that a good, solid relationship with the United States is more important than these sales.”
The Bush administration has made nonproliferation a “make-or-break issue” with China, according to U.S. diplomats. The United States wants China to stop exporting technology related to weapons of mass destruction, particularly to Iran, Iraq and North Korea, which Bush labeled the “axis of evil” last month (Pan/Pomfret, Washington Post, Feb. 20).
U.S. Concerns
The Bush administration has taken a different approach to China than the Clinton administration, according to the Christian Science Monitor. Bush officials have increased weapons sales to Taiwan, significantly reduced military ties to China and labeled the country a “strategic competitor” in contrast with former President Bill Clinton’s “strategic partner” term (see GSN, Jan. 4).
U.S. officials believe China proliferates missile technology to Pakistan, Iran and other countries, despite a November 2000 promise to the United States to end transfers of technology for nuclear-capable ballistic missiles(see GSN, Feb. 4).
Chinese Concerns
China is concerned about an increase in U.S. troops in Central and South Asia and new U.S.-India military ties (Ann Scott Tyson, Christian Science Monitor, Feb. 20). Chinese officials have also said that U.S. plans to build a national missile defense system could negatively affect China’s intercontinental ballistic missile deterrent and give the United States the ability to dominate any confrontation (see GSN, Feb. 12).
Last week U.S. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice attempted to reassure China that U.S. plans will not threaten its influence.
“Our missile defense program is defensive in nature. It is not aimed at anybody,” she said. “It is not intended to give the United States unilateral advantage” (Associated Press/New York Times, Feb. 20).
Working the “Axis”
Meanwhile, in addition to the possibility of increased cooperation on nonproliferation issues, China has also used its influence to pressure Iraq to allow U.N. weapons inspectors to return, according to the Post (see GSN, Feb. 15). China maintains military relations with Iraq, Iran and North Korea and warmly welcomed Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz two years ago, the Post said.
When Aziz visited Beijing last month, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji repeated that China opposes unilateral U.S. action against Iraq but also publicly told Aziz that Iraq should allow inspectors to return (see GSN, Feb. 8). Chinese officials privately told Aziz that China could do little to help Iraq if the country refused to abide by U.N. resolutions.
“Aziz came to China to get Chinese support,” said a diplomat. “He got zilch.”
“We are seeing a pattern of the Chinese trying to influence the bad guys’ behavior,” said a Western diplomat. “We saw it in Pakistan. We are seeing it now with Iraq. Maybe Iran and North Korea will be next” (Pan/Pomfret, Washington Post, Feb. 19).
U.S. President George W. Bush called for talks on weapons of mass destruction and expressed support for South Korea’s efforts to conduct dialogue with North Korea during a 40-hour visit to South Korea that began yesterday.
Bush said South Korean President Kim Dae-jung’s “sunshine policy” of dialogue with North Korea is visionary, White House officials said. The two leaders agreed that holding talks with North Korea on weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons is vital to security (Reuters/New York Times, Feb. 20).
The United States is willing to talk with North Korea, but the North Korean regime must prove it will not threaten other countries with weapons of mass destruction, Bush said. North Korea has not responded to a U.S. offer in June to hold talks, Bush said (see GSN, Feb. 8). “If anybody’s listening involved with the North Korean government, they know that the offer is real, and I reiterate it today,” he said.
“President Bush is more than ready to dialogue with North Korea,” Kim said. “The Korean people, I believe will be assuaged by this reiteration” (Mike Allen, Washington Post, Feb. 20).
“We shared the view that it is urgent that North Korea’s WMD and missile issues must be addressed early through dialogue, and that South Korea and the United States agree to make joint efforts for this,” Kim said.
“Now that we have made a sincere proposal (to the North) for dialogue to settle all issues, I hope the North will respond, and dialogue between the two Koreas and between the North and the United States will resume as early as possible,” Kim added (Sohn Suk-joo, Korea Times, Feb. 20).
North Korea has said the U.S. offer for talks has strings attached and that Bush wants war.
“We have no intention of invading North Korea,” Bush said (Reuters/New York Times, Feb. 20).
Bush Continues Tough Talk
Although he did not repeat the “axis of evil” phrase he used last month to describe North Korea, Iran and Iraq, Bush did call the North Korean regime evil (see GSN, Jan. 30). While visiting the Demilitarized Zone between the two Koreas, Bush saw axes North Koreans used to kill two U.S. soldiers in 1976. “No wonder I think they’re evil,” he said.
Bush also called on North Korea to open its borders and said he envisioned the Korean peninsula united again in the future (Allen, Washington Post).
“I will not change my opinion on (North Korean leader) Kim Chong-il until he frees his people and accepts genuine proposals from countries, such as South Korea, to dialogue,” Bush said (Reuters/New York Times, Feb. 20).
Criticism of Bush
Bush faced a diplomatic challenge during his visit to keep pressure on North Korea while supporting South Korea’s sunshine policy, according to the Washington Post.
James Steinberg, former U.S. deputy national security adviser under former President Bill Clinton, said he supported Bush’s identification of North Korea as a dangerous regime but disagreed with the way Bush has dealt with the issue. “At some point, he has to accompany the tough talk with some indication of how this can be resolved diplomatically,” Steinberg said. “If North Korea can drive wedges between us and the South Koreans, we will have little chance of achieving our goals.”
Bush’s “axis of evil” phrase angered people in both North and South Korea, according to the Post (see GSN, Jan. 31). South Korean police restrained anti-Bush demonstrators outside the military base where Bush’s plane landed yesterday (Allen, Washington Post, Feb. 20).
Many South Koreans agreed with Bush, however, and supporters planned to demonstrate in support of the U.S. president, Knight Ridder reported (Ron Hutcheson, Knight Ridder/Miami Herald, Feb. 19).
To China
Bush is scheduled to fly China (see related GSN story, today) for meetings with Chinese President Jiang Zemin tomorrow (Allen, Washington Post, Feb. 20).
U.S. and Russian officials failed to agree on Russian military assistance to Iran after two days of meetings ended in Moscow yesterday, said U.S. Undersecretary of State John Bolton (see GSN, Jan. 31).
Disagreements over Iran could stall efforts to reach an agreement on nuclear reductions and other strategic issues by May, when U.S. and Russian Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin are scheduled to meet in Russia, the Washington Post reported (see related GSN story, today).
The United States has called on Russia to end transfers of nuclear and missile technology to Iran, but Russia has said it is providing assistance only for civilian projects (see GSN, Feb. 6).
Preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to rogue states is a critical issue for the United States, according to the Post.
“For us, this is a matter of fundamental importance in shaping of Russian policy to be consistent with that of the other major powers that have access to nuclear and ballistic missile technology to prevent its spread to countries like Iran,” Bolton said (Sharon LaFraniere, Washington Post, Feb. 20).
“How could any Russian citizen see any benefit whatsoever from a nuclear-equipped, ballistic-missile-ready Iran?” Bolton said (Nicholas Kralev, Washington Times, Feb. 20).
Russia Considers Building Third Reactor in Iran
Meanwhile, Russia and Iran are considering constructing a new nuclear reactor in Iran, said Viktor Kozlov, director general of Atomstroyeksport, which is currently building a reactor at the Bushehr nuclear power station in Iran (see GSN, Feb. 15).
Iran has said it wants three reactors, according to the Russian Interfax news agency.
Russia has submitted a feasibility study to Iran with plans for building reactors and suggestions for their locations, Kozlov said (Moscow Interfax, Feb. 18 in FBIS-SOV, Feb. 19).
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By David Ruppe
Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — A group of 76 U.S. legislators, including top Democrats, last week urged President George W. Bush to oppose developing new U.S. nuclear weapons and shortening preparation time for possible resumption of nuclear testing.
Such activities, they said, could undermine U.S. efforts to stem nuclear weapons proliferation and to discourage explosive underground nuclear testing.
“Adopting an aggressive nuclear posture by resuming testing and new weapons development is a step backward into the hostile policies of the Cold War era and a virtual invitation to other nations to opt out of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime,” the lawmakers wrote in a letter to Bush, sent Feb. 14.
The letter was drafted by Representative Edward Markey (D-Mass.) and signed by 73 other House Democrats including Minority Leader Richard Gephardt (Mo.), and Whip Nancy Pelosi (Calif.). Representatives James Leach (R-Iowa) and Bernie Sanders (Ind.-Va.) also signed.
Last month’s release of the Nuclear Posture Review — a reconsideration of the Pentagon’s nuclear strategy, alert status and holdings — alluded to possibly resuming nuclear testing and new roles for nuclear weapons in U.S. strategy (see GSN, Jan. 24).
Request for ‘Clear and Unambiguous’ Assurance
The signers urged Bush to provide a “clear and unambiguous” assurance that the United States will not pursue new nuclear weapons or resume explosive underground nuclear tests, “absent the emergence of grave new threats to national survival that cannot be deterred by the current enduring stockpile.”
The Bush administration has said that the president continues to support a 10-year-long moratorium on explosive nuclear testing, which parallels widespread international opposition to such testing and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. President Bush also has indicated his opposition to the CTBT, which was signed by former President Bill Clinton but failed to receive Senate support.
Administration officials and the president’s fiscal 2003 budget request have indicated that the administration plans to study modifying a nuclear warhead currently in the arsenal or developing a new warhead for possible special missions to destroy deep and hardened bunkers (see GSN, Dec. 20, 2001).
Critics have said developing new warheads would greatly undermine the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which obligates countries to work toward nuclear disarmament, and could erode the taboo discouraging other countries from obtaining nuclear weapons. The legislators echoed that concern while noting a legal obstacle.
“The development of a new generation of low-yield nuclear weapons would require the termination of an existing legislative prohibition on such activity, sending a resoundingly negative signal to allies and potential adversaries alike that the U.S. is abandoning international efforts to stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons,” they wrote.
Considering Low-Yield Nuclear Warheads?
The administration is considering even more ambitious plans to develop “a new generation of low-yield nuclear weapons,” the legislators wrote.
Experts say some in the Pentagon might consider the use of low-yield nuclear weapons more politically acceptable, since they would be designed to minimize civilian causalities.
Critics say designing warheads to even a small fraction of the 15-kiloton Hiroshima bomb would still cause large numbers of civilian casualties and rain fallout on surrounding areas.
“Nuclear weapons are uniquely destructive at even very low yields,” said Kathy Crandall, director of the Nuclear Disarmament Partnership (See GSN, Feb 11, 2002).
Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith told a congressional committee last week that while the B61-11 nuclear warhead, developed as a earth penetrating “bunker buster” in the 1990s, is being studied for possible further modification, it is not being considered for low-yield explosions.
Retired Air Force General John Gordon, administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, said there currently is no design work for low-yield nuclear weapons, but officials are discussing and considering the possibility.
A Tuesday Washington Post story said the Defense and Energy departments have ordered a three-year study on developing earth-penetrating warheads, and Energy also has established “advanced concept teams” at the nation’s nuclear weapon laboratories to work on new warheads or warhead modifications. (Walter Pincus, Washington Post, Feb. 19).
The Natural Resources Defense Council also released a report last week that said the Pentagon is planning to develop a new warhead for a new nuclear missile (see GSN, Feb. 19).
Nuclear Testing
Bush administration officials have said live nuclear testing may be required to ensure the safety and efficacy of the U.S. nuclear arsenal and have asked Congress for money to shorten the preparation time for conducting a nuclear explosion test in the event that an order is given by the president to do so.
Shortening the pretest process, the legislators wrote, “undermines a moratorium that has been upheld for nearly 10 years by both Republican and Democratic administrations.”
The Nuclear Posture Review “contemplates turning the current red light against nuclear testing to yellow, thereby causing other nations to wonder when that light will turn to green, and to ‘hedge’ their own nuclear weapons programs accordingly,” the legislators wrote.
U.S. and Russian officials had failed to reach an agreement on nuclear warhead reductions when a second round of talks ended yesterday in Moscow, the Washington Times reported (see GSN, Feb. 19). U.S. Undersecretary of State John Bolton said the two countries might not reach an agreement in time for U.S. President George W. Bush’s visit to Moscow in May (see related GSN story, today).
“Both presidents are extremely interested in reaching an agreement, but surprising things can happen beside the best intentions,” Bolton said. “We have a number of difficult issues, questions about how exactly to account for the offensive strategic weapons, measures of transparency and verification.”
Warhead Accessibility, Defense Systems Undecided
One of those difficult issues is what to do with nuclear warheads withdrawn from operational status. The United States has pledged to cut its nuclear arsenal to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads from its current 7,000 warheads, and Russia has agreed to cut its arsenal to between 1,500 and 2,000 warheads from its current level of 6,000, according to the Times (see GSN, Dec. 17, 2001).
Bolton said the United States would only agree to reduce warheads on operational status (see GSN, Feb. 15). Officials plan to store many of them (Nicholas Kralev, Washington Times, Feb. 20), but Russia wants reduced warheads to be dismantled.
During the talks, Russian officials also called for limiting a future U.S. missile defense system, which Russia would consider a threat to its nuclear capability, the Washington Post reported (Sharon LaFraniere, Washington Post, Feb. 20).
The United States is “not about to begin” discussing limitations on missile defense, Bolton said (see GSN, Feb. 7).
“For now, the two sides are keeping to different approaches concerning a document on radical cuts [in nuclear arms] and a framework agreement on new partnership relations between Russia and the United States,” said Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov.
One Decision: Document the Decisions
The two sides also discussed a “legally binding agreement on reductions in strategic offensive weapons and other associated documents,” said U.S. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher.
The Bush administration previously expressed reluctance for a legally binding document but said earlier this month that it would sign such an agreement (Kralev, Washington Times, Feb. 20).
Russian and U.S. negotiators agreed to “intensify efforts”to create a legally binding agreement on nuclear reductions and “a declaration on the formation of a new strategic relationship between Russia and the United States” in preparation for the presidential summit in May, according to the Russian Foreign Ministry (Russian Foreign Ministry release, Feb. 19).
Evolution of the U.S.-Russian Relationship
The United States and Russia are much closer on strategic matters and hope to show that in May with a declaration on cooperation in fighting terrorism, reducing nuclear weapons and developing parts of a U.S. missile defense system, Bolton said (LaFraniere, Washington Post, Feb. 20).
If the two sides fail to reach an agreement, however, it would demonstrate that Russia has diminished in strategic importance to the United States, the Financial Times reported today (Andrew Jack, Financial Times, Feb. 20).
The two countries agreed to hold more talks in March. A U.S. team submitted proposals at the meeting this week, and the Russian team submitted proposals earlier during the first round of talks (Russian Foreign Ministry release, Feb. 19).
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The Journal of the American Medical Association today published detailed case studies of the two women who died of anthrax during last autumn’s attacks. Meanwhile, a biological weapons expert said the FBI has probably already interrogated the person responsible for the anthrax attacks, according to reports.
The first JAMA case study describes Kathy Nguyen, the New York City woman who died from inhalational anthrax on Oct. 31, 2001 (see GSN, Nov. 1, 2001). The second case study describes Ottilie Lundgren, a Connecticut woman who died from inhalational anthrax on Nov. 21, 2001 (see GSN, Nov. 21, 2001).
The journal is also publishing the case study of a 7-month-old boy that contracted a serious case of cutaenous, or skin, anthrax in late September. The boy was believed to have contracted the disease after visiting the New York offices of ABC where his mother worked and where anthrax spores were later found (see related GSN story, today).
“Despite intensive investigations, the sources of their infection may never be known,” wrote scientists from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in an editorial appearing in the same issue of the Journal. They added that Americans are still at risk from biological weapon attacks (Denise Grady, New York Times, Feb. 20).
Last year’s anthrax cases illustrate that constant awareness is needed to ensure that any future anthrax patients receive prompt treatment, experts said.
Lundgren’s initial symptoms were so mild that she probably would not have been hospitalized if she had been younger, said Lydia Barakat, the physician who diagnosed Lundgren’s anthrax.
Somebody did suggest that Lundgren’s symptoms might have resulted from anthrax, however, “it was more like initially a joke,” Barakat said. “I said, ‘What are the odds of this woman having anthrax?’”
“These stories teach the important lesson that anyone — active elderly persons, healthy infants and hardworking private citizens — could be infected during a bioterrorist event,” wrote the CDC’s Julie Gerberding in the Journal editorial.
Publishing the case studies helps remind medical personnel to be on alert for signs of bioterrorism, said James Adams, chief of emergency medicine at Northwestern Memorial Hospital in Chicago.
“None of us wants to be the person who misses the next case of anthrax,” Adams said (Associated Press/New York Times, Feb. 20).
FBI Might Already Know Who Is Responsible
Meanwhile, the FBI probably already knows who is responsible for the anthrax attacks last fall, and might have already questioned them, Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, a microbiologist at New York State University, said Monday (see GSN, Feb. 8).
According to Rosenberg’s “government insider” contacts, the FBI has had a suspect since October and has already questioned the possible culprit more than once, Rosenberg said during a talk at Princeton University in New Jersey. Rosenberg has authored a paper for the Federation of American Scientists that outlines her suspicions about who is responsible for the attacks, based on available evidence.
“There are a number of insiders — government insiders — who know people in the anthrax field who have a common suspect,” Rosenberg said. “The FBI has questioned that person more than once, … so it looks as though the FBI is taking that person very seriously.”
The suspect is likely a former employee of the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases at Fort Detrick, Md., Rosenberg said.
“We can draw a likely portrait of the perpetrator as a former Fort Detrick scientist who is now working for a contractor in the Washington, D.C., area,” she said. “He had reason to travel to Florida, New Jersey and the United Kingdom…”
Rosenberg said she is trying to encourage media coverage and attempting to put pressure on the FBI to vigorously prosecute whoever is responsible for the attacks.
“I know that there are insiders, working for the government, who know this person and who are worried that it could happen that some kind of quiet deal is made that he just disappears from view,” she said. “This I think would be a really serious outcome that would send a message to other potential terrorists, that (they) would think they could get away with it.”
“So I hope that doesn’t happen, and that is my motivation to continue to follow this and try to encourage press coverage and pressure on the FBI to follow up and publicly prosecute the perpetrator,” Rosenberg said (Joseph Dee, Trenton Times, Feb. 19).
The FBI yesterday denied Rosenberg’s allegations that they know who is responsible and are dragging their feet on the investigation.
“The FBI is vigorously investigating the mailing of anthrax-laced letters and hoax letters,” said FBI spokeswoman Tracey Silberling. “It is not accurate, however, that the FBI has identified a prime suspect in this case.”
“Ms. Rosenberg has made these comments before,” said FBI spokeswoman Sandra Carroll. “She, and I’m sure many others, may have their ideas or opinions about the investigation. But the FBI is actively and aggressively moving forward with this investigation” (John Dee, Trenton Times, Feb. 20).
Irradiated Mail Irritating You? Use Moisturizer.
U.S Senate staff members have reported a variety of health problems after handling mail that has been irradiated to sanitize it of any biological agents, according to the Baltimore Sun (see GSN, Feb. 11).
At first it was believed that the fumigation process used to decontaminate the Hart Senate Office Building might have caused the staff members’ illnesses (see GSN, Feb. 15). Staff members in other office buildings that were not fumigated, however, have also reported symptoms, which has cast suspicion on the mail, the Sun reported.
The irradiated mail is perfectly safe, according to the U.S Postal Service. Studies conducted by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency found no high levels of chemicals in any Capitol Hill building since the irradiated mail was first delivered.
The staff members’ ailments might be caused by plastic in the mail that could have melted when irradiated, federal authorities said. The illnesses might not be from the irradiation process, but from the fumes of melted plastic, they said.
In an attempt to fix the problem, the Postal Service has begun removing plastic from envelopes, decreased the level of radiation used to sanitize the mail and now airs out letters before delivering them, according to the Sun. Mail that has undergone this new process will begin arriving on Capitol Hill as early as this week, congressional aides said.
Other staff members’ symptoms could be the result of the flu or winter colds, investigators said. They added that skin irritations being reported could come from the brittle irradiated mail absorbing the moisture from the hands of those who open it. More serious complaints likely have no relations to the irradiated mail, the investigators said.
“We’re not aware of any clinical evidence that associates the irradiated mail with the symptoms that have been reported,” said Postal Service spokesman Gerry Kreinkamp. “If (mail handlers) feel like they’ve had an adverse reaction to dry mail, use moisturizer” (Ellen Gamerman, Baltimore Sun, Feb. 20).
Physicians in private practices and hospitals will be the front line of defense in the event of another bioterrorism attack, scientists from the U.S. Centers of Disease Control and Prevention said today.
“In most situations, alert clinicians actually initiated the first phase of the response by obtaining the appropriate laboratory tests, recognizing that a patient might have anthrax and notifying health officials,” wrote three health officials — Julie Gerberding, deputy director of the CDC’s National Center for Infectious Diseases, James Hughes, the CDC official overseeing the anthrax investigation and CDC Director Jeffrey Koplan — in an editorial in today’s issue of the Journal of the American Medical Association (see related GSN story, today).
Clinicians have created an effective system for first identifying and reporting cases of a suspected bioterrorism attack, according to the health officials. In order for the system to work, physicians need to have basic information on symptoms of diseases that are used as biological weapons. They also must be able to make accurate diagnoses and know when to report the cases to public health officials, the authors said.
For physicians, learning about the symptoms of biological weapons agents and how to diagnose them is an ongoing process, the officials said.
“Bioterrorism-related infections hopefully will remain rare events, and creative ongoing strategies will be required to sustain attention to potential new cases when the current phase of alarm and interest ebbs,” they said.
The authors added that public health officials need a better system to notify physicians when a bioterrorism attack occurs. Such a system would improve real-time data reporting and would better disseminate needed information.
“The importance of individual clinicians in bioterrorism preparedness and response was not fully appreciated by many until the current attacks occurred,” said the CDC officials.
“Hopefully, the lessons learned during the past [four] months will motivate local health departments, health care organizations and clinicians to engage in collaborative programs to enhance their ... capabilities” (Journal of American Medical Association, Feb. 20).
In the early to mid-1990s, the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) in Fort Detrick, Md., lacked strict security measures to prevent against the theft of biological agents, the Washington Post reported yesterday (see GSN, Jan. 22).
“No one asked questions,” said former USAMRIID scientist Richard Crosland, who worked with botulinum toxin. “You could literally walk out with anything.”
“It blew me away,” said another researcher who worked at USAMRIID until the early 1990s. “I could have lifted vials of anything, and they never would have been missed. There was nothing to stop me.”
USAMRIID lacked strict inventory controls over the pathogens and toxins used by researchers, former facility scientists said. They added that the strict controls would be considered standard procedures at facilities that worked with less dangerous materials.
“No one ever came in and asked, ‘Where’s that material you ordered?’ Never once did they ask you what you did with it,” Crosland said. “7-Eleven keeps better inventory than they did.”
“I would work all by myself with some of the most dangerous organisms in the world,” said a former USAMRIID technician. “It wasn’t just a matter of security lapses — there was absolutely no security.”
In a 1992 statement, the then-head of the facility’s pathology division told Army investigators that “shenanigans have been going on” at USAMRIID.
Scientists at the facility had secretly been working on their own projects, technicians were asked to come in on weekends to assist in unauthorized projects and “quite a bit of stuff was unaccounted for,” said Lt. Col. Michael Langford in a transcribed interview.
“It was obvious to me there was little or no organization of that group and little or no accountability of many things,” Langford was quoted as saying.
Lapses Due to “Culture Change”
USAMRIID officials said there is no evidence that any dangerous pathogens were taken from the facility or misused. They added that security has been improved at the facility since the mid-1990s and further still in the past four months since the anthrax attacks. The current security measures are similar to those adopted by the National Institutes of Health, said USAMRIID spokesman Charles Dasey.
Security lapses in the early to mid-1990s resulted from a major shift in focus after the Gulf War, USAMRIID officials said.
“There was a huge culture change,” Dasey said. “Before the war, the threat from weapons of mass destruction wasn’t as real as it became after the war. Suddenly the threat was very real.”
One change at USAMRIID was a shift away from an “academic style of research” to one more concerned with the possibility of a biological weapons attack, Dasey said.
“Some of the scientists at the time weren’t comfortable with that change,” he said.
Lapses Found at Energy Department Laboratories
Security lapses were also found at U.S. Energy Department laboratories that conducted research on pathogens with the potential to be used as biological weapons, according to the Post (see GSN, Dec. 18, 2001).
At one Energy laboratory, scientists worked for years on anthrax without notifying security officials, according to an internal audit. Several facilities exchanged pathogen samples, including those of anthrax and plague, without notifying the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention as legally required, according to a report by the department’s inspector general completed last year. The report also said another laboratory had provided potentially misleading information to the CDC about its qualifications to handle certain pathogens.
Energy said it has enacted new security measures in the past year to protect workers and the public. New measures include requirements for all department laboratories to conform to CDC guidelines on handling pathogens, an Energy spokesman said.
Biological security in the mid-1990s was not as high of a priority as it is today, said Tara O’Toole, Energy undersecretary for the environment, safety and health from 1993 to 1997.
“It’s a measure of how fast things have changed,” said O’Toole, now head of the Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies at Johns Hopkins University. “It is unfair to impose January 2002 standards and sensibilities on 1999” (Joby Warrick, Washington Post, Feb. 19).
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Police in Rome yesterday arrested four Moroccans in possession of a cyanide-based chemical and a map of Rome’s water supply system (see GSN, Dec. 3, 2001).
Police arrested the men during a dawn raid yesterday on their apartment in southern Rome, according to Agence France-Presse. The U.S. and British embassies were highlighted on the map. Police also discovered several forged documents in the apartment.
The four men had previously been under surveillance for several days and police arrested them after gathering evidence that they had the chemical, police said. The men had more than four kilograms of the chemical, which could have caused “dozens of deaths,” the Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera reported (Agence France-Presse, Feb. 20).
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Past measures and a lack of Russian reaction have aided the Bush administration’s plan to withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, former U.S. cabinet official James Schlesinger said in an op-ed column in today’s Washington Post (see GSN, Dec. 17, 2001).
“Defenders of the ABM Treaty had earlier undermined their own position, and it was just a matter of time before the logical consequences followed,” said Schlesinger, a former U.S. defense secretary, energy secretary and CIA director.
In 1999, supporters of the ABM Treaty, including then-President Bill Clinton, backed the National Missile Defense Act, which mandated the development of a missile defense system as soon as “technologically possible.” The treaty, however, was designed to prohibit the development of much of the needed technology for any missile defense, Schlesinger said.
“In the face of a new law mandating deployment of a missile defense as soon as ‘technologically possible’ there appeared to be no alternative to abandoning those very barriers to technology that were the essence of the ABM Treaty,” he said. “The treaty would have to be sharply modified or abandoned.”
The Bush administration, a vigorous supporter of missile defense, tried to persuade Russia to make changes to the treaty. Russia, however, included unacceptable demands, such as being allowed to monitor any technology developments, before allowing changes to the treaty, according to Schlesinger (see GSN, Jan. 24).
“So if the administration was serious, it had no choice but to withdraw,” he said. “President Bush cut the Gordian knot.”
The announced U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty has provoked little reaction, Schlesinger said. Russia only made small protests to the move, but instead of starting a new arms race, recently agreed to bilateral strategic offensive weapons reductions with the United States (see GSN, Feb. 12).
The lack of a stronger Russian reaction defused much of the protests from European governments. China has chosen to simply continue increasing its stockpile of strategic weapons and U.S. defenders of the treaty have remained relatively quiet, said Schlesinger.
“Arms control agreements are not forever. Strategic conditions change,” Schlesinger said. “Rather than being ‘the cornerstone of strategic stability,’ the treaty turned out to be more like the cornerstone of arms control theology” (James Schlesinger, Washington Post, Feb. 20).
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