U.S. Response:  More Funds Needed for Water Security, Utilities Say

Officials from more than 80 U.S. water departments are expected to visit Washington this week to lobby for more funds to safeguard U.S. public water systems from a terrorist threat, USA Today reported today (see GSN, Oct. 10, 2001).

The officials plan to push for at least $2.1 billion to adequately safeguard water supplies, including $500 million for vulnerability reviews conducted by outside security experts and $1.6 billion for new security measures, such as alarms, cameras, locks and fences.

President George W. Bush proposed $37.7 billion in homeland defense funding in his fiscal 2003 budget, of which $22 million would go toward public water safety.  That is only 1 percent of what is needed, water utilities said.

“Utilities aren’t particularly vulnerable to an attack, but they are not invincible, either,” said Rob Renner, deputy executive director of the American Water Works Association.

Threats to water supplies might come less from terrorists dumping poisonous chemicals than from attacks on facilities themselves, said Tom Curtis, deputy chief for governmental affairs at the American Water Works Association.

“It’s not necessarily truckloads of chemicals that we’re worried about,” Curtis said.  “There are pumps.  There are pipes.  There are things utilities need to protect.”

Water utilities want the additional funds to come without regulations that might mandate making security review findings available to the public, according to USA Today.

“Is keeping this away from public view going to guarantee safety?  No,” Curtis said.  “But why make it easy for somebody to have a blueprint to attack the water supply in a city?” (Patrick O’Driscoll, USA Today, March 18).

Back to top

Threat Assessment:  U.S. Tells Allies to Watch Out for Al-Qaeda

The United States has told its allies to watch out for al-Qaeda attempts to develop weapons of mass destruction, FBI Director Robert Mueller said today in Manila, where he discussed U.S. concerns about al-Qaeda with Philippine officials.

U.S. officials have collected enough evidence in Afghanistan to prove al-Qaeda was attempting to obtain weapons of mass destruction, Mueller said (see GSN, Feb. 26).

“We have not seen any definitive evidence that [Osama bin Laden] was successful, but there is enough there to cause us substantial concern and ... to say to countries around the world to be on the alert for any efforts or attempts by terrorist groups to obtain weapons of mass destruction,” Mueller said.

Southeast Asia is a potential sanctuary for al-Qaeda members, although it is not clear whether the organization has established a presence in the region, Mueller said.

“He emphasized that there is no evidence of any al-Qaeda cell in the Philippines, but we have to take all the necessary precautions to make sure that this continues this way,” said Philippine presidential national security adviser Roilo Golez.

Jemaah Islamiah

The group known as Jemaah Islamiah is linked to al-Qaeda and has ties to several countries including Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia, Mueller said (see GSN, Nov. 26, 2001).  Security forces in those three countries have detained dozens of suspected Islamist militants in the last few weeks on suspicions they have connections to Jemaah Islamiah.

Philippine police detained at least four Indonesians on suspicions they had links to al-Qaeda.

“What has emerged from our investigation is that the Indonesians, while they may have no direct link to al-Qaeda, appear to have a connection with Jemaah Islamiah,” said Philippine national police chief Leandro Mendoza.

U.S. Assistance to the Philippines

Mueller offered FBI technical assistance to help Philippine officials track down terrorist organizations’ funds and offered to share information obtained from al-Qaeda and Taliban members captured in Afghanistan, said Golez.

U.S. special forces are also providing counterterrorist training to Filipino troops to help combat the Abu Sayyaf group in the southern Philippines, which U.S. officials have said is tied to al-Qaeda (Reuters/New York Times, March 18).

Back to top

India-Pakistan:  Analysts Propose to Safeguard South Asian Arsenals

By Kerry Boyd
Global Security Newswire

Recent U.S. proposals to expand post-Cold War programs could provide experience and technology to improve the security of nuclear arsenals in Pakistan and India, but adapting the programs to circumstances in South Asia might be difficult, analysts told Global Security Newswire last week.

U.S. Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) said earlier this month that he intends to propose legislation to expand U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction programs — established to help former Soviet states dismantle and secure nuclear materials and facilities — to countries including Pakistan and India.

“The precise replication of the [CTR] program will not be possible everywhere, but a satisfactory level of accountability, transparency, can and must be established in every nation with a WMD program,” Lugar said in a Council on Foreign Relations speech (see GSN, March 5).

The United States and other countries with applicable knowledge should offer assistance to Pakistan and India to help them ensure the security of various nuclear assets, said Robert Einhorn, a senior analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and former assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation.

“There’s no reason that any process that has worked in Russia couldn’t work well in any other country,” said Jon Wolfsthal of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Start Simple

Although Pakistan’s command and control system works well, India and Pakistan could learn a lot from the U.S. experience of managing its own nuclear capability and avoiding nuclear war with the Soviet Union, said Brigadier Feroz Khan, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs Division of the Pakistani Joint Services Headquarters.

“Why must I learn something that was already learned in the 1950s and 60s?” he said.

U.S. advisors should help both countries install more sophisticated locks, fool-proof communication systems and other means to prevent unauthorized access to and use of weapons, Khan said (see GSN, Nov. 29, 2001).

Any assistance, however, must not be in a context of weakness and must not violate the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty or other legal requirements, Khan said.

“No one’s asking for nuclear weapon designs,” he said.

Personnel Reliability

Khan and Wolfsthal both suggested that the United States could help improve ways to ensure loyalty and reliability of personnel with access to nuclear materials and facilities (see GSN, Oct. 1, 2001).

The United States — which uses techniques also used by banks, government and other entities that require a loyal and stable work force — has provided its experience developing a personnel reliability program to Russia, said Wolfsthal. 

U.S. measures include drug tests, credit history checks and lie-detector tests to ensure that workers with access to sensitive materials are loyal, stable and do not have weaknesses that could allow someone to blackmail or tempt them, said Wolfsthal.

Pakistan already has some technology and procedures to ensure proper control, such as identity cards and coded locks, Khan said.  He added that the country could, however, benefit by learning more about the U.S. personnel reliability system, as could India and Israel — the other two nuclear powers outside the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty regime.

Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers

The United States can also offer assistance beyond CTR-type efforts.  One important measure is to establish crisis prevention centers, Khan said.  “South Asia is endemic to crisis” and needs a method to deal with tense situations, he said.

Pakistan and India should establish nuclear risk reduction centers in Islamabad and New Delhi similar to the ones in Moscow and Washington, Khan said.

Nuclear risk reduction centers are “a good idea,” said Einhorn.  “It’s a modest confidence-building measure that can provide a vehicle for exchanging information that could help defuse a crisis.”

The United States and former Soviet Union established two Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers in 1988 to provide “direct, reliable, high-speed systems for the transmission of notifications and communications at the government-to-government level,” according to a U.S. State Department summary.

The two centers exchange information, such as notifications of ballistic missile launches, in accordance with treaties and confidence-building agreements.

A South Asian center might include a combination of diplomats, scientists and military officials with regular meetings between Indian and Pakistani officials, Khan said.

Potential Problems

Concerns exist, however, that threat reduction programs might not work in South Asia due to Pakistani and Indian distrust of U.S. intentions, some analysts said.

“I think we should be realistic about what the Pakistanis and Indians are prepared to accept in the way of help from other countries,” said Einhorn.  Pakistan and India do not trust each other, and they are unlikely to provide U.S. personnel access to certain nuclear facilities, he said.

CTR programs between the United States and Russia followed decades of interactions between U.S. and Soviet, and then Russian, officials that created a level of confidence and comfort allowing some access, Einhorn said.  That is not the case in South Asia.  Despite those potential difficulties, the United States should still offer assistance, he said.

The techniques and approach of the CTR program in the former Soviet Union are applicable to South Asia, but the program may not be politically workable, Wolfsthal said.  India and Pakistan are “paranoid about U.S. intentions,” he said.  “There’s a lot of skepticism about our intentions.”

The principle behind the CTR program — that many unsecure nuclear weapons were left in the former Soviet Union — does not apply to Pakistan, Khan said.

The regional context in South Asia and lack of cooperation between India and Pakistan create a very different situation.  Khan emphasized that he supports the concept of CTR but is unsure whether it applies to South Asia.

Tension to Dialogue

In any case, proposals for U.S. assistance and South Asian cooperation face a serious obstacle in the current mobilization of Pakistani and Indian forces after a Dec. 13 attack on the Indian Parliament.

Tension reduction measures are most needed but are particularly difficult in such a climate, Einhorn said.  The situation might have to calm down before India and Pakistan can begin serious dialogue, but in the meantime, the United States can “float ideas” and let the two countries “mull them over,” he said.

India and Pakistan should not expect assistance from the United States until the two form some type of cooperative security agreement to prevent misperceptions and escalation, Khan said (see GSN, Feb. 25).  India and Pakistan must promise to restrain their forces — both conventional and nuclear, Khan said.

South Asia needs a third party to jumpstart, facilitate and monitor agreements, Khan said.  If India and Pakistan reach a restraint agreement, the United States could help provide information on each country’s adherence with an agreement, he said.  The United States previously has used information from satellites and other means to prevent crises in South Asia, so why not formalize that role, Khan said.

Back to top

U.S. Response:  New Detectors Could Have Limited Use, Experts Say

Some scientists have said that new radiation detecting devices might be of little use in preventing terrorists from detonating a nuclear weapon or “dirty bomb,” the New York Times reported today (see GSN, March 6).

The key to finding a nuclear device is information — without it, “needle in a haystack” does not describe the challenge, said Steven Fetter, a physicist and professor of public policy at the University of Maryland.

“If you tell me there’s a warhead in New York, it’s just hopeless,” Fetter said.  “You just hope you never get to the point where you have to track down one of these in a city.”

Under ideal conditions, it is possible to detect a nuclear weapon from more than 200 feet away, but a weapon under terrorist control might be more difficult to find, said Frank von Hippel, a physicist and science policy professor at Princeton University.

A joint U.S.-Russian study in 1989 “showed that U.S. and Soviet warheads were quite detectable,” von Hippel said.  “That might not necessarily be true for a terrorist warhead.”

Terrorists could attempt to shield a nuclear device with lead to block emissions that detectors would otherwise pick up, the Times reported.  Some of the most dangerous nuclear materials, such as uranium and plutonium necessary for a bomb, emit very little radiation.  Natural radiation could also mask a faint signal coming off of a nuclear device, according to the Times.

The best way to prevent nuclear terrorism is to make sure terrorists do not have access to nuclear materials, according to some experts.

“The moral of the story is you lock up nuclear materials as well as you can lock them up,” Fetter said.  “Once you let them get out, the problem is a thousand times harder.”

New Sensors

Since Sept. 11, the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration’s annual budget for the development of radiation sensors has doubled to $20 million, according to the Times.  In addition, federal laboratories are spending up to $18 million on the effort, an NNSA spokeswoman said (James Glanz, New York Times, March 18).

Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory engineers have developed the Cryo-3, a small, 10-pound detector that uses a high-purity germanium crystal to find a radiation source.  Photon, X and gamma rays interact with the germanium to create a corresponding charge.  The charge is then processed to determine the type and quantity of radioactive isotope present.

The germanium crystal is cooled by the same kind of mechanical cooling device currently used to cool low-noise cell phone antennae.  The Cryo-3 can operate for six hours on two camcorder batteries that can be switched while the detector is running, allowing for almost unlimited operational time.

“Whatever you can detect with a germanium crystal, you can detect with the portable system,” said Lorenzo Fabris of Berkeley Laboratory’s Engineering Division. “Ideally, we would be able to place one at any customs port” (U.S. State Department release, March 17).

Researchers at the U.S. Energy Department’s Brookhaven National Laboratory are working on another type of radiation detector, one that would use semiconductor chips that could detect radioactive isotopes through their individual radiation “fingerprints,” according to United Press International.

“You’re after something that’s low-power, battery operated, very compact in size, long-term operation unattended, no maintenance, all those things are going to be required …,” said Ralph James, associated director for energy, environment and national security at Brookhaven.  “This (chip) technology really fits the bill.”

One major factor is the ability of a radiation detector to be able to differentiate between naturally occurring radiation and that given off by a terrorist nuclear device, James said.

“What we need is something that can discern special nuclear materials that might be part of something with nuclear yield,” he said.  “These are cases of plutonium-239, uranium-235, the ones people know about.  (We have to spot these) materials from a wide range of naturally occurring isotopes.”

The new semiconductor chip technology can do just that, James said.

“Just as you can tune your radio to find the frequency of your favorite station, you can identify each isotope by tuning into the unique energies associated with the emissions,” he said.  “We can spectrally ‘window’ and determine if (a source) is plutonium-239, a great concern for nuclear weapons, or something like americium-241, which is in practically every smoke detector in the United States” (Scott Burnell, United Press International, March 17).

Who Will Track Down Nuclear Devices?

Any new radiation detectors would be sure to find their way into the hands of the Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST), part of the Energy Department’s Nevada Operations Office, which is in charge of responding to a nuclear terrorism threat (see GSN, March 4).

NEST can send about 600 personnel to the site of nuclear terrorism threat, though deployments have so far involved fewer than 45 people, according to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.  NEST personnel come from the Nevada operations office, Energy Department laboratories and three private contractors.  There are 17 different types of NEST personnel representing a wide range of abilities, including four types of physicists, chemists, mathematicians and communications specialists.

If there is a nuclear terrorist threat, the first step the team takes is to determine its validity.  NEST maintains a database on nuclear weapons design information, taken from sources ranging from scientific journals to spy novels, in order to check the technical accuracy of a threat.  Psychologists examine the wording and structure of any accompanying communication to determine the mindset of the terrorist and where in the world he or she might have originated.

If it is necessary to respond to a threat, NEST has more than 150 tons of equipment at hand, according to the Bulletin.  The team has its own air fleet consisting of four helicopters with radiological search systems and three airplanes equipped for remote sensing missions.  NEST can also deploy vans equipped to detect radioactive emissions and has its own graphics agency to disguise the vans and blend in with commercial traffic.

NEST already has in its arsenal handheld nuclear detectors that can be hidden in objects the size of suitcases or briefcases.  These detectors can silently alert a NEST member to the presence of a nuclear device through a signal transmitted to the member’s earphone, the Bulletin reported.

NEST also has diagnostic and disablement equipment if a nuclear device is discovered.  If it is necessary to disable a nuclear or “dirty” bomb, team members might surround it with explosives and then detonate them or use a 30-millimeter cannon to break the bomb up into tiny pieces.  NEST can also build a nylon tent 35 feet high and 50 feet in diameter around a nuclear device, and then pump up to 30,000 cubic feat of foam to limit the spread of radiation (Jeffrey Richelson, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 2002).

Back to top

U.S.-Russia:  Russia May Agree to Store Nuclear Weapons

Russia might agree to a bilateral arrangement that allows the United States to store some decommissioned nuclear weapons rather than destroy them, said Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov Sunday on NBC’s Meet the Press (see GSN, March 15).

“Part of it may be stored.  I don’t argue with that principle,” Ivanov said.  “But the devil is in details — how much, how long and how quickly it might go back to operational, and, well, jeopardize strategic stability” (Meet the Press, March 17).

U.S. insistence on an agreement that cuts the two countries’ operational nuclear arsenals to between 1,500 and 2,200 warheads but allows storing some so they could become operational again has been a major point of contention in the latest U.S.-Russia arms talks.  Russia said previously that it wanted each side to agree to destroy the decommissioned warheads (Steve Gutterman, Associated Press/Yahoo.com, March 17).

Ivanov’s comments followed an earlier U.S. concession to agree to a legally binding document formalizing the cuts rather than the informal document the Bush administration originally wanted (see GSN, March 14).  Exactly what constitutes a legally binding agreement, however, remains an unresolved issue, Ivan Safranchuk, director of the Center for Defense Information’s Moscow office, wrote in a Moscow Times opinion piece. 

Russian law states that the Duma must ratify any document dealing with national security and arms reductions, so Russia is pushing for a full treaty that requires Russian and U.S. Senate ratification, according to Safranchuk.

The U.S. Bush administration, however, wants to bypass a Senate ratification requirement by forming an executive agreement.

“The Russian side is hardly likely to agree to a treaty that it must ratify fully, while the United States is under no such obligation,” Safranchuk wrote.

Russian officials have indicated that the United States will concede to the Russian definition of a legally binding document in exchange for Russian acceptance of U.S. plans to store decommissioned warheads, wrote Safranchuk.  Russia will likely follow suit and store rather than destroy its warheads.

Verification measures would probably be based on START I and START II, according to Safranchuk (Ivan Safranchuk, Moscow Times, March 18).

Senate Requests Vote on Agreement

U.S. Senators Joseph Biden (D-Del.) and Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), the ranking members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, sent a letter to Secretary of State Colin Powell Friday demanding that any agreement to cut nuclear warheads be sent to the Senate for ratification.

An agreement on “significant obligations by the United States regarding deployed U.S. strategic nuclear warheads” would “constitute a treaty subject to the advice and consent of the Senate,” the letter said.

“With the exception of the SALT I agreement, every significant arms control agreement during the past three decades has been transmitted to the Senate pursuant to the Treaty Clause of the Constitution,” the senators wrote.  “Mr. Secretary, we see no reason whatsoever to alter this practice.”

Three Ways

The U.S. president can formalize a legally binding agreement in three ways, the New York Times reported.  One is by executive authority, which does not require congressional consent.  The president could also send an agreement to both houses of Congress, and require a majority vote.  The third route is to submit a treaty to the Senate, which would need a two-thirds majority to approve it (Thom Shanker, New York Times, March 17).

Back to top

U.S-India:  Talks Could Shift Away From Old Issues, Indian Newspaper Says

In talks in New Delhi tomorrow, the United States and India might set aside old issues and focus on bilateral cooperation with missile defense systems and ways to deal with the threat posed by nuclear terrorism, according to the Hindu.

Officials will probably resume discussions on nuclear weapons issues during a visit today by Christina Rocca, U.S. assistant secretary of state for South Asian affairs (see GSN, Feb. 25).  Even though Rocca will probably discuss old concerns such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, many such issues have lost their importance, the Hindu reported (see GSN, March 14).

The United States and India have had more than 10 rounds of talks on nuclear issues since India conducted nuclear tests in 1998, the Hindu reported (C. Raja Mohan, Hindu, March 18).

Back to top

Smallpox:  Russia and U.S. Speed Up Live Smallpox Research

The Russian and U.S. centers responsible for housing the world’s only known samples of smallpox are preparing to intensify their research efforts to develop smallpox defenses, Science magazine reported Friday (see GSN, March 15).

Scientists at the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention will devote one of its two maximum-containment laboratories exclusively to smallpox research starting at the end of this month.  The research will continue “for as long as it takes,” said James LeDuc, who heads the studies.

“That’s a huge commitment,” said Jonathan Tucker, a smallpox expert at the Monterey Institute of International Studies.

The Russian State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology, known as Vector (see related GSN story, today), is also preparing to launch a three-year smallpox program with Russian and U.S. funding.

The two centers are working to develop modern diagnostics, safer vaccines and new drugs to fight smallpox in the wake of the Sept. 11 attacks and heightened fears that terrorists could obtain and use smallpox as a biological weapon. 

Researchers are also speeding up efforts to complete as much research as possible before the international community could someday order the destruction of the remaining two live smallpox virus stores.  The World Health Organization decided earlier this year to extend the destruction deadline for three additional years, rather than order its destruction at the end of 2002 (see GSN, Jan. 18).

“It’s clear we cannot destroy the virus at this stage,” said Antonio Alcami, a mousepox expert at the Cambridge University and a WHO adviser.

The World Health Assembly must vote on the WHO decision in May, and although it is expected to approve the extension, it could theoretically vote to continue with destruction at the end of this year.

Debate

China and a few other countries that oppose the restricted U.S. and Russian possession of the smallpox samples are expected to state their preference for destroying the samples at the assembly meeting.

The CDC has not shown much enthusiasm for keeping its smallpox stocks, perhaps mostly due to the large amount of maximum-security space it requires, according to Science.

“We were told to do it,” said LeDuc, “and we’re doing it to the best of our ability” (Enserink/Stone, Science, March 15).

There are also critics in the United States, many of whom helped eliminate smallpox in the wild, who believe the samples should be destroyed to rid the world of the disease.  Alfred Sommer, who helped eliminate the disease, argues that developing new antiviral drugs to fight smallpox is unlikely to happen soon and that the world needs to emphasize that keeping smallpox stocks is immoral. 

“The world would be a much safer place if we all decided we want to get rid of it, instead of playing with it,” Sommer said.

Other scientists, such as virologist Peter Jahrling of the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, have said they need time to study the virus to develop antiviral drugs and vaccines that do not endanger people with weak immune systems (see GSN, Nov. 21, 2001).

Those who support keeping the virus samples appear to be winning the argument in the political sphere, according to Science.  The Sept. 11 attacks “muted the criticism of the research pretty substantially,” said Tucker (Martin Enserink, Science, March 15).

What the Scientists Are Trying to Do

Scientists conducted little research on the smallpox samples until a former Soviet scientist defected to the United States and revealed that the Soviet Union had conducted a huge program to weaponize smallpox, Science reported (see GSN, Jan. 22).  In response, the United States, with WHO oversight, began a program in 1999 to modernize smallpox research using medical developments such as molecular biology advances.

The CDC and USAMRIID have developed new diagnostic tests, examined genetic diversity of virus strains, sequenced the genomes of eight new isolates and developed a possible animal model for smallpox — an important step to developing drugs for humans (see GSN, Jan. 29).  Scientists are also working to develop safer vaccines.

U.S. and Russian researchers have been working together to study whether other types of poxes are filling the void left with the eradication of smallpox.

Vector researchers plan to test antiviral compounds and compare their smallpox strains with CDC strains (Enserink/Stone, Science).

Vector also wants to conduct a second expedition to the Arctic Circle to look for frozen, buried bodies of smallpox victims, Science reported.  Some Russian scientists have expressed concern that the virus could be viable in the tissues of corpses there and therefore potentially available to terrorists.

“It’s still quite possible that live smallpox exists in the permafrost,” said Vector’s Evgeny Belanov.

A terrorist “would only need to find a little bit of live virus to be successful,” said Alcami of Cambridge.  “I’m not sure if you would be able to recover infectious particles,” he said.  “But it’s not impossible.”

A Russian team went to Pokhodsk village in the Arctic Circle in 1991 and studied the bodies of smallpox victims from the 19^th century whose bodies had been frozen and thawed several times since their death.  In that case, they were unable to isolate a live virus from the bodies, according to Science (Richard Stone, Science, March 15).

Back to top

Russia:  Vector Laboratory Sees Successful Conversion

By Michael Kitchen
Global Security Newswire

The former top-secret Soviet biological weapons laboratory called Vector offers a good case study for such facilities converting to peaceful pursuits, public policy scholar Kathleen Vogel said Thursday in Washington (see related GSN story, today).

Speaking last week at a U.S. Institute of Peace briefing on health security, Vogel — a fellow at the University of New Mexico — said the success of Vector laboratories in moving out of the biological weapons business has been largely due to efforts by the center’s management, the Russian government and the international community.

Located near Novosibirsk, Vector is divided into a “research zone” and a “production zone,” with the latter now involved in the manufacturing of pharmaceutical and agricultural products as well as in animal breeding and other economically viable activities, Vogel said.  Perhaps among the most prominent of the facility’s accomplishments is an advanced HIV diagnostic kit developed in the late 1990s.

While concern continues over employing researchers formerly involved in weapons development, Vogel said that about 170 “Ph.D.-level scientists” are currently working for Vector.

The conversion of Vector was by no means a forgone conclusion, Vogel said.  Plans for changing the facility began soon after it began downsizing in 1989, but a lack of funds made this impossible, Vogel said.  She added, however, that Vector’s management proved itself to be “proactive for change,” something that is almost unique among such facilities. 

With the help of its proactive managers, Vector managed to save itself from closure after the fall of the Soviet Union and secured the status of “Russian State Research Facility.”  By 2001, Vector was collecting a $3.4 million budget, funded not only by Moscow but also by U.S. grants and various other forms of international assistance (see GSN, Nov. 26, 2001).

Vogel said plans are also under consideration to turn Vector into an international research institute, although there are no funds for such a project as yet.  In suggesting new financial sources for Vector and similar centers, she urged greater private-sector involvement, noting that while the United States is actively involved in the Vector project, U.S. corporations have yet to follow suit.

Commenting on the conversion of weapons research centers, U.S. Assistant Surgeon General Ken Bernard said the difficulty also lies in luring scientists away from what is potentially very lucrative research.

“There are people out there who would pay a lot of money to buy a biological weapon,” he said, likening the situation to convincing opium poppy farmers in Southeast Asia to switch crops.

Back to top

United States I:  Tooele Sarin Stockpile Destroyed

The last material in the largest U.S. sarin stockpile was destroyed Friday at the Tooele incinerator in Utah (see GSN, Jan. 28).

“As of today we have destroyed over 75 percent of the nation’s chemical stockpile of [sarin] weapons,” Maj. Gen. John Doesburg, commander of the U.S. Army Biological Chemical Command, said Friday.  “This signifies a remarkable beginning to an end of the U.S. chemical stockpile.”

The Army has worked since 1996 to destroy more than 12 million pounds of sarin stored at the Tooele depot, according to the Associated Press.  A treaty certificate on the completion of the sarin disposal will not be awarded until the facility is decontaminated (Associated Press/Deseret News, March 17).

Back to top

United States II:  Anniston Depot Incinerates Test Materials

The U.S. Army began incinerating test materials Saturday at the Anniston Army Depot in Alabama in preparation for destroying chemical weapons stored there (see GSN, Feb. 15).

The test was the first conducted in a well-populated area, according to the Associated Press.  More than 72,000 people live within nine miles of the Anniston depot, which holds more than 2,200 tons of chemical munitions.  Residents near the depot have little to fear, said Anniston spokesman Mike Abrams.

The Army is using dummy rockets in a nine-day test that began Saturday, Abrams said.  The process of destroying actual chemical weapons will begin in September, the AP reported.

“We’ve already destroyed safely more than three times the amount of the chemicals we have stored here,” he said, referring to incineration projects at the Johnston Atoll in the Pacific Ocean and Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility in Utah.

Some residents, however, said they are concerned that it would be impossible to evacuate the town if an accident does occur.

“If something goes out that smokestack and the siren goes off, it’s still gone,” said Brenda Lindell, a founder of Families Concerned About Nerve Gas Incineration.  “You can’t protect the public.  I think it’s crazy” (Jay Reeves, Associated Press/Deseret News, March 17).

Back to top

U.S. Plans:  Interceptor Test Produces Fourth Successful Hit

The U.S. Defense Department Friday successfully tested a missile interceptor designed as part of the developing national missile defense system.  It was the fourth hit in six intercept tests (see GSN, March 15).

More than 140 miles above the Earth, a prototype missile interceptor launched from Kwajalein Atoll in the Pacific Ocean hit a modified Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missile launched from Vandenberg Air Force base in California.

Operators integrated land- and space-based sensors and command, control and communication procedures to track the launch of the Minuteman target.  They also used a prototype X-band radar that provided intercept data to the interceptor (U.S. Defense Department release, March 15).

Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz praised the outcome of Friday’s test.

“I think what we can say is that our test program is proceeding and showing some quite impressive success,” Wolfowitz said Saturday on CNN.

“I’ll say right off the bat — before some critic discovers it — this was not a, quote, ‘realistic’ test of exactly what an intercept would have to do,” he said in response to criticism that the test was deceptively impractical.  “But it’s the first time we’ve had anything that looked like a decoy warhead, and it picked out the real warhead from the decoys.”

“We’re in a development program.  People need to understand that,” Wolfowitz said.  “As we have said over and over again, it’s an important area where we’re going to go down the avenues that work and cut off the avenues that don’t work” (U.S. Defense Department transcript, March 16).

Critics of a U.S. missile defense plan, however, said that the system is still very far from operational.

“We have a long way to go before the final exam,” said Chris Madison of the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation.  “I’m concerned that people have the impression, based on these tests, that we’re almost to missile defense.  Until we have operational testing, we’ll have no idea whether we can get there.”

The U.S. Missile Defense Agency expects to conduct operational tests based on the most realistic scenarios over the North Pacific Ocean after 2004, said MDA spokesman Lt. Col. Rick Lehner.  Developers will need to conduct 20 more tests before they can reach an operational system, and the Pentagon plans to conduct a test every three months until 2007, he said (Associated Press/Deseret News, March 17).

Back to top

Radiological Weapons:  Left-Behind Soviet Generators Could Be Dirty Bomb Source

Small radioactive power generators left throughout the former Soviet Union could be a source of radioactive materials for terrorists looking to build a “dirty bomb,” the Washington Post reported today (see GSN, March 7).

The radiothermal generators (RTGs) were used by the Soviet Union as power sources for navigational beacons and communication equipment in remote areas, according to the Post.  Each RTG can contain up to 40,000 curies of strontium or cesium, of which a tiny fraction is enough to have a high probability of causing cancer.

Although cesium and strontium cannot be used to make a nuclear weapon, they could be combined with conventional explosives to make a dirty bomb, according to experts.

“This stuff can be just ghastly to clean up,” Henry Kelly, president of the Federation of American Scientists, said this month during a Senate hearing on radiological weapons.

In the former Soviet republic of Georgia, investigators are searching for at least two RTGs that are believed to have been left behind and stolen after a Soviet military base was closed, according to the Post.  In the eastern Russian region of Chukotka, investigators found a lack of controls on more than 85 RTGs installed along the Arctic coast in the 1960s and 1970s.

“The generators are placed on open land, are clearly visible from the sea and are visited by staff no more than once a year (in recent years, staff has not visited the sites at all),” said a report from a Russian commission that inspected the Chukotka generators in 1997.  “They would be easy targets for a terrorist attack, the consequences of which could be extremely serious.”

The International Atomic Energy Agency classifies Soviet RTGs as “orphaned” sources of nuclear material and has called for an effort to locate and safeguard them.

“They are a problem from the point of view of terrorism,” said IAEA spokeswoman Melissa Fleming.  “Since we can’t find them, presumably it would be hard for terrorists to find them as well.”

There is a wide gap between finding an RTG and taking it away to be used as a weapon, according to nuclear experts.  Potential terrorists tampering with a radiothermal generator would be at risk themselves, said Institute for Energy and Environmental Research President Arjun Makhijani.  If people knew what they were doing, however, RTGs could become a potent weapon in their hands, he said.

“If you don’t know what you are doing, it will kill you first,” Makhijani said.  “But if you know what you’re doing, it will do an extreme amount of damage” (Joby Warrick, Washington Post, March 18).

Back to top