 |

If we store our nuclear weapons, Russia is likely to follow suit. And if there are more warheads retained by Russia, the threat of proliferation of nuclear weapons will increase.
—U.S. Senator Carl Levin (D-Mich.), on the Bush administration’s plan to keep available thousands of nuclear warheads removed from U.S. missiles and bombers.

A top U.S. official yesterday confirmed reports the United States has discovered a laboratory in which al-Qaeda attempted to develop anthrax and other biological weapons (see GSN, March 20)...Full Story
Tensions within the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons are likely to continue as the United States has vowed to continue its efforts to remove the organization’s director general, Jose Mauricio Bustani, O Globo reported today (see GSN, March 22)...Full Story
The United States plans to keep 2,400 nuclear warheads in a reserve “responsive force” that would enhance a deployed force of 1,700 to 2,200 warheads, according to arms control experts briefed by U.S. officials (see GSN, March 22)...Full Story
 |
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission does not conduct extensive background checks on nuclear power plant employees and does not know how many foreign nationals work at nuclear plants, according to a report released today (see GSN, March 1).
The report, titled “Security Gap: A Hard Look at the Soft Spots in Our Civilian Nuclear Reactor Security,” was prepared by Representative Edward Markey (D-Mass.) from an analysis of more than 100 pages of correspondence requested from the NRC. The report indicated that although the agency does require criminal background checks of nuclear plant employees, the checks are limited to crimes conducted in the United States.
“It is unacceptable that the NRC (does not have) a policy on screening of foreign nationals,” the report said. “Terrorists may now be employed at nuclear reactors in the U.S. just as terrorists enrolled at flight schools in the U.S.”
Security exercises conducted at nuclear plants are inadequate and the sites that conduct them fail more than half of the time, according to the report. The NRC waited until six months after the Sep. 11 attacks to increase security at nuclear power plants, the report said, adding that the NRC has “historically failed” to change security regulations and has “yet to begin a permanent revision of security regulations.”
“Black hole after black hole is described and left unaddressed,” Markey said. “Post 9-11, a nuclear safety agency that does not know — and seems little interested in finding out — the nationality of nuclear reactor workers or the level of resources being spent on security at these sensitive facilities, is not doing its job.”
The NRC has worked hard to ensure that the 103 U.S. operating nuclear reactors are safe, said NRC spokesman Neil Sheehan.
“We think we’ve been very proactive in trying to identify any threats against nuclear power plants,” Sheehan said. “There are a number of things that have been done and will continue to be done. We’re not taking any threats against nuclear power plants lightly” (Cheryl Thompson, Washington Post, March 25).
The names of all nuclear plant employees are vetted by the FBI and any criminal records would likely be discovered through the process, said Ralph Beedle, chief nuclear officer for the Nuclear Energy Institute, the main lobbying group for the nuclear power industry.
“The people we hire, for the most part, are folks who have come over here and gone through school,” Beedle said. “I hired a lot of people out of Columbia University, [City College of New York], folks from India, China, that were over here for years as students,” he said, referring to when he was chief of nuclear operations at the New York Power Authority (Matthew Wald, New York Times, March 25).
The NRC also does not know how many security guards are employed at each nuclear plant, Markey said. NRC spokeswoman Diane Screnci said nuclear plant security forces are fingerprinted and minimum staffing levels would be included in each plant’s security plan, which is filed with the NRC.
“The security plan would tell you the minimum number, but not necessarily the whole number,” Screnci said.
Screnci also said security tests conducted at nuclear plants are not done on a “pass-fail” basis. Instead, they are used to find “chinks in the armor,” she said.
Even though the NRC does require background checks, “the scope is somewhat limited” and not enough to assure security at a site where a terrorist attack could be potentially devastating, said Dave Lochbaum, a nuclear safety engineer with the Union of Concerned Scientists.
“I’ve worked in over 20 plants in the 17 years I was in the industry,” Lochbaum said. “Had I wanted to sabotage the plant, it wouldn’t have been that difficult to do so.”
Although other agencies do not conduct extensive background checks of their employees, “The consequences of someone causing mayhem [at nuclear power plants] are a little more severe than someone working at a 7-11,” Lochbaum said (Susan Milligan, Boston Globe, March 25).
|
 |
|
 |
The United States plans to keep 2,400 nuclear warheads in a reserve “responsive force” that would enhance a deployed force of 1,700 to 2,200 warheads, according to arms control experts briefed by U.S. officials (see GSN, March 22).
U.S. President George W. Bush announced plans last November to cut the deployed nuclear arsenal to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads by 2012, and U.S. officials have repeatedly stated U.S. intentions to place some of those warheads in reserve rather than destroy them (see GSN, Nov. 14, 2001).
Arms control experts only recently learned, however, that the United States would keep as many as 2,400 warheads as a responsive force, plus thousands more on inactive reserve. According to leaked parts of the classified Nuclear Posture Review, warheads in a responsive force would be removed from delivery vehicles such as missiles, aircraft and submarines, but they could be redeployed quickly — ranging from a few days to a few months but all within three years.
A U.S. draft proposal of an agreement with Russia to cut nuclear arsenals would allow either side to move warheads from a responsive force into operational mode as long as one country informs the other, said an arms control expert.
A Natural Resources Defense Council report said that the U.S. arsenal would probably contain almost the same number of nuclear warheads in 2012 as it does today (see GSN, Feb. 19).
From Reductions to Proliferation?
Some members of Congress have said Bush’s plan to store rather than destroy nuclear warheads would create an incentive for Russia to also store nuclear warheads, which might be kept in insecure facilities (see GSN, March 18).
“This approach surely will make it highly unlikely that Russia will destroy its nuclear warheads,” said Senator Carl Levin (D-Mich.). “If we store our nuclear weapons, Russia is likely to follow suit. And if there are more warheads retained by Russia, the threat of proliferation of nuclear weapons will increase.”
“What kind of an example do we set for other nations when we say we are reducing our strategic nuclear stockpile to 1,700 or 2,200 nuclear warheads when what we really are thinking of doing is moving nuclear warheads from missiles and bombers to warehouses where they could be quickly and easily brought back to service?” asked Levin (Jonathan Wright, Reuters/Yahoo.com, March 22).
Russia might resume nuclear weapons testing if the United States continues to develop its nuclear arsenal, a senior Russian lawmaker said Sunday (see GSN, March 22).
“A resumption of nuclear testing at Russia’s Novaya Zemlya test range is quite possible if the U.S. pushes ahead with its nuclear weapons program,” said Andrei Kokoshin, a member of the State Duma, the lower house of the Russian Parliament.
Russia should also begin developing precision weapons, Kokoshin said. Russia conducted its last nuclear weapons test in 1990 and ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 2000 (Vladimir Radyuhin, The Hindu, March 25).
All nuclear weapons states will probably need to test their nuclear weapons arsenals at some point, former Russian Atomic Energy Minister Yevgeny Adamov said today.
“Countries of the world will either agree and develop a formula for totally renouncing nuclear weapons, or those possessing them will have to make tests,” Adamov said, adding that nuclear weapons states should purchase supercomputers as a temporary measure to simulate tests.
“The role of nuclear weapons will soon change,” Adamov said. “One will stop seeing it as a deterrence factor, and it can quite easily become the cheapest means to solve a conflict in order to spare manpower and material values” (Vladimir Rogachev, ITAR-Tass, March 25).
North and South Korean officials plan to discuss concerns about North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs in meetings next month, with preparations beginning as early as today, according to reports.
“I will deliver our views on nuclear and missile issues and will relay the president’s desire that the issues should be settled in a good way,” said envoy Lim Dong-won, reportedly a close advisor to South Korean President Kim Dae-jung.
“What is important is to prevent tension from mounting on the Korean peninsula,” Lim said.
Lim helped design the South Korean “Sunshine Policy” of engaging North Korea, and he helped produce the June 2000 summit between the two Korean leaders, AFP reported (Agence France-Presse, March 25).
Lim left for North Korea today, the South Korean news agency Yonhap reported, according to the New York Times (see GSN, Feb. 20).
“We expect the talks to lay the groundwork for a resumption of stalled relations between South and North Korea,” said South Korean presidential spokeswoman Park Sun-sook (Howard French, New York Times, March 25).
Renewed Sunshine?
Some experts and officials expressed hope for progress in North and South relations after the June 2000 summit, but the peace process stalled last year, according to AFP. North Korea froze relations with South Korea and the United States in response to what it called hostile policies of the Bush administration (see GSN, Feb. 22), AFP reported (Agence France-Presse).
Tensions peaked after U.S. President George W. Bush said North Korea is part of an “axis of evil,” along with Iran and Iraq (see GSN, March 12). Last week, Bush refused to certify that North Korea is in compliance with the 1994 Agreed Framework (see GSN, March 21), under which North Korea promised to freeze its nuclear program in exchange for international aid, including the construction of two modern nuclear power reactors.
“The United States welcomes and supports dialogue between South and North Korea,” U.S. State Department spokeswoman Jo-Anne Prokopowitz said after simultaneous North and South Korean announcements on the upcoming talks (New York Times).
North Korea Warms Up to Russia
Bush’s policy, which is more hard-line than that of former president Bill Clinton, has pushed North Korea closer to Russia, despite cold relations for a decade, according to the New York Times.
Before this year, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il never visited the Russian embassy in Pyongyang, but “the Russian ambassador sees Kim Jong Il almost once a week now,” said Alexandre Mansourov, a former Soviet diplomat in North Korea and now a teacher at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawaii.
“The North Koreans want to know clearly that the Russians will be on their side” if the United States attempts to form a coalition against the country, said Mansourov. “If crunch time comes, they want to know that Russia will not support any military action.”
Another problem that could push North Korea toward Russia is a delay in constructing the two light-water reactors in North Korea (see GSN, March 20).
Choe Thae Bok, chairman of the North Korean Supreme People’s Assembly went to Russia last week and asked Russian Industry Minister Ilya Klebanov for Russian assistance to build a nuclear power plant. Klebanov was noncommittal, according to the Times. The Russian Atomic Energy Ministry said Friday that North Korea had not officially asked for a nuclear power plant, and “neither have our countries negotiated the issue” (James Brooke, New York Times, March 24).
|
 |
A top U.S. official yesterday confirmed reports the United States has discovered a laboratory in which al-Qaeda attempted to develop anthrax and other biological weapons (see GSN, March 20). There was no evidence al-Qaeda successfully produced the weapons.
At the site near Kandahar, Afghanistan, “there was evidence of the attempt by [Osama] bin Laden to get his hands on weapons of mass destruction, anthrax or a variety of others,” Gen. Tommy Franks, head of the U.S. Central Command, said on NBC’s Meet the Press.
“What we found in that site, and in fact, what we have found in several sites is evidence of the attempt,” the general said. “We have not yet found a place where we see weaponized weapons of mass destruction.”
“The laboratories, based on what we’re able to take from it, documentation, vials and so forth, was dedicated to that purpose [developing weapons of mass destruction] … In hot pursuit was bin Laden and were agents of al-Qaeda, but we have not seen a successful product of their labors up to this point,” Franks said (Meet the Press, March 24).
Other officials also confirmed the reports. “U.S. Special Forces operating in the vicinity of Kandahar found a possible al-Qaeda chemical and biological research facility,” said Central Command spokesman Lt. Commander Matthew Klee.
The facility “contained some laboratory equipment and possibly was intended for use in a biological warfare production effort,” Klee said (BBC, March 24).
The Laboratory
Officials did not find any biological agents in the laboratory, which was under construction when al-Qaeda agents left it. U.S. intelligence officials believe al-Qaeda would have needed foreign assistance to turn their research into an effective WMD program, the New York Times reported Saturday.
The equipment and documents at the site, however, indicated that al-Qaeda wanted to produce anthrax, the Times reported. The laboratory contained medical equipment and supplies that scientists could have used for legitimate research but also to produce biological warfare agents, U.S. officials said.
U.S. officials refused to say whether they had information from a former al-Qaeda agent or local resident who might have provided information about activities at the laboratory.
The discovery of the laboratory provides more evidence to support U.S. officials’ belief that al-Qaeda was working to develop weapons of mass destruction but has so far failed, according to the Times.
“It is another example that they had an appetite for developing biological agents,” said a U.S. official.
U.S. agents have been searching more than 60 sites in Afghanistan where they suspect al-Qaeda had been operating during the Taliban’s rule. Only a few samples showed any possible biological agents in very small amounts. U.S. officials continue to search the sites and investigate evidence, the Times reported (Michael Gordon, New York Times, March 23).
Federal investigators are examining a report that one of the hijackers involved in the Sept. 11 attacks was treated for a skin lesion that could have been caused by anthrax three months before last fall’s deadly mailings, U.S. officials said Saturday (see GSN, March 13).
Experts at the Johns Hopkins Center for Biodefense Strategies prepared the report after examining the documents of a Florida doctor who treated Ahmed Ibrahim al-Haznawi, who was a hijacker on United Airlines Flight 93, which crashed in Pennsylvania, said U.S. officials. The experts concluded that anthrax was the most likely diagnosis for a lesion found on al-Haznawi’s leg, said Tim Parsons, spokesman for Johns Hopkins University’s school of public health.
Physician Christos Tsonas treated al-Haznawi for the lesion in June, the Associated Press reported Saturday. Al-Haznawi said he developed the lesion after bumping into a suitcase, but after the Sept. 11 attacks and the anthrax mailings, Tsonas concluded that the lesion was consistent with anthrax, according to the AP.
FBI officials, however, said they did not think there is a connection between the Sept. 11 hijackers and last fall’s anthrax attacks.
“This was fully investigated and widely vetted among multiple agencies several months ago,” said Assistant FBI Director Jon Collingwood in a written statement. “Exhaustive testing did not support that anthrax was present anywhere the hijackers had been. While we always welcome new information, nothing new has, in fact, developed” (Associated Press/New York Times, March 24).
The report, along with prior evidence that the hijackers involved in the Sept. 11 attacks were also interested in obtaining access to cropdusting planes, could mean that the Sept. 11 and anthrax attacks were connected, said an FBI official. Scientists and FBI agents, however, have found no connections in the course of their investigation, the official said.
“We did look into this sometime ago. This was fully investigated,” the FBI official said. “It’s a theory, but there’s no evidence. It’s just not there. We just have no evidence to feed the speculation that any of those guys came into contact with anthrax.”
“Amerithrax” Investigators Trudge Ahead
Investigators are concerned that the “Amerithrax” investigation into last fall’s anthrax attacks might become a “Unabomber-type investigation” — one that takes years, and possibly a lucky break, before it is solved, said a senior U.S. Justice Department official (Shogren/Meyer, Chicago Tribune, March 24).
FBI investigators had been prepared for a bioterrorism attack conducted in a subway or from an airplane but were surprised by the use of letters, the Wall Street Journal reported.
“None of the training exercises I participated in anticipated that type of delivery,” said a top law-enforcement official involved in the case. “We had virtually no crime scene in the traditional sense. We only have the envelopes and the letters and the anthrax.”
So far, one of the most difficult things in the “Amerithrax” investigation has been how to analyze the powder found in the anthrax mailing for clues that might lead back to a suspect, according to the Journal (see GSN, Feb. 26).
Investigators are nonetheless making progress, said two senior law enforcement officials. One step has been to narrow down the number of U.S. laboratories that have stocks of the Ames strain of anthrax, the same strain that was used in the attacks.
Analysts have conducted a comprehensive review of the possible facilities that could have supplies of the Ames strain, the officials said (see GSN, Feb. 27). Out of about 22,000 potential U.S. facilities, “We’ve come up with what we think is a pretty tight list,” said one of the officials, adding that the number is less than 100.
Investigators have also had to develop ways to test and analyze the most pristine anthrax samples — those taken from the tainted letter mailed to Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.). To do so, the FBI brought to together about 20 experts from the American Association for the Advancement of Science, the National Science Foundation and other research groups, according to the Journal.
“They came up with a flowchart of all the different tests that should be attempted in order to find out how was it made, where was it made, how old is the sample — all these questions,” one of the officials said.
Once tests were developed, FBI researchers created samples of harmless bacteria similar to anthrax to conduct dry runs. Additionally, to conduct the sophisticated tests needed, the FBI took time to get needed contracts and secrecy agreements to use outside laboratories, the Journal reported.
One test conducted by an outside laboratory determined the ratio of atomic isotopes in a specific element in the powder. The ratio varies based on where the element comes from, investigators said. For example, the isotopic properties of oxygen and hydrogen in rainwater vary depending on the water’s geographic location, they said (Schoofs/Fields, Wall Street Journal, March 25).
|
 |
Tensions within the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons are likely to continue as the United States has vowed to continue its efforts to remove the organization’s director general, Jose Mauricio Bustani, O Globo reported today (see GSN, March 22).
A U.S. motion calling for Bustani’s resignation failed Friday, as did a Brazilian motion to resolve the U.S.-Bustani dispute through negotiation and an outside audit of the OPCW.
At an OPCW Executive Council meeting Friday in The Hague, 17 countries — including Japan, Poland, Cameroon, Nigeria, Canada, Slovenia, South Korea and most of the European Union — voted in favor of the U.S. no-confidence motion, leaving it 10 votes shy of a two-thirds majority.
Brazil, Cuba, China, Iran and Russia voted against the proposal, and 18 countries — including India, Pakistan, Mexico, South Africa, Sudan and France — abstained, ensuring neither side could claim victory (Bernlick/Oliveira, O Globo Online, March 25, Global Security Newswire translation).
Brazil’s motion for an outside audit might have given Bustani, himself a Brazilian, an opportunity to defend himself against U.S. accusations of mismanagement, according to Folha de Sao Paulo. The motion was voted down 17-14 with 8 abstentions (Renata Giraldi, Folha de Sao Paulo, March 22, Global Security Newswire translation).
“This vote demonstrates clearly that Mr. Bustani can no longer lead the OPCW and should clearly resign,” U.S. State Department deputy spokesman Philip Reeker said Friday of the outcome of the U.S. motion.
“The large majority of countries demonstrated that they had no confidence in him by supporting our request for his resignation or abstaining,” he said. “It sent a powerful signal that the loss of confidence in him is widespread. ... We hope the director general will understand and accept this clear signal and act on it.”
If Bustani does not resign, Reeker said, the United States will seek a special conference of the 145 signatories to the Chemical Weapons Convention in an attempt to oust the OPCW chief. According to OPCW rules, such a conference may be called within 30 days if 49 of the signatories agree (Agence France-Presse, March 22). A two-thirds majority of the parties would then be needed to force Bustani out.
Bustani said he will fight to retain his position and accused the United States of undermining the independence of international organizations. The OPCW head is concerned about the “precedent” that the U.S. no-confidence motion “could create in other international organizations,” OPCW spokesman Gordon Vachon said (Berlinck/Oliveira, O Globo Online).
“Only one country, the United States, is criticizing my management,” Bustani told Jornal do Brasil. “The others are afraid that the United States will withdraw from the organization should I continue.”
“There is no pressure that can make me resign,” he said, vowing to fight to “the end” (Rodrigo Rosa, Jornal do Brasil, March 25, Global Security Newswire translation).
“I cannot resign simply because one country does not like my style,” Bustani said. “I was elected by 145 countries. When these countries decide that I should go, I will” (Monica Tavares, O Globo Online, March 25, Global Security Newswire translation).
The director general said his resignation would plunge the OPCW into crisis. He added that member states would look on OPCW Vice Director General John Gee, a potential replacement as director general, as a tool of Washington; that nonpayment of dues by the United States and other countries is behind the organization’s financial problems and that U.S. opposition arose with the “unilateralist” administration of President George W. Bush (Rosa, Jornal do Brasil).
Jornal do Brasil reported this weekend that Washington’s stances toward Iraq and several other countries could be behind tension with Bustani (see GSN, March 19).
“I would say that Iran is more a central issue” than Iraq, one expert in Washington said, recalling U.S. Undersecretary for State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton’s January identification of Iran as a principal chemical weapons producer.
A former State Department official said U.S. officials “do not like one bit what they see as Bustani’s proselytizing in relation to the Russians.”
“Besides that, after Sept. 11, Bustani began to want to augment his role in the war against terror,” the State Department official said. “The United States saw this as opportunism on behalf of a person that could not even keep the accounts straight. ... In any case, this type of action is very atypical. ... Now the thing is public. It has become a political dispute, which was not really the case before, and that makes it more difficult” (Douglas McMillan, Jornal do Brasil, March 23, Global Security Newswire translation).
Debates over incineration and neutralization are continuing as destruction activities progress at U.S. chemical weapons sites in Colorado, Alabama and Oregon, the Associated Press reported this weekend.
The Defense Department has delayed a decision on the best way to destroy chemical weapons stored at the Pueblo Chemical Depot in Colorado, the AP reported Saturday (see GSN, March 15).
A decision had been expected by March 22, but the Defense Acquisition Board had not gathered enough data to recommend how to destroy the 2,600 tons of mustard gas at the depot, said Pentagon spokesman Maj. Jay Steuk. A recommendation is now expected within the next few weeks, and Defense Undersecretary Pete Aldridge is to make the final decision, Steuk said (Associated Press, March 23).
Mystery Vials
Meanwhile, the U.S. Army has moved 10 vials from the former U.S. Air Force Lowry bombing range in Colorado to the Pueblo depot while investigators determine what substances are inside, according to the AP. U.S. Army chemical specialists examined the containers Friday but could not identify their contents, said Marion Galant, spokeswoman for the Colorado Department of Public Health.
Colorado public health officials believe the vials might contain lewisite, which is similar to mustard gas, the AP reported. Two of the containers are labeled as mustard agent, three others contain crystals and the other five are empty, Galant said (Associated Press, March 23).
Anniston Completes Test Run
At the Anniston Army Depot in Alabama, officials completed a test run of an incinerator Saturday, Alabama officials said (see GSN, March 18). The test, a preparation for using the incinerator to destroy chemical weapons, ran for eight days.
“You want to prove the equipment is capable of doing what it’s supposed to do before you put the hazardous material in there,” said Ron Gore, head of the Alabama Department of Environmental Management’s air division.
The tests used dummy rockets, said Anniston spokesman Mike Abrams. Crews measured three test chemicals suctioned from the rockets and chopped metal shells into pieces before destroying them.
The results of the tests will not be known for several more weeks when the emissions are tested in a laboratory, Gore said. In order for the incinerator to be a success, 99.9999 percent of the chemicals must be destroyed.
The U.S. Army plans to start destroying M55 rockets armed with sarin nerve agent at the Anniston incinerator in September, the AP reported. Administrators plan to destroy the rockets first because they regularly leak sarin during storage, officials said (Associated Press, March 23).
Umatilla Considers Neutralization
At the Umatilla Chemical Depot in Oregon, the Army wants to re-examine plans to incinerate mustard gas, according to the Associated Press.
Assistant Army Secretary Mario Flori is expected to meet with Oregon state officials, including Governor John Kitzhaber, this week to discuss destroying the mustard gas through neutralization rather than incineration.
“Given the new situation after Sept. 11, we’re willing to talk about anything that will speed up the (chemical destruction) process,” said Chris Dearth, environmental project director for the Oregon Natural Resources Office.
Neutralization is a faster and less expensive method to destroy the more than 3,700 tons of mustard gas agent stored at the Umatilla depot, according to the Army. Kitzhaber and Oregon environmental officials, however, are wary of last-minute changes to the disposal plans, Dearth said.
“We’re a little worried because we’re so close to the start-up of incineration,” he said. “We don’t want to do anything to delay that.”
Oregon officials are also concerned about water resources needed for the neutralization method, Dearth said.
“We’re concerned about the amount of water it takes,” he said. “And our other concern is what happens to the secondary waste. There’s no place in Oregon to deal with that” (Associated Press, March 23).
Officials for Tooele County, Utah, said newly revised VX nerve agent toxicity ratings will not lead to a change in evacuation plans for residents around the U.S. Army Tooele Chemical Depot, the Deseret News reported Saturday (see GSN, March 22).
Current emergency response plans, based on the event of a grave disaster, are designed to evacuate residents as quickly as possible, said Tooele County Emergency Management Director Kari Sagers.
“Our objective is never to allow the public to be anywhere near where they could get contaminated,” Sagers said. “Less of (VX) will kill you faster I suppose, but such a small amount will kill you anyway.”
Most Tooele residents know the dangers of VX and have not responded to the new toxicity ratings, which indicate that the nerve agent is 10 times stronger than previously believed, said Tooele Mayor Charlie Roberts. The 1,000 households near the depot have radios ready to receive emergency information and to transmit evacuation orders once public sirens go off, Sagers said.
The new ratings reinforce the need to destroy the VX at the Tooele depot as quickly as possible, said State Senator Ron Allen.
“The basic opinion is we’re glad we’re getting rid of it,” Allen said (Catherine Blake, Deseret News, March 23).
Three former scientists at the Porton Down biological weapon center in England could face charges resulting from biological and chemical weapon experiments carried out on British soldiers during the 1950s and 1960s, the London Sunday Telegraph reported yesterday (see GSN, Feb. 27).
Police investigating the tests have recommended that charges be filed against the three scientists, who are accused of testing mustard gas and sarin on British soldiers. More than 20,000 British soldiers volunteered for the tests over 20 years, with many of them believing they were helping in research to find a cure for the cold, according to the Telegraph. About 300 servicemen claimed that disabilities such as breathing problems and liver disease could be traced to the tests.
British Director of Public Prosecutions David Calvert Smith will make the final decision on filing charges against the three former scientists once he has reviewed the evidence, the Telegraph reported.
Former British Royal Air Force Officer Allan Phillips, who was tested with mustard gas in 1959, said senior officials involved in the test also need to be held accountable.
“I am surprised that they have only found evidence against middle-ranking officials,” Allen said. “The people in charge must have known what was going on. Any prosecution of lower-ranking civil servants would be a whitewash when the real culprits are free” (Rajeev Syal, London Sunday Telegraph, March 24).
|
 |
|
 |
The Missile Defense Agency will probably delay the Airborne Laser’s first attempt to shoot down a ballistic missile until 2004, a year later than previously scheduled, Aviation Week & Space Technology reported today.
A top MDA official said small technical problems exist with the laser’s program, but an official with the ABL program said the problems are related to administrative restructuring (see GSN, March 14).
“The most likely date [for the test] is the fall of 2004,” said MDA Director Ronald Kadish.
There are small problems with the Boeing 747-based laser designed to shoot down a ballistic missile during its boost phase, but officials do not believe the system suffers any serious flaws, according to Aviation Week & Space Technology.
“The problems that were experienced — that prevented that 2003 (shoot-down attempt) — are not serious enough in our view, at this point in time, to restructure the program,” said Kadish. Part of the problem relates to the system’s hardware, Kadish indicated, such as weight-distribution problems and poor manufacturing on some welds.
One program official, however, said the delay is “a reflection of our transition to the Missile Defense Agency .… MDA’s philosophy is to develop lower risk, higher confidence schedules for all of its programs, including us. In other words, they want to make the testing program more comprehensive and extend it in case we run into unforeseen problems.”
The laser is currently the Pentagon’s most mature boost-phase intercept project, but MDA officials plan to put other boost-phase projects on the fast track, Aviation Week & Space Technology reported (see GSN, March 11).
Officials plan to hold the first flight of the Boeing 747-400 that is being modified to carry an airborne laser this summer (Robert Wall, Aviation Week & Space Technology, March 25).
|
 |
|
About Newswire | Contact National Journal | Re-Use Guidelines
 © Copyright 2002 by National Journal Group, Inc. The material in this section is produced independently for NTI by the National Journal Group, Inc. Any reproduction or retransmission, in whole or in part, is a violation of federal law and is strictly prohibited without the consent of the National Journal Group, Inc. All rights reserved.

HOME | CONTACT US | SITE MAP
|
 |