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History may judge at what point this comatose body actually expired, or at what stage continued inaction became dereliction of duty or even inexcusable negligence.
—Ambassador Eric Javits, U.S. representative to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, on the failure of the conference to hold any substantive arms control or nonproliferation discussions since 1998.

By David Ruppe Global Security Newswire
GENEVA — Efforts to negotiate arms control and nonproliferation measures remain deadlocked after three years here at the Conference on Disarmament despite nearly universal agreement among CD delegations that such measures seem more necessary in light of the terrorist attacks against the United States last year...Full Story
By Mike Nartker Global Security Newswire
In mid-March, Hispanic-American organizations and lawyers in Washington and southern California received hate letters that warned about a white powder included in the envelopes, although the powder later tested negative for anthrax, sources told Global Security Newswire this week (see GSN, Dec. 7, 2001)...Full Story
By Kerry Boyd Global Security Newswire
The U.S. Energy Department cannot account for small but potentially dangerous amounts of plutonium that the United States has donated or loaned to foreign countries since the 1950s, according to an Energy Inspector General report released this month...Full Story
By Greg Seigle Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — The United States should create a system to identify and monitor foreign students who study sensitive subjects such as nuclear, biological or chemical engineering, a top Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor said yesterday...Full Story
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By Greg Seigle Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — The United States should create a system to identify and monitor foreign students who study sensitive subjects such as nuclear, biological or chemical engineering, a top Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor said yesterday.
The State Department, Immigration and Naturalization Service and other government agencies often are unaware of how many students from potentially threatening countries are studying subjects potentially related to weapons of mass destruction at U.S. universities, an oversight that must now be changed, said Marvin Miller, senior research scientist emeritus at MIT’s Department of Nuclear Engineering.
“One of the problems we face if we try to filter out what I call ‘rogue students’ is to coordinate our policies,” Miller told a small gathering of diplomats, analysts and journalists during a speech sponsored by the Monterey Institute of International Studies.
If government agencies are unable or unwilling to track graduate students or visiting scientists from countries that could eventually pose a threat to the United States, then universities should consider establishing their own informal monitoring system, Miller said.
There are some university officials who would be reluctant to track and monitor students from suspect countries, Miller said.
“One rationale is that the academic community would be loathe to get involved in terms of academic freedom, and I think that’s largely a red herring,” Miller said during a speech on the role scientists play in developing weapons of mass destruction.
“I think there are people at places like MIT, Stanford, etc., who understand this problem and are willing to make a good faith effort to deal with it,” he continued. “Obviously it’s a very delicate matter, but I think much more can be done to come up with a rational system.”
Iranian Nuclear Experts Trained at MIT
In 1976, when Miller was an assistant professor at MIT, 25 Iranian students arrived to study nuclear engineering, he said. The students had been admitted to MIT as a bloc, against individual admissions policy, after a secret deal had been brokered by a nuclear engineering professor of Iranian descent, he said. Many of the Iranian students wound up in a nuclear engineering class being taught by Miller and a more senior professor, he added.
“It seemed to me rather strange at the time that they all seemed to be interested in uranium enrichment,” Miller said.
State Department officials appeared unaware of the sudden influx of Iranian students when Miller called to alert them, and he was told “the Shah of Iran is a good friend of the United States and we’d like to do all we can to help him,” Miller said.
The students were “not welcome” back in Iran after the overthrow of the Shah in 1979 by radical Islamic fundamentalists, and most stayed in the United States or moved to Europe, Miller said.
Today, however, many of those Iranian scientists hold top positions in the Iranian nuclear program, he said.
“More recently, word was passed that all is forgiven and they were ‘encouraged’ to return to Iran,” Miller said. “Several of them are now key members of the Iranian nuclear program.”
Key Warning Signs Missed
A strong indicator that a country is actively seeking to develop weapons of mass destruction comes when its regime sends large groups of students, its “best and brightest,” overseas to study at the world’s top institutions, Miller said.
Iraq, for example, sent hundreds of students to foreign countries in the 1970s and 1980s to study subjects pertaining to weapons of mass destruction, Miller said. Many of those former students, including those who studied nuclear, biological or chemical engineering at U.S. universities, are now in charge of the Iraqi WMD programs, he said.
U.S. officials “do not seek any advice from the academic community,” nor do they collect potentially valuable information on student research, Miller said.
“For example, we had a student in nuclear engineering [at MIT] some years ago who had finished up a master’s degree, a Pakistani student, who said he didn’t want to go back to Pakistan. And I said why, he said he didn’t want to work on a nuclear weapons program,” Miller continued. “If there had been a mechanism to pick up things like that I would think it would be helpful for the U.S. government to know about what’s going on.”
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By David Ruppe Global Security Newswire
GENEVA — Efforts to negotiate arms control and nonproliferation measures remain deadlocked after three years here at the Conference on Disarmament despite nearly universal agreement among CD delegations that such measures seem more necessary in light of the terrorist attacks against the United States last year.
Outsiders question whether the conference has become unworkable, and many countries, even close allies, are pointing fingers at the United States.
During the past two months of speeches here, in the first of three conference sessions this year, delegates have employed particularly strong language levying often thinly veiled criticisms of the Bush administration’s approaches, charging it has turned its back on multilateral arms control.
It is a conclusion U.S. officials are aware of and have sought to refute.
“We’re trying our best at disabusing people from feeling that,” said Ambassador Eric Javits, U.S. representative to the CD, told Global Security Newswire in an interview last week.
The United States “is certainly not walking away from multilateral engagement or this forum,” he said.
Differing Agendas
The deadlock currently centers on a fundamental difference of agenda between the United States and China. The former wants to negotiate a treaty banning future production of fissile materials for weapons purposes, but is willing only to discuss, not negotiate, agreements banning all weapons in outer space or nuclear force reductions.
China opposes negotiations on a fissile material treaty without negotiations on the other issues.
Exactly who is at fault can depend on how you look at it, says Wade Boese, a senior research analyst at the Arms Control Association and frequent writer on CD negotiations.
“You could assign blame on the United States, but you could also assign it to China,” he said.
One could also blame the nature of the Conference on Disarmament itself, a Cold War-born institution composed of 66-diverse countries, any one of which can block any action with a single vote.
“The conference itself is utterly unwieldy,” said James Leonard, a former U.S. ambassador here.
It became so, he said, as membership grew and U.S.-Soviet direction over negotiations was eliminated.
Leonard and some other observers think the CD, the principal multilateral arms control and nonproliferation negotiating forum, may have seen its day. The two giant U.S. and now Russian missions, nearly side by side and practically overlooking the United Nations complex where numerous major treaties were negotiated, have overseen several years of fruitless oratory and scattered attendance.
“To be perfectly blunt,” said Javits in a speech to the conference, “after so many years of deadlock and delay, to waste yet another year would be an evasion of our collective responsibility. History may judge at what point this comatose body actually expired, or at what stage continued inaction became dereliction of duty or even inexcusable negligence.”
Many delegations, however, including some of the closest U.S. allies, are assigning blame to certain Bush administration policies for the inaction.
Cited in particular, is U.S. resistance to negotiations on anything but fissile materials, as are the administration’s aggressive pursuit of a national missile defense system, which it says could include a space component, and its announced withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty that currently prevents such a system.
Earlier this month, senior Chinese and Russian officials issued a statement saying U.S withdrawal from the treaty “has adversely affected a solution to nonproliferation problems” and indicated they agreed to coordinate at the CD to prevent deployment of offensive weapons in space.
Bush Administration “Unilaterlism”
More generally, delegations are charging that “unilateralist” Bush administration policies regarding a host of existing or potential international agreements over the past year have undermined the spirit of mutual compromise and cooperation needed for multilateral cooperation here, and international law and norms in general.
Among the sharpest of U.S. critics is its close ally in its international campaign against terrorism, Canada.
Apparently referring to the Bush administration’s controversial Nuclear Posture Review made partially public in January, Canada’s ambassador to the CD Christopher Westdal, lamented that “the combined visions and security postures of major players continue to preclude wholehearted multilateralism and the political will and specific instructions we delegates need to be able to work here” (see GSN, March 14).
He called multilateralism “essential in countering ubiquitous WMD threats.”
Canadian Foreign Minister William Graham reiterated his government’s concerns last week at the conference, arguing for multilateral cooperation in starker terms.
“After what the world has been through with Sept. 11, one would think that our minds would finally be concentrated and that we would see — more clearly than ever — the need for an international security system within which all people and countries might feel secure,” said.
Not only has the conference been unable to agree on a program of work, he said, but also the existing system of treaties “representing the acquired gains of decades, is threatened from within and without.”
The international community “is now in danger of getting stuck again,” said British Ambassador David Broucher. Although 2001 saw some successes, he said, “we remember the past year as much for its disappointments.”
Russian Ambassador Leonid Skotnikov said failure last year resulted “largely because of the fact that a unilateral approach was pursued at the expense of a multilateral one and doubt was cast on the efficiency of multilateral efforts … where fundamental national security interests are brought together and may be reconciled.”
Retreating From Commitments?
While these diplomatic leaders decline to name names, other diplomats here have privately cited at least a half a dozen major international arms control initiatives allegedly undermined, prevented or destroyed by the Bush administration including the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty (see GSN, Dec. 13, 2001), the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention protocol (see GSN, Dec. 10, 2001), the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty inspection system (see GSN, March 19), the U.S. negative security assurances issued in 1979 and in 1995 (see GSN, February 22), a proposed treaty against putting weapons into space, argued as unneeded and the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, declared abandoned for replacement by a new, not fully negotiated U.S.-Russian agreement on “operationally deployed” nuclear warhead force cuts.
U.S. officials say the administration has good reasons for its approach to each item.
The BWC protocol, which would have created an inspection regime, was rejected last summer as too intrusive on the United States yet too weak on its targets. The administration refuses to forswear future nuclear testing, required by the CTBT, ostensibly in case arsenal maintenance some day requires it (see GSN, March 22).
Regarding negative security assurances, previous administrations had offered possible exceptions in response to chemical and biological weapons attacks (see GSN, March 19). A treaty against weapons in space is seen as unneeded, unenforceable and potentially hampering unique U.S. military advantages. The START II Treaty and follow-on negotiations were announced discarded last year for a new regime to preserve U.S. strategic flexibility. Abandoning the ABM treaty was needed for pursuing aggressive missile defense plans, deemed necessary for U.S. security.
Javits, in a Feb. 7 speech to the conference, explained that the administration’s approach was motivated by U.S. national interests, and reflected that some arms control approaches were not equally beneficial to all countries:
“Although maintaining international peace and security is our primary goal and overarching purpose, in the final analysis preserving national security is likewise necessary and essential,” he said.
“Mutual advantage is one key factor, for any arms control treaty must enhance the security of all states parties,” he said.
U.S. Undersecretary of State John Bolton in a January speech to the conference put it even more bluntly, calling U.S. policy “quite simply, pro-American, as you would expect.”
Canadian officials have argued that embracing the full body of the international rule of law, while having costs, brings its own security benefits.
“This in its own way opens other options — collective options — that have the power of international legitimacy. Embracing the rule of law means that the law must apply to all, equally,” said Foreign Minister Graham.
In the long run, said Ambassador Westdal, sustained cooperation from states is “best invoked through international law; the engagement of all states in collective, binding multilateralism is essential in countering ubiquitous WMD threats.”
U.S. Supports Multilateral Efforts
While unapologetically pursuing U.S. interests to the detriment of others’ multilateral priorities, Ambassador Javits has nevertheless sought to discourage the idea that the United States is unilateralist.
We’re “doing our best to try to bring people along to feel it’s not one way or nothing else,” he said.
“There are a number of international agreements we have signed on to,” he also said, citing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention, the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention and the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, banning weapons of mass destruction in space. In his February speech, Javits also listed the 1990 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, which reduced U.S., West European and former Soviet bloc conventional arms levels to reflect the end of the Cold War.
The United States “supports and upholds many multinational arms control agreements,” he said in the speech.
Where To?
Bolton argued the CD’s attention has been misplaced and should be changed. He urged negotiations on a fissile material cutoff treaty, which officials have said could have important consequences for curbing the proliferation of nuclear materials.
Nearly every other CD member is believed to support such a treaty. Yet, because of the three-year deadlock, the conference has been unable to approve a work plan.
A possible solution to please everybody came with the widely supported Amorim proposal of August 2000, named for its author, Brazil’s former ambassador to the CD Celso Amorim. It proposed creating four separate ad hoc committees to negotiate fissile material and negative security assurances treaties, and to “deal with” nuclear disarmament and preventing an arms race in outer space.
Many countries including the United States continue to support the Amorim proposal. Javits said in his speech holding discussions on the other issues is “the only appropriate approach when member states have not reached agreement on a realistic framework for seeking to negotiate a multilateral treaty.”
Other countries do not see that way. The United States provides “no support for things others want to talk about … other countries are saying what are we here for?” said former Ambassador Leonard.
“To put all the CD’s problems on the U.S. is excessive,” Boese said. “You can’t identify one country, and say they’re to blame.”
China’s proposal for banning weapons in outer space is untenably broad, he said, noting it calls for banning satellites that would inform or assist military action on the ground.
“That isn’t going to happen, those satellites are already up there, and not just [put up there] by the United States,” he said.
Still he, like many, think U.S. actions within the international arena in recent years “have definitely led to a negative atmosphere at the CD, perhaps provoking unwillingness to negotiate and give the United States what it wants.”
Some CD diplomats are hopeful a change in political will (read governing party) in the United States or elsewhere might one day change things dramatically for the better.
Some analysts, though, say the CD’s effectiveness ultimately is hampered by its nature.
“The consensus rule might have made sense when the CD was called something different and had 18 countries there,” said Henry L. Stimson Center President Michael Krepon. “As the conference has grown, its procedures have become disabling.”
Suspending the conference should be an option, he said, possibly prompting states to work informally to the exclusion of those with intent on blocking progress.
“You either have to change the procedures, which is very hard to do since the CD works by consensus, or you have to change the setting for useful work to be done.”
Russian and U.S. officials start a new round of talks today to revise U.N. sanctions against Iraq, but Russia and the United States continue to disagree on the issue, Russian news agency ITAR-Tass reported, according to Reuters (see GSN, Feb. 14).
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State John Wolf was scheduled to begin two days of discussions with Russian officials today in Moscow.
The two sides are negotiating a goods review list to allow more civilian goods into Iraq while tightening a ban on potential military goods. If the two sides reach an agreement, the U.N. Security Council could approve the list and revise the current oil-for-food program. Russian and U.S. officials have been negotiating since December and have yet to agree.
Russian and U.S. diplomats said they hope to reach an agreement in time for U.S. President George W. Bush’s visit to Moscow May 23-26 — a few days before the council is due to vote on sanctions revisions (Reuters/Yahoo.com, March 26).
The two delegations will also discuss ways to control proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction, Russian news agency Interfax reported. Russian officials might want to talk about U.S. statements that certain Russian organizations and companies sell missile technology to Iran (Interfax/BBC Monitoring, March 27).
Annan to Meet Iraqi Officials in April
Meanwhile, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan plans to meet with Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri on April 18 and 19 to discuss sanctions and Iraqi compliance with U.N. resolutions, Annan’s spokesman Fred Eckhard said Monday. Annan intends to focus on returning U.N. weapons inspectors to Iraq, Eckhard said (see GSN, March 21).
The United States, however, expressed skepticism about Iraqi intentions.
“The issue is — what are they coming with?” State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said Monday.
“Are they coming with a clear indication that they're going to accept the U.N. resolutions and implement them? Are they coming with a clear indication that they're going to allow the unfettered access by inspectors that's necessary to prove their claims that Iraq is not developing weapons?” he said.
“If it's no more than they've come with in the past, then we don't expect anything to happen,” Boucher added.
Russia’s ambassador to the United Nations Sergei Lavrov, however, welcomed Iraqi agreements to meet with Annan and discuss inspections.
“This has not been the case for quite some time,” he said Monday. “And I believe it is a very positive sign” (Gerald Nadler, Associated Press/Yahoo.com, March 25).
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By Kerry Boyd Global Security Newswire
The U.S. Energy Department cannot account for small but potentially dangerous amounts of plutonium that the United States has donated or loaned to foreign countries since the 1950s, according to an Energy Inspector General report released this month.
The report concluded that “the oversight of radioactive sealed sources provided by the U.S. to foreign entities was inadequate given current realities.”
The United States loaned or gave two to three kilograms of plutonium to 33 countries as part of the Atoms for Peace program, according to a 1996 Energy report. Several of those countries have since developed nuclear weapons programs or raised concerns about nuclear proliferation, including India, Pakistan, Iran and Israel.
Most of the plutonium was provided in the form of sealed sources, which contain nuclear or radiological material and are used for nuclear research and to calibrate radiation-measuring devices.
The Atomic Energy Commission, the Energy Department’s predecessor, required that information regarding sealed sources be reported to the Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System (NMMSS) and later to a separate Sealed Source Registry.
The department and its predecessors, however, did not enforce reporting requirements and stopped tracking the sources in the mid-1980s, the report says. Therefore, there is no database with current information on where the sealed sources are today.
“The department does not have current information on the location and condition of the sealed sources that it and its predecessor agencies provided to foreign countries from the 1950s through the 1970s,” the report says.
“Without controls in place to detail the location, condition, and ownership of sealed sources located in foreign facilities, the department cannot effectively administer its nuclear materials management program. Inaccurate inventory records limit the department's ability to detect stolen or lost material, and to effectively carry out its responsibility to dispose of nuclear materials,” the report says.
The Energy inspector general also concluded that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, U.S. State Department and the International Atomic Energy Agency do not maintain records of loaned sealed sources and could not sufficiently track their location and condition.
Who?
Another problem is the issue of ownership of the sealed sources. When the United States first provided the materials to foreign countries, the United States retained ownership, the report says. Later the United States changed its policies to donate or sell the materials, but confusion remains over which materials the United States still owns and which it does not.
Energy, however, did not keep adequate records regarding ownership. It is quite possible that 536 U.S. government-owned sealed sources exist unaccounted for in other countries, the report says.
The issue of ownership is important partly because the United States is responsible for finally disposing of the materials.
Why?
The report concludes that accurate and current information does not exist because the United States did not appropriately monitor where its sealed sources went. Additionally, the report says, international agreements limit the type of information foreign countries provide to the United States on nuclear materials and international safeguards that control other forms of nuclear material do not apply to all sealed sources.
Risks
The inspector general expressed concern that the sealed sources could be used to create a “dirty bomb” — a conventional explosive that spreads radioactive materials (see GSN, Nov. 5, 2001).
“While the quantities of nuclear materials in sealed sources are small, in the wrong hands, these sources could be misused,” the report says, adding that the material also poses a serious health risk if it is accidentally released.
“Recent world events have underscored the need to strengthen the control over all nuclear materials, including sealed sources,” the report says. “Individually and collectively, sealed sources represent a health, safety, and material security concern.”
Recommendations
Energy should update and reconcile tracking systems to account for sealed sources and work with the IAEA to control the materials, Inspector General Gregory Friedman wrote. The department should also quickly determine which materials the United States owns and locate them.
The department’s security office and the National Nuclear Security Administration must work together and with the IAEA to account for and control the sealed sources, the report says.
The security office’s director agreed with the inspector general’s report and proposed ways to improve NMMSS data on sealed sources, according to Friedman.
The NNSA disagreed with recommendations for itself and some general conclusions, according to a letter from Anthony Lake, NNSA associate administrator for management and administration.
“While it is a good idea to be aware of the locations and conditions of any material, it is not the current policy of the U.S. government. Should the policy change, various governmental elements would require additional funding from the Congress to undertake this initiative, which could well be expensive,” the NNSA said.
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By Mike Nartker Global Security Newswire
In mid-March, Hispanic-American organizations and lawyers in Washington and southern California received hate letters that warned about a white powder included in the envelopes, although the powder later tested negative for anthrax, sources told Global Security Newswire this week (see GSN, Dec. 7, 2001).
Brent Wilkes, national executive director of the League of United Latin American Citizens, said this was the first time his organization had received hate mail that included an implied anthrax threat. He is concerned it could happen more often in the future, he said.
About 40 organizations and lawyers received hoax letters, said Anna Lopez, executive director of the National Association of Hispanic Journalists. The organizations included the Washington offices of the League of United Latin Citizens, the Aspira Association, Southwest affiliates of the National Council of La Raza and the Sacramento, Calif., office of the Mexican-American Legal Defense Fund, among others.
The letters, postmarked from Oakland, Calif., with no return address, were sent in plain envelopes with typed-out addresses, and did not arouse suspicion when they arrived, said officials from several of the groups targeted. Inside was a letter attacking Hispanic immigration to the United States and filled with ethnic slurs. The sender claimed to be from India and warned the recipients of a white powder at the bottom of the envelope.
“And by the way, watch out for the white powder … envelope,” one passage in the letter said.
Lopez said she noticed something on her hands as she read the letter. She then saw the white powder, dropped the letter and called 911, she said.
Field-testing conducted on the powder came back negative for anthrax, Lopez said. Further testing on the powder by the FBI also came back negative for anthrax and other harmful substances she said. The scare, however, did close down many of the Washington offices of the targeted groups for a day, officials from several organizations said.
The Justice Department and FBI have opened an investigation into the case and are treating the hoax as a hate crime.
“All anthrax hoaxes are serious violations of federal law,” said Attorney General John Ashcroft in a press release. “Perpetrators of criminal acts, targeting Americans because of their race or heritage, will not be permitted. We are committed to identifying, tracking down and prosecuting domestic terrorists who threaten the lives and welfare of innocent Americans.”
Larry Gonzalez, Washington director of the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials, said he was pleased that the Justice Department had made the case a top priority, especially in terms of the amount of resources devoted to the case, and that they had decided to classify the incident as a hate crime.
Lopez said she met with the Justice Department last week and was assured the investigation is “a high priority,” adding that she was “thus far satisfied” with the progress of the investigation.
Wilkes, however, said he did not think the scare was being taken as seriously as it should. The FBI agents that arrived at the League of United Latin American Citizens “didn’t strike me as a crack team,” he said.
“I wouldn’t say that it was top priority,” Wilkes said, adding that federal law enforcement officials appeared to become progressively more concerned as the scope of the case increased.
Both the FBI and the Justice Department said they would not comment further on the case, because of the ongoing investigation.
Why Hispanics?
Officials from several of the groups targeted said they did not know why their groups, or Hispanic-American groups in general, were the targets of such a hoax.
There are some who blame immigrants for the Sept. 11 attacks, despite U.S. President George W. Bush’s best efforts to dispel that idea, Wilkes said. There has been an increase in anti-immigrant feelings, and targeting immigrants in general is not as taboo as targeting specific ethnic groups, he said. There are some people who feel they can get at nonwhites by targeting immigrants, he added.
Both Lopez and Gonzalez said their groups might have been targeted simply because they have the words “Hispanic” or “Latino” in their names. Whoever is responsible could have made the assumption that every Hispanic-American organization is involved with immigration issues, Gonzalez said.
Whoever is behind the hoax might not have had some purpose in mind, and instead just wanted to take advantage of the current climate to cause fear, officials from the several of the organizations said.
“I want to think it’s one person who is a very disturbed individual who wanted to scare people,” Lopez said.
New developments have emerged in the cases of last autumn’s inhalational anthrax victims Ottilie Lundgren and Thomas Morris Jr., while U.S. military officials assess the effects of anthrax vaccine and authorities begin cleanup activities at the Brentwood Road postal facility in Washington, according to reports.
Lundgren, the Connecticut woman who died of inhalational anthrax in November, might have contracted the disease by ripping up contaminated junk mail, a Connecticut health official said yesterday (see GSN, Feb. 20).
None of Lundgren’s first-class mail passed through mail-processing centers contaminated with anthrax, said Connecticut state epidemiologist James Handler. About 80 percent of her mail was bulk mail, however, and some of that passed through the Trenton, N.J., mail-processing center that became contaminated after handling anthrax-tainted letters sent to Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle (D-S.D.) and Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.).
Anthrax spores could have cross-contaminated mail as it passed through the Trenton facility, and then that mail could have contaminated mail-processing machines in Connecticut, according to the New York Times.
Testing conducted at a Wallingford, Conn., postal distribution center discovered anthrax spores on four out of 13 mail-sorting machines, Hadler said. One machine that handled primarily bulk mail had 3 million spores still remaining on it a month after contaminated mail is believed to have passed through. At another machine, one out of 52 columns of mail bins also tested positive for spores — the same column used for mail on Lundgren’s route, the Times reported.
Because the mail was so lightly contaminated, Lundgren probably was the only person in her town to become infected, according to scientists. Due to her age, the 94-year-old Lundgren might have only needed to be exposed to a few spores to contract the disease.
Hadler said he believes it was appropriate to advise all people to open mail gently (Denise Grady, New York Times, March 27).
Victim’s Family Files Malpractice Lawsuit
In the case of Thomas Morris Jr., a Washington postal worker who died of inhalational anthrax last year, Morris’ family has filed a lawsuit charging that a Maryland medical center misdiagnosed Morris’ symptoms shortly before his death (see GSN, Nov. 8, 2001).
The multimillion-dollar lawsuit claims medical malpractice, wrongful death, negligence and other errors in Morris’s death, according to the Washington Post. The Kaiser Permanente health plan that owns the Maryland medical center and nurse practitioner Alan Korff are named as defendants.
According to the lawsuit, Morris went to the Kaiser Permanente Marlow Heights Medical Center on Oct. 18 and claimed he had trouble breathing, along with other anthrax-exposure symptoms. Morris told Korff he though he had contracted anthrax, but Korff and physician supervisors told Morris that he only had a virus, the lawsuit said. They told him to take Tylenol and sent him home, according to the lawsuit.
Morris “died needlessly because of the negligence,” said Johnnie Cochran Jr., one of the lawyers representing the Morris family. Two other Washington postal workers who were treated for anthrax at a different hospital eventually recovered, Cochran said.
Kaiser Permanente spokeswoman Susan Whyte Simon said Korff had contacted Maryland health officials about Morris’s case and followed their recommendations.
Morris “died because someone put anthrax into an envelope and sent it through the mail,” said a Kaiser Permanente official, adding that it would “provide a response through the court system” to the lawsuit’s allegations (Fernandez/Castaneda, Washington Post, March 27).
Vaccine Effects on Pregnancies Studied
Meanwhile, the current U.S. anthrax vaccine does not appear to have a negative effect on women’s fertility, according to a study conducted on U.S. Army soldiers (see GSN, March 1).
The study, conducted on women in the Army who were not pregnant when they were vaccinated, found that the vaccine did not appear to have a negative effect on pregnancy and birthrates, according to the Associated Press. Researchers at the Madigan Army Medical Center in Tacoma, Wash. conducted the study and the results are expected to be published today in the Journal of the American Medical Association.
It appears that the vaccine also does not increase the chance of later birth defects when given to nonpregnant women, according to the study. The results on birth defects, however, were not conclusive because of the low numbers of pregnancies occurring among the women involved, researchers said.
The new study contrasts with the findings of a prior U.S. Navy study, which found possible connections between an increase in birth defects and the anthrax vaccine when used early in pregnancy (see GSN, Jan. 18).
There have been major questions raised about the accuracy of the Navy study, said William Winkenwerder, assistant defense secretary for health affairs. The results of the Army study were “reassuring to women in the services,” he said (Lindsey Tanner, Associated Press, March 26).
Brentwood Mail Facility Cleanup Has Begun
At the anthrax-contaminated Brentwood Road postal facility in Washington, some cleanup activities have begun, according to CNN.com (see GSN, March 26). The bulk of the decontamination effort — pumping the building full of chloride dioxide gas — will not begin until at least late May, said Thomas Day, U.S Postal Service vice president for engineering.
Before the chlorine dioxide process begins, postal officials plan to conduct a weeks-long community outreach program to allay fears of residents near the facility, according to CNN.com. Postal officials are also expected to talk with postal workers about their concerns over the Brentwood decontamination effort.
Chlorine dioxide gas was chosen to kill anthrax spores inside the Brentwood facility because of its success in decontaminating the Hart Senate Office Building. One major difference, however, is the size of the buildings — 100,000 cubic feet of space were decontaminated at the Hart building, while the Brentwood facility is 17.5 million cubic feet.
“Just sheer size is one of the challenges,” Day said yesterday, describing the Postal Service’s plan to decontaminate Brentwood.
The building layouts are also different.
Brentwood is “an open, easily accessible area. … It’s hard to make the complete comparison,” Day said. “The Hart building was a classic office environment with lots of nooks and crannies and bookshelves and desks and everything else” (Brad Wright, CNN.com, March 26).
By Kerry Boyd Global Security Newswire
U.S. President George W. Bush yesterday announced nominees for two top public health positions, the director of the National Institutes of Health and the surgeon general (see GSN, March 20). Both are key positions in responding to the threat of bioterrorism, he said.
Bush nominated Elias Zerhouni, Executive Vice Dean of the Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, to lead the NIH and Richard Carmona, a medical professor at the University of Arizona, for surgeon general.
“We’re improving our public health system to make sure that we can respond quickly to any biological threat that our country may face,” Bush said yesterday at the White House in Washington.
NIH Director
Zerhouni, who immigrated to the United States from Algeria, is a professor in radiology and biomedical engineering at Johns Hopkins and is known for his skills in both research and management, Bush said.
If the Senate confirms Zerhouni’s nomination, he will lead an organization that has grown significantly in the last 25 years and that — if Congress approves Bush’s fiscal 2003 budget proposal — will receive a $4 billion budget increase next year (see GSN, March 8).
Bush urged Congress to approve the proposed NIH budget, stressing the organization’s role in fighting terrorism.
“Medical research will improve our ability to identify and respond and treat infectious diseases, whether they occur naturally or are used as terrorist weapons,” Bush said.
“The NIH has taken a leading role in this important front on the war against terror. The work of the National Institutes of Health have never been more promising, and never been more important,” he added.
Surgeon General
At the University of Arizona, surgeon general nominee Carmona oversaw the development of management plans for WMD and anti-terrorism preparedness and consequences, said Health and Human Services Secretary Tommy Thompson in a statement yesterday.
Carmona has unique experience in both law enforcement and community health services, Bush said. He has served as a Green Beret in Vietnam, a police officer, a SWAT team member, a nurse and a physician.
“Dr. Carmona has redefined the term ‘hands-on medicine,’” said Bush. “Dr. Carmona is an experienced voice to help educate Americans about the best precautions and response to the threat of bioterrorism.”
The surgeon general’s primary responsibility is to be “America’s chief health educator,” according to Bush. The surgeon general also runs the Public Health Service Commission Corps, consisting of 5,600 health professionals who respond to emergency situations, such as the Sept. 11 attacks and subsequent anthrax attacks.
Senate Approval
The Senate must approve Bush’s nominees. Senate Health Committee Chairman Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) told the New York Times that Zerhouni is “a distinguished scientist with an impressive career as a scientific administrator.”
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U.S. defense contractor Lockheed Martin has won a U.S. Army contract worth more than $325 million for the continued production of the Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3) missile, the company announced yesterday (see GSN, March 22).
The U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command contract is for 72 PAC-3 missiles with 26 missile-round trainers, six telemetry kits, six launcher modification kits and nine fire solution kits. Lockheed Martin said it plans to deliver the order by February 2005.
The PAC-3 missile destroys incoming enemy targets such as theater ballistic missiles and cruise missiles by direct impact. The new PAC-3 will increase the firepower of a Patriot missile battery, since a Patriot launcher can hold 16 PAC-3 missiles, as opposed to four PAC-2 missiles.
“The PAC-3 missile is the world’s most effective hit-to-kill air defense missile,” said Mike Trotsky, vice president of Air Defense Programs for Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control, in a press release.
“We continue to see the robustness of PAC-3 in ongoing operational tests,” Trotsky said. “As PAC-3 missile production ramps up and economies of scale are introduced, we are confident that PAC-3 will become the world’s most cost-effective hit-to-kill air defense missile” (Lockheed Martin release, March 26).
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Authorities have arrested four men in Tajikistan for possession of two kilograms of stolen uranium, BBC News reported yesterday (see GSN, Feb. 22).
The men were arrested in the northern city of Chkalovsk, said a spokesman for the Tajik security ministry. The four men did not say how they obtained the uranium or what they planned to do with it. Laboratory tests, however, determined it came from the Vostokkredmet metal plant in Taboshar, near Chkalovsk (BBC News, March 26).
Western nations are planning to conduct a search within Georgia to find two missing containers of strontium-90, which could be used by terrorists to construct a “dirty bomb,” the London Guardian reported today (see GSN, March 18).
Western nuclear safety experts scheduled to meet in Paris in two weeks are expected to agree to conduct air, road and foot searches in Georgia to find two missing strontium containers, which came from Soviet-era nuclear batteries. It is the first time a national search for missing nuclear materials has been organized, according to the Guardian.
In December, three lumberjacks working in northern Georgia discovered another two nuclear batteries with their lead casings removed. The men carried the batteries away and later suffered severe burns and radiation sickness.
The strontium in those containers had a radioactivity of 40,000 curies, so strong workers recovering the two found batteries had to wear protective clothing and could only work on the radioactive metal from a distance of two meters away and for 40 seconds at a time.
“Sept. 11 has made everyone think differently about this,” said Melissa Fleming, a spokeswoman for the International Atomic Energy Agency. “There is more than an assumption that there are two more (abandoned nuclear devices) left in Georgia.”
The radioactivity of the missing strontium, combined with the unstable political situation in Georgia, increases the risk that terrorists could obtain the material for use as a weapon, according to experts.
“In Georgia you have a weak state and Muslim extremists,” said a senior European official in the Georgian capital of Tbilisi. “If you put the strontium together with classical explosives, you could make a town highly radioactive.”
The strontium in the missing containers, however, would be encased in heavy ceramic, which would make it difficult to disperse, Fleming said.
There is a “potential for a dirty bomb if it is shrouded in conventional explosives and then set off,” Fleming said. “But the strontium would need to be naked — someone would need to handle it and shroud it. The person (making the bomb) would need to be prepared to die” (Ian Traynor, London Guardian, March 27).
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