U.S. Export Controls:  Lawmakers Mark Up Changes to Bush-Backed Bill

By David Ruppe

Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — In a bipartisan vote, the House Armed Services Committee yesterday approved major changes to a Bush administration-backed technology export control bill that some members had said supports high-tech industries at the expense of national security (see GSN, March 4).

The marked-up legislation would, among other things, now strengthen the position of the secretary of defense relative to the Commerce Department in interagency procedures for licensing and decontrolling sensitive “dual-use” technologies for export and keep responsibility for satellite technology exports at the State Department.

It also requires creating a new multiagency regulatory regime for high-performance computer technology exports.

The 44-6 vote signaled resolve among committee Republicans and Democrats, including the most senior members, to press for major changes to the pending Export Administration Act of 2001, passed last year by the full Senate.  The House International Relations Committee has approved a version of the bill.

“We’ve made our statement, and we’re prepared to go to the floor to fight,” Representative Curt Weldon (R-Pa.), a leading proponent of the bill, said after the vote.

Administration Opposition Expected

The House International Relations version, while modifying the Senate-approved bill, “still falls short in a couple of specific areas mostly dealing with the ability of the secretary of defense to continue to play an important role in the process,” Armed Services Chairman Bob Stump (R-Ariz.) said in an opening statement.

A General Accounting Office official last week told the committee the International Relations bill places greater emphasis on protecting foreign policy and national security interests than the Senate bill, which emphasized economic interests.

Joseph Christoff, the GAO’s director of international affairs and trade, said, however, neither “provides a role for the Defense Department in executive branch assessments of the impact of a potential export on the military capabilities of a country supporting terrorism.”

The Bush administration is expected to oppose the marked-up legislation.  Administration officials at a hearing last week signaled their opposition to many aspects of the International Relations version.

The administration “strongly opposes the bill as reported out” by International Relations, Assistant Commerce Secretary for Export Administration James Jochum said.

The administration helped draft the Senate bill, cosponsored by a number of powerful senators, including Phil Gramm (R-Texas), and voted for by Senate Armed Services Chairman Carl Levin (D-Mich.), Ranking Member John Warner (R-Va.) and Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Joseph Biden (D-Del.). 

A number of other powerful senators voted against it, including Fred Thompson (R-Tenn.), John McCain (R-Ariz.), Robert Byrd (D-W.Va.) Jesse Helms (R-N.C), John Kyl (R-Ariz.) and Richard Shelby (R-Ala.).

Fundamental Differences

The legislation is intended to create a comprehensive new export control act to supersede a 1979 act that all parties agree needs replacement.  Nearly all of the Armed Services Committee changes were approved as a single package, combined in a “manager’s amendment” offered by Stump.

The House Armed Service Committee mark-up differs fundamentally from the Senate and House International Relations versions in a number of ways, by requiring:

*         concurrence of the defense secretary before items can be decontrolled if they are available from other countries;

*         maintenance of a Defense Department list of critical technologies that provide the U.S. military a qualitative edge, items from which cannot be licensed for export without Defense approval, unless the president overrides Pentagon opposition;

*         concurrence of the secretaries of state and defense for decontrolling technologies deemed to have “foreign availability” or “mass market availability”; controls also would remain in place if the item is covered by a multilateral export control or other international regime;

*         responsibility for satellite technology export controls to remain at the State Department, while the International Relations bill would have moved it back to Commerce;

*         items to be controlled if they could, rather than would, contribute to the military potential of countries detrimental to U.S. national security;

*         interagency disagreements over particular licensing decisions to result in denial, unless appealed to a higher level of officials and all concur to approve , or if the president approves the license; and

*         Defense to conduct an assessment of the national security impact of a change in the National Security Control List, and Commerce to notify Congress 30 days before a change.

New High-Performance Computer Controls

The Armed Services bill would, as did the Senate and International Relations versions, also repeal a 1998 law requiring agency notification and Commerce licensing of high-performance computer exports above a performance threshold for certain countries of proliferation concern (see GSN, March 6).

“The manager’s amendment recognizes the limited utility of the existing performance measure,” according to a summary of the amendment provided by the chairman.

The Armed Services version differs, however, by making the repeal contingent upon the secretaries of commerce, state, defense and energy developing a joint system to restrict high-performance computer exports, to monitor high-performance computer technology exports, to assess proposed exports and to conduct post-shipment verifications.

Separate from the manager’s amendment, the committee also approved language proposed by Representative Duncan Hunter (R-Calif.) requiring the Pentagon and CIA to be notified in advance of proposed computer exports above $250,000 or an equivalent new standard, to determine whether they might harm national security, contribute to WMD proliferation or assist a foreign terrorist organization.

Trade Concerns

Although he ultimately voted for the amendment, Representative John Spratt, (D-S.C.) did so with reservations.  He said the requirements for interagency concurrence might make the licensing process “more burdensome, cumbersome, time-consuming,” and might hurt exporter competitiveness.

“We are going to significantly disadvantage our ability to stay competitive in the United States,” said Representative Adam Smith (D-Wash.).

A committee fact sheet cited a Congressional Research Service study concluding that the value of all license applications filed with Commerce represented potential sales worth approximately $2.5 billion, or less than .025 percent of the more than $9 trillion economy.

“According to CRS, GAO and the executive branch, the trade in controlled goods is very minimal. Is liberalizing our national security export controls, therefore, really worth the risk?” the committee fact sheet asked.

Democrat Neil Abercrombie of Hawaii said no balance should be struck when it comes to national security.  “I’m not in the business here of striking a balance with respect to national security interests,” he said.  “I’m not interested in the free trade of the security of this country.”

Republican Differences With the President

The mark-up casts unusual allies of senior House Republicans and Democrats in opposition to Republican President George W. Bush.

Republican proponents of the marked-up legislation directly and indirectly acknowledged being at odds with the Bush administration on the legislation.

Stump said his amendment was needed to strengthen the export control system against inevitable pressures from high-tech industry on the executive branch, which he said have affected Republican and Democratic administrations alike.

“As history has borne out, this dynamic is not unique to Democrat or Republican administrations but rather the expected normal relationship between industry and government on these matters,” he said.

Stump cited a need for procedures “able to withstand the normal and expected pressure that any administration is going to receive to allow competition and expansion into new overseas markets.”

The manager’s amendment was heartily endorsed by the Center for Security Policy, founded by a former Reagan administration defense official.

“There is a real — and growing — cost to the U.S. military that is incurred as the qualitative edge upon which it relies is steadily eroded through ill-considered technology transfers,” the center said in a release yesterday.

Weldon said the House Armed Services Committee had a duty to amend the bill as it did, as “eyes and ears of the country on national security” matters.

“I’m a supporter for President Bush.  But I won’t roll over for President Bush on an issue like this,” said Weldon.

Back to top

Iraq:  Annan Meets With Iraqis Amid U.S. Charges of Oil-For-Food Abuse

U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan is holding talks today with Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri al-Hadithi on the possible return of weapons inspectors to Iraq and easing of sanctions on the country (see GSN, March 6).

Entering the United Nations today before the meeting, Annan expressed hope that the talks would include discussion of the return of inspectors, “one of the key bones of contention between the United Nations and Iraq.”

“I wouldn’t want to see a widening conflict in the region,” Annan said.  “I would want to see a situation where we are able to resolve our differences diplomatically, and that Iraq comes into compliance and we can move on with this.  If that is done, I don’t think the [Security] Council will take any further action.”

Some observers have charged that only the threat of U.S. attack has prompted Iraq to renew relations with the United Nations.  Asked whether the Iraqis are entering into the talks in good faith, Annan said he is “getting indications from some sources and some governments close to Iraq ... that Iraq is coming in that spirit, or they sense some flexibility on the part of Iraq” (Wurst/Fiorill, UN Wire, March 7).

United States Photographs Iraqi Violations

Yesterday at the Security Council, the United States accused Iraq of abusing the oil-for-food program for military ends.  In a closed-door meeting, U.S. officials said Iraq had converted 1,000 trucks purchased under the program into missile components and delivery vehicles capable of transporting heavy pieces of artillery.  U.S. officials showed council members a dozen U.S. satellite photos and a video clip from Iraqi television to support their claim (Colum Lynch, Washington Post, March 7).

Annan today called the briefing a “good start,” saying, “If there is to be further action, it is better if it is with Security Council authorization” (Wurst/Fiorill, UN Wire).

“Specifically, these are dump trucks that we have seen that were stripped and diverted for possible usage in air defense and missile systems,” a U.S. official told the London Guardian.  “They could be used for launching missiles.  We saw a large number of them in military bases and barracks and garrisons, in clear violation of sanctions.”

According to the Guardian, the revelations were timed to coincide with the talks between Annan and al-Hadithi.  The newspaper reported that, with U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney set to meet with British Prime Minister Tony Blair in London next week, the move prompted suggestions that Washington is seeking support from the United Nations and key allies in anticipation of a military strike (Oliver Burkeman, London Guardian, March 7).

A spokesman for the U.S. Mission to the United Nations said the timing of the revelations “was coincidental, though I know you won’t believe me.”

The U.S. report “is doubly worrying,” said Catherine MacKenzie, an official at the British Mission to the United Nations. “The military buildup that it would bring about adds to Iraq’s ability to project its power more effectively.  And these are vehicles that should be distributing food and humanitarian supplies, a job that is not being done.  We know that Iraq’s priority is weapons, not food or welfare, and this is one more graphic illustration of that” (William Orme, Los Angeles Times, March 7).

Some U.N. officials expressed doubts about the U.S. allegations.  One British delegate said it is “not altogether clear” that the trucks were purchased through the oil-for-food program but added, “Either way, it’s a violation of the sanctions” (London Guardian).

According to the London Independent, the United States is trying to convince the Security Council to ban the import of trucks to Baghdad under the program and dampen criticism that it is unnecessarily holding up humanitarian imports (Rupert Cornwell, London Independent, March 7).  The U.N. sanctions committee has already held up $5.3 billion in aid contracts with Iraq out of concern that the goods were “dual-use” items that could be used for military purposes (BBC Online, March 6).

Former U.N. weapons inspector in Iraq Scott Ritter accused the United States of trying to jeopardize the success of Annan’s talks with Iraqi officials.

“The U.S. wants to undermine (the Iraqi meeting with the U.N), pure and simple,” Ritter said.  “I’m not challenging the U.S. evidence, but when members of the Bush administration say that time is running out for Iraq to comply with sanctions, they show a level of arrogance that detracts from their legitimate concerns” (London Guardian).

Back to top

Al-Qaeda:  New Test Detects Exposure to Plutonium

U.S. scientists have developed a test that may show whether a person has handled plutonium within the last 20 years or longer, ABC News reported Monday.  The test could be used on suspected al-Qaeda detainees at the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to learn whether they were exposed to materials used to make nuclear or radioactive weapons (see related GSN story, today).

Terrorists living in caves probably lacked the facilities or knowledge to protect themselves from radioactive contamination if they were building such weapons, said scientists at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, where the test was developed (see GSN, Feb. 26).

“If you inhale it, it will eventually get in your bone, get into your liver, and those become long-term sources for the leaching of this out of your system, probably over your lifetime,” said environmental chemist John Knezovich.

The new test, which turns urine into a powder and then runs it through a spectrometer, is 100 times more sensitive than previous detection methods and would cost about $2,000 per specimen.  It would detect whether the test subject had been exposed to more plutonium than an average person.

“Due to aboveground atomic testing, we all have a little tiny bit of plutonium in us, whether we like it or not,” said Knezovich.  “And the issue becomes a statistical one, as to when we can tell that level of plutonium apart from someone who has actually handled the material.”

Lawrence Livermore scientists said they are also close to developing a test to detect uranium (ABC News, March 5).

Back to top

Threat Assessment:  Stanford Tracks Thefts of Former Soviet Nuclear Material

Researchers at Stanford University said 40 kilograms of weapon-grade uranium and plutonium have been stolen from nuclear facilities in the former Soviet Union during the past decade, Reuters reported yesterday (see GSN, March 1).

“It truly is frightening,” said Lyudmila Zaitseva, a visiting fellow at Stanford University’s Institute for International Studies.  “I think this is the tip of the iceberg.”

While much of the stolen material has been recovered, at least four pounds of highly enriched uranium remains missing, according to Reuters.  Zaitseva said that the destination of much of the missing nuclear materials is still unknown.

“We haven’t found a single occasion in which the actual end users have been caught,” Zaitseva said.  “We can only guess by the routes where the material is going.  We can’t say for sure if it is Iraq, Iran, North Korea, al-Qaeda or Hezbollah.  We can only make assumptions” (Andrew Quinn, Reuters/Yahoo.com, March 6).

The total amount of missing weapon-grade nuclear material could be at least 10 times higher than officially believed, Zaitseva said.

“We don’t know what’s missing,” she said.  “That’s the most frightening thing.”

Stanford Tracks Stolen Nuclear Materials

Stanford international studies researchers have compiled information on missing nuclear material into a new database called the Database on Nuclear Smuggling, Theft and Orphan Radiation Sources.  The researchers combine information from two unclassified databases and confirm it with additional sources from government agencies.  They then re-evaluate the information to ensure accuracy.

“You’d be surprised how much scientific junk is in the existing databases, from mixing up units to reporting on tertiary sources,” said Friedrich Steinhausler, one of the Stanford researchers who worked on the compilation of the database.  “We decided to look at each case … is it scientifically credible?  And who is reporting this?  Is it a scientific agency or a central Asian local newspaper?”

The database focuses on illegally trafficked nuclear materials and orphaned radiation sources — radioactive materials that have been lost.  The information — which is divided into 21 categories, such as incident type, material type, reported destination and perpetrators involved — can only be accessed by carefully checked researchers working with the Stanford team.

Orphaned radioactive materials pose a threat because victims might not know than they have been exposed, Steinhausler said.

“Many countries don’t even have a central register of radioactive materials,” he said.  “If they don’t know what they have, they don’t know what they’ve lost.”

A good illustration of threat posed by abandoned radioactive materials comes from the United States itself, which has an excellent radioactive material registering system, Steinhausler said.  Each year the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission receives 200 reports of missing, stolen and abandoned radioactive materials, according to a Stanford University press release.

“If the U.S. loses control of a registered source almost every second day, what do you expect goes on in the rest of the world?” Steinhausler asked.  “Whether it is in scrap metal or in terrorism, you will meet again.”

Steinhausler said he and other Stanford researchers compiled the database to raise public awareness and to force governments to increase security of nuclear and radioactive materials.

“We cannot supply the means to improve the situation,” Steinhausler said.  “But, as academics, we feel the responsibility to raise awareness.  We’re pinpointing weakness and loopholes and saying, ‘Do something about it’” (Stanford University release, March 5).

Back to top

U.S.-Russia:  Build a Better Relationship in Phases, Gottemoeller Says

By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire

The United States and Russia need to adopt a three-phased approach to building a better strategic nuclear relationship, said arms control expert Rose Gottemoeller this week (see GSN, Feb. 20).

“The phases required to achieve a new strategic relationship will be important, because they will determine whether or not the process will be successful,” said Gottemoeller, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, in an article appearing in the Washington Quarterly’s spring issue.

“Frankly embracing a phased approach that enables the two countries to clear old troubling issues from the agenda as they move toward new cooperation would be desirable,” she said.

According to Gottemoeller’s approach, the two countries should first establish a cooperative atmosphere, then begin collaborating on more military and defense projects, and finally they would be able to make more dramatic changes such as large cuts in their nuclear forces and plans for joint missile defense systems.

The first phase, which would occur this year, would establish the groundwork for later changes, Gottemoeller said.  U.S. and Russian Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin should issue a joint statement that each country’s strategic forces should not target those of the other.  They should also coordinate plans for unilateral nuclear weapon reductions, she said.

The United States and Russia need to speed up efforts to change Cold War-era practices, such as the deployment of nuclear weapons on “hair-trigger” alert, said Gottemoeller.  Further steps that could be taken include reducing launch readiness and enhancing early-warning cooperation, she said.

To increase confidence that missile defense systems do not threaten each country’s strategic offensive weapons, both countries also need to cooperate on plans for such systems, Gottemoeller said (see GSN, Jan. 17).  Already, the Bush administration has taken a step in this direction with work to renew the Russian-American Observation Satellite program (RAMOS), she said.  RAMOS is a joint project to develop better early-warning satellite technology that could contribute to a missile defense system.

The U.S.-Russian experience in working together on the International Space Station “has shown that extensive cooperation between both countries’ military and industrial sectors not only is feasible but also can be mutually beneficial,” Gottemoeller said.

Phase Two:  Clearing Away the “Negative Underbrush”

In the second phase of improving the U.S.-Russian strategic relationship, the countries would progress from constructing foundations to implementing certain measures, Gottemoeller said.

“The focus of this phase would be to clear away the negative underbrush left from the previous era as well as to establish new mechanisms … to enable the new relationship to unfold,” she said.

The first step in this phase would be to create a high-level venue to air out concerns and differences, Gottemoeller said.  To create better transparency, the United States and Russia should establish a joint defense-military planning mechanism, she said.

The United States and Russia should also work together on joint missile defense projects, such as the deployment of the Russian S-300 as a component in a NATO theater missile defense system, Gottemoeller said.  Although there may be concerns over the release of military secrets, there is enough experience from joint civilian projects for developing sufficient procedures, she said.

Greece, a NATO member, has already deployed some Russian-built air defense systems, Gottemoeller said.

“In short, rapid engagement on theater defenses in the NATO context may provide valuable and early precedents for working together on missile defenses at the national level,” she said.

The United States and Russia should cooperate to develop new expert processes for new transparency measures for offensive and defensive strategic systems, Gottemoeller said.  Both countries could decide to use measures in place from previous strategic agreements, such as the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I).  They also might decide additional measures are needed, such as ways to monitor warheads removed from deployment, she said.

Last year, Russian experts said they wanted to see a 20 percent to 30 percent reduction in inspections mandated by START I, according to Gottemoeller.  They wanted to retain other treaty measures, however, such as notifications, data exchanges and confidence-building measures.

On the U.S. side, “a new, more informal approach might require some significant loosening of compliance requirements, which, in turn, would need congressional acquiescence,” Gottemoeller said.

Phase Three:  Final Steps

By 2008-2012, the United States and Russia could take final steps to improve their strategic relationship, Gottemoeller said.

The United States and Russia could each reduce their nuclear warheads to less than 1,000 and could even begin to draw other nuclear states into the reduction process, she said.  The two countries also could continue with joint military planning and could develop a joint project to deploy missile defense systems while cooperating to reduce proliferation concerns and the threat of weapons of mass destruction in different regions, Gottemoeller said (see GSN, Feb. 20).

“As the third phase unfolds,” she said, “the United States and Russia would actually be entering the new era of strategic cooperation that Bush and Putin have heralded.”

Back to top

United States:  DOE Accelerates Cleanup at Hanford Nuclear Site

The U.S. Energy Department has reached an agreement with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and Washington state officials to accelerate environmental cleanup of the Hanford nuclear weapons site, the department announced yesterday.

Under the agreement, the department will complete the Hanford cleanup 35 to 45 years before the previous completion date of 2070.  The agreement will increase budget requests for Hanford by $433 million — totaling more than $2 billion for fiscal 2003, according to the department (Energy Department release, March 6).

Bush administration officials will restore $300 million cut from the cleanup budget for the former plutonium production site in the fiscal 2003 budget proposal and add $150 million, according to the Associated Press.

“The Department of Energy and the Office of Management and Budget are promising that the days of fighting over nuclear cleanup budgets are behind us,” said Senator Patty Murray (D-Wash.).  “I sincerely hope they are” (Linda Ashton, Associated Press/Yahoo.com, March 7).

Congress appropriated $1.87 billion in fiscal 2002 for cleanup operations at Hanford.

Part of Energy’s New Cleanup Program

Hanford’s $433 million will come from an account for the new Environmental Management Accelerated Cleanup Program, which provides funds to nuclear cleanup sites that reach an agreement with the Energy Department to streamline cleanup operations (see GSN, Feb. 7).  The agreement between the department and the Hanford site is the first under the new program.

“The Hanford pact is a framework for all department sites to follow in moving toward an accelerated cleanup plan, because it provides the necessary level of detail and criteria to reach a commitment to faster, safer cleanup,” said Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham.

The agreement includes 42 “improvement initiatives,” such as accelerating “plutonium de-inventory work at the Plutonium Finishing Plant” and speeding up cleanup of a spent nuclear fuel storage facility, the department said (Energy Department release, March 6).

Back to top

Anthrax I:  Vaccine Could Be Good Post-Exposure Remedy, Experts Say

By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire

Anthrax vaccine can effectively protect people from contracting anthrax after they have been exposed to the bacteria and have completed an antibiotic treatment, according to a report from the U.S. Institute of Medicine released yesterday (see GSN, Jan. 8).

Brian Strom, chair of the institute committee that produced the report, said he supports using U.S.-licensed vaccine in tandem with antibiotics such as Cipro to prevent germination of anthrax spores in the body after exposure.

In 2000, the Defense Department commissioned the institute to examine the safety and effectiveness of the sole U.S. licensed anthrax vaccine (see GSN, March 1).  The institute found that the vaccine is both safe and effective for developing immunity to anthrax and preventing progression of the disease after exposure.

When asked whether he would have recommended that postal workers take the vaccine, Strom said that as a physician, “knowing what I know now,” he would have recommended that they be inoculated.

Strom stressed the need to administer antibiotics with the vaccine in post-exposure regimens to allow time for the vaccine to trigger immunity.  More long-term studies on the vaccine as a post-exposure option are needed, because current data are based on limited animal studies, and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration would have to approve the treatment, he said (see GSN, Feb. 1).

The anthrax vaccine could be effective against all strains of the anthrax bacterium, Bacillus anthracis, including genetically modified forms, Strom said.  The vaccine works directly on toxins released by anthrax bacteria, and for the disease to be fatal the toxins must remain unchanged.

Although the vaccine is safe, Strom said he would not recommend a broad immunization program.  The vaccine does have risks and should not be used indeterminately, he said.  There is no need to inoculate the general population because anthrax does not spread through person-to-person contact.  Instead, the vaccine has been categorized for “high risk” recipients, Strom said.

Further Development Needed

Although the anthrax vaccine is safe and effective, side effects and the high number of inoculations needed over a long time-period indicate need for continued development of new alternatives, the report said.

Currently, the vaccine is administered in a series of six injections over an 18-month period.  Additional annual booster injections sustain immunity.  The side effects associated with the vaccine, such as redness and swelling at the injection site, are comparable with those for other vaccines, Strom said, adding that some of the side effects might come from the fact the vaccine is injected under the skin, instead of into the muscle as with other vaccines. 

Other reported side effects, such as malaise and muscle pains, occur less frequently, Strom said.  He added that the data used in the study showed no permanent, disabling reactions associated with the vaccine.

Even though most side effects from the current anthrax vaccine are mild, Strom said, he still recommends developing an alternative — one requiring fewer injections.  That would allow people to build up immunity to anthrax faster and reduce the total risk from any side effects, Strom said.

The main reason for a new vaccine, however, is that “getting injections hurts,” Strom said.

Back to top

Canada:  Team Excavates Former Biological Weapons Site

Canada’s chemical weapons demilitarization team is decontaminating the dumpsite of the country’s former biological weapons project, the National Post reported yesterday.

The first Canadian biological weapons laboratory buried equipment and biological agents at the Canadian Forces Base Kingston in Ontario, where the laboratory was located from 1951 to 1964.  Decontamination experts excavated a parking lot at the base Tuesday and uncovered vials, beakers, gauze soaked with blood and a dead rabbit.

Much of the laboratory material buried at the site was soaked with bleach or potassium hydroxide and methanol to disinfect it, but the disinfectants could pose a health risk or cause environmental damage, said Ken Pirie, head of the excavation team.  The laboratory “would have produced a large volume of waste and decontamination solution, and this is what we’re recovering right now,” Pirie said.

Below the laboratory equipment, the team might find biological or chemical agents.  “Primarily, this was an anthrax lab,” Pirie said.

The excavators are concerned they could uncover sarin, tabun, mustard gas or other chemical weapons in unsafe containers, the Post reported.

“This was Canada’s first bio-lab, and we say bio-lab tongue-in-cheek, because it usually went hand-in-hand with chemical.  And that’s why we haven’t let our guard down … We may still find those [chemical] products,” Pirie said.  “We are prepared for the worst.”

Officials ordered cleanup at the dumpsite years ago, but financial constraints and the demilitarization team’s other obligations, including dismantling weapons in Iraq, delayed the project, the Post reported.  The team expects to be at the Kingston site until the end of March.

The decontamination team recently cleaned up the Canadian laboratory’s new site at the Defense Research Establishment in Ottawa, where chemical bombs and nerve gases were found (see GSN, Jan. 17).

Canadian Biological Weapons Research Helped the Soviet Program

The Canadian biological weapons program, which was commissioned by the United Kingdom, began near the end of World War II with a focus on weaponizing anthrax.

British scientists eventually sold some of the Canadian research to the Soviet Union, said John Bryden, a Canadian member of Parliament and researcher who studied the program.

“The Soviet biological warfare program owes its very existence to work that Canadians did,” Bryden said (Joseph Brean, National Post, March 6).

Back to top

Anthrax II:  Capitol Hill Cleanup Costs Increase

The cost of the anthrax decontamination effort in U.S. Capitol office buildings has reached $23 million and is still increasing, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency said yesterday (see GSN, Jan. 29).

After last fall’s anthrax attacks, Congress approved $21 million for the EPA’s nationwide anthrax costs.  The EPA had originally estimated that it would need $12.5 million to decontaminate Capitol Hill, the Washington Post reported.  In response to an inquiry from Senator Charles Grassley (R-Iowa), the EPA said in mid-January that it had spent $14 million and expected to reach at least $20 million.

In a letter to Grassley yesterday, EPA Assistant Administrator Marianne Horinko increased the total cost to $23 million.  She added that the agency would not know the final cost of the decontamination effort until work at all affected Capitol Hill buildings was complete.

Grassley said the EPA had not been specific enough in its answers to the questions raised in his inquiry into the agency’s management of the cleanup project.

“The EPA’s response is so lacking in context and answers to all my questions that it’s difficult for the taxpayers to judge whether their money was used properly,” Grassley said in a statement.  “I plan to learn more about the details of this project” (Spencer Hsu, Washington Post, March 7).

In January, Grassley said he wanted to monitor the cleanup operation’s cost in order to establish a standard for any future EPA bioterrorism decontamination efforts.  If it becomes apparent that the EPA has mismanaged its funding, it would be “a bit like exposing the $600 toilet seat in the Defense Department,” Grassley said.

The EPA defended the cost of the cleanup operation as necessary to protect public health.

“Certainly the cost so far is justified in ensuring public health,” said EPA spokeswoman Steffanie Bell.

“We’re talking about up to 125 people working on the cleanup at a time, and there was work going on for 90 days, 24 hours a day,” she said.  “We’re also talking about using unprecedented technology to fix an unprecedented situation.  Costs add up” (Guy Taylor, Washington Times, March 7).

Back to top

Czech Response:  Civilian Protection Lacking Against Biological Weapons

Two senior officials said the Czech Republic lacks sufficient funds and emergency plans to protect civilians against biological weapon attacks, Pravo newspaper reported today, according to the Czech news agency CTK.

The country has made only minimal progress in several areas important to creating civilian defenses, according to Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir Spidla and State Nuclear Safety Office Chairwoman Dana Drabova.  One major problem is lack of funds — a shortfall of $7 million to $8 million necessary to complete a basic civilian protection system.

The Health, Defense and Interior ministries and rescue system units must complete emergency plans, the officials said.  Authorities have also not established regulations for preventing the spread of infection, and police lack proper protective equipment against biological agents.

The Czech Republic does not have enough vaccines for civilians, according to the report.  Only the military has enough vaccines to protect its troops.  The military also is building a health facility to focus on countering biological attacks in Techotin, East Bohemia (see GSN, Jan. 23), but the Czech Health Ministry does not have such a facility (Prague CTK news agency/BBC Monitoring, March 7).

Back to top

Radiological Weapons:  Experts Recommend Defensive Measures

By David Ruppe

Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — U.S. national laboratory experts yesterday outlined a number of areas where homeland defense could be improved against radiological terrorism.

“Unfortunately, there is no silver bullet that will protect us from these threats,” said Donald Cobb, associate director for threat reduction at Los Alamos National Laboratory, said in prepared testimony.  “Rather, we must have a systematic approach that provides us with defense in depth.”

That, he said, will take “much hard work and continued investments to achieve.”

Cobb recommended extending the Energy Department’s Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting Program, run by its National Nuclear Security Administration, to cover radiological materials sources, as well as nuclear weapon-usable materials. 

Such lesser materials, he wrote, are “least well protected,” but can be used to make radiological weapons.  He said the program is working with Russian counterparts to move in that direction.

Cobb said another NNSA program to help former Soviet countries detect smuggled weapon-usable materials also could be extended “with some modest modifications” to be effective against lesser-grade radiological materials.

In general, the experts said, weapon-grade materials internationally are subject to tighter, government controls.  Lower-grade radiological materials are used more widely all over the world for medical and industrial uses and generally have fewer controls.

Radiological terrorism, involving the use of radioactive materials that might not have sufficient quality to make nuclear weapons, would probably cause many fewer casualties than a nuclear detonation, the experts said, but nonetheless can terrorize a population and shut down contaminated areas, possibly for months.

“Even a negligible, but measurable, exposure would exploit the general public’s fear of things radioactive and have significant psychological consequences,” said Harry Vantine, program leader for counterterrorism and incident response at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, in his prepared statement.  “The greatest impact,” he said, “would be economic.”

He said important elements of a layered defense against nuclear threats are already in place.

Cobb said better technology is needed for detecting and intercepting weapon-grade nuclear materials, as well as radiological materials, concealed in luggage, packages or shipping containers.

Most customs agents and emergency response teams in cities have handheld sensors that can detect large radiological sources generally more easily than weapon-usable materials, he said.

Radiological materials, he wrote, can be easier to detect “since the radiation signatures from such sources is generally much stronger than from uranium or plutonium.”

Providing complete protection for large metropolitan areas remains difficult, according to Vantine, who suggested installing “correlated sensor networks around key facilities and approach routes” (see GSN, March 4).

More capability also is needed for the federal response to a radiological incident, said Cobb, including more practice and training against realistic scenarios, investments in science and technology and upgraded forensics and attribution capabilities.

“Cleanup and wide-area radiological decontamination represent a huge challenge.”

Additional Nuclear Emergency Search Team personnel need to be recruited and trained, said Vantine.

Cobb said similar recommendations to his had been made by the Pentagon’s Defense Science Board in previous years, and some had begun to be implemented since Sept. 11.

“But the pace remains slow and the scope of the effort is not yet broad enough to cover the spectrum of nuclear threats, including [radiological devices].  This work needs to be expanded and accelerated now,” he said.

Back to top

Nuclear Waste:  Senate Could Block Yucca Mountain Vote, Reid Says

Parliamentary rules in the U.S. Senate could block Congress from making Yucca Mountain the nation’s sole high-level nuclear waste repository, Senator Harry Reid (D-Nev.) said Monday (see GSN, Feb. 19).

Under the law creating a national nuclear waste repository, Nevada Governor Kenny Guinn is empowered to veto President George W. Bush’s decision to make Yucca Mountain the repository site (see GSN, Feb. 26).  Guinn has promised a veto, which would require both houses of Congress to vote on the designated site within 90 days, according to the Reno Gazette-Journal.

Under Senate rules, however, only the majority leader can bring a bill before the full Senate for a vote, Reid said.  Some observers have said that Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle (D-S.D.) “can keep this from the Senate floor,” Reid said.  Although Daschle has stated his opposition to the Yucca Mountain plan, the law might nonetheless force him to bring the issue to a vote, according to the Gazette-Journal.

The chances of defeating the Yucca Mountain plan in Congress — if it goes to a vote — are “pretty slim,” Reid said (Doug Abrahms, Reno Gazette-Journal, March 4).

Licensing Hearing Announced for Utah Spent-Fuel Site Plan

Meanwhile, beginning April 8, the U.S. Atomic Safety and Licensing Board plans to hold a license application hearing for a proposal to build a spent-fuel storage site in Skull Valley, Utah (see GSN, Jan. 25).

At the hearing, the board will review evidence presented by the state of Utah and three organizations — the Ohngo Gaudadeh Devia, the Confederated Tribes of the Goshute Reservation and the Southwest Utah Wilderness Alliance — who oppose the plan by Private Fuel Storage to build the facility on the Goshute Indian reservation in Skull Valley.  The board will also hear public comments on the issue (Federal Register, March 7).

Back to top