By Kerry Boyd
Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — Improved U.S.-Russian relations since the Sept. 11 attacks on the United States have helped accelerate and ease cooperative efforts to secure and destroy Russian weapons of mass destruction, U.S. and Russian officials said Friday (see GSN, Feb. 5).
At a workshop sponsored by the Monterey Institute of International Studies and the Center for Policy Studies in Russia, U.S. Energy official Linton Brooks, U.S. Defense official Thomas Kuenning and Russian diplomat Oleg Novikov said that warmer relations between the two former Cold War rivals have benefited nonproliferation programs.
The status of U.S. Energy Department programs dedicated to securing Russian nuclear weapon materials “is very good,” Brooks said.
Energy’s nuclear nonproliferation programs in Russia, which have been functioning since the early 1990s, also provide a model for a new strategic relationship because the programs have been based on cooperation since their beginning, Brooks said.
Kuenning said he is optimistic about the Pentagon’s Cooperative Threat Reduction programs, which are similar to Energy Department programs but cover different specific projects and generally focus on dismantling weapons.
Nonproliferation programs have become a cornerstone of U.S.-Russian cooperation, Novikov said. Russia greatly appreciates U.S. assistance to secure nuclear weapons, dismantle weapons of mass destruction and help former Soviet weapon scientists, he said.
Cooperative Threat Reduction programs will continue, Novikov predicted, because the programs suit the national interests of both the United States and Russia.
The Bush administration, however, has told Russia that the United States is concerned about Russian compliance with treaties addressing chemical and biological weapons, and the United States may reduce funding for some projects, the New York Times reported today (see related GSN story, today).
Strong Relationships
Meanwhile, good relations between U.S. Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham and Russian Atomic Minister Alexander Rumyantsev have been an “unexpected bonus” to the programs, Brooks said.
After November’s Crawford summit between U.S. and Russian Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin, Abraham and Rumyantsev agreed to accelerate nonproliferation efforts, and Energy officials now have access to Russian sites that previously were closed, Brooks said.
The Bush administration has been helpful to promoting cooperative efforts, and Congress has provided “extraordinary” support, Brooks said.
Good Progress, but Work Remains
The officials outlined specific areas where nonproliferation experts have improved conditions. Russia and the United States signed a new agreement earlier this month that should allow more U.S. access to certain sites to begin installing security enhancements, Kuenning said.
Energy officials have been able to enhance security of transportation systems for nuclear material and have consolidated nuclear material in more secure locations, Brooks said.
Russia has increased its budget for destroying chemical weapons several times and has drawn up plans, said Novikov.
More work remains, however, Brooks said.
Russia needs continued international support and U.S. funds for Shchuchye, according to Novikov. The Pentagon is waiting for the status of fiscal 2002 funds related to the Shchuchye project, Kuenning said (see GSN, April 3).
Meanwhile, the Energy Department plans to start securing devices that could be used to create radiological weapons, something not under consideration before Sept. 11, Brooks said (see GSN, Feb. 12). Pentagon officials are also helping collect radiological material, Kuenning said.
At Vozrozhdeniya Island in the Aral Sea, the Defense Department plans to ensure that any remaining anthrax is eliminated (see GSN, Jan. 22).
In the Ukraine, Pentagon nonproliferation experts plan to eliminate SS-24 intercontinental ballistic missiles — a project that was delayed but is now back on track, Kuenning said (see GSN, Dec. 5, 2001).
The Bush administration has told Russia that the United States will cut back several disarmament projects due to concern that Russia is not complying with treaties banning chemical and biological weapons, senior administration officials said (see GSN, March 20).
The State Department last week issued a cable saying it could not certify that Russia is committed to complying with the treaties, the New York Times reported. U.S. law requires such certification, so the Bush administration will be unable to start certain new programs and will reduce funding for some projects.
The decision not to certify Russian compliance does not mean the United States is accusing Russia of violating any treaties, nor does it mean the United States cannot certify compliance in the future.
Refusing to certify Russian commitment, however, sends a message to Moscow that the United States demands more cooperation and honesty related to WMD issues, officials said.
“This is a signal of our seriousness about compliance on arms control and the need to meet all obligations under the chemical and biological weapons conventions,” said a senior administration official.
The decision not to certify will affect several cooperative programs to secure and dismantle weapons of mass destruction in Russia, according to the Times. Pentagon Cooperative Threat Reduction programs worth $450 million, and State Department programs worth $70 million will probably be affected, officials said (see related GSN story, today).
Programs likely to be affected include military exchanges and efforts to ensure against theft of nuclear materials. Authorities have already canceled several planned visits to discuss new projects, officials said. Several State Department programs will also run out of funds soon.
The law establishing the Cooperative Threat Reduction program does not allow the president to waive the certification requirement. The Bush administration asked Congress to provide the president with such authority in the emergency supplemental spending bills for the State Department.
Congressional aides said Congress will probably grant the waiver authority but not in time for U.S. President George W. Bush’s May meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin (see GSN, March 28).
The Energy Department programs, worth $500 million, do not require certification and will not be affected.
Insufficient Cooperation
The decision not to certify Russian commitment was prompted by U.S. concerns about Russian refusal to provide accurate information and to send a strain of anthrax to U.S. scientists, the Times reported.
According to the Times, the United States has approved plans to help Russian destroy its chemical weapons stockpile, but Russia has not said that the Soviet Union produced “fourth generation” chemical weapons — far more lethal that the most advanced U.S. chemical weapons (see GSN, March 20).
Russia has also said the Soviet Union never developed certain pathogens, including some genetically modified strains capable of resisting vaccines and antibiotics. Russian defectors previously involved with the biological weapons program, however, have said the Soviet Union did have such pathogens (see GSN, Nov. 30, 2001). The Russian denials are absurd, said one U.S. official.
U.S. officials also want to be able to visit four biological laboratories under Russian military control where Russia has denied access. Russia has said the United States also does not allow access to U.S. military laboratories.
Finally, Russia has refused to allow Russian scientists to send the United States a genetically modified strain of anthrax that reportedly can defeat Russia’s anthrax vaccine, although the two countries signed a scientific strain exchange agreement that requires Russia to send a sample.
Russia has said it has not violated the biological or chemical weapons treaties.
National Security
The Bush administration has said that cooperative nonproliferation and disarmament programs suit U.S. national security interests, but the administration also wants Russia to cooperate more.
“What we’re trying to do,” said one senior official, “is send a signal that we require full compliance with the chemical and biological weapons.”
“But we’ve also made clear in the review of our assistance programs to Russia and the record size of our budget requests that these programs are very much in our own national security interests,” the official said. “We’re trying to find a way to bring these two goals together.”
Several arms control advocates said the decision not to certify and therefore to cut back on some programs is unwise.
“It’s in our country’s interest to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction from leaking out of Russia in any way we can,” said Rose Gottemoeller of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “So undercutting these programs is tantamount to shooting yourself in the foot” (Judith Miller, New York Times, April 8).
British Prime Minister Tony Blair said yesterday that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein must allow U.N. weapons inspectors to return to Iraq or face consequences (see GSN, April 5).
Hussein “has to let the inspectors back in — anyone, any time, any place the international community demands,” Blair said. Hussein has blocked U.N. inspections since 1998.
“To allow weapons of mass destruction to be developed by a state like Iraq ... would be grossly to ignore the lessons of Sept. 11, and we will not do it,” Blair said, adding that Hussein's regime is “detestable.”
Blair did not threaten to use military force against Iraq, but speaking of fighting terrorism more generally, he said the international community must take military action “if necessary” to end terrorism. “If necessary and justified, it should involve regime change,” he added.
Blair made the comments at the end of his weekend meetings with U.S. President George W. Bush (Ron Fournier, Associated Press/Philadelphia Inquirer, April 8).
All Options Open
Bush and Blair said they would consider “all options” to end the threat Hussein poses.
“We must be prepared to act where terrorism or weapons of mass destruction threaten us,” Blair said, although he added there would be no “precipitive action” against Iraq (Olivier Knox, Agence France-Presse, April 8).
Hussein has violated U.N. resolutions and refuses to allow inspectors to return to verify Iraq is no longer pursuing weapons of mass destruction programs, Blair said Saturday.
“Doing nothing in those circumstances is not an option, so we consider all options available,” he said.
Will U.S. Attack?
Bush repeatedly refused Friday to articulate any plans to use military force against Iraq.
“I made up my mind that Saddam needs to go,” he said. “That's about all I'm willing to share with you,” he told a reporter (Karen DeYoung, Washington Post, April 6).
U.S. Postpones Evidence to Security Council
Meanwhile, the United States postponed plans last week to share information with the U.N. Security Council about Iraqi attempts to develop banned missile technology, the Washington Post reported. The U.S. decision followed an earlier British decision to delay publishing similar information (see GSN, April 2).
U.S. officials had planned to provide information to council members alleging Iraq is developing missiles that could carry weapons of mass destruction farther than the 93-mile range allowed under U.N. resolutions (see GSN, April 5). It would have been the first time for the United States to supply the council with classified intelligence on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs since inspectors left Iraq in 1998.
Increased violence in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and Arab criticism of U.S. support for Israel's military offensive, however, led U.S. diplomats to delay meetings to share such intelligence, according to the Post (see GSN, April 4). Officials plan to present the information in the future, but the date is unclear, the Post reported.
U.S. officials refused to say what type of information they plan to present to the council, but officials said it includes photographs and other information showing Iraqi attempts to build banned missiles.
“We believe that Iraq is taking steps to reconstitute its weapons of mass destruction capability, to develop new and longer missiles and to increase its conventional capability,” said a senior U.S. official.
Inspectors Have Photos, Need Access
Hans Blix, head of the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, the organization responsible for inspections in Iraq, said he has seen satellite photos showing new construction on facilities the United States destroyed in 1998 and has received information from some governments about Iraqi efforts to rebuild weapons of mass destruction programs. He said he cannot prove Iraq has such programs until UNMOVIC inspectors can conduct inspections in the country.
“We cannot exclude the possibility that they retained something from the past or that they have produced something new,” Blix said. “But if I had clear-cut evidence of Iraq still possessing or producing weapons, I would go to the Security Council with that evidence” (Colum Lynch, Washington Post, April 7).
Meanwhile, UNMOVIC is preparing to conduct inspections in case Iraq agrees to allow inspectors to return (see GSN, Feb. 21).
Under UNMOVIC's plan, more than 50 inspectors would be based in Baghdad the New York Times reported. There would be 230 inspectors available to allow inspectors to rotate in and out of Iraq. Inspectors have already received training, including cultural-sensitivity training.
The inspectors would have unlimited access to suspected weapons sites, and Iraqi officials would be required to provide documents. Iraqi officials “will have to help by coming up with the evidence,” said Blix. “They have the archives, the bills of lading and budget documents.”
The first stage of inspections would include establishing what Iraq must do to address concerns about its weapons programs, and the process would last several months. If Iraq provides full cooperation, UNMOVIC might be able to report progress within a year, Blix said.
“If we have the kind of cooperation the Security Council has requested, we can get a high level of assurance,” he said. “We would not get certainty. Nor do I think you can do it with occupation” (Michael Gordon, New York Times, April 7).
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