U.S. Response:  Legislators Propose Presidential Waiver on CTR

By Kerry Boyd
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — Citing reports that an al-Qaeda leader has told U.S. officials that terrorists are close to obtaining a nuclear device to be used against the United States, two members of the U.S. House of Representatives this week filed legislation aimed at strengthening U.S.-Russian cooperation to lower the nuclear threat.

The proposed Nuclear Threat Reduction Act, sponsored by Representatives Ellen Tauscher (D-Calif.) and John Spratt (D-S.C.), would allow the president to waive certification requirements on Cooperative Threat Reduction programs, a change the administration has requested.  Currently lacking power to waive certification, the Bush administration informed Russia last month that it would suspend some funds due to questions about Russian compliance with chemical and biological weapons treaties (see GSN, April 8).

The bill would authorize increased funding for CTR programs in Russia and for research at U.S. laboratories on technologies to prevent attacks involving weapons of mass destruction (see GSN, April 23).  The bill would provide:

*         $1.4 billion for Energy Department threat reduction and nonproliferation programs, including $340 million for nonproliferation verification and research and development, $295 million for nuclear materials disposition and $520 million for “weapons activities, campaigns and high energy density physics;”

*         $600 million for Defense Department CTR programs, including $180 million for efforts to destroy chemical weapons in Russia, such as constructing a chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuchye (see GSN, April 3) and

*         $300 million for State Department programs.

The bill would also call on the president to clarify how plans to reduce nuclear weapons could be accomplished by 2006, 2008 or 2010, compared to the current 2012 target date.  Bush has said the United States will cut its operationally deployed nuclear warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads within the next decade (see GSN, Nov. 14).

According to the legislation, the administration would be required to report the numbers of operationally deployed nuclear weapons, weapons to be held in a reserve force (see GSN, April 9), active and inactive weapons in the reserve force and weapons to be dismantled, said a Tauscher press release.

Tracking Nuclear Weapons and Materials

In the bill, Tauscher and Spratt also call on the United States to work with Russia to create an inventory system of nuclear weapons and materials.  Russia inherited its nuclear warhead security system from the Soviet era, and the system does not provide adequate protection against the possibility of theft, a Tauscher spokeswoman said, citing a National Intelligence Council report.

The bill also calls for a data exchange system between the United States and Russia to ensure that nuclear weapons are safely stored or eliminated. 

Nuclear Testing

The bill also addresses another controversial issue in U.S. nuclear policy — resuming nuclear testing (see GSN, April 23).  The bill would support the continuing U.S. moratorium on actual nuclear weapons tests and would require the president to notify Congress 18 months prior to a test, if the president decides resuming testing is necessary.

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Iraq:  U.N., Baghdad Begin Talks With Differing Agendas

By Jim Wurst

UN Wire

UNITED NATIONS — The second round of talks between Iraq and the United Nations began yesterday with the public positions of the two sides far apart (see GSN, May 1).  While the United Nations wants to focus on getting weapons inspectors back into the country, the Iraqis want other issues, such as the lifting of sanctions and the U.S. threats of military action against Iraq, on the table.

Secretary General Kofi Annan is heading the U.N. delegation and the Iraqi team is led by Foreign Minister Naji Sabri al-Hadithi, who also headed the delegation in the first round of talks in March.

The key issue is the return of weapons inspectors to Iraq to check on whether Baghdad has resumed production of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.  The UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission was set up by the Security Council in December 1999 to complete the disarmament of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and to operate a system of ongoing monitoring and verification.  Iraq maintains it has no weapons of mass destruction and thus is in compliance with Security Council resolutions.  No UNMOVIC inspectors have ever visited Iraq.

Annan's spokesman Fred Eckhard said yesterday, "The secretary general would like to focus the discussions on weapons inspectors.  Iraq has indicated a desire to discuss other issues.  We are not restricting the agenda, we are just trying to focus it."

No Iraqi officials have commented on the talks since arriving in New York.  But in recent interviews, Iraqi officials repeated their positions from the March meetings that a full range of issues must be dealt with.

Annan was accompanied yesterday by UNMOVIC Chairman Hans Blix, International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Mohamed ElBaradei and Legal Counsel Hans Corell.  The IAEA has a dual function in Iraq:  under the inspection regime, the agency is in charge of dismantling Iraq' nuclear weapons infrastructure and under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, IAEA conducts less intrusive inspections of a few sites.  The NPT inspections have continued.

Al-Hadithi heads a 16-person team that includes U.N. Ambassador Mohammed al-Douri, General Hussam Amin, the official in charge of dealing with the inspectors, and General Amir al-Saadi, an advisor to President Saddam Hussein.

As to the Iraqi position that the threats by the United States against Iraq should be on the agenda, Eckhard said, "I don't think the secretary general is in a position to respond to those questions. … That would be for the members of the council and especially the United States to respond to."

There will be no high-levels talks today because Annan is in Washington for a meeting of the “quartet” of parties discussing the Middle East peace process.  With Annan out of town, the New York talks are being held among the teams' experts.  The talks are scheduled to conclude tomorrow.

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International Response:  U.S. Leads Spending in Arms Control, Verification

By David Ruppe
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — The United States spends far more than the rest of the world combined on scientific and technical work to support nuclear arms control and verification, according to a report released yesterday by a British nongovernmental organization.

While other countries combined spend an estimated $50 million to $100 million per year on arms control verification, Washington spends $2 billion, according to Global Spending on Nuclear Disarmament Verification Work, written by researcher Tom Milne for the Verification Research, Training and Information Center in London.

Second-tier spenders include other official nuclear powers such as China, France, Russia and the United Kingdom, but it is hard to pin down exactly how much they spend because of insufficient data, the report says.  The United Kingdom spends a fraction of 1 percent of what the United States spends, it says.

Spending by countries other than the United States is “very low,” the report says, especially considering that some non-U.S. funds are spent on safeguarding nuclear materials in Russia, “where there is a clear and present danger and where safeguards cooperation could clearly reduce the danger.”

The report is the first such attempt by VERTIC or by any other organization to survey global nuclear arms verification spending, according to Milne, a Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs researcher contracted by VERTIC to write the report.

More Spending Advocated

The data suggest “that some of the world's richer countries — for example, countries in the European Union, and Japan — should vastly increase the contributions that they are making to safeguarding nuclear materials in Russia,” Milne said.  “There are, of course, calls for the United States to increase its already significant programs on Russian nonproliferation.”

Arms control verification and related work can include monitoring for nuclear test explosions, detection of nuclear materials diversion and proliferation, verifying nuclear warhead reduction, managing civilian and military nuclear materials, and researching and developing new technologies.

“Given the importance that countries place on verifying progress in nuclear disarmament, and the very complex and sensitive issues involved, and the need for national expertise to take part in arms control negotiations and so forth, one would think that more money could and should be spent productively outside of the United States,” Milne said.

U.S. Levels “Counterintuitive”

As a reflection of U.S. support for international arms control initiatives, however, the level of U.S. spending can be “somewhat counterintuitive,” said VERTIC researcher Oliver Meier.

“The U.S. spends more than 90 percent of global resources on arms control verification, yet politically it is backing away from multilateral verification regimes,” he said.  “The Bush administration has partially withdrawn its support from the CTBT verification regime and blocks progress on other areas like BW [biological weapons] verification.”

The Bush administration is the leading contributor to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization’s $84 million budget, supporting its nuclear test monitoring efforts and other work with $16 million this year and with several dozen monitoring stations.  The U.S. Senate, however, has voted against ratifying the treaty, and President George W. Bush also has said he will not ratify it, calling it unverifiable and withdrawing specific funding for on-site verification of nuclear blasts (See GSN, March 19).

Driven by National Security

The United States appears to have a national security interest in contributing to the organization.  It gains access to data collected by monitoring stations of treaty signatories, which number nearly 100 and are expected to rise to 321 in the next five years (see GSN, April 15).

The report says that much U.S. verification spending is driven by general national security initiatives and would continue in the absence of arms control regimes and accords.  U.S. satellite and seismic monitoring serve an intelligence and national security function in addition to contributing to treaty verification, Milne said.

The U.S. departments of Defense and Energy have a budget of approximately $1 billion per year each for such work, according to the report.  Energy spends the money mainly on research, development and technical analysis that directly support arms control and disarmament through its nuclear weapons laboratories, it says.

U.S. satellite and ground-based detection of nuclear explosions — for which $72 million was budgeted in 2001 — “dwarfs” all other monitoring operations, the report says.  Other U.S. agencies, including the State Department, also spend on scientific and technical work related to nuclear arms control and disarmament, though on a much smaller scale, according to the report.

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United States I:  GAO Cites Improvements in Weapons Facilities’ Security

By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — The U.S. Energy Department and the National Nuclear Security Administration have made progress in improving security at U.S. nuclear weapons facilities, but there are still several issues of concern remaining, the General Accounting Office said in a March report released Tuesday (see GSN, March 29).

Energy and the NNSA have completed 65 percent of the 75 security initiatives begun in 1998, with the remainder scheduled for completion by the end of this year, according to the GAO.  Not only will the successful implementation of these new measures help improve security at NNSA facilities, but also will help ensure the success of future initiatives, the report says.

One of the lessons learned in implementing the new security measures is that the perspectives of Energy and NNSA field offices should be considered when the measures are drafted, according to the report.  GAO investigators who visited two nuclear weapons facilities found the facilities’ databases on foreign visits and assignments were incompatible with the Energy Department’s database, because of the fast-track approach taken in its creation, the report says.

The report also said Energy and the NNSA need to better communicate security initiatives to facilities.  For example, a contractor at a U.S. nuclear weapons laboratory received multiple instructions on cyber security initiatives from a number of Energy Department and NNSA offices, according to the report. 

“This lack of clear communication produced confusion at sites about which requirements they needed to implement,” the report says.

A coordinated process within NNSA facilities on enacting new security measures has been found to be beneficial, according to the report.  At the Pantex nuclear weapons assembly plant in Texas, new security measures were put into place through a process developed by the entire site security team, unlike the case at two nuclear weapons laboratories where new measures were only implemented by the security teams at areas within the laboratories most affected by the new measures, the report says.

NNSA Progress

The 2-year-old NNSA has made progress in establishing a security organization, according to the report.  Two offices on security and counterintelligence are almost fully staffed, and a review of security policies, conducted with Energy, is almost completed.  The NNSA has also taken steps to create a “security-oriented culture” within the organization and both headquarters and field sites have conducted short-term security improvement measures and begun more long-term initiatives, the report says.

There are still several issues within the NNSA that need to be resolved, however, in order for the agency to be effective, according to the report.  The agency needs to do more to establish clear lines of authority for security oversight, it says.  The Energy Department and the NNSA also need to clear up confusion about the roles and the authority of Energy and NNSA security offices, according to the report.  Contractors and NNSA field staff have said they have received guidance on security from both Energy and the NNSA, making it difficult to determine which security measures need to be carried out and how to do so, the report says.

The NNSA also needs to further develop ways to evaluate the effectiveness of security initiatives, the report says.  The creation of security performance measures could also aid in the preparation of the annual performance plan required to be submitted to the Office of Management and Budget, it says.  Lacking these performance measures, however, leaves both the Energy Department and the NNSA without any way to determine the effectiveness of security initiatives, the report says.

“While NNSA is addressing all these issues, clarifying who provides security direction and establishing clear lines of accountability ... for security activities as quickly as possible take on increased importance in the aftermath of the Sept. 11 attacks,” the report says.

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U.S.-Russia:  U.S. Holding to Reversible Reductions, Official Says

U.S. negotiators are standing their ground against Russian pressure to irreversibly destroy nuclear warheads in a U.S.-Russian arms reduction agreement, a senior U.S. Defense Department official said yesterday (see GSN, May 1).

“A point we’ve been trying to make to them is that, in fact, in reality, there’s no such thing as something that’s irreversible,” Assistant Defense Secretary for International Security Policy J.D. Crouch said.  “Given enough time, given money, given will, anything can be reversed.”

The issue of nuclear warhead destruction has been only a minor issue during discussions on the proposed arms reduction agreement, Crouch said.

“In general, there’s not a real desire to get into the details of warhead destruction,” he said.  “It’s very challenging from a verification standpoint and very intrusive.”

Warhead destruction has not been a part of past strategic arms control agreements because of the difficulties in verification, Crouch said.  The Bush administration did not like the idea of creating a formal arms control treaty, but the final arms reduction agreement will probably be a legally binding document that would survive the administrations of U.S. and Russian Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin, he said.

The final agreement is likely to be different from the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, Crouch said, calling START “a good snooze.”  The two countries did not need that level of detail in the proposed agreement, he said.  The final arms control agreement, however, probably will have verification measures based on those described in START and could go beyond them, Crouch said (Sharon Weinberger, Aerospace Daily, May 2).

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United States II:  Governor Sues Energy Over Plutonium Shipments

South Carolina Governor Jim Hodges filed suit yesterday against the U.S. Energy Department as part of an effort to prevent a shipment of weapon-grade plutonium to the state from the former Rocky Flats nuclear production site in Colorado (see GSN, April 30).

The suit alleges Energy did not properly complete environmental impact studies concerning its plans to convert the plutonium into mixed-oxide fuel at the South Carolina Savannah River site.  Hodges’ suit says the department has changed its plans on storing and treating the plutonium so many times that it has violated U.S. environmental law.

The suit seeks an injunction against the plutonium shipments set to begin this month, until the department complies with the law.  Conducting proper environmental studies could take six months to a year, Hodges said.

“If we’re successful, there will be a significant delay in their ability to ship plutonium to South Carolina,” Hodges said.  “It would throw a significant roadblock in their way.”

Hodges has said he would fight the shipments until the department agrees to a legally binding commitment to remove the nuclear material from the state at some point, rather than leaving it there indefinitely.  Energy officials have said they would remove the material, but Hodges wants an agreement filed in court or a law passed by Congress to ensure the department keeps the promise.

Energy Reaction

Despite the suit, the department plans to begin the shipments as early as May 15, Energy spokesman Joe Davis said, calling Hodges’ suit “political grandstanding for the cameras.”

Negotiations between the department and state officials made some progress yesterday, Davis said, adding that the department would continue to try to resolve the conflict.

“We are therefore disappointed that in light of our most recent good faith efforts to satisfy the governor … he chooses instead to run to the courthouse,” an Energy statement said.  “This action is totally inconsistent with a desire to work things out.”

Hodges said he still wants to negotiate, and if the department and South Carolina reach an agreement, he will drop the lawsuit.

Congressman Criticizes Governor

The lawsuit will probably fail and complicates efforts to reach an agreement between South Carolina and the department, said U.S. Representative Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.).

The plutonium shipments are vital to national security because a U.S.-Russian agreement requires the plutonium be converted into nonweapon-grade material, Graham said.  Therefore, Hodges will probably lose the suit, he said (Sammy Fretwell, State, May 2).

The bilateral agreement calls on the United States and Russia to neutralize 34 metric tons of weapon-grade plutonium.  “Turning this weapons plutonium here and in Russia in a nonweapons material will make the world imminently safer, because terrorists can’t get ahold of this stuff,” Graham said.  “I think South Carolinians would like to see us do that” (Sammy Fretwell, State, May 1).

Hodges Refused Compromise

The department had agreed to Graham’s proposal to pay $1 million in fines per day — up to $100 million per year — if the plutonium conversion does not work or falls behind schedules, Graham said.  The department also said it would remove the plutonium by 2017 if the conversion program fails (Fretwell, State, May 2).

Hodges, however, refused to accept the agreement Tuesday and said the department’s offer did not provide a strong enough commitment.  He offered new proposals for resolving the issue, including demanding that the department agree not to ship most of the plutonium to South Carolina until facilities to convert the material are within a year of being completed.

“What’s good enough is a strong piece of legislation and an enforceable agreement with teeth that protects South Carolina,” he said.  “And until we get that, I’m not budging.”

Graham disagreed with Hodges’ decision to reject the proposal, saying it is the best deal South Carolina will get from the department.  Hodges’ new proposals were made at the last minute, Graham said.

Graham plans to introduce legislation to limit the time the department can store the nuclear material in South Carolina (Fretwell, State, May 1).

Spratt Wants Assurances

Representative John Spratt (D-S.C.), however, said the state needs more assurances the department will not permanently store the plutonium there.

“What the governor is seeking, what I am seeking, is some firm assurance that if plutonium comes to South Carolina, it will be processed expeditiously and be transferred out of state as quickly as possible,” he said (Gene Crider, Rock Hill Herald, April 30).

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Uzbekistan:  Experts Prepare for Cleanup on

Experts have begun conducting tests to determine how to clean up a past Soviet biological weapons stockpile on a former island in the Aral Sea, an Uzbek expert said yesterday (see GSN, Feb. 28).

Scientists began the most recent tests at the end of April, Bek Tashmukhamedov, a biology professor at the Uzbekistan Academy of Science in Tashkent, said.  The testing is part of a cooperative threat reduction program funded by the United States, which is providing $10 million to clean up biological weapons facilities and materials on Vozrozhdeniya Island.  Uzbekistan, which controls two-thirds of the island, receives $6 million, and Kazakhstan receives the rest (see GSN, Jan. 22).

Earlier tests have shown that dangerous biological agents, including anthrax, remain in the soil.  If the buried agents rose to the topsoil, there would be a possibility that small animals such as rodents could carry germs to the mainland, Tashmukhamedov said.  The island has become a peninsula as the Aral Sea has receded, increasing such concerns.

U.S. experts plan to destroy the former biological weapons complex and kill any remaining live anthrax, which the Soviet Union buried on the island in 1988 (Associated Press/Yahoo.com, May 1).

The U.S. team plans to soak an area containing 11 pits of buried anthrax with a chlorine beach solution and to excavate the pits.  Researchers will analyze samples from the pits, and if no live anthrax remains, the workers will return the dirt to the pits and cap them.  Armed guards and helicopter patrols plan to provide security during the process, which expected to last 30 days.

Experts believe the anthrax in the pits remains very dangerous but poses little threat of spreading infection, according to the BBC (Catherine Davis, BBC News, May 1).

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U.S. Response:  Pentagon Looks to Partner With Biotechnology Firms

The U.S. Defense Department hopes to work with biotechnology companies to develop ways to better defend against biological weapons attacks, the Washington Post reported today (see GSN, May 1).

More than 350 biotech executives, government contractors and Pentagon officials met this week at a conference sponsored by the Biotechnology Industry Organization and the Defense Department.

During the last several months, the Pentagon has issued internal reports that call for increased funding for biotechnology research, and several military agencies have stepped up development of biological warfare defenses, such as antibiotics and vaccines (see GSN, April 12).  Many biotechnology firms have said they are interested in working with the Pentagon to adapt their technologies for use in counterterrorism, the Post reported.

There are some barriers, however, that hinder cooperation between the Pentagon and private biotech companies, according to the Post.  Many firms are more used to working with the National Institutes of Health and have less experience in working with the military.  Some biotech companies are concerned over potential product liability issues, while others want a long-term commitment to their products, the Post reported.

Biotechnology companies probably do not now see the U.S government as a major customer, but the Sept. 11 attacks and last fall’s anthrax attacks have revealed a need, said a BIO official.

“I don’t think the biotech industry looks at the government as a huge market,” said Brent Erickson, BIO director of industrial and environmental biotechnology.  “I think there’s genuine concern about the vulnerability of our country to biological attack” (Terence Chea, Washington Post, May 2).

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Anthrax:  JAMA Publishes New Guidelines

The Journal of the American Medical Association this week published a revised, illustrated guide on how to diagnose and treat anthrax.  The new guidelines incorporate information learned during last fall’s anthrax attacks, according to the Associated Press (see GSN, May 1).

In order to help doctors better diagnose anthrax cases, the guidelines include an image of an abnormal chest X-ray and of a black scab on a baby’s arm, the sign of a cutaneous anthrax infection.  The guidelines also include new information on antibiotic treatments for both cutaneous, or skin, and inhalational anthrax, according to the AP.

The body of an anthrax victim might need to be cremated to prevent further spread of spores, according to the new guide.  If an autopsy is performed on the body, the instruments must then be sterilized or destroyed, it says.

Last fall’s attacks illustrated that “you never know when it’s going to be at your doorstep,” said James Hughes of the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, a member of the panel that created the original anthrax guidelines in 1999.  Physicians “need to refresh their memories about what they probably learned,” he said (Associated Press/New York Times, April 30).

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U.S. Response:  Pentagon to Practice for Chemical Attack

The Pentagon and surrounding Arlington County in Virginia will conduct a chemical defense exercise next week in the Pentagon’s center courtyard.  The May 8 exercise will test the county’s ability to respond to a chemical weapons attack in a public place, according to a Defense Department press release.

County emergency response units and the Defense Protective Service will conduct the exercise, although other local police and fire units and various government and private agencies will also participate.  The Justice Department’s Domestic Preparedness Program is funding the exercise.

The 300 people expected to participate will act as victims and responders.  They will practice rescuing victims, identifying chemical agents, decontaminating the site, controlling crowds and other necessary response and recovery activities (Defense Department release, May 1).

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Japan:  Pentagon Announces Proposed Aegis Sale

The U.S. Defense Department has notified Congress that it might sell Japan an Aegis naval weapons system, which could be used for missile defense, the Straits Times reported today (see GSN, April 3).

The Aegis system links a naval vessel’s phased-array radar and weapons systems to track and combat more than 100 aerial targets simultaneously.  The $578 million proposed sale would provide Japan with its fifth Aegis system, along with a Joint Tactical Information Distribution System, which allows the Aegis to expand its capability by connecting to a network of similarly equipped ships (Straits Times, May 2).

The Aegis system would be installed on a Japanese improved Kongo-class destroyer expected to enter into service in 2006, according to Defense Daily.  Japan is expected to begin construction of a sixth Kongo-class destroyer in the near future, and Japan and the U.S. Navy have begun talks about purchasing a sixth Aegis system (Marc Strass, Defense Daily, May 1).

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Nuclear Waste:  Nevada Lawmakers Looking to Block House Resolution

Nevada’s congressional delegation is examining procedural ways to block a House resolution in support of a planned nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, the Las Vegas Review-Journal reported today (see GSN, April 26).

The House resolution, which has already made its way out of committee, would override Nevada Governor Kenny Guinn’s veto of the Yucca Mountain site.  Nevada congressional aides are considering challenging the resolution on the basis that it is an “unfunded mandate,” which would force states to spend funds on highways and emergency response training without reimbursement from Washington, according to the Review-Journal.  If that is so, then the resolution would violate congressional budget rules, according to the Review-Journal.

Representative Jim Gibbons (R-Nev.) raised the unfunded mandate issue when Congress last dealt with Yucca Mountain in 2000 but lost by a 206-205 vote, according to the Review-Journal.

“It’s an option we’re looking at,” Gibbons said yesterday.  “We haven’t had a chance to review it thoroughly.”

The full House is expected to vote on the override resolution next week, the Review-Journal reported.  Nevada will probably receive significantly less support in opposing the vote than in 2000, when 167 representatives voted against Yucca Mountain, said Representative Shelley Berkley (D-Nev.) yesterday (see GSN, April 18).

“That (167) is a benchmark for us, but candidly, I don’t think we can get there,” she said.  “Anything over 100 (next week) would be very respectable.”

Instead, it is important for Nevada to obtain as many votes as possible against Yucca Mountain in the House as a show of strength for when the Senate takes up the issue, Berkley said.

“In other words, we’re the dam holding back the water,” she said.

While both the Bush administration and the House Republican leadership are solidly in favor of the override resolution, there is still no consensus among House Democrats on how to vote on the issue, said Brendan Daly, spokesman for House Minority Whip Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.).

“We know we’re not going to win so we’re not whipping it officially,” Daly said.  “But Congresswoman Pelosi thought (helping Berkley) was the right thing to do because she is very concerned about the transportation of nuclear waste across the country” (Las Vegas Review-Journal, May 2).

NRC Proposes No Double Containment for Plutonium Waste

Meanwhile, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Tuesday proposed doing away with a requirement that nuclear waste containing plutonium be shipped in “double containment” casks, indicating the commission believes the requirement is not needed to protect the public.

“The NRC is unaware of any risk studies that would provide either a qualitative or quantitative indication of the risk reduction associated with the use of double containment in transportation of plutonium,” the commission said in its proposal in the Federal Register.

Eliminating the double containment rule would remove an inner container from waste casks, allowing them to have larger storage capacity, according to Energy Daily.  The double containment requirement was created in 1974 because of safety concerns over the shipments of liquid plutonium waste.  The NRC said it intends to remove the double containment requirement only for solid plutonium wastes.

Double containment has already been waived for shipments of vitrified, or solidified, waste from former nuclear weapons production sites to the planned Yucca Mountain repository (see GSN, April 14).  The rule change, however, could also ease shipping restrictions for nuclear waste shipped to Yucca Mountain from nuclear power plants, which would make up the bulk of the shipments, according to Energy Daily (George Lobsenz, Energy Daily, May 1).

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