U.S. Response:  House Approves Emergency Fiscal 2002 Funds

The U.S. House of Representatives early this morning voted 280-138 to approve the fiscal 2002 emergency supplemental bill, which appropriates funding for the war on terrorism and homeland security measures (see GSN, May 23).

The $29 billion bill would provide supplemental funds until Oct. 1, the end of fiscal 2002, according to the Associated Press.  Under the bill, the military would receive a majority of the funds, $5.5 billion would go to New York for recovery from the Sept. 11 attacks and the rest would be spent on homeland security measures, AP reported.  Many Democrats in the House voted against the bill over concerns that some provisions might lead to an increase in federal borrowing.

The Senate Appropriations Committee Wednesday passed its $31 billion version of the supplemental.  Senate Republicans were able to block full debate on the bill until after the Memorial Day recess, however, in order to have more time to work on reducing the bill closer to the Bush administration’s $27.1 billion request (Associated Press/New York Times, May 24).

Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle (D-S.D.) criticized Senate Republicans yesterday for blocking debate on the supplemental bill.

“It is inexcusable that they would work to delay this bill,” he said.  “They seem to be playing a very high-stakes game here on all of this.”

Senate Republicans were against beginning debate on the bill because of its size and insufficient time in order to review it, according to Republican sources.

“As Senate watchers know, it takes more than one day to consider a $31 billion bill meant to help our troops who are fighting overseas,” a Republican leadership aide said (CongressDaily, May 23).

Nonproliferation Funds

The Senate fiscal 2002 emergency supplemental bill would allow Bush to waive Cooperative Threat Reduction certification restrictions for fiscal 2002 (see GSN, May 9).

The legislation also includes $100 million of additional funds for U.S. nonproliferation programs overseen by the Energy Department, according a Council for Livable World press release.  The funding includes:

*         $10 million for the Nuclear Cities Initiative, which helps employ former Soviet nuclear weapons scientists;

*         $10 million to help upgrade security at Russian nuclear reactors;

*         $19 million to help Russia shut down and replace three plutonium-producing nuclear reactors;

*         $20 million in support for International Atomic Energy Agency initiatives and for the Materials Protection, Control and Accounting Program, which works to secure nuclear materials outside the former Soviet Union and

*         $35 million to help develop technology to detect and counter nuclear and radiological threats (Council for a Livable World release, May 24).

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Iraq: U.S. Military Attempts to Sway White House From Invasion

U.S. military leaders believe they have persuaded civilian officials to postpone, or even cancel, any plans to invade Iraq, the Washington Post reported today (see GSN, May 23).

According to senior Pentagon officials, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have attempted to convince the Bush administration to change its warlike position toward Iraq, the Post reported.  The U.S. military’s top leadership is concerned over two aspects of the conduct of any invasion, according to the Post.  One is a concern that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein would have no constraints, as he did during the Gulf War, on using biological and chemical weapons.  The other is the casualty rates that would result from street-to-street fighting in Baghdad.

Some Pentagon military leaders also are concerned about the impact of removing a weakened Hussein completely from power, according to the Post.  There is no evidence that a successor would come to power that would be more cooperative with the United States, and instead, a more hostile regime could take control, the Post reported (see GSN, March 20).

Part of the Joint Chiefs’ efforts included a briefing for President George W. Bush conducted earlier this month by Army Gen. Tommy Franks, head of Central Command.  Franks told Bush that at least 200,000 troops would be needed for any military offensive into Iraq, implicitly criticizing proposals to overthrow Iraq through Special Operations forces fighting alongside Iraqi resistance groups, according to the Post.

Such a buildup is needed to prompt a similar buildup of Iraqi forces, making them more vulnerable to aircraft and missile attacks, according to a senior U.S. military official.

“We don’t need as much as Desert Storm, but we need a large competent ground force in order to shape the other force,” said the official.  “What forces the other guy to mass is the presence of another ground force.  Then you can deal with that force” with concentrated firepower.

The Bush administration is still considering ways to remove Hussein from power, but now is examining covert operations in response to the military’s advice, two military officials said.

“There are many ways in which that (regime change) could come about, only one of which is a military campaign in Iraq,” an official who said he is familiar with the thinking of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said yesterday (Thomas Ricks, Washington Post, May 24).

Stretching the Military Thin

Senior military officials have said that a top secret Pentagon war game has demonstrated that the U.S. military would be stretched thin if called to expand the war on terrorism to another country such as Iraq, according to the New York Times.

The war game, code named “Prominent Hammer,” examined the impact on the U.S. military from increased domestic defense responsibilities, long-term deployments in the Balkans, South Korea, the Middle East and the Sinai Peninsula and the campaign in Afghanistan, according to the Times.

The exercise indicated that a military operation against a country like an Iraq might require mobilizing reserve forces at a level approaching that used during the Gulf War, when 265,000 National Guard and Reserve troops were called up, the Times reported.  The simulation also indicated that such an offensive would cause shortages in equipment, including surveillance, electronic jamming and refueling tanker and transport aircraft.

“Prominent Hammer” did indicate, however, that the U.S. military could still engage in a regional conflict and maintain its other operations, the Times reported.

“The question we asked in ‘Prominent Hammer’ was, ‘If you’re forced into anther conflict, what do you do?’” said a U.S. military officer.  “It was not about Iraq or North Korea, per se.  It played out multiple scenarios.  But we found we could do Iraq.  We could do North Korea.  We could do elsewhere” (Shanker/Schmitt, New York Times, May 24).

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U.S.-Russia:  Presidents Agree to Increase Nonproliferation Cooperation

By Kerry Boyd
Global Security Newswire

Russia and the United States today agreed to increase joint efforts to prevent WMD proliferation and to lower the risk that terrorists might acquire nuclear, chemical or biological materials (see GSN, May 9).

Russian and U.S. Presidents Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush signed a joint declaration stating that all countries must combat WMD proliferation and promising to expand efforts to protect and dismantle weapons of mass destruction.  The two presidents also signed a treaty to reduce their strategic nuclear forces (see related GSN story, today).

“President Putin and I agree also that the greatest danger in this war is the prospect of terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction.  Our nations must spare no effort at preventing all forms of proliferation,” Bush said in Moscow today (see GSN, May 23).

The joint declaration calls for continuing cooperative threat reduction programs, including intensifying cooperation to destroy chemical weapons (see GSN, May 7).  The presidents agreed to establish joint groups of experts to study how to eliminate more weapon-grade fissile material and “to recommend collaborative research and development efforts on advanced, proliferation-resistant nuclear reactor and fuel cycle technologies.”

The two countries said they would implement and bolster the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the chemical and biological weapons conventions.  They called on all countries to enforce export controls, tighten border controls and take law enforcement measures to prevent WMD proliferation.

Bush also said the two countries would work together on issues concerning proliferation to Iran (see related GSN story, today).

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Iran:  Summiteers Fail to Agree on Nuclear Assistance

Although U.S. and Russian Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin agreed today to intensify cooperative efforts to prevent WMD proliferation, they continued to disagree on whether Russian nuclear assistance to Iran is a proliferation threat, according to reports (see related GSN story, today).

Russia has denied U.S. accusations that a Russian project to build a civilian nuclear reactor in Iran contributes to WMD proliferation (see GSN, May 21). 

Russian assistance to Iran is “the single most important proliferation threat there is,” a senior Bush administration told reporters enroute to Moscow, according to Reuters.  “Frankly, we haven’t been able to see eye to eye about it,” the official said (Reuters/Gazeta.ru, May 24).

“I worry about Iran, and I’m confident Vladimir Putin worries about Iran, and that was confirmed today,” Bush said today during a press conference after signing the joint declaration, which included a commitment to nonproliferation. 

Bush said that the two presidents spoke “frankly and honestly about the need to make sure that a nontransparent government run by radical clerics doesn’t get their hands on weapons of mass destruction.  It could be harmful to us and harmful to Russia.”

“I’m confident we can work together on this issue,” Bush added.

Putin said he agrees that WMD proliferation is a serious threat to international security but said Russia’s cooperation with Iran “is not of a character which would undermine the process on nonproliferation.”

Russian-Iranian cooperation is purely economic — in terms of the “energy sector” — Putin said.

“I’d like to point out also that the U.S. has taken a commitment upon themselves to build similar nuclear power plant in North Korea, similar to Russia,” he added (see GSN, May 13).

Russia has information indicating that Western companies helped several countries build missile and nuclear programs, Putin said, offering to share the information with the United States.

“As regards Iran and some other countries, according to our data, the missile programs of those countries, nuclear programs, are built largely on the basis of the technologies and with the support of the Western companies,” he said (Federal News Service transcript, May 24).

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U.S.-Russia I:  Bush and Putin Sign Nuclear Treaty, Leave Details for Later

By David Ruppe
Global Security Newswire

U.S. President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin today signed a unique, nonspecific, arms control treaty in Moscow that would require Russia and the United States to remove thousands of strategic nuclear warheads from active service by December 31, 2012.

With fewer than 500 words, the treaty text lacks specific details about how the reductions would be achieved, a feature critics say is a major flaw, but which Bush administration officials say signals a positive trend in U.S.-Russian relations.

Article I, the only substantive section of the five-article agreement, says:  “Each party shall reduce and limit strategic nuclear warheads … so that by December 31, 2012 the aggregate number of such warheads does not exceed 1,700-2,200 for each party.”

Treaty details, such as how to implement the agreement, have yet to be decided, and will be negotiated in the coming months, an administration official told Global Security Newswire today.

“The treaty is essentially a statement of broad intent,” said Michael Anton, a National Security Council spokesman.

“The verification stuff, all of that is going to go into the implementation agreement.  These are essentially the details, the nitty-gritty and it’s being worked on, but it’s not done.  It may take a little while,” Anton said.

That lack of specificity is drawing criticism from arms control experts.

“This treaty is toothless and almost pointless,” said Jon Wolfsthal, an associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Nonproliferation Project.

“It does not define what it is it is trying to control.  It does not have verification terms.  It is almost impossible to violate this treaty,” he said, since it “does not define what types of nuclear warheads are being limited, does not define what is ‘deployed,’ and does not say how you count aggregate warheads.”

“It is not an arms control treaty.  It is essentially a signed political statement, confirming statements the presidents agreed to previously,” he said.

Some see the agreement, however unspecific, as a positive step in U.S. Russian relations.

“I would say this is a positive step,” says Jack Matlock, a former ambassador to Russia during the Clinton administration.  “This obviously is the best we could get on both sides and it is a step forward, it moves things in the right direction.”

Undecided Specifics

As previously reported, the text of the signed “Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty,” released today by the White House, allows each country to dispose of warheads taken off the front lines in a manner it sees fit, which can include keeping them in storage and available for reintroduction into the force following a withdrawal from the treaty, as officials have said the United States will do.

It does not require that any weapons be destroyed, either warheads or delivery platforms — aircraft, submarines and missiles — differing from the U.S.-Russian START agreements, which required that platforms be destroyed.

The language also does not provide for any mechanism to verify that the required changes take place.

The treaty, furthermore, specifically allows each country to determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms, which with respect to the United States, allows it to size to its choosing its “strategic triad” of submarine, aircraft and missile forces.

Administration officials, who did not release the text until today, previously had described the agreement as three pages long, but a hard copy printed from the White House web site is only 1 1/2 pages.

Mixed Reviews

The NSC’s Anton says the lack of specificity of the agreement is a positive sign about the state of U.S.-Russian relations.

“President Putin and President Bush trust each other enough to say OK, we can sign a three-page treaty with confidence [that] the spirit of it and the letter of it, that after 10 years we’ll be down to this level.  We’ll stick to that and we’ll work out exactly how this works in every detail in the implementation agreement subsequent to signing,” Anton said.

Bush described the treaty as “historic” at the joint signing at the Kremlin.

“This treaty liquidates the Cold War legacy of nuclear hostility between our countries,” he said.

An implication of the lack of specificity, said Carnegie’s Wolfsthal, is that “there is no way to violate a treaty that doesn’t define its terms.  The United States today could say, ‘well, we’re deploying 1,700 to 2,200 warheads depending on how you count them.’”

“It is a signed, essentially blank piece of paper,” he said.

“We want to make sure these are clear reductions, and not just accounting reductions,” said Karl Inderfurth, a former senior State Department official during the Clinton administration and senior advisor to the Nuclear Threat Reduction Campaign.

“It is clearly an important step in establishing this new strategic relationship between the United States and Russia, there’s no question about that,” he said, adding though, “It does not, as President Bush has suggested, liquidate the Cold War legacy of our nuclear relationship.”

“We are not out of the nuclear woods yet with Russia” and because the United States will continue to have large numbers with many “on a state of high alert and our targeting plans still include Russia as the main focus of those plans.  So we still have more work to do,” he said.

U.S. officials have said each country has about 6,000 deployed strategic warheads.

Russian Approval

Putin offered strong support for the treaty text at the join press conference today, saying, “the fact that we agreed with President Bush regarding such detente, in such manner, this is a serious move ahead to ensure international security, which is a very good sign as regards the relationship between our two countries.”

Another Russian official said at a Tuesday press conference that Moscow supports the treaty text because it requires no restrictions on the Russian arsenal.

The treaty “is good for Russia because it places absolutely no restrictions on Russia.  As distinct from all the previous accords in this sphere, there are no restrictions under the new treaty,” said Duma Committee for Defense Vice Chairman Alexei Arbatov.

“It places no restrictions on Russia from the point of numbers, structure, or quality.  It is absolutely unrelated to the strategic arms development program adopted by Russia,” he said.

Arbatov did, however, identify some treaty flaws.

“The quite long list of our proposals on limiting and cutting the U.S. forces was not accepted in any way,” he said.  “Secondly, having agreed on ceilings, the parties did not quite specifically agree on how to count those ceilings.  Again another unique aspect of the new treaty is that, unlike all the previous ones, it has no rules of ‘netting,’ no systems of verification and inspection, and no procedures for cuts and dismantling.  These are the three main sections which in all the previous treaties used to occupy a huge place and literally fill volumes of articles and agreements that accompanied each treaty.”

Critics Say Cuts Overstated

Some arms control analysts say the administration has been overstating in a subtle way the implications of the agreement, by describing the changes that would be required by the treaty as arsenal reductions, although the language does not require eliminating any warheads.

Bush said at the signing, for instance, the treaty would reduce “strategic nuclear warhead arsenals to the range of 1,700 to 2,200, the lowest level in decades.”

“I think they are defining arsenal as what weapons are actually operationally deployed,” said Inderfurth, who disagrees with that definition.

“If they are in our control, they are part of our arsenal. If placed in storage, but can be taken out again, they are clearly in our arsenal,” he said. “Any weapon that could be deployed or could be used is part of our arsenal.

“I would think that reduction of arsenals, and the president used the terms arsenals, is a stronger term than simply removing warheads from operational deployment,” said Matlock.

“I think this phrase is just one of the phrases that are going to give a lot of people problems as they examine this document and look at exactly what it means and what it requires of this country,” said Joseph Cirincione, director of Carnegie’s Nonproliferation Project.

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U.S.-Russia II:  Arms Control Experts Debate New Treaty

U.S. and Russian Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin signed a strategic nuclear reductions treaty today in Moscow that calls for reducing the number of their strategic warheads to below 2,200 each by the end of 2012 (see GSN, May 23).

Members of the arms control community have criticized the treaty as not going far enough, illustrated by a release issued earlier this week by Matthew McKinzie of Natural Resources Defense Council suggesting the agreement is “a three-page political charade.”  The release lists a number of specific criticisms to which Global Security Newswire asked Baker Spring of the Heritage Foundation to respond.

Matthew McKinzie, NRDC	Baker Spring, Heritage Foundation
At a time when the threat of nuclear terrorism hangs over the globe, this treaty is a major step backward.  It is, in short, a sham treaty.  President Bush is squandering a major opportunity to reduce the nuclear danger.  Instead he is ensuring that the United States will continue to brandish the world’s most capable system for delivering weapons of mass destruction.	This is a good treaty and [it] deserves Senate consent to ratification…. (see GSN, May 20) This agreement is consistent with the national security requirements established in part through the Nuclear Posture Review.  Why should it be otherwise?
The new treaty does not require the elimination of a single strategic missile, silo, bomber, submarine or warhead.  The treaty actually represents a reversal of the START II Treaty’s goal of eliminating the heavy ICBMs, the missiles that can be reloaded with large numbers of multiple warheads, and which promote instability because they provide an incentive to initiate a first strike.  Both sides can keep as many nuclear weapons in storage as they want, warheads that can become operational within weeks or months of the decision to do so.	The treaty is a substantive agreement.   The NRDC asserts this treaty achieves nothing substantive.  This is nonsense.   It will reduce U.S. and Russian operational strategic nuclear warheads by roughly two-thirds.  This is much more than what the Clinton administration achieved with its attempt to implement the NRDC’s approach to arms control.  START II was never ratified.  START III floundered.  The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was rejected by the Senate.  This is a record of substantive achievement?  The NRDC’s and the Clinton administration’s overreaching on arms control essentially destroyed the process.
The treaty does not require either country to account for or destroy their nonstrategic, or tactical, nuclear weapons (see GSN, May 16).  We are especially concerned about the more than 8,000 tactical nuclear weapons in Russia’s arsenal, which could wind up in the hands of terrorists.	History reveals that tactical nuclear weapons are not an appropriate subject for this treaty.  It is true that this treaty does not address tactical nuclear weapons, but neither did SALT II, INF, START or START II.  The NRDC is clearly attempting to change the standard by which strategic arms control agreements are judged in order to allow it to criticize this agreement.  The standards should remain the same.
The treaty includes no verification protocols.  The treaty does nothing to improve the monitoring, or accelerate the destruction of Russian warheads.  Even as friends, both countries would be better served if they exchanged and verified data on the number and location of nuclear weapons each side possesses.	While as I understand it this treaty does not itself include a verification protocol, the extensive verification protocol from START is grandfathered.  Further, the treaty will establish a joint commission that will provide the opportunity to establish new transparency measures to increase confidence on both sides that other is doing what it says it is doing.
The limit of 2,200 warheads imposed on the deployed U.S. and Russian strategic arsenals will be in effect for just one day:  December 31, 2012. This limit comes into and out of effect long after the Bush administration, even if Bush wins a second term. The treaty apparently imposes no constraints on either the deployed or total nuclear arsenals during the next 10 years or beyond 2012.	The U.S. and Russia will gradually reduce their arsenals and are free to conclude follow-on arrangements.  The NRDC uses the fact that the treaty has no interim targets for reductions during the 10-year implementation period to imply that the United States will go from roughly 6,000 operationally deployed warheads on Dec. 30, 2012, to fewer than 2,200 on Dec. 31, 2012.  This is simply impractical.  The United States and Russia are all but certain to reduce their arsenals on a gradual and consistent basis.  In fact, the United States is already in the process of removing the MX/Peacekeeper missile and Trident submarines from service as strategic delivery systems.  As to the fact that the agreement expires in 2012, the United States and Russia will have 10 years to discuss and agree to a follow-on arrangement.

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North Korea:  U.S. Officials Split on Whether to Resume Talks

The Bush administration cannot decide whether it should begin talks with North Korea and has not yet scheduled a date for a proposed visit by a U.S. envoy, the Washington Times reported today.

When North Korea said in late April that it wanted to resume talks — which have been on hold since U.S. President George W. Bush took office — the United States said that it would determine a date soon (see GSN, April 30).

Publicly, U.S. officials have said the envoy’s visit has not been scheduled due to logistics, and one official said senior administrators agree that dialogue should begin soon, according to the Times.  Other officials, however, want the administration to wait until it is convinced of North Korea’s sincerity before sending an envoy, the Times reported (see GSN, May 13).

“We are still gauging how sincere the North Koreans are, especially after they canceled the next round of economic cooperation talks with the South this month,” a second official said.  “There is no consensus in the administration on the way forward.”

Most State Department officials and some National Security Council officials advocate resuming talks, but the Pentagon and some State and NSC officials disagree, saying it would be “appeasement,” the second official said.

Meanwhile, State’s special envoy for North Korea, Charles Pritchard, said yesterday the two countries “are moving toward opening a dialogue on a broad range of issues.”  He was speaking at the annual conference of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, the multinational organization responsible for building two nuclear reactors in North Korea under the 1994 Agreed Framework with the United States (see GSN, May 21).

Pritchard called on KEDO members, which include the United States, South Korea, the European Union, Australia, Japan, Canada and Poland, to increase their contributions to the organization’s budget.  Having provided $605 million, South Korea is the largest donor, and the United States is next at $311 million (Nicholas Kralev, Washington Times, May 24).

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U.S. Response:  Congress Passes Bioterrorism Defense Bill

The U.S. Congress this week passed and sent to the White House legislation to provide $4.6 billion to boost defenses against bioterrorism.  The Senate passed the bioterrorism bill yesterday in a 98-0 vote, following House approval Wednesday (see GSN, May 23).  President George W. Bush is expected to sign the bill into law when he returns from Europe.

The bill includes provisions to expand the U.S. stockpile of vaccines and drugs, improve food inspections and increase water systems security (see related GSN story, today).

“This bill reduces our vulnerability when it comes to threat of bioterrorism and thus reduces the likelihood of an attack,” Senator Bill Frist (R-Tenn.) said (Jesse Holland, Associated Press/Yahoo.com, May 24).

Although the Senate unanimously approved the bill, some senators expressed regret the legislation does not include certain provisions.  Senator Judd Gregg (R-N.H.) had wanted to include an antitrust exemption to allow vaccine manufacturers to discuss drug supplies and future needs with U.S. government agencies.  Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) said he wished the bill had provisions related to testing drugs on children and had provided for user fees for medical equipment manufacturers (CongressDaily, May 24).

Bush said in a statement he looks forward to signing the legislation (White House release, May 23).

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Cuba:  U.S. Army Commander Questions Development Claims

U.S. Army Maj.-Gen. Gary Speer, commander of U.S. forces for Latin America and the Caribbean, said yesterday that he has seen no evidence that Cuba has been involved in producing biological weapons (see GSN, May 22).

Speer said he does not know why Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton alleged that Cuba has a limited biological weapons development program.  He said he was “surprised [Bolton] raised the subject.”

Cuba’s research and development program could be used both for medical technologies and to produce biological weapons, since “it’s all kind of the same science,” Speer said.  Cuba, however, has a history of pride in their biomedical developments and their research fits into that program, he said.

“I think what Mr. Bolton said in his statement, it kind of got reported as an accusation that the Cubans were ... that we had evidence that they were actually producing bioweapons,” Speer said.  “And I’m not sure that’s the case” (Carol Rosenberg, Miami Herald, May 24).

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South Korean Response:  U.S. Forces Deploy Detection Vehicles

U.S. forces in Seoul today deployed five vehicles that can detect biological weapons agents, according to Yonhap news agency (see GSN, May 7).

A U.S. biological weapons unit in South Korea deployed the five biological integrated detection systems at the parking lot of the unit’s command post.  The U.S. Army also plans to station biological weapons detection troops at each of the 10 venues for the World Cup, scheduled to begin on May 31, a U.S. command post official said (Yonhap/BBC Worldwide Monitoring, May 24).

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Russia:  Moscow Calls for Release of U.S. Funds for Weapons Disposal

The head of Russia’s chemical weapons demilitarization program has called on the United States to unblock promised funding to assist Russian chemical weapons disposal programs, the Financial Times reported today (see GSN, March 22).

The hold on U.S. funding comes as concerns about the security of Russia’s chemical weapons stockpile are rising, said Zinovy Pak, head of the Russian Munitions Agency.  Pak said he is not satisfied with security at Russia’s seven chemical weapons disposal sites.  Some theft might already have occurred, he said.

Possible leakage of Russian chemical weapons skills is also a concern, Pak said.

“There are knowledgeable people without work, who have to feed their families,” he said.

The United States has pledged millions to assist in Russia’s chemical weapons disposal efforts but has been frustrated at the slow progress of the program, the Times reported.  U.S. officials recently blocked funds because of concerns that Russia had not accurately reported the extent of its biological and chemical weapons programs (Andrew Jack, Financial Times, May 24).

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Iran:  Shahab-3 Tests Successfully

Iran successfully tested a Shahab-3 missile earlier this month, U.S. officials said, according to the Associated Press.  With a range of 1,300 kilometers, the missile is capable of striking Israel, parts of Turkey, and U.S. troops stationed in the Middle East and South Asia (see GSN, May 15).

Officials believe the May test was the fifth time Iran tested the Shahab-3, which is based on North Korean No Dong missiles, but some previous tests have been failures, AP reported.  Iran could probably launch a few Shahab-3 missiles in a crisis, but the country has not developed a completely reliable system, U.S. intelligence officials said.

The test “shows they are continuing to move forward with their missile programs,” said one U.S. official yesterday.

The United States monitors missile tests with early warning satellites, according to AP (Associated Press/Ha’aretz, May 24).

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U.S.-Russia:  New Agreement Addresses Missile Defense

The U.S.-Russian joint declaration on a new strategic relationship, signed today alongside a strategic arms reduction agreement, includes provisions on transparency and possible joint cooperation on missile defense systems (see GSN, May 23).

The United States and Russia have agreed to several measures — including exchanges of information on, and visits to, missile defense tests — to increase confidence and transparency in missile defenses, according to the declaration (see GSN, May 16).  The United States and Russia plan to create a joint center to exchange early warning data, the declaration says.

Both countries have also examined potential areas for cooperation in missile defense, including joint exercises and joint technology development, the declaration says.  Through the framework of the new NATO-Russia Council, the United States and Russia will continue to examine areas of cooperation on missile defense with Europe, according to the declaration (see GSN, May 22).

The joint declaration also says that the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty will provide the basis for confidence and transparency measures in any future strategic arms reduction agreements that might be agreed to by the United States and Russia (White House release, May 24).

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Nuclear Waste:  Senate Committee Examines Terrorism Risk to Waste Shipments

By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — Preparing for an expected vote on whether to build a permanent nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain in Nevada, members of a key Senate committee this week examined issues surrounding the project (see GSN, May 17).

In a series of hearings that concluded yesterday, the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee considered various issues, including the potential risk of terrorist attacks on waste shipments en route to the repository.  The committee is expected to vote June 5, and the full Senate is expected to vote in July, on a resolution that would override Nevada Governor Kenny Guinn’s veto of the Yucca Mountain site.  The Senate override resolution is identical to one passed this month in the House of Representatives.

Wednesday, Yucca Mountain opponents testified that waste shipments would present a symbolic target to terrorists and might lead to devastating effects if attacked.  Salt Lake City Mayor Ross Anderson, testifying on behalf of Nevada, told the committee that the large number of waste shipments that would have to travel to the repository might present terrorists with an attractive target (see GSN, May 22).

“From experience, we know that the Yucca Mountain proposal would put most Americans, including all the citizens of Salt Lake City, at tremendous risk by creating tens of thousands of highly lethal ‘dirty bombs,’” Anderson said.

Based on the mode of transportation used — the Energy Department has not yet created a comprehensive waste transportation plan — there would probably be 935 to 2,200 waste shipments to the site annually for 24 years once the repository is operational, Robert Halstead, transportation adviser for the Nevada Agency for Nuclear Projects, told the committee.

Most shipments would occur under a “mostly legal-weight truck” transportation scenario, under which Energy would transport nuclear waste to the repository via standard trucks, Halstead said.  Although there are several other scenarios, including the use of rail and heavy-haul trucks for the waste shipments, “the DOE mostly legal-weight truck scenario is the only national transportation scenario that is currently feasible,” he said.

Preliminary waste shipment routes laid out in Energy’s final environmental impact statement (see GSN, April 26) would affect 45 states and more than 123 million people, Halstead said.  The department also predicted that up to 16.4 million people could be living as close half a mile from a waste transportation route, either road or rail, by 2035, he added.

Radiation, Contamination Potential Cited

The spent fuel that would be shipped to Yucca Mountain contains significant amounts of fissile material, such as cesium-137, that would be a major source of radiation and contamination in the event of a terrorist attack, Halstead said.  Unshielded spent fuel can emit a lethal dose of radiation in less than two minutes after being cooled for 10 years and in less than 5 minutes after being cooled for 50 years, he said, adding that Energy has estimated that spent fuel would be cooled for about 23 years before being shipped to Yucca Mountain.

Energy has acknowledged that a successful terrorist attack on a waste shipment could expose the public to radiation and potential latent cancer deaths, Halstead said.  Testing in the 1980s by the department and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission demonstrated that the truck casks to be used to ship waste can be breached with an explosive device such as a military detonation charge, which could disperse spent fuel, he said.

In its draft environmental impact statement, the department estimated that a successful attack on a truck cask in the middle of an urban area could result in a radiation dose equal to 31,000 person-rems — enough to cause 15 latent cancer deaths, according to Halstead.  In its final version, Energy increased the estimate to a radiation dose of 96,000 person-rems — enough to cause 48 latent cancer deaths, he said.  The department did not evaluate any other effects of a successful attack, such as the economic consequences, in either environmental statement, Halstead said.

An analysis prepared for Nevada by radioactive waste experts came to a more dramatic conclusion in the event of a terrorist attack on a waste shipment, Halstead said.  By using a different set of computer models than Energy, the independent analysis estimated that up to 1,800 latent cancer deaths could result if a truck cask was 90 percent penetrated by an explosive charge, he said.

“Full perforation of the cask, likely to occur in an attack involving a state of the art anti-tank weapon, such as the TOW missile, could cause 3,000 to 18,000 latent cancer fatalities,” Halstead said.  “Cleanup and recovery costs would exceed $10 billion.”

Symbolic Target

The general public fear of radiation and the potential consequences of a release of spent fuel from a cask makes nuclear waste shipments an attractive target for terrorists, James Ballard, an academic expert on terrorism, told the committee Wednesday.

“The primary reason why these shipments will be a target is their symbolic value to terrorists,” Ballard said.  “Just as the World Trade Center was not just a building, an attack against these waste shipments is not just an inconsequential incident probability to be explained away by statistics.”

It might be better instead to continue to store spent fuel on-site at nuclear power plants, Ballard said.  The number of needed shipments, as well as the transportation pattern and large physical size of the casks, presents terrorists with a “target-rich” environment for potential attacks, he said. 

“In short, moving them increases our risk of terrorist attack,” Ballard said.  “It does not decrease the risk.”

Senator Larry Craig (R-Idaho), a staunch supporter of the Yucca Mountain repository plan, questioned the logic of maintaining thousands of tons of spent fuel at more nuclear plants throughout the United States, rather than storing it all at one centralized location.

“Now, if the terrorist world believes that this is a right approach toward intimidating American citizens, then my guess is they know where every one of those locations is today,” he said to Ballard.  “I cannot understand how you would suggest that this is not a level of high vulnerability.”

Spent fuel on-site at nuclear power plants “seems like … a much more reasonable target than a mobile target,” Craig said.

Salt Lake City Mayor Anderson expressed doubts that the government would be able to adequately defend waste shipments from a terrorist attack.

“Protecting the Salt Lake 2002 Winter Olympic Games for less than two weeks, in a relatively constrained geographical area, was a monumental task,” he said.  “Adequately protecting tens of thousands of highly lethal shipments of nuclear waste as they travel thousands of miles through dozens of major cities over a period of 38 years will be impossible.”

Making Shipments Safe

During a committee hearing yesterday, however, NRC Chairman Richard Meserve defended the safety and security of nuclear waste shipments.

“The commission believes that the spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste stored at multiple sites can be safely and securely transported to a single location,” he said.  Both the NRC and the Transportation Department have responsibility for nuclear waste shipments.  The department regulates all transport activities, and the NRC is in charge of certifying shipment casks.  The NRC also oversees an inspection and enforcement program and approves security plans for nuclear waste shipments, Meserve said.

Security plans include information from waste shippers about how they will comply with NRC regulations, advance notifications to state officials about shipments, establishment of several communication systems with transport vehicles, provision of escort services and establishment of contacts with local law enforcement officials along waste shipment routes, he said.

Although the commission is satisfied with the current transportation regulatory system, the NRC will still conduct evaluations, Meserve said.  The waste shipment casks are also being re-evaluated in order to upgrade their response to acts of attack or sabotage, he said.  The NRC believes that the history of spent fuel shipments in the United Statements, as well as the NRC studies, reviews and inspections, provides a strong basis for confidence in the safety and security of waste shipments to Yucca Mountain, Meserve said.

Spent fuel shipments could be made safer by delaying them for extended periods of time from the on-site locations at nuclear power plants where spent fuel is now stored, Halstead said at Wednesday’s hearing.  Since radiation decreases over time, the oldest spent fuel currently on-site should be shipped first under any transportation plan, and newly spent fuel should be kept on site for 40 to 50 years before being transported to a long-term repository, he said.

Halstead also said more research needs to be conducted on the potential effects of a release of radiological material from a damaged truck or rail cask.

“It’s in this … area of protecting shipments from becoming dirty bombs that I am most pessimistic about our ability to actually protect the public health and safety,” he said.

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Radiological Weapons:  Congress Requires Drug Near Nuclear Plants

By Kerry Boyd
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — Bioterrorism legislation passed in the House and Senate this week (see related GSN story today) would require state and local officials to stockpile drugs near nuclear power plants in preparation for a large-scale accident or terrorist attack.  President George W. Bush said in a White House release that he looks forward to signing the bill into law (see GSN, May 23).

The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act, passed by the Senate yesterday following House approval Wednesday, contains provisions that would require U.S. officials to provide potassium iodide tablets to state and local governments.  Potassium iodide helps prevent the thyroid gland from absorbing radioactive iodine, which could be released in a nuclear disaster and possibly cause cancer.  The drug must, however, be taken shortly before exposure.

Federal guidelines already recommend stockpiling potassium iodide within 10 miles of a nuclear plant (see GSN, Jan. 10).  Some communities have potassium iodide stockpiles, but the legislation would make the drug available to all relevant areas (see GSN, Feb. 15).

According to the bill, state and local officials would stockpile and distribute tablets “as appropriate” to public facilities such as hospitals and schools within 20 miles of any nuclear power plant.  The legislation also would require the president to ask the National Academy of Sciences to study the safest and most effective ways to distribute the tablets.

Reaction

Opponents of stockpiling potassium iodide in nuclear power plant communities have noted that thyroid cancer is only one ill effect of radiation exposure and have cautioned that people might view the drug as a panacea.  Distributing the drug could slow evacuation procedures, according to critics.  Some have also expressed concern about the availability of children’s doses (see GSN, March 21).

Stockpiling advocates have praised the opportunity residents would have to protect themselves.

David Lochbaum of the Union of Concerned Scientists welcomed the legislation, calling it a “pleasant surprise.”  Stockpiling within 20 miles of a plant is a reasonable distance, he said, since it provides for the people at immediate risk and allows authorities to examine wind patterns to determine whether tablets should be provided beyond 20 miles.

Alan Morris, president of Anbex.com — one of two U.S. potassium iodide producers — expressed relief that Congress has recognized the need for potassium iodide (see GSN, Feb. 5).

“We recognize and are encouraged by the fact that the need is being perceived,” he said.

Morris said he was concerned, however, that the government would not stockpile enough potassium iodide.  World Health Organization studies of the aftermath of the 1986 Chernobyl accident indicated that radioactive iodine spread 500 kilometers downwind and caused significantly higher rates of thyroid cancer, particularly in children, he said.  If an accident occurred at the Indian Point nuclear power plant in New York and radiation spread 500 kilometers, there would be a huge need for potassium iodide, Morris said.

Call for Wider Radius

Other bills moving through the legislative process call for stockpiling potassium iodide over areas beyond the 20-mile radius.

The bioterrorism bill is a good first step, a spokesman for Representative Edward Markey (D-Mass.) said.  Markey has sponsored two bills, both currently in committee, that would require U.S. officials to stockpile pills within a 200-mile radius and to distribute them within a 50-mile radius of a nuclear power plant.

Representative Phil English (R-Pa.) has also introduced legislation that would require the Federal Emergency Management Agency to stockpile potassium iodide within 50 miles of nuclear plants.  He is happy that the legislation Congress passed includes potassium iodide provisions, a spokeswoman said.

Nuclear Vessel Ports

Meanwhile, one bill sponsored by Bob Filner (D-Calif.) would require FEMA, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and related federal agencies to develop and implement a plan for stockpiling potassium iodide within 50 miles of home ports of nuclear-powered naval vessels.

The potassium iodide provisions in the bioterrorism bill do not apply to military reactors, such as those on nuclear-powered vessels, but it is not logical to exempt the military from the same protective measures as civilian sites, Filner told Global Security Newswire yesterday.  The military should be required to comply with the same rules as civilian facilities, he said, adding that the decision to stockpile potassium iodide is a “no-brainer.”

San Diego is a home port to at least three nuclear vessels, and the ships sit a few blocks from residential areas, said Filner, who represents the southern part of the city and parts of the bay area.  The crews on the ships have potassium iodide, he said, but nearby residents do not.

Lochbaum said that naval vessel reactors contain less radioactive iodine than nuclear power plants.  The ships would pose less of a threat than the plants but could still cause harm, he said, adding that stockpiling potassium iodide around home ports would not be a bad idea.

Filner said he would continue to work to pass his bill but expressed doubt that the Republican-controlled House would seriously consider the legislation, especially as the military is asking for more exemptions during the war on terrorism.

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