By David Ruppe Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control treaty language signed last week would confer requirements upon the two countries’ militaries for exactly one day, Dec. 31, 2012, U.S. officials and independent analysts said this week (see GSN, May 24).
According to the treaty language, until that time, neither country would be explicitly required to remove any warheads from active service, the experts said. The following day, each country could begin returning thousands of warheads to active service.
“We could be at 2,200 on December 31, 2012 and be back up at 6,000 on Jan. 2, 2012,” said Thomas Graham, a former senior U.S. arms control negotiator. “The treaty doesn’t require compliance after the last day it is in force.”
Graham added the text contains no verification provision to check that the countries are moving toward the treaty goal up until that day, or had reached the goal.
Those are two of a number of several details analysts say could enable either party to easily avoid making any significant or lasting reductions of thousands of operationally deployed warheads, the purpose of the treaty stated by U.S. officials.
“Obviously it’s very thin gruel. All it says is each party agrees they will do what their president said in a speech Nov. 13, 2001, with respect to strategic nuclear weapons,” said Graham.
A senior Bush administration official, while acknowledging the treaty allows for greater flexibility on how each party can pursue cuts and withdraw from the treaty, took issue with criticism the treaty is set up to be skirted easily.
“The analysts that are looking at it from that perspective are living in the past. That clearly is a Cold War analysis that presumes the relationship between the two parties is one of mistrust,” said the official, who asked not to be identified.
The senior official said if either country did not intend to move toward the treaty goal, it would be obligated by international law to declare that intention.
U.S. officials say they plan to begin to further negotiate details on definitions and a verification provision in coming months as they try to hammer out a “bilateral verification agreement” with Russia.
“START I didn’t need a bilateral verification agreement, because every detail was in the treaty,” said National Security Council spokesman Michael Anton.
Anton expressed uncertainty about what form that agreement would take. “I don’t envision it will be a treaty,” he said.
More Lenient Withdrawal
Another detail adding flexibility, experts said, is the fact that the accord does not contain a “supreme national interest” clause for withdrawing from the treaty, making it easier for either country to withdraw from this treaty than from previous U.S.-Russian arms control agreements.
In START I, for example, if a party wishes to withdraw, it is required to explain how “extraordinary events” have caused the treaty to jeopardize the country’s “supreme national interests.” That notice must be delivered six months before the withdrawal can take effect.
Under the new treaty, signed by U.S. President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin, either side may cite “its national sovereignty” and withdraw with only three months notice.
Either side can withdraw “for any reason,” said a U.S. official critical of the text, who also asked not to be identified.
What Will the Treaty Reduce?
The absence of the phrase “operationally deployed” in the treaty language also creates unprecedented ambiguity about what warheads will actually be reduced and how. Senior U.S. officials had used that language repeatedly since Bush and Putin announced the proposed reductions last November (see GSN, Jan. 10).
Bush administration officials had negotiated for removing thousands of strategic nuclear warheads from active, operationally deployed status. The countries could then dispose of the warheads as they each saw fit, for instance, by putting them into storage or totally dismantling them.
The treaty language says instead each party shall “reduce and limit strategic nuclear warheads, as stated by the president of the United States of America on Nov. 13, 2001, and as stated by the president of the Russian Federation on Nov 13, 2001, and Dec. 13, 2001, respectively,” which was when the phrase “operationally deployed” was originally used by President Bush.
Russia’s senior negotiator of the treaty said last week Russia had insisted the “operationally deployed” phrase was not included in the treaty text because it opposed that plan.
“The Americans seem to have said that the missiles and the warheads must not be destroyed, they must be mothballed and be capable of swift redeployment on the carriers and be rapidly returned to the battle-ready forces,” said First Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff Yuri Baluyevsky in a May 24 interview with reporters.
“You understand that we could not accept such conditions and we did not accept them. And today in the treaty neither directly nor between the lines on the pages of the test you will not see the words ‘operationally deployed warheads,’” he said.
The two countries apparently continue to disagree over the definition of the phrase used. Baluyevsky suggested Russia interprets it to mean both countries must fully eliminate the capability to use all but 1,700 to 2,200 strategic nuclear warheads — by destroying the strategic delivery systems that would enable either country to deliver more than that.
“I wish to say that the juridical ‘truth’ and the juridical rules as laid down by the treaty is on our side. It is not we who would have to explain to the world community the way we understand a particular article of the treaty,” he said.
For further information, see:
Moscow Treaty (U.S.-Russia Nuclear Reduction Treaty)
Bush Announces Treaty
State Department Fact Sheet on Arms Reduction Treaty
Treaty Text (State Department)
START I
Treaty Text
Pentagon Executive Summary
Pakistan has ordered its troops to prevent militants from crossing the line of control that divides the disputed Kashmir territory, possibly averting war with India, the London Financial Times reported today (see GSN, May 28). Meanwhile, Pakistani officials defended their right to use nuclear weapons and called for increased U.N. presence in Kashmir, according to reports (see GSN, May 29).
Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf apparently instituted new measures last weekend to halt cross-border terrorism, the Times reported. Pakistani officials yesterday emphasized their commitment to the measures.
“There are clear orders. Nobody is to venture close to the line of control,” a Pakistani official said yesterday.
Islamic militants in Pakistani-held Kashmir also said the military is under orders to withdraw support for militant groups.
“Pakistan has told us to suspend our activities,” said a senior member of one of the groups. “We feel very betrayed.”
“We believe that the threat of war has been sharply reduced — at least for the next couple weeks,” a Western diplomat said yesterday (Financial Times, May 30).
No Action Before Four to Six Weeks?
To avoid war, India says it must be able to verify that Pakistan is taking action to stop the militants, which will take time.
“The central and perhaps the only real issue now is whether infiltration across the LOC [line of control] has stopped,” said Uday Bhaskar, a senior official at an Indian defense think tank. “At a guess, it will take at least four to six weeks to verify if any slow-down or cessation of infiltration is lasting or not.”
One senior Indian defense official said that, in addition to stopping militant infiltration, Pakistan must dismantle “the infrastructure of terrorism.”
Western Concern
Western officials also expressed concern that another high-profile attack, similar to the killing two weeks ago of 34 people on the Indian side of the line of control, could detract attention from a decrease in overall infiltration (Edward Luce, Financial Times, May 30).
Bush administration spokesmen said yesterday that the United States is worried that “irresponsible elements” might provoke the situation and fuel tensions. The statement was directed at Islamic militants on the Pakistani side, a State Department spokesman said.
“There is a danger that as tensions escalate, the leaders could find themselves in a situation in which irresponsible elements can spark a conflict,” State spokesman Richard Boucher said (Associated Press/New York Times, May 30).
Nuclear Threat
Meanwhile, Pakistan’s new ambassador to the United Nations defended Pakistan’s refusal to commit to a nuclear no-first-use policy, AFX reported today. The country has small conventional forces compared to India, Munir Akram said a day after presenting his credential to the U.N. Secretary General (see GSN, Jan. 24).
“We have to rely on our means to deter Indian aggression. We have that means, and we will not neutralize it by any doctrine of no first use,” he said.
“If India reserves the right to use conventional weapons, how can Pakistan, a weaker power, be expected to rule out all means of deterrence,” he said. “We have not said we will use nuclear weapons. We have not said we will not use nuclear weapons. We possess nuclear weapons. So does India. India has a larger army,” he said, adding that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization never declared a no-first-use doctrine (AFX European Focus, May 30).
“What we do subscribe to is no first use of force,” Akram said. “We believe India should be committed to the non-use of force … So long as use of force is outlawed, we will accept no first use of nuclear weapons also, but India should not have the license to kill with conventional weapons while our hands are tied with regard to other means to defend ourselves” (Jim Wurst, GSN, May 30).
President Musharraf said yesterday Pakistan would respond “with full force” if Indian forces cross any part of the line of control, adding, “we will take the fight to the Indian territory.”
“We don’t just have a defensive strategy. We also have offensive plans,” he said (Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Washington Post, May 30).
Analysts said that tit-for-tat escalation might even lead to nuclear war (see GSN, May 22). If India launched a conventional strike, Pakistan would probably strike back with conventional weapons, but if escalation continued, nuclear weapons might come into play, analyst Teresita Schaffer said.
“One side or another — probably Pakistan — says, ‘This last attack has put our country in severe danger. We have no choice but to use nuclear weapons,” Schaffer said (Associated Press/New York Times).
Pakistan Calls for Expanded U.N. Role
Also yesterday, Pakistan repeated a call for the United Nations to take action regarding Kashmir, particularly calling for a U.N.-sponsored vote within the territory to determine its future, a process that has been stalled for decades.
“India reneged on that pledge after four or five years,” Akram said, “and it is because of that unfulfilled pledge that we are at the pass in which India and Pakistan find themselves today.”
If the U.N. Security Council renewed calls for a plebiscite, it would be more problematic today, according to the New York Times. Diplomats said the council does not want to raise the issue again, but Kashmir’s future might come up on the agenda.
Akram also asked for an expansion to the international team of 43 military and 22 civilian observers monitoring the line of control. India has refused to agree to any expansion and also opposes mediation in the conflict (see GSN, Feb. 13).
Straw Says War Is Not Inevitable
British Foreign Minister Jack Straw, who has been visiting the region, said yesterday that his country stands with India on the issue of terrorism. He called on Musharraf to end infiltration and cut off support to militants (Barbara Crossette, New York Times, May 30).
Straw said he believed Musharraf is serious about cracking down on militants but added that actions must back up words.
“The situation is dangerous, but war is not inevitable,” he said. “Neither side wishes to see war” (Chandrasekaran, Washington Post, May 30).
For further information, see:
Stimson Center Background on Kashmir
Carnegie Endowment Nuclear Status Map
Government of Pakistan
Government of India
Iranian and Russian Deputy Foreign Ministers Mohammed Jawad Zarif and Georgy Mamedov met today in Moscow to begin talks on nuclear nonproliferation issues (Associated Press, May 30). The talks are also expected to focus on missile proliferation, export controls and bilateral cooperation on peaceful uses of nuclear power, ITAR-Tass reported, according to the Islamic Republic News Agency (see GSN, May 29).
The United States is concerned that Russian nuclear assistance to Iran, such as aid in constructing the Bushehr nuclear power plant, might help Iran develop nuclear weapons. Russia and Iran, however, have dismissed such concerns, according to IRNA.
“Russia and Iran have sufficiently vast and concrete cooperation within the scope of the requirements set by the nonproliferation of missile and nuclear technologies (treaty),” a Russian Foreign Ministry official said (Islamic Republic News Agency, May 30).
A Step Away from the United States
Meanwhile, Iran should stop attempting to improve its relationship with the United States, Iranian President Mohammad Khatami said yesterday before the Parliament.
“When a big power uses a militant, humiliating and threatening tone to speak to us, our nation will refuse to negotiate or show any flexibility,” he said.
Khatami told his supporters in the Parliament that they should give up efforts to build better ties with the United States and instead should follow Iran’s official position, according to Reuters. Iran’s Supreme National Security Council recently decided not to hold talks with the United States regarding U.S. President George W. Bush’s accusation that Iran is part of an “axis of evil” (Reuters/Washington Post, May 30).
For further information, see:
NPT Text
NPT Parties
U.N. Background on NPT
Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference
2000 NPT Review Conference
Carnegie Endowment Nuclear Status Map
Japan’s Foreign Ministry is considering scrapping bilateral cooperation committees on nuclear disarmament with Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus, senior ministry official Yuji Miyamoto said yesterday, speaking before a Japanese House of Representatives committee (see GSN, April 15).
The former Soviet countries are ill-equipped to construct facilities to dispose of radioactive waste and to implement other programs to dispose of nuclear arms, Miyamoto said. Some of the funds Japan has provided for such programs were not used as intended, he said.
“There are some systematic problems regarding the implementation (of the planned disposal projects). Although we have to see how Russia (and the three other countries) respond, we’d like to seriously consider abolishing the committees,” Miyamoto said. He would like to end the committees “as soon as possible,” he added (Yomiuri Shimbun/Asia New Network/India Statesman, May 30).
Kazakhstan ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty May 14 (see GSN, May 20). One primary seismological station, three auxiliary seismological stations and an infrasound station, all part of the treaty’s International Monitoring System, are located in Kazakhstan. To date, 165 nations have signed the treaty and 93 have ratified it, including 31 of the 44 nations whose ratifications are necessary for the treaty to enter into force (CTBTO release, May 30).
For further information, see:
CTBT Text
CTBT Parties
CTBT Organization
U.N. Background on CTBT
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