By David Ruppe Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — The U.S. Energy Department conducted its 17th subcritical nuclear test Friday, amid reported protests from the governors of Hiroshima, Nagasaki and many other Japanese cities (See GSN, June 6).
Yuzan Fujita, governor of Hiroshima, wrote President George W. Bush in protest and called the test “a challenge to the international community,” the Japan Times Online reported Sunday.
Fujita also criticized Bush for not ruling out using nuclear weapons against Iraq or Iran, according to another report.
Some 80 protesters reportedly demonstrated peacefully outside the U.S. embassy in Tokyo last Friday and Saturday, during which local guards received letters of protest, according to a State Department spokesman.
Energy said it has conducted subcritical testing since 1997 to gain data useful for maintaining the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile.
The test Friday was designed to gather data on properties of plutonium, according to the department.
Protests Say Tests Could Lead to Arms Race
Subcritical tests, which are designed to create no self-sustaining fission chain reaction, are generally considered not to violate the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which prohibits “any nuclear weapons test explosion or nuclear explosion.” The United States has signed but not ratified the treaty (see GSN, May 2).
The U.S. tests have nevertheless provoked nongovernmental and foreign criticism, which has argued that the tests undermine the purpose of the treaty and can be difficult for international observers to discern from low-level nuclear testing banned by the treaty.
On Saturday, the governors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the mayor of Nagasaki and numerous other municipal officials protested the U.S. test, Japan Times Online reported.
Hiroshima’s governor, Fujita, wrote Bush expressing anger the test was conducted despite repeated urging not to do so, the publication reported.
Nagasaki’s Governor Genjiro Kaneko and Mayor Itcho Ito also sent protest messages to the U.S. embassy in Tokyo, the publication reported.
“It is a very dangerous act that could lead to a nuclear arms race,” Kaneko wrote, according to the story. “It is an offense to the international community, which is seeking nuclear disarmament, and it cannot be allowed.”
The mayors of Kyoto, Sakai, Hirakata, Takasuki and Suita also sent letters of protest to the United States, the story reported.
The cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were the first and only sites of nuclear warfare, devastatingly struck by the United States in August 1945 and prompting an abrupt end to World War II.
The most recent test comes amid controversy over comments by senior Japanese officials suggesting Japan might one day rethink its post-war policy against developing nuclear weapons (see GSN, June 5). China’s nuclear weapons arsenal has been cited as a threat. Chinese officials have cited the U.S. national missile defense program pursued by the Bush administration as a threat to its capabilities.
Alternative to Subcritical Testing Proposed
According to Energy, the subcritical tests help maintain the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile without needing to resume explosive nuclear testing banned by the treaty.
“Subcritical experiments are scientific experiments to obtain technical information in support of the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Stockpile Stewardship and Management programs — the DOE programs are to maintain the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile without nuclear testing,” according to an Energy fact sheet released last year.
“Performance is being studied as a function of plutonium age as well as surface finish and manufacturing technique,” C. Bruce Tarter, director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, said in congressional testimony in April. “Results will affect estimates of pit lifetime and decisions about future production of replacement pits and improve our fundamental understanding of performance.”
Arms control critics said the subcritical testing is not needed to maintain the stockpile.
There is no evidence that there will be problems with the plutonium pits as they age, and if problems do emerge the United States could always replace the pits with pits on the shelf or newly produced pits, said Christopher Paine, a senior analyst at the Natural Resources Defense Council.
“The main application would be to get more detailed knowledge of plutonium behavior under pressure to develop new weapons simulation codes,” he said, adding that such information could be used to develop new types of nuclear weapons.
David Wright, senior staff scientist at the Union of Concerned Scientists, said an argument has emerged from the department that continued testing enables the weapons laboratories to attract top scientists to do interesting work.
“I think it’s quite clear that if what you’re really trying to do is maintain your existing arsenal, there is no reason in the world to do these because as he (Paine) says, you can remanufacture these weapons to the original specifications,” he said. “There is no reason to do subcritical testing because you basically have done testing before to know how they operate.”
For further information, see:
CTBT Text
CTBT Parties
CTBT Organization
U.N. Background on CTBT
By Kerry Boyd Global Security Newswire
Tensions between India and Pakistan decreased over the weekend after U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage met with leaders in both countries and U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld prepared to visit the region in an attempt to avert war between the nuclear-armed countries (see related GSN story, today).
Several U.S. experts last week supported the Bush administration’s plan to focus on preventing a South Asian war but said the United States must also pave the way for a more stable future once the current crisis passes.
A nuclear war in the region “would make Hiroshima and Nagasaki look like nothing,” and would require massive international assistance to deal with the consequent humanitarian crisis, said Institute for Science and International Security President David Albright on Thursday. Albright and other South Asia analysts spoke at the Carnegie Endowment of International Peace to launch their new collected papers: “A New Equation: U.S. Policy Toward India and Pakistan After Sept. 11.”
Fortunately, there is only a “low probability” of nuclear war, although some scenarios of nuclear escalation are realistic, Albright said (see GSN, June 7). He noted, however, that if Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf were overthrown, it would change the calculations dramatically and for the worse. Therefore, the United States should focus on preventing such an event, he said.
Deal with Kashmir
If conventional and unconventional war can be avoided in the near term, there are several steps the United States can take to prevent continuing instability, the analysts said. In terms of overall policy toward South Asia, the United States must help resolve the dispute over the Kashmir territory, which is divided between the two countries, said Lee Feinstein of the German Marshall Fund.
U.S. efforts in the region since the end of the Cold War have usually taken the form of crisis diplomacy, Feinstein said. U.S. leaders should instead help Pakistan and India work to begin a process of resolving the Kashmir dispute. While no one should expect immediate results, the world can no longer “let the Kashmir issue fester,” he said. Even if the current crisis does not lead to war, “there will be more close calls” if the two countries do not deal with Kashmir, he said.
Although India prefers to deal with Kashmir as an internal or bilateral issue, “Kashmir is now everybody’s problem,” partly due to the nuclearization of the subcontinent, Feinstein said. The United Nations, China, Russia and the United States have all become involved in trying to prevent war and must deal with the dispute over the territory.
“The most effective nonproliferation measure would be for India and Pakistan, with discreet assistance from Washington, to resolutely devise a process to address the half-century-old dispute over Kashmir,” Feinstein wrote in his paper. The Kashmiri people should also be part of the final process, he added.
Promoting Nuclear Restraint
If South Asia peacefully resolves its current crisis, the United States should put nuclear restraint back on the agenda as a top priority in its South Asian policy, Feinstein said last week. In his paper, he called on the United States to encourage India and Pakistan to define a credible minimum deterrent at the lowest level possible and to promote confidence-building measures. The United States should also engage both countries in nonproliferation efforts, he said.
The United States should also encourage continual meetings between Indian and Pakistani experts to discuss nuclear issues, said Lewis Dunn of Science Applications International Corp. Often such meetings could be unofficial, such as involving retired officials, and participants could discuss potential scenarios and what could go wrong in times of heightened tension, he said.
Sharing Lessons Learned
Dunn and Feinstein also suggested that the United States should provide advice based on lessons it has learned trying to manage its own nuclear capability and preventing nuclear conflict during the Cold War.
Encouraging Pakistani and Indian experts to discuss nuclear issues and providing lessons from the U.S. experience could help the adversaries identify questions and issues they must address on their own, Dunn wrote in his paper.
The United States should also share information on some of its “organizational best practices,” such as personnel reliability programs, Dunn wrote (see GSN, March 18).
Some officials are interested in such assistance. The United States could provide unclassified information on such issues as safely transporting hazardous materials in difficult weather conditions, Pakistani Brig. Gen. Feroz Khan told Global Security Newswire. The United States should provide some of its expertise — through unclassified means — on nuclear safety, he said. “Why must I learn something that was already learned in the 1950s and ’60s?” he said.
Safeguarding Materials
Slightly trickier is the possibility of U.S. assistance to help safeguard nuclear materials. Some members of Congress have proposed expanding programs similar to those in the former Soviet Union for protecting WMD materials to other countries (see GSN, March 20). The United States should offer assistance to protect such materials, Albright, Dunn and Feinstein said.
Albright suggested offering items such as unclassified books on nuclear weapons safety and surveillance equipment (see GSN, March 18). The United States should also work to persuade India and Pakistan to adopt internationally accepted export controls to prevent the spread of WMD materials, he said (see GSN, May 22).
Feinstein wrote that the United States should provide nonsensitive equipment, such as monitoring equipment for vaults and tracking equipment for nuclear weapons. Dunn wrote that limited discussions on steps to “make a nuclear weapons unusable” in a case of theft and provisions of nonsensitive technology and equipment to enhance security are other ways to improve safety.
NPT Restrictions
The experts said the United States is under certain obligations, stemming from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which would limit the types of assistance it could provide to India and Pakistan, who have not signed the treaty. Those obligations are important and affect U.S. efforts to prevent proliferation in other regions, Dunn said, but he added that the NPT requirements leave room for some useful assistance. At a minimum, the United States could provide unclassified materials related to nuclear security and control, he said.
Feinstein also said that providing information available in the public domain could be helpful without violating the NPT. Offering advice based on U.S. experience managing a nuclear arsenal and providing nonsensitive equipment are some examples. The United States should follow the motto of “do no harm” in deciding what assistance to provide — such as withholding any technologies that would enhance the countries’ ability to deploy their nuclear weapons, he said.
Consequences of South Asia on Global WMD Proliferation
Beyond direct assistance to South Asia, the analysts also said the United States must consider the broader implications of the tensions between the two nuclear-armed states.
“The concern is to avoid a ‘cascading effect’ where second-tier states feel increasingly exposed by their earlier decision to give up the nuclear option,” Feinstein wrote (see GSN, June 7).
If the two countries avert war, it could add support to the argument that nuclear weapons are a stabilizing force, therefore increasing the risk that more countries would pursue obtaining nuclear weapons, Dunn said.
On the other hand, if nuclear war occurs and obliterates Pakistan, the message to the world would be very different, he said.
For further information, see:
Stimson Center Background on Kashmir
Pakistani Government
Indian Government
NPT Text
NPT Parties
Tensions between India and Pakistan, which has world leaders worried about nuclear war, decreased over the weekend as India welcomed a pledge from Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf to crack down on militants. Details of Pakistani and Indian plans to de-escalate the crisis, however, remain uncertain (see GSN, June 7).
On a visit to the region over the last few days, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage (see related GSN story, today) secured a promise from Musharraf to “stop cross-border infiltration (by Pakistan-based militants into Indian Kashmir) permanently” (Scott Baldauf, Christian Science Monitor, June 10).
Armitage also told Indian leaders that Musharraf had indicated he would eventually dismantle militant training camps on Pakistan’s side of the Line of Control, which divides Kashmir between the two countries, an Indian official said Saturday.
“The impression I got from Armitage is that Musharraf has some difficulty in this regard, that yes, he’ll do it, but not immediately,” the official said.
India welcomed the promise to end infiltration in an official statement. The pledge was a “step forward and in the right direction,” Indian External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh told U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell by telephone Saturday.
India has decided that infiltration across the Line of Control has decreased substantially but not completely, the Indian official said (Dugger/Shanker, New York Times, June 9). The infiltration has decreased since May 27, when Musharraf said militants had stopped crossing the line, Indian army sources said (see GSN, May 28).
Indian army sources said they would monitor the infiltration until June 15 before deciding whether to pull back troops from the border, the Indian Asian Age reported, according to the Christian Science Monitor (Baldauf, Christian Science Monitor).
India to Reciprocate
India promised to “respond appropriately and positively” to a decrease in militancy, an Indian spokeswoman said.
In exchange for Pakistan’s efforts to crack down on militants, the United States expects India to reciprocate with measures to de-escalate the tensions.
“It is quite clear that there will be some actions on the part of India responding to the messages I brought from Islamabad,” Armitage said Saturday “I think you couldn’t say the crisis is over, but I think you could say the tensions are down measurably.”
Armitage said he expected India to make “military gestures” in the next few days to ease the crisis, although he did not specify what those gestures would be. “There’s a whole host of things they could do, and I don’t know which they’ll do, but I got the very strong impression that they were inclined to respond to the international community,” he said.
Armitage also said he thought India was considering “some diplomatic actions which could include the return of some people to diplomatic postings in Islamabad.” India removed its ambassador from Pakistan in December and later expelled Pakistan’s ambassador (Karl Vick, Washington Post, June 9).
An Indian official, however, said a return of Indian diplomats to Pakistan is unlikely, saying India might instead slightly reduce its military buildup along the border. India would give its response in the next few days, the official said.
U.S. Defense Secretary to Continue Diplomatic Efforts
U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld is expected to follow Armitage’s trip and visit the region this week. He is expected to continue pressing for ways to avert war.
Dealing with Kashmir?
One subject that could arise during Rumsfeld's visit is the possibility of new monitors along the Line of Control, according to the Wall Street Journal. Pakistan and India have disagreed on whether a third party should be involved in watching the border (Solomon/Slater, Wall Street Journal, June 10).
Musharraf is “quite keen … on entering into a dialogue on the whole question of Kashmir,” Armitage said.
India has so far rejected most proposals for discussing Kashmir. “We hope that New Delhi would agree (to) holding talks with Pakistan on all issues of Kashmir,” Pakistani Information Minister Nisar Memon said (Vick, Washington Post).
Militants Might Be Able to Derail De-escalation
Despite optimism expressed by several U.S., Indian and Pakistani leaders, some analysts and officials expressed concern that another major attack on India’s side of the Line of Control by militants could derail any progress made toward peace.
“In this circumstance, if a major incident were to take place, it would create a situation where the government would be under tremendous pressure,” an Indian official said (Dugger/Shanker, New York Times).
Several militants on Pakistan’s side of the Line of Control said they had received orders from the Pakistani leadership to stop infiltration but said they might not obey those orders, according to Newsweek. “We will continue to fight,” said one militant called Atif.
Two weeks ago, a major general from the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence agency ordered militant commanders to stop crossing the Line of Control, according to Atif. Several commanders said Musharraf was betraying the Kashmiri cause, Atif said.
Atif and some other militant commanders said they could still sneak by Indian patrols and obtain weapons. “There could be renegades from these militant groups who can’t really be stopped regardless of the tremendous obstacles they face,” said Talat Masood, a retired Pakistani Army lieutenant general.
There are already many militants already on India’s side of Kashmir, Atif said. Those militants would likely plan some of their own attacks, another militant commander said. “If they can’t come home, they’ve got nothing to lose,” he said.
Militants inside Pakistan might also target Musharraf, Masood said (Hussain/Moreau, Newsweek, June 17).
Assessing U.S. Role
Despite the potential for militants to derail negotiations, some analysts said the U.S. diplomatic efforts have been helpful.
“I think the U.S. has shown great sensitivity in this crisis,” said Anuradha Chinoy of Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi. “They are using the classic pressure-compromise, carrot-and-stick tactics. The carrot is if India can de-escalate this crisis, there might be some encouragement of increased trade with India, which India wants. And if Pakistan de-escalates, there might be more aid for Pakistan, which it desperately needs” (Baldauf, Christian Science Monitor).
Meanwhile, the United States has also been discussing sharing U.S. satellite information with both sides in an attempt to avoid miscalculations that might lead to war, Armitage said, adding there has been no decision (Dugger/Shanker, New York Times).
For further information, see:
Stimson Center Background on Kashmir
Pakistani Government
Indian Government
Carnegie Endowment Nuclear Status Map
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