Threat Assessment:  Al-Qaeda Might Attack for Sept. 11 Anniversary

British and other international intelligence agencies have detected signs that al-Qaeda might be planning a series of attacks to coincide with the one-year anniversary of the Sept. 11 attacks in the United States, the London Observer reported Sunday (see GSN, July 3).

Intelligence agencies in the United Kingdom, the Middle East and South Asia have detected an increase in communications among various al-Qaeda cells, the Observer reported.  Sources within Pakistan have said al-Qaeda operatives have a three-month deadline to work with local terrorist groups to plan attacks against Western targets in South Asia, according to the Observer.

The United Kingdom is believed to rank third on al-Qaeda’s list of targets, after the United States and Israel, said British intelligence sources.

“The threat remains high, and the background noise has been growing over recent weeks,” a British intelligence source said.  “It’s a question of when, rather than if, they will attempt another spectacular” (Burke/Bright, London Observer, July 7).

Al-Qaeda Speaks

Al-Qaeda spokesman Sulaiman Abu Ghaith has said the terrorist group is preparing more attacks against the United States, the Algerian newspaper El Youm reported yesterday.

“Al-Qaeda will organize more attacks inside American territory and outside at the moment we choose, at the place we choose and with the objectives we want,” Abu Ghaith was quoted as saying.  He also criticized the U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan designed to break up al-Qaeda.

“The American campaign (against it) is but a Hollywood script with its victims, thousands of innocent villagers, killed without having been implicated in the battle” (Bassem Mroue, Associated Press/Yahoo.com, July 10).

In previous reports Abu Ghaith has said that as many as 4 million Americans, including 1 million children, will be killed through chemical and biological weapons attacks (see GSN, June 14).

A statement from Abu Leith al-Libi, also believed to be a spokesman for al-Qaeda, said the terrorist organization plans to expand its attacks to include assassinations and attacks on infrastructure, CNN.com reported yesterday.  In a statement broadcast on the Dubai-based Middle East Broadcasting Company, al-Libi also said that suspected terrorist mastermind Osama bin Laden, Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar and two other top al-Qaeda operatives are alive and well (CNN.com, July 9).

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U.S. Response:  European Commission Objects to U.S. Inspectors at Seaports

The European Commission has objected to U.S. plans to improve maritime security by stationing U.S. Customs Service inspectors at European seaports, the Financial Times reported today (see GSN, June 28).

The commission has told U.S. officials that the U.S. plan might violate World Trade Organization rules and could lead to higher costs for European importers by disrupting trade.  While the United States has signed agreements to station inspectors at seaports in France, Belgium and the Netherlands, it would be technically illegal for individual states to put the plans into effect since customs and trade issues are part of common European Union policy, the commission has said.  Commission officials plan to set up talks with the United States over altering the plan, according to the Times.

U.S. Customs Commissioner Robert Bonner rejected the commission’s claims, adding that the U.S. plan would not violate any WTO rules since the United States wants all seaports to agree to similar security measures.

“This is purely a security measure,” Bonner said.  “It has nothing to do with trade rules or competitive advantage” (De Jonquieres/Alden, Financial Times, July 10).

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Iraq:  Sabri Accuses Blix of Blocking Progress in Talks

The head U.N. inspector for Iraqi weapons sites blocked any opportunity for progress during last week’s talks, Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri charged yesterday (see GSN, July 9).

“It was very clear that America pushed the head of the inspection team, Mr. Hans Blix, to obstruct and hinder a joint agreement,” he said after returning from the talks.

Blix had attended the talks as head of the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspections Commission.  The discussions failed to produce an agreement on resuming weapons inspections, which have been suspended since Iraq barred inspectors in 1998.

Sabri said Blix refused to hold “meaningful discussions” on what inspections had and had not achieved from 1991 to 1998.  “Without agreeing on what has not been achieved, we cannot go forward,” he said (Reuters/CNN, July 9).

For further information, see:

UNMOVIC

U.N. Resolution 687 (Sanctions Regime)

U.N. Resolution 1409 (“Smart Sanctions”)

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U.S.-Russia:  Powell Says U.S. Plans to Reduce Arsenal to 4,600 Warheads

By David Ruppe
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — The United States plans to reduce its strategic nuclear warhead holdings to roughly 4,600, Secretary of State Colin Powell told a congressional committee yesterday. 

Such a level would mean the United States intends to keep at least 2,400 warheads in reserve above the deployed warhead numbers agreed to in May by U.S. and Russian Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin when they signed the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (see GSN, July 9).

That agreement, also called the Moscow Treaty, would require each party to remove all but 1,700 to 2,200 strategic nuclear warheads from operational service by December 31, 2012.  Powell defined “operationally deployed” warheads to mean re-entry vehicles on ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles plus weapons loaded on bombers or kept in storage facilities at bomber bases.

U.S. officials have not said exactly how many strategic nuclear warheads the United States currently has deployed and in reserve.  In what is considered the most authoritative nongovernmental estimate, the Natural Resources Defense Council puts the number at 6,480 plus 342 spare warheads.  It is not clear when the new level would be achieved and if the number quoted by Powell includes spares or warheads assigned to submarines in overhaul.

The treaty, which requires Senate approval before ratification, would not require dismantlement or destruction of any warheads or delivery vehicles.  Administration officials have said many of the downloaded warheads would be kept in reserve either as spares or as a hedge against some uncertain threat that may materialize.

Russian officials have not said whether they plan to destroy any of their offloaded weapons.

Until yesterday, administration officials had given no indication of how many warheads they plan to keep in the arsenal.

“The total number that I believe you will hear from Secretary [of Defense Donald] Rumsfeld, both deployed and in reserve, is somewhere around 4,600,” said Powell, during a question and answer period of a hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Powell said he was offering the estimate “in a very tentative way, because I think Don Rumsfeld should really give you that definitively.”  Rumsfeld is expected to testify about the treaty July 17.

Pentagon spokesman Lt. Cmdr. Don Sewell said today the Pentagon could not confirm the number, as a final decision involving discussions with the State Department has not yet been made.

“I’ve already spoken to the forces policy folks … no definitive number that can be released yet,” he said.

Powell’s announcement received brief praise from Senator Joe Biden (D-Del.), who chairs the committee.

“You’ve just told me something I find very encouraging,” he said.

“Well, good.  When Secretary Rumsfeld does that, that means if we stick to that, we are clearly going to destroy at least a thousand of these warheads, you know, up to 1,200, and maybe more,” Biden said.

Explaining the New Levels

During the hearing, several senators including Biden criticized the Moscow Treaty for, among other things, not requiring destruction of any Russian or U.S. warheads and for not requiring that more warheads be taken out of operational service.  Citing Iraq, North Korea, Iran, Libya and China, Senator Russell Feingold (D-Wisc.) said he could not imagine what kind of threat from any of those countries would require the United States to keep 1,700 operationally deployed warheads.

“Only by dismantling and destroying these devastating weapons can we truly achieve the goal of meaningful nuclear arms reduction,” he said.

Powell explained the administration’s rationale for selecting the 1,700 to 2,200 level.

“In this period of change, with new partnerships but with still a great number of unknowns out there … the Defense Department made a judgment that we could safely, in their view, go down to a range of 1,7(00) to 2,200,” he said.

Powell said analysts determined that the United States would be safe with that number of operationally deployed forces no matter how Russia configured its weapons.

“If they had said, ‘Okay, you’re going from 1,700 to 2,200; we’re going to stay at 6,000, the START I level, or the START II level,’ President Bush would have said, ‘Fine.  I’m safe with 1,700 to 2,200.  So do what you think you have to do,’” he said.

Prior to Powell’s announcement, Biden questioned the need to maintain a reserve of thousands of warheads.

“My concern is it’s not that we’re going to 1,700 or 2,200, but we’ve maintained the capacity to go back to 5,700 to 6,200, and what the rest of the world reads from that and what everybody else thinks their requirements are.”

New Thinking on MIRVs

Senators also criticized the new treaty for not eliminating ICBMs with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles.  The unratified START II Treaty, which was abandoned by the administration in favor of the Moscow Treaty, had required elimination of MIRVs.

“Multiple-warhead ICBMs are a cheap way to maximize Russian forces, but they are vulnerable because an attack there can destroy those warheads with only one or two of its own.  Russia, therefore, is likely to keep those missiles on hair trigger,” said Biden.

He said U.S. officials told the Russians, “We see you as a partner.  So you can do whatever you think you have to do for your security.  You can MIRV your missiles.  You can keep more.  You can go lower.  Do what you think you need.”

“If the Russians want to keep all of them on land-based ICBM’s and they want to MIRV them, fine” Powell said. 

That appeared to represent a change in thinking for Powell.

During former President George H. W. Bush’s administration, the view on MIRVs was different.  That administration negotiated and signed START II, the highlight of which was the agreement to eliminate multiple-warhead ICBMs such as the Russian SS-18 and U.S. MX missiles.

“Elimination of heavy ICBMs and the effective elimination of all other multiple-warhead ICBMs will put an end to the most dangerous weapons of the Cold War,” Bush wrote Jan. 12, 1993, in a letter submitting the treaty to the Senate for its approval. 

In a July 1993 hearing defending the treaty, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Powell called multiple-warhead ICBMs “the most destabilizing weapons in our inventories.”

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India-Pakistan:  Powell Plans Visit to South Asia

U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell plans to visit Pakistan and India this month in an attempt to further reduce tensions in the region, he said yesterday (see GSN, July 2).

“We are anxious to get through this crisis and see a dialogue begin between the two sides so that they can start to move forward to find a solution to the problem in Kashmir ultimately,” Powell told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.  He plans to visit the two nuclear-armed rivals on his way to a meeting of Asian countries in Brunei that begins July 31, a senior State Department official said.

Tensions surged between India and Pakistan in December 2001 when militants attacked the Indian Parliament and in May when others raided an Indian Army camp.  The two countries began to back away from the brink of war last month after visits by high-level U.S. officials and a promise from Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf to crack down on militant infiltration (see GSN, June 25).

U.S. officials believe militant infiltration into India’s portion of the disputed Kashmir territory has decreased significantly, but they want Musharraf to continue to crack down, a U.S. official said.

“We do want to keep the ball rolling in reducing the tension further,” the official said.  “We know Musharraf has made a commitment, and we want to make sure he keeps it.”

Powell said he has “spent an enormous amount of time” talking to both leaders on the telephone and wants both countries to “understand that the United States is interested in them beyond this crisis” (Elaine Monaghan, Reuters/Boston Globe, June 10).

As long as the dispute over Kashmir remains unresolved, there will be more crises and pressures for arms competition between the two countries, Lee Feinstein, former deputy director of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, wrote in the current issue of Arms Control Today (see GSN, June 10).

“Sustained American diplomatic engagement needs to supplant crisis diplomacy as Washington’s main tool for reducing the risk of war between these two nuclear nations,” Feinstein wrote (Lee Feinstein, Arms Control Today, July/August).

For further information, see:

Stimson Center Background on Kashmir

Pakistani Government

Indian Government

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Threat Assessment:  Cruise Missiles Need More Attention, Reports Say

By Bryan Bender
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — As the Bush administration accelerates development of ballistic missile defenses, two reports issued this month warn that low-cost, low-tech cruise missiles could become an attractive alternative for potential adversaries.  They urge defense officials to erect new defenses and give greater attention to reducing the spread of cruise missile technologies (see GSN, April 16).

In separate reports, the RAND Corporation and Congressional Research Service renewed concerns that proliferation of cruise missiles — effectively low-flying, slow-moving aircraft lacking a pilot — poses a growing threat to overseas military bases and U.S. population centers but has been given relatively scant attention compared to the ballistic missile threat.

The reports’ authors recommended a series of steps to reduce demand for cruise missiles, strengthen international controls over related technologies and develop new military countermeasures to defend against cruise missile attack.

“The threat of cruise missiles cuts across all scenarios,” says one of the reports, Future Air and Missile Threats, a RAND study for the U.S. Army.  “Unsophisticated cruise missiles could be available to a wide spectrum of potential opponents, including drug lords and terrorists.  They could use cruise missiles to hold airports or even densely populated cities at risk.”

According to Cruise Missile Proliferation, a report by the research arm of the U.S. Library of Congress, more than 80 countries — including Iran, Iraq and North Korea, which the Bush administration has charged with supporting terrorism and developing weapons of mass destruction and the missiles to deliver them — currently possess cruise missiles.

While the greatest short-term threat is from anti-ship cruise missiles, the report says that “as relevant technology becomes increasingly available commercially, efforts to control the sophistication of these missiles and their spread may become more difficult.”

Cruise missiles may currently threaten U.S. and allied forces deployed overseas, according to CRS, but “the U.S. intelligence community estimates that, by the end of the decade, a cruise missile attack on the United States may be possible.”

Ballistic Versus Cruise Missile Threat

RAND contended that several features make a cruise missile attack increasingly probable and an attractive alternative to a ballistic missile attack, particularly in unconventional conflicts that involve not military forces but terrorist groups or other transnational actors that lack sophisticated arms.  Whereas ballistic missiles pose a threat primarily in conventional military conflicts, cruise missiles could be utilized in virtually any scenario, RAND wrote.

“If the world evolves in such a way that a conventional conflict is not likely — the United States remains the sole superpower and democracy spreads worldwide — the threat of tactical ballistic missiles is correspondingly low,” the report says.

At the same time, cruise missile technology overlaps significantly with commercial technologies available in the aviation sector.  Ballistic missiles, on the other hand, have little commercial value unless they are intercontinental and can be used to launch satellites.

“Overlapping military and civilian technology increases pressure to allow technology exports,” CRS wrote.  In addition to the 18 nations that manufacture cruise missiles, 22 other countries appear to have industrial capacities to make them, it said.  The status of these ‘threshold cruise missile manufacturers’ could have a significant impact on global cruise missile supply, demand, inventory and capabilities, CRS wrote.

U.S. defense and intelligence officials believe it is unlikely that a terrorist or other transnational group would use a cruise missile to launch a strike, particularly one using chemical, biological or nuclear weapons.  There are other, less detectable means of delivering a weapon of mass destruction — for example, smuggling it into the United States.  Officials are not, however, ruling out any possibility.

“We can’t just close off one avenue of attack and leave others open,” Paul Wolfowitz, deputy secretary of defense, said in a July 2 interview with National Public Radio.  “And we’re doing everything we can to close the door to terrorists.  We’re trying now finally after 30 years … to vigorously explore ways of stopping ballistic missiles.  And we’ve also got to look at how to stop cruise missiles, which are basically unmanned aircraft.”

International Controls Insufficient

Cruise missile technologies are widely available and include such common aircraft components as guidance sets, turbojet engines, navigation equipment, flight control systems, avionics and analog and digital computers.  Efforts to control these dual-use technologies have fallen short, according to the reports.

Complete cruise missile systems are regulated by the Missile Technology Control Regime, which prohibits members from exporting systems that can carry a 500-kilogram warhead to distances of 300 kilometers or more.  A 1993 annex to the agreement added a “catch-all” clause intended to prohibit the transfer of particular components when there is persuasive information that they are intended for delivering chemical, biological or nuclear warheads.  However, nearly half of the current cruise missile manufacturers — including India, China, Iran, Iraq, North Korea and Israel — are not members of the MTCR.

The CRS report says that such a supply-side approach, which requires countries to voluntarily follow export restrictions, has inherent weaknesses.  While the MTCR can be strengthened, more emphasis should be placed on reducing demand, according to the congressional researchers.

“Creating incentives or disincentives (or perhaps both) for countries to refrain from importing or manufacturing cruise missiles might help reduce demand for these weapons,” CRS wrote.

Another international control mechanism, the Wassenaar Arrangement, regulates unmanned aerial vehicles and UAV technologies designed for military purposes.  Like the MTCR, however, it has exceptions for technologies intended for manned aircraft systems, which can easily be applied to cruise missile developments.  The United States is currently seeking to strengthen the agreement to include more frequent reporting and a “no undercut” provision that would require all signatories to honor the decision of one member state to deny an item to a particular country.

“It may also be possible to tighten controls through bilateral agreements, particularly with nations such as Russia and France, which are two of the very few countries capable of making stealthy cruise missiles,” the congressional report says.  “Negotiating an agreement prohibiting the export of stealthy cruise missiles with these and other appropriate countries is sometimes seen as a potentially useful step.”

Cruise Missile Defenses

Developing effective cruise missile defense systems are another necessary step, the reports say.

“Cruise missiles present significant challenges for air and missile defenses,” according to CRS.  “Detecting a cruise missile attack is difficult because they are small and can be launched from the air, sea or ground.”

CRS recommendations include improved coordination between the North American Aerospace Defense Command and the Federal Aviation Administration as well as an expansion of the Customs Service’s radar-bearing balloons, called aerostats, currently used to detect small aircraft attempting to smuggle drugs into the United States.

In calling for greater investments in cruise missile defense, RAND identifies several possible approaches.

“To ensure effective defenses, the Army needs to develop a system that includes a sensor mounted on an aircraft or on a balloon that can detect low-altitude cruise missiles at long range,” RAND researchers wrote.  “Assuming that naval systems could defend seaports, the Army should make its cruise missile defenses deployable so they will be available to protect airports.  Finally, to defend the United States or other large territories, effort should be invested in developing long-range interceptors so that cruise missile defenses can protect large areas with a reasonable number of launchers.”

For further information, see:

U.S. State Department MTCR Summary

Wassenaar Arrangement Web site

Wassenaar Arrangement Participating States

Pentagon Executive Summary of Wassenaar Arrangement

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Iran:  Shahab 3 Development Complete, Pentagon Says

U.S. defense officials believe that Iran has completed development of the Shabab 3 missile, which could hit several U.S. allies, Bloomberg News reported yesterday.

“The Shahab 3 has completed development, and a few missiles are likely deployed, which would allow Iran to reach Israel, most of Saudi Arabia and Turkey,” the Pentagon said (see GSN, May 28).

“The U.S. government is now saying that the Shahab 3 is no longer experimental, no longer just a ‘program,’ but it is now a weapon that needs to be factored into U.S. planning,” said Kenneth Katzman, an analyst for the Congressional Research Service.  “It reflects a ratcheting up of official concern about Iran’s weapons of mass destruction programs.”

Iran deployed some of the missiles “about a month ago,” Representative Curt Weldon (R-Pa.) said, adding that Iran is probably “moving on to the longer-range Shahab 4, which threatens all of Europe” (see GSN, May 8).

Joseph Cirincione, an analyst at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, questioned the military’s assessment of Iran’s missile capabilities.  The Pentagon’s “evaluation is a little hard to believe,” he said.

“It is a stretch to say that they have ‘completed development,’” Cirincione said.  “More likely is that Iranian defense officials, anxious to show some progress in the troubled program, have fielded a few missiles while development continues.  Whether or how they will perform is unknown, not just to us but probably to the Iranians as well.”

Earlier intelligence reports estimated that Iran could deploy some Shahab 3 missiles “on an emergency basis,” Cirincione added.  “That more cautious estimate seems closer to reality.”

The Pentagon estimates that the Shahab 3 has a range of 1,300 kilometers.  Israel estimates the range at closer to 3,000 kilometers, Ephraim Halevy, head of the Israeli Mossad intelligence agency, said last month, according to the Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz (see GSN, June 27).

The missile’s design is based on North Korean No Dong missiles and uses Chinese and Russian technology, according to unclassified defense reports.  Russian technology could help Iran “accelerate the pace of its ballistic missile development program,” one Pentagon report said.

Russian assistance to Iran has been a continuing point of contention in the U.S.-Russian relationship (see GSN, June 7).  The United States must continue to pressure Russia to crack down on providing WMD technology to Iran, U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz told Bloomberg News.

“There’s no way we can cooperate with them [Russia] on missile defense if the technology goes out the back door to countries like Iran,” Wolfowitz said (Tony Capaccio, Bloomberg News, July 9).

For further information, see:

Carnegie Endowment World Missile Chart

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Israel:  Raytheon Fights Israeli Efforts to Market Arrow

U.S. defense contractor Raytheon is working to persuade U.S. lawmakers to oppose Israeli sales of the Arrow missile defense system to other countries, saying that Arrow sales would harm U.S. firms and damage arms control agreements (see GSN, May 16).

Since the signing of a co-production agreement in January, Israel has intensified efforts to win U.S. permission to sell the Arrow system — which is jointly developed for Israeli defense purposes by U.S. contractor Boeing and Israel Aircraft Industries — to other countries.  Under the agreement, Boeing produces 51 percent of Arrow components and IAI produces the rest and completes assembly (see GSN, Feb. 1).

Raytheon, which produces the Patriot missile defense system, sent a letter June 10 to dozens of congressional aides stating reasons for opposing Arrow sales beyond Israel, according to Defense News.

“We do not have a problem with U.S. support for development of Arrow but find it perplexing at best that after the U.S. taxpayer financed the development of the system, our government would then give Israel permission to sell it on the international market,” Raytheon lobbyist Andrew Schnabel wrote in the letter.

The letter and an attached document expressed concern that Arrow sales to other countries would damage sales of completely U.S.-produced systems, including the Patriot Advanced Capability 3 and Theater High Altitude Area Defense systems.  Arrow sales “would result in a foreign product, funded by the U.S. government, competing with American products … for the same national funds in the international market.  The likely international customers for a missile defense system cannot afford both Arrow and Patriot or THAAD,” Raytheon said.

Damage to U.S. sales would eventually increase costs to the U.S. military, according to Raytheon.

“International sales of Patriot (and potentially THAAD) increases sales volume and drives down costs for U.S. forces.  The loss of Patriot customers will diminish economy of scale savings for U.S. Army procurement of PAC 3 missiles,” the company said.

MTCR Violation?

Raytheon also said that allowing Arrow sales to third countries would undermine U.S. arms control commitments, particularly the Missile Technology Control Regime, which prohibits exports of systems that can deliver a 300-kilogram payload more than 500 kilometers.

“The export of Arrow is prohibited by MTCR due to its range and payload.  Whether Arrow is defined as a defensive or an offensive system is not the issue; the MTCR focuses on capabilities,” Raytheon said (see GSN, May 16).

The Israeli Defense Ministry refused to comment publicly on Raytheon’s effort to prevent Arrow sales to third countries, but Israeli senior officials said privately that if Raytheon continues its effort, Israel “will not hesitate to respond in kind,” as one official said.

“This is not just a competitive battle between Raytheon and Boeing, it’s a challenge to the government of Israel and our national security interests,” the official said last week.

Arrow sales would not violate the MTCR, Israeli officials said.  According to January’s co-production agreement, U.S.-produced Arrow components fall under the less restrictive Category 2 of the MTCR’s Equipment and Technology Annex, Defense News reported.  The Arrow system falls short of the MTCR’s range and payload restrictions, Israeli officials said.

“The Arrow simply cannot carry 300 kilograms for 500 kilometers or vice versa,” Israeli Maj. Gen. Isaac Ben-Israel said late last year.

If the United States authorizes Israeli sales of the Arrow system, it could result in $600 million to $900 million in sales over the next 10 years, according to Israeli officials and industry sources.

Until Israel receives U.S. authorization, “we are not selling and we have not sold to any other country, and we will not do so without the agreement of the United States,” Amos Yaron, director general of Israel’s Defense Ministry, said last month (Barbara Opall-Rome, Defense News, July 8-14).

For further information, see:

Missile Technology Control Regime (U.S. State Department)

THAAD Program Fact Sheet

PAC-3 Fact Sheet

MDA Terminal Defense Segment (Arrow)

Federation of American Scientists Background (Arrow)

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Nuclear Waste:  U.S. Senate Approves Yucca Mountain

By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — The U.S. Senate yesterday approved a resolution supporting Yucca Mountain in Nevada as the site for the first U.S. long-term nuclear waste repository (see GSN, July 9).

“This vote is a great step forward in securing America’s energy future.  Now more than ever, we need a safe central and secure facility for our nation’s nuclear waste,” Senator Frank Murkowski (R-Alaska), who had called the joint resolution to the floor of the Senate for the vote, said in a press release.  “Today the Senate spoke, and the Senate agreed.”

The Senate voted 60-39 to pass a procedural motion on considering the resolution, which was later approved by a voice vote.  Senate Republicans were nearly united in their support of the resolution, the final step in overriding Nevada Governor Kenny Guinn’s veto of the site.  Only three Republicans — Senators Ben Nighthorse Campbell (R-Colo.), John Ensign (R-Nev.) and Lincoln Chafee (R-R.I.) voted against the resolution.  Senate Democrats, however, were more divided with 35 voting against it and 15 voting in favor.

To maintain Yucca Mountain as the site of the nuclear waste repository, both houses of Congress needed to pass the override resolution.  The U.S. House of Representatives overwhelmingly passed the resolution in May (see GSN, May 9).

Yesterday U.S. Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham praised the outcome of the Senate vote.

“We are pleased that the Congress agrees moving forward is the right thing to do, rather than cutting off the process now and leaving nuclear waste for future generations to deal with,” he said in a press release.

The Nuclear Energy Institute, the industry’s main lobby group, also praised the decision, calling it a “clear signal” of support for nuclear energy.  The activist group Public Citizen, however, criticized the industry’s influence over the Senate and the Bush administration’s decisions to support the project (see GSN, April 2).

“This vote was paid for, and records likely will show more contributions poured into campaign coffers in recent weeks,” Public Citizen President Joan Claybrook said in a statement released yesterday.  “With today’s vote, lawmakers have not only succumbed to industry influence but have again failed to check the Bush administration’s inappropriate coziness with the energy industries.”

Guinn said he is “disappointed” with the vote.  His state still plans to continue the fight against the Yucca Mountain repository, he said.

“Now the process moves to the federal courts, where the playing field is level and Nevada’s factual, scientific arguments will be heard by impartial judges,” Guinn said in a statement (see GSN, June 7).   “The Department of Energy and the nuclear industry will no longer be able to hide behind the political process and wield their influence to move the Yucca Mountain agenda.  Now, for perhaps the first time in this process, the DOE will finally be held accountable for its many imprudent and unsound decisions, and we are highly confident that Nevada will prevail.”

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