By Bryan Bender
Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — The U.S. termination of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Russia could have dramatic repercussions for the security situation in South Asia, according to regional experts. The balance of power between China, India and Pakistan may be increasingly difficult to stabilize as the three countries adapt their nuclear and missile development plans to a new global security environment, they said.
In a collection of essays published by this week by the Henry L. Stimson Center, several experts based in South Asia speculated how the three states would probably react to any U.S. deployment of national and theater missile defense systems and what effect their actions would have on regional security. While the viewpoints differ — corresponding in large part to each author’s home country and its stated policy toward the U.S. move — a common theme emerges throughout.
China, India and Pakistan have no formal constraints on their nuclear and missile programs and, unlike the United States and Russia, they lack parity in nuclear and missile capabilities, the experts agreed. In addition, the three have declined any significant transparency over their respective programs.
At best, informal arrangements might help forestall a destabilizing nuclear and missile arms buildup in the region, but U.S. missile defense plans are likely to accelerate nuclear and missile competition in the region and breed further distrust in coming years, most of the experts agreed.
“China, India and Pakistan are enmeshed in a three-cornered interaction that will not be easy to stabilize,” wrote Michael Krepon, an arms control expert at the Stimson Center, in the collection, The Impact of U.S. Ballistic Missile Defenses on Southern Asia, published Wednesday. “They make a triangle of three unequal sides — an inherently unstable geometric form.”
Threat to Deterrence?
The United States formally backed out of the 1972 ABM Treaty last month to enable it to deploy comprehensive missile defenses (see GSN, June 14). Russia’s nuclear deterrent — which may consist of thousands of strategic warheads even after the recently signed arms treaty is in effect — is expected to remain intact in the face of U.S. plans to field only limited defenses (see GSN, July 9).
The same cannot be said, the experts said, about China, India and Pakistan, which have “minimalist” nuclear weapons and ballistic missile inventories. Their deterrent value might be eroded — if not militarily, then politically — in the face of proliferating missile defense systems or a weapons buildup to overwhelm those defenses. For example, a nuclear or missile buildup undertaken by China to strengthen its deterrent against the United States might set off a chain reaction in the region.
In addition, the distinction made in the United States between national and theater missile defenses — one designed to protect U.S. territory from long-range missiles and the other intended to prevent short-range missiles from striking U.S. forces overseas — does not apply to the region, the experts said. Indeed, theater missile defenses are national missile defenses in South Asia because China, India and Pakistan do not require intercontinental ballistic missiles to attack each other.
Recently, tensions between the three have been high (see GSN, July 10). India has continued to clash with Pakistan over Kashmir. It has jockeyed with China over disputed border areas including Tibet. China and India both have been developing advanced navies (see GSN, Feb. 1 and June 11) and preparing for a regional competition for command of the high seas. Meanwhile, China has been the prime supplier of missile and nuclear technology to Pakistan, and any Chinese developments in the nuclear and missile arena are likely to make their way to its allies in Islamabad, the experts said.
“Nuclear weapons and missile programs now overlay these neuralgic issues, making it even harder for national leaders in China, India and Pakistan to create and sustain a stable strategic environment,” according to Krepon. “Chinese, Indian and Pakistani nuclear requirements will be derived from an interactive set of conditions that are subject to change based on domestic and external factors. Prospective missile defense deployments add one more external factor to this mix.”
The “Cascading” Effect
U.S. deployment of missile defenses would affect all three countries, according to the report, destabilizing actions on the part of one would probably ignite a chain reaction.
For example, Krepon said, “Beijing’s calculations of nuclear sufficiency will reverberate in New Delhi, and India’s recalibrated nuclear requirements will reverberate in Islamabad.”
“U.S. missile defense deployments and transfers could prompt cascading military requirements in China and around the periphery of Asia,” he said. These include “accelerated growth in nuclear stockpiles, missile inventories and conventional capabilities. A trickle-down effect on South Asia is already underway, but it has yet to become a cascade.”
China’s close cooperation on nuclear and missile technology with Pakistan could be another complicating factor. Even if India chose not to react to a Chinese buildup, any new technical assistance to Islamabad could force India to accelerate or expand its efforts.
China as Pivot
The authors of the essay collection agreed that the outcome would depend largely on China, which is currently the strongest military power in the area with the largest nuclear and ballistic missile forces. China has been the most vocal opponent of U.S. missile defense plans and has been particularly concerned by the prospect of the United States transferring missile defense technology to Taiwan. Distrustful of U.S. assurances that its defenses would not erode Beijing’s nuclear deterrent, China may be compelled to accelerate its nuclear enhancement efforts to avoid any such erosion, the experts said.
Krepon argued that while China’s actions to counter U.S. defenses would have only a limited effect on the U.S.-China equation, they “could be compelling on the subcontinent.”
Another of the experts, Arvbind Kumar of the National Institute of Advanced Studies in Bangalore, India, argued that China’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs could be accelerated as a result of the U.S. national missile defense system, including introducing multiple-warhead missiles. The transfer of missile defenses to Taiwan, meanwhile, could serve the same purpose, prompting China to expand its arsenal of short-range missiles, which could theoretically also hit targets in India.
These scenarios would in turn prompt India to improve its nuclear command and control structure and mate its nuclear weapons with delivery systems to ensure a more credible nuclear deterrent, according to Kumar. To have such a credible deterrent against China, India would need a nuclear force in the “low hundreds” of warheads, Kumar said.
“India is not reassured by China’s no-first-use guarantee, or its claims that its nuclear arsenal is purely defensive and not on hair-trigger alert, because of a lack of transparency in China and the absence of reliable warning systems in India,” Kumar wrote. “India needs a better sense of Chinese behavior and intentions, which would in turn help India in shaping its strategies and planning for its force structure.”
Krepon said he believes that the trickle-down effect from U.S. missile defense plans is already underway.
“The extent of acceleration will depend, in the first instance, on decisions taken in Washington and Beijing,” he said.
India Supports Missile Defenses
India sits apart from its neighbors as one of the only vocal supporters of the Bush administration’s decision to scrap the ABM Treaty, construct wide-ranging missile defense systems and share some of this technology with allies.
According to Rajesh Masrur of the Center for Global Studies in Mumbai, India, New Delhi’s support for U.S. missile defenses is based on a deep-rooted cultural aversion to nuclear weapons and longtime opposition to the doctrine of mutually assured destruction. He argued that it therefore makes sense for India to support U.S. missile defenses and to aspire to have a limited missile defense of its own (see GSN, May 16). He said he does not envision a major Indian buildup of weapons, regardless of what China or Pakistan might do.
“India has long accepted the nuclear gap between itself and China,” according to Masrur. “The widening of the gap will not make much difference. China will still be vulnerable to an Indian strike as and when Indian capacity develops. The number or relative sophistication of Chinese forces does not matter.”
On the other hand, other experts point out that India has yet to codify its nuclear force structure goals and strategy.
“While India has embraced the concept of minimal, credible deterrence, the size and scope of the of the Indian nuclear deterrent are not fixed,” wrote Lawrence Prabhakar, of Madras Christian College in Chennai, India. “India’s commitment to nuclear minimalism could be challenged by developments in China and Pakistan, as well as by prospective U.S. missile defense deployments.”
Pakistan Watching India
Unlike India, Pakistan has opposed U.S. missile defense plans and seen India’s aspirations for a missile defense as an effort to increase its military and political dominance. An Indian missile defense system would probably cause a buildup by Islamabad, according to Mutahir Ahmed of the University of Karachi.
“In response to Indian acquisition of missile defenses, China and Pakistan are likely to engage in nuclear buildups and to continue established patterns of strategic cooperation,” Ahmed said. Pakistan might “be compelled to respond to Indian ambitions by increasing military cooperation with China and keeping its nuclear option open as the last resort in a war against India.”
The world’s hottest nuclear flashpoint — and the cause of three previous wars — is the disputed territory of Kashmir, which nuclear-armed India and Pakistan both claim as their own, Ahmed said.
“New Delhi’s deployment of missile defenses could jeopardize improved relations between India and China … and make the resolution of the Kashmir dispute more remote,” he wrote.
Prospects for Treaties Remote
The prospects for reaching any formal agreement to reduce the spread of nuclear and missile forces in South Asia are considered low, according to the report. China, India and Pakistan have been opposed to the degree of transparency necessary for such agreements, the experts said.
“Cold War models of nuclear risk reduction are only partly relevant to Asia,” Krepon wrote. “The Hot Line agreement and other accords to prevent dangerous military practices could certainly be adapted to meet Asian circumstances. But the stabilizing aspects of strategic arms limitation and reduction accords, especially their codification of equality and intrusive monitoring provisions, are unlikely to be applicable to this region.”
The best hope for stabilizing the region, Krepon argued, is for the United States to avoid weakening China’s nuclear deterrent. “If future U.S. administrations do not seek the negation of China’s strategic deterrent, cascade effects on the subcontinent could be greatly reduced.”
By Kerry Boyd
Global Security Newswire
The U.S. zero-tolerance approach toward Russian nuclear assistance to Iran is not working, and the United States should drop its resistance to some Russian programs if Russia agrees to limit the scope of its aid, two former U.S. officials said yesterday in Moscow (see GSN, June 7).
The United States — demanding an end to Russian assistance for the Bushehr nuclear power facility in Iran and other fuel-cycle activities — has refused to enter into nuclear cooperation with Russia, Robert Einhorn, former State Department assistant secretary for nonproliferation, said at a PIR Center seminar. That policy, however, has failed. Because Russia is committed to completing the Bushehr project, the United States should adopt a new approach, Einhorn said.
Under their new policy proposal, Einhorn and Gary Samore, former senior director for nonproliferation and export controls at the National Security Council, urged the United States to “agree to a full range of nuclear cooperative activities with Russia,” even if Russia continues the Bushehr project. Cooperation should include developing advanced reactors and implementing a plan for storing spent fuel in Russia — “a project that could earn 10 to 20 billions of dollars,” Einhorn said.
In exchange, Russia would agree “to limit its nuclear cooperation with Iran to the supply of power reactors at Bushehr,” Einhorn said. Russia would provide fuel for the reactors and ship back the spent fuel to Russia (see related GSN story, today). U.S. officials had mistakenly thought that Russia and Iran had already agreed formally to return spent fuel to Russia, Einhorn said, but recent media reports have indicated otherwise (see GSN, June 25).
Russia must also insist that Iran comply with the additional protocol to the International Atomic Energy Agency’s safeguards agreement, Einhorn said. That would require Iran to provide more information about nuclear activities and accept more intrusive inspections to guarantee that nuclear activities are for peaceful purposes only, Einhorn said.
Under the new proposal, Russia must demand that Iran publicly commit to halting any nuclear fuel-cycle activities beyond the Bushehr project, including reprocessing, uranium enrichment and fuel fabrication. Iran would have to agree to end such projects regardless of whether their capabilities came from other countries or were developed indigenously.
Universal Satisfaction
In theory, the proposal meets the requirements of each country involved, Einhorn said. The United States would see an end to Russian cooperation with fuel-cycle projects in Iran. Russia would have the opportunity to fulfill its commitments, reap the economic benefits of the Bushehr project and pave the way for new nuclear cooperation between the United States and Russia.
The proposal would also provide Iran with additional sources of energy — the country’s stated need, Einhorn added. If Iran is serious about using nuclear technology for purely peaceful purposes, it should be able to agree to some added restrictions on fuel-cycle projects and increased verification measures.
“So it’s really hard to turn this proposal down, unless Iran wants this fuel-cycle technology to acquire nuclear weapons. Basically the proposal poses a choice to Iran: Do you want nuclear energy, or do you want nuclear weapons?” Einhorn said. “If it turns down the deal, I think it would expose its motivations.”
If that happens, Russia would probably agree to stop providing nuclear assistance, he said.
Despite his belief in the wisdom of the proposal, Einhorn said Iran might not accept new restrictions and verification measures. Iranian agreement with the deal would depend on several conditions. One element is Iraqi nuclear ambitions.
“Unless Iraq’s own nuclear ambitions can be thwarted, I think we have very little chance of heading off an Iranian capability,” he said.
Another condition would relate to Iranian internal politics. If conservative clerics remain in power, the deal would probably not work. If Iranian reformers gain more control, however, there would be more hope, Einhorn said.
Iranian relations with the United States and Russia would also be determining factors, Einhorn predicted. If U.S.-Iranian relations warm to a point where Iran no longer fears U.S. interference in Iranian affairs, Iran would feel less need to pursue a nuclear weapons capability. Also, Russia must decide to join the United States and other countries in working to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran rather than trying to “placate both the United States and Iran,” Einhorn said.
Dealing with Missile Proliferation
Samore and Einhorn believe that the current framework for preventing missile proliferation to Iran is mostly satisfactory, but enforcement should be strengthened, Einhorn said.
The Russian agencies that are responsible for “detecting, investigating and punishing unauthorized missile assistance to Iran” need more resources and need to place a higher priority on preventing missile proliferation, Einhorn said. Russian President Vladimir Putin must make a strong commitment to ensure that those agencies receive the resources and support they need. The United States and Russia also need to improve intelligence sharing.
“The U.S. side needs to be a bit more flexible in this area, and the Russian side needs to show that it will follow up in a very conscientious way and conduct the necessary investigations so that the U.S. sharing of information is not futile,” Einhorn said.
Russia and Iran are creating a written agreement under which Iran would return spent nuclear fuel from the Russian-built Bushehr nuclear power plant to Russia, Russian Nuclear Power Ministry officials said yesterday. Iran has agreed to the arrangement, the officials added (see GSN, June 25).
An agreement on retrieval of spent nuclear fuel had been left out of the original contract for the plant because it was signed around the same time that Russian legislators passed a law banning nuclear waste imports, the officials said. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law last July, however, which allowed imports of spent nuclear fuel, according to the Moscow Times.
Officials clarified that Iran will return spent fuel in response to reports that Russia had not been able to obtain such guarantees, the Times reported. Russia’s cooperation with Iran has become one of the major points of disagreement in U.S.-Russian relations, senior U.S. diplomats said, adding progress on the issue is not moving as fast as the United States would like to see.
Robert Einhorn, a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, has said the United States needs to tone down its criticism of the Bushehr nuclear plant (see related GSN story, today).
“The problem with this zero-tolerance approach is that it won’t work,” Einhorn said. “Russia is too committed to complete the Bushehr project and has a strong economic and political stake in carrying the project to fruition” (Natalia Yefimova, Moscow Times, July 12).
A Russian nuclear submarine today launched a prototype of a European-Russian spacecraft designed to be propelled by solar wind, the Russian navy said in a statement (see GSN, June 21). The craft conducted a successful flight test, according to the navy.
“According to the telemetric flight data, the experiment to send the Demonstrator-2 into orbit and return it to the atmosphere went successfully,” the Russian Navy statement said.
The Russian Ryazan submarine, submerged in the Barents Sea, launched the Demonstrator 2 on a converted SS-N-18 ballistic missile (Angela Charlton, Associated Press/Yahoo.com, July 12). Russian Delta III class submarines are the only ones capable of launching SS-N-18s, according to naval analyst Norman Polmar. He believed today’s launch was the first successful space launch from a submerged submarine (Greg Webb, GSN, July 12).
The Demonstrator 2 prototype was launched in a sphere form within the booster, said Lidia Avdeyeva, spokeswoman for the Babakin Space Center, which built the spacecraft. After launch, the prototype’s two sail-like panels unfolded into a cone shape, AP reported. The prototype’s flight test lasted about 30 minutes (Charlton, Associated Press/Yahoo.com).
The Demonstrator 2 has been designed to recover cargo from outer space, said Russian Navy spokesman Capt. Igor Dygalo. The spacecraft is also capable of landing on other planets, he said (RIA/BBC Monitoring, July 12).
There have been more than 8,000 safety and security violations, including missing plutonium, at the U.S. Energy Department’s Savannah River Site over the last 10 years, the South Carolina Greenville News reported yesterday.
The department has been preparing to ship 34 metric tons of surplus plutonium from the Rocky Flats former nuclear weapons plant in Colorado to the Savannah River Site, which currently holds two metric tons of plutonium, according to the News (see GSN, June 24).
Documents from the private contractors that run the site indicate that between 1991 and the beginning of this month, 8,339 incidents were reported in Energy’s Occurrence Reporting System, according to the News. The incidents included 666 cases of radioactive contamination of materials and areas within the site and a 1999 incident in which seven site workers inhaled escaped particles of plutonium and americium-241.
During the decade, there were at least nine reports of missing nuclear materials at Savannah River, the News reported. The United States is missing a total of 2.6 metric tons of plutonium, including 500 pounds missing from Savannah River, according to the News. Savannah River officials have said the nuclear materials were lost in spills, through being stuck in equipment, or because of incorrect measurements made when the site first opened.
Energy spokesman Joe Davis said the department studies the security and safety reports to improve procedures.
“It’s important to note that these relatively few off-normal occurrences reported over several years are dwarfed by the untold number of safe, secure decisions and actions of thousands of dedicated workers every day,” Davis said. “By any measure ... SRS is among the safest and most secure facilities, not just within the DOE complex but, in general, heavy industry” (Tim Smith, Greenville News, July 11).
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