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Dr. Henderson is treating a bioterror attack as if it were a historical, natural smallpox outbreak. It is not wise to prepare for a smallpox bioterror attack — where terrorists are trying as hard as they can to kill as many of us as possible — in this fashion.
—Yale University professor Edward Kaplan, challenging a policy approach — spearheaded by U.S. official D.A. Henderson — that recommends against vaccinating the entire U.S. population against smallpox.
Russia announced plans Saturday to build five nuclear reactors in Iran over the next 10 years in addition to the nuclear power plant that Russia is currently constructing at the Bushehr site (see GSN, July 24)...Full Story 
By David Ruppe
Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — A senior Bush administration health official and a critic are publicly debating a pending government decision on whether to vaccinate the U.S. population against smallpox...Full Story
White House lawyers have decided that a demonstrated link between Iraq and al-Qaeda would provide the legal justification needed for a U.S. attack against Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, USA Today reported today (see GSN, July 11)...Full Story
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The U.S. House of Representatives approved legislation Friday to create a homeland security department (see GSN, July 26).
The bill, approved 295-132, would create the third-largest Cabinet-level department, after the Defense and Veterans Affairs departments, according to the Los Angeles Times (see GSN, July 15). The proposed department is expected to have more than 169,000 workers and an annual budget of $37 billion. The department would merge 22 federal agencies including the Coast Guard, Secret Service and the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
Almost all House Republicans and 88 Democrats voted in favor of the legislation, according to the Times. In opposition were 120 Democrats, 10 Republicans and two independents. While the final vote on the legislation passed by a large margin, representatives defeated several amendments in close votes, the Times reported. An amendment that would have allowed more liability for companies that sell homeland security products was defeated 215-214. By a 222-208 vote, Republicans also defeated an amendment to ensure collective bargaining rights for department workers.
The White House Friday said it supports House homeland security legislation but disagrees with the Senate version of the bill (see GSN, July 18). The full Senate is expected to vote on the department next week. Senate Governmental Affairs Committee Chairman Joseph Lieberman (D-Conn.) said, however, that attempts to pass the legislation before the Senate’s summer recess might be “in jeopardy.” Some critics of the bill might attempt to derail it through parliamentary procedures, Lieberman said (Nick Anderson, Los Angeles Times, July 27).
The U.S.-Russia Working Group on Counterterrorism met for the first time Friday to discuss ways to prevent terrorists from using weapons of mass destruction and other issues (see GSN, May 24).
The group, formerly known as the U.S.-Russia Working Group on Afghanistan, met in Annapolis, Md., in a session co-chaired by U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and Russian First Deputy Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Trubnikov, according to a joint press statement.
U.S. and Russian delegates discussed the potential threat of terrorist WMD use and agreed on the importance of U.S.-Russian cooperation in addressing the threat of WMD terrorism, especially with regard to consequence management, according to the joint statement (see GSN, July 16). The delegates “agreed that these issues require the highest priority attention and the application of the full range of intelligence and law enforcement capabilities,” the joint statement said.
The delegates also discussed increased tensions between India and Pakistan, the joint statement said (see GSN, July 26). They discussed measures to combat terrorism in other parts of the world and agreed on the need to improve cooperation in the framework of the NATO-Russia Council and other international agreements (see GSN, May 29). Both delegations also announced support for efforts to implement U.N. Resolution 1373, designed to combat terrorism financing (see GSN, June 28).
The delegates agreed to hold the group’s next meeting in December in Moscow, according to the statement (U.S. State Department release, July 27).
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White House lawyers have decided that a demonstrated link between Iraq and al-Qaeda would provide the legal justification needed for a U.S. attack against Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, USA Today reported today (see GSN, July 11).
Bush administration and Defense Department legal experts believe that a link between Iraq and the Sept. 11 attacks would allow the administration to bypass debates in the U.S. Congress and the United Nations over what some critics would call an unprovoked attack, USA Today reported. White House experts are considering using U.N. Security Council Resolution 1373 and Senate Joint Resolution 23 as the legal foundation for an attack on Iraq.
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Joseph Biden (D-Del.) said senior Bush administration officials have often asked him what congressional authorization, if any, would be required for U.S. military action against Iraq. Biden, who is expected to hold hearings on Iraq this week, has said President George W. Bush must come before Congress on the issue, but if a link can be established between Iraq and al-Qaeda, then “he has the authority” to attack (see GSN, June 11).
Bush nonetheless will not be able to avoid a debate in Congress over whether to attack Iraq, said Senator John Warner (R-Va.).
“He’ll have to come to Congress,” Warner said. “No existing resolutions of a general nature would suffice to meet that political — not legal — requirement” (John Diamond, USA Today, July 29).
Possible Options
Some White House and Pentagon officials are advocating a military campaign against Iraq that would target Baghdad and one or two other command centers to cut off the Iraqi leadership and cause a quick collapse of Hussein’s regime, the New York Times reported today.
The “inside-out” strategy, as some have labeled the Baghdad-first plan, would utilize the U.S. military’s ability to conduct long-distance strikes, according to the Times. The main focus of the strategy would be to kill or isolate Hussein and prevent Iraq from using its suspected WMD arsenal. It might be possible to cripple the Iraqi military’s command-and-control system since it its highly centralized and authoritarian, officials said.
Any military action against Iraq would probably require 70,000-250,000 troops, according to the Times. Strategists could conduct the inside-out plan with troops at the low end of the estimate, the Times reported. If the military could carry out a strike with less than the earlier-estimated 250,000 troops, support for the plan might increase among U.S. allies in the Middle East, according to the Times (Sanger/Shanker, New York Times, July 29).
On the Other Hand …
Other senior U.S. military officials, however, have said that Hussein does not pose a threat to the United States, according to the Washington Post. They advocate the current containment strategy rather than a military campaign, the Post reported.
According to some Pentagon officials, the earliest that the United States would attack Hussein would be next spring. The Bush administration might achieve its goal of removing Hussein from power by waiting for Hussein to fall ill or conducting covert CIA operations, they said (see GSN, June 17). The U.S. military shares support for containment with senior State Department and CIA officials, according to people familiar with interagency discussions.
Senior U.S. military officers believe containment policy has been more effective against Iraq than is widely known, officials said. One sign of its effectiveness is that Hussein has been deterred from threatening his neighbors or from supporting terrorist groups, senior officers said.
While there is no doubt that Iraq has chemical and biological weapons, it lacks long-range missiles to use them against Israel or other U.S. allies in the Middle East, defense officials said. Senior officers believe the containment approach is a better plan that invading an Iraq armed with biological and chemical weapons, officials said.
Some military officers have questioned Bush’s reasoning for his repeated calls for the removal of Hussein, according to the Post.
“I’m not aware of any linkage to al-Qaeda or terrorism, so I have to wonder if this has something to do with his father being targeted by Saddam,” said a U.S. general involved in the war in Afghanistan.
Retired U.S. officers have been more forthcoming about their support for the current containment policy, the Post reported.
“I’d argue that containment is certainly a better approach than either marching on Baghdad or destabilizing the Iraqi government by killing Saddam,” said retired Col. Richard Dunn, a former Army strategist. “It only has to work until something happens to him — he’s either killed or dies.”
Senior White House and Pentagon civilian officials, however, disagree with the containment approach, according to the Post. They have said that Hussein is still attempting to intimidate other countries and is still attempting to obtain weapons of mass destruction (see GSN, July 25).
“The whole question is, how long do you wait with Saddam Hussein in possession of the capabilities he has and would like to have?” said Richard Perle, head of the Defense Policy Board, a Pentagon advisory group.
Supporters of U.S. military action against Iraq have said Iraq is more able to obtain long-range ballistic missiles than supporters of the containment policy have indicated. For example, he might be able to obtain missiles from Islamic extremists based in Pakistan, said retired Air Force Lt.-Gen. Thomas McInerney.
Other military action supporters have said Iraq could conduct a biological or chemical weapons attack without missiles.
“You don’t have to have a long-range missile necessarily to deliver a deadly weapons, especially if it’s powdered anthrax,” Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz said recently.
It would be wrong to think that Hussein would only use the conventional methods he has used in the past to carry out an attack with biological or chemical weapons, Perle said.
“Saddam could decide at any time to hand anthrax to terrorists,” he said (Thomas Ricks, Washington Post, July 28).
United States Invites Iraqi Opposition Leaders
The United States has invited six top Iraqi opposition leaders to Washington to discuss a post-Hussein Iraq, a State spokesman said Saturday (see GSN, March 20).
“Some opposition leaders have been invited to Washington for a meeting on either Aug. 9 or 16, co-hosted by Undersecretary of State (Marc) Grossman and Undersecretary of Defense (Douglas) Feith,” State spokesman Frederick Jones said, adding that the talks will probably last three to four days.
The six invited opposition leaders are:
* Al-Sharif Ali Ben Hussein of the Constitutional Monarchy Movement;
* Iyad Allawi of the Iraqi National Accord;
* Mohammed Bakr al-Hakim of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq;
* Massoud Barzani of the Kurdish Democratic Party;
* Ahmed Chalabi of the Iraqi National Congress;
* and Jalal Talabani of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan.
“The purpose of the meeting is to discuss the next steps in coordinating our work with the Iraqi opposition,” Jones said (Jordan Times, July 28).
For further information, see:
UNMOVIC
U.N. Resolution 687 (Sanctions Regime)
U.N. Resolution 1409 (“Smart Sanctions”)
U.S. State Department Fact Sheet on Iraqi Sanctions Revisions
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Russia announced plans Saturday to build five nuclear reactors in Iran over the next 10 years in addition to the nuclear power plant that Russia is currently constructing at the Bushehr site (see GSN, July 24).
The plans to build the five additional reactors are contained in a document on enhancing Russian economic, political and scientific connections with Iran over the next decade, which Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov recently approved, according to the Washington Post. While Russia and Iran have discussed building additional reactors since 1996, the agreement advances those discussions by putting the idea into writing, the Post reported. Russia plans to present the document to Iran in September, according to the Post.
No new contracts have been signed for the additional reactors, according to the Post. Russia’s record of slow construction on the Bushehr plant suggests that the additional reactors would not be built soon, the Post reported. Three additional reactors might be installed at the Bushehr plant, which is expected to become operational by early 2004, according to the Russian plan. A second, two-reactor nuclear power plant might also be built at Ahvaz, the document says (Peter Baker, Washington Post, July 27).
Russia’s construction of a second nuclear power plant for Iran “would play into the hands of the far right in the Bush administration who are already skeptical that Russia can be a partner in the war on terrorism” and other foreign policy issues, said John Tedstrom, a National Security Council aide in the Clinton administration (see related GSN story, today; Robyn Dixon, Los Angeles Times, July 27).
Russia’s increased nuclear assistance to Iran, however, could mean billions of dollars for the Russian nuclear power industry, according to experts.
“To a large extent, this is about money,” said Dmitri Trenin, an analyst at the Moscow Center of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “No one here wants to establish Iran as a nuclear power, but there are many people here who believe Iran is likely to become one with Russia’s help or without. It’s useful to have a finger in the pie.”
While U.S. President George W. Bush has charged that Iran forms part of an “axis of evil,” Russia sees Iran as “a good citizen of the region, or not much worse than the others,” Trenin said. Russia’s nuclear assistance to Iran has not violated any international agreements, Russian officials said.
“I don’t think we’re doing anything illegitimate,” said Sergei Rogov, director of the Institute for USA and Canada Studies in Moscow. “Whether it is politically correct is another question” (Baker, Washington Post).
Officials plan to conduct high-level U.S.-Russian talks on Russia’s nuclear assistance to Iran within the next few months, according to a Bush administration official (see GSN, July 12). The current White House strategy is to increase criticism of Russia and to warn Russia that its failure to cooperate might damage U.S.-Russian relations, according to the Washington Post.
“We continue to have concerns that technology and know-how for nuclear weapons are flowing to Iran,” the U.S. ambassador to Russia, Alexander Vershbow, said in remarks outside Moscow Monday. “Russia has to avoid letting its desire for commercial gain end up hastening the day that these countries can pose a threat that could not only destabilize their own region, but undermine the security of the entire world.”
Proposal to Destroy Bushehr
Some U.S. defense officials have said that the Bushehr plant should be destroyed before it receives its first shipment of Russian nuclear fuel, according to the Post.
“There is some support for preemption within the administration,” said Middle East expert Anthony Cordesman.
If Iran agrees to abide by international safeguards, then the Bushehr plant is probably not a threat, according to others in the Bush administration. While destroying the plant probably would not stop Iran’s nuclear program, it might increase the country’s hostility toward the United States at a time the Bush administration is trying to improve relations, they said.
Even though the United States might not choose to use military action against the Bushehr nuclear plant, Israel might do so, the Post reported. While only a few Israeli officials support attacking the plant, Israel has indicated it will not allow Bushehr to become operational, according to the Post.
“Does Israel have a military option?” asked a Washington official. “The answer is yes.”
Israel destroyed the Iraqi Osirak nuclear power plant in a pre-emptive attack in 1981, according to the Post. Recently, Israel has warned Iran that it considers the Bushehr plant to be a security threat (see GSN, June 27). There is some indication that Iran has begun installing anti-aircraft missiles near the plant and a nuclear research facility near Tehran, according to analysts who have examined satellite photographs of the sites.
“Within the next year, either the U.S. or Israel is going to either attack Iran’s (nuclear sites) or acquiesce to Iran being a nuclear state,” said John Pike, director of GlobalSecurity.org, a nonpartisan military and intelligence research center (Dana Priest, Washington Post, July 29).
U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell called on India and Pakistan yesterday to take steps to avert war and increase stability, specifically by ensuring that elections in the disputed Kashmir territory in the fall are free and fair and that militant infiltration into India’s side of Kashmir ends (see GSN, July 26).
After meeting with both Indian and Pakistani officials, Powell said he was encouraged.
“Everyone is focused on the need to get tensions down and ensure that it doesn’t start over again,” he said, referring to recent high tensions on the subcontinent that decreased only after U.S. officials shuttled between the two countries.
Free and fair elections in India’s side of Kashmir might “be a first step in a broader process that begins to address Kashmiri grievances and leads India and Pakistan back to dialogue. Only a productive and sustained bilateral dialogue on all issues, including Kashmir, will prevent future crises and will finally bring peace to the region,” Powell said yesterday in New Delhi (see GSN, July 10).
Powell asked India to free political prisoners and to allow international observers to monitor the Kashmir elections. U.S. officials said India has jailed two dozen politicians who do not advocate violence. India has also refused to allow any organized monitoring mission, and Pakistanis and Kashmiris have said past elections were not fair.
Powell also said he had “forceful” discussions with Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf. Musharraf agreed to take steps to end remaining infiltration, Powell said. India has said militant infiltration continues, but Musharraf said it has ended (Robin Wright, Los Angeles Times, July 29).
Powell said infiltration has decreased but has not ended completely.
“I am not, independently through my own sources, able to substantiate everything the Pakistanis are saying to us,” he said. “There is still a long way to go before negotiations can begin.”
Several U.S. officials plan to visit the region in the next few months in efforts to decrease tensions and build stronger U.S. ties with both Pakistan and India, Powell said. He added, however, that the United States could not mediate the situation.
“If you try to internationalize it at this point, it will not move forward because of Indian resistance,” he said (Todd Purdum, New York Times, July 29).
The next 10 weeks will be essential to decide whether both countries are truly serious about taking steps for peace, Powell said, adding that a decrease in infiltration and a de-escalatory response from India would be key (Wright, Los Angeles Times).
For further information, see:
Stimson Center Background on Kashmir
Pakistani Government
Indian Government
A member of the Belgian Parliament has said officials will probably decide by the end of August whether to agree to a U.S. request to convert a small amount of plutonium to mixed-oxide fuel, the Greenville News in South Carolina reported Friday (see GSN, July 18).
The United States has asked Belgium to convert a small amount of plutonium into MOX fuel to assist a project to build conversion facilities in the United States. Belgium is divided on the issue, with conservatives supporting the U.S. request and Social Democrats and Greens opposed, according to Eloi Glorieux, a Parliament member who opposes the U.S. request.
“Right now, it’s absolutely open,” Glorieux said. “It will depend on how the game is played. It will be the one who gives in first. It’s not an economic issue. It’s not really a social or an employment issue. It’s an ethical question, so to say.”
Since Belgium plans to eventually cease production and use of MOX fuel, it makes little sense to assist another country’s production, Glorieux said. The United States also has other options besides Belgium, he said.
“If Belgium doesn’t do it, France will,” Glorieux said. “And if Belgium and France won’t do it, then the United States has enough experience and technology that it will only take one or two more years for them to make their own MOX facilities. But I think it is a very bad message to give to the world, that the use of MOX is a good thing.”
Converting plutonium into MOX test fuel is essential for the success of the U.S. MOX program, said Lisa Cutler, spokeswoman for the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration (see GSN, June 21).
“We need to know how the material is going to perform in the reactor,” Cutler said. “And we need to perform tests so that the facility that is going to be built is done to the right specifications” (Tim Smith, Greenville News, July 28).
Efforts to resume U.S.-North Korean dialogue might be back on track after a June 29 naval clash between North Korea and South Korea, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell said Friday (see GSN, July 8).
Powell indicated that he might meet with North Korean Foreign Minister Paek Nam Sun this week at an Association of Southeast Asian Nations conference in Brunei. Such a meeting would be the highest level of contact between the two countries since U.S. President George W. Bush took office. Regarding the opportunity to meet with Paek, Powell said, “I’m not ruling anything in or out.”
Speculation that U.S. and North Korean officials might meet at the conference increased after North Korean Cabinet official Kim Ryong Song expressed regret Thursday to South Korea for the naval clash, calling it “accidental.” North Korea also said Thursday that it is ready to receive a U.S. envoy (see GSN, July 3).
“In the last couple of days, they’ve made what I consider some very positive statements that we have welcomed — acknowledging responsibility for the naval incident that took place a few weeks back, also once again indicating receptivity to a dialogue with the United States. We welcome that. We’ll be following on it,” Powell said Friday.
The Bush administration has said it wants talks with North Korea to focus on concerns about weapons of mass destruction and redeployment of North Korean conventional forces from the demilitarized zone with South Korea (Robin Wright, Los Angeles Times, July 27).
Meanwhile, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov reaffirmed North Korea’s interest in U.S. dialogue after meeting with Paek and leader Kim Jong Il yesterday in North Korea.
“Pyongyang is ready for a constructive dialogue with the U.S. and Japan without preconditions,” Ivanov said.
Ivanov added that he had “the impression that North Korean officials are ready for contacts with officials from the United States and Japan as early as the ASEAN summit in Brunei.” Japan said its foreign minister plans to meet with Paek during the conference (Paul Eckert, Reuters, July 29).
Unlikely to Agree to Inspections
North Korea is still unlikely to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency to inspect potential nuclear weapon sites unless the country’s relationship with the United States improves, said Charles Kartman, executive director of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization. KEDO is a U.S.-led consortium responsible for building a nuclear power plant in North Korea (see GSN, June 25).
The Bush administration has said North Korea must agree to allow IAEA officials to begin inspections immediately, saying that a 1994 U.S.-North Korea agreement requires the inspections to begin. The Agreed Framework, however, also calls for efforts to improve U.S.-North Korean relations, and those relations have deteriorated over the past two years, Kartman said, according to Saturday’s Washington Post.
North Korea “is not going to give up its hypothetical nuclear capability unless it gets something of equal value to them, and what they agreed to was improved relations with the United States,” he said.
Kartman said he expects U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly to lead a U.S. team to North Korea, but he expressed concern that North Korea would want higher-level contacts.
Meanwhile, KEDO’s project to build two nuclear reactors in North Korea is continuing, and the organization plans to hold a ceremony Aug. 7 to pour concrete for the reactors, Kartman said (see GSN, May 13; Doug Struck, Washington Post, July 27).
A delegation of 25 North Korean officials returned to their country Saturday after completing 26 days of safety training in South Korea in preparation for the completion of the nuclear plant (see GSN, July 2; Korea Herald, July 27).
For further information, see:
Agreed Framework Text
KEDO
International Atomic Energy Agency
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By David Ruppe
Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — A senior Bush administration health official and a critic are publicly debating a pending government decision on whether to vaccinate the U.S. population against smallpox.
An expert advisory panel, the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), last month recommended to Health and Human Services Secretary Tommy Thompson against mass vaccination (see GSN, June 21). Instead, the panel favored vaccinating certain U.S. healthcare workers and using selective vaccination through a containment strategy in the event of an outbreak (see GSN, July 8). Thompson’s decision is pending.
The debate centers on whether that “ring vaccination strategy,” which involves vaccinating an infected person’s immediate contacts and household members, would be sufficient to contain the spread of the disease in the event of a smallpox attack.
The strategy was used to eradicate smallpox globally during the 1960s and 1970s and is considered beneficial since it minimizes exposure to the smallpox vaccine’s side effects, estimated to kill three people per million vaccinations.
A prominent proponent of that ring strategy is D.A. Henderson, who led the successful eradication effort and is now Thompson’s principal science advisor for public health emergency preparedness.
“Let’s say we’ve got a case, and that individual is going to be in contact with a lot of people, and what you want to do is to vaccinate those contacts. If you get to them with in the first two to three days, you can prevent the disease,” Henderson said, speaking on a panel Friday intended to provide information on the pending decision.
The ring strategy was challenged earlier this month when Yale University professor Edward Kaplan co-authored a study suggesting a mass vaccination would be a better alternative to deal with a terrorist attack using smallpox.
“Dr. Henderson is treating a bioterror attack as if it were a historical, natural smallpox outbreak. It is not wise to prepare for a smallpox bioterror attack — where terrorists are trying as hard as they can to kill as many of us as possible — in this fashion,” Kaplan said.
Judging the Spread of Infection
Specifically, Henderson and Kaplan differ on how quickly the disease would spread through the population.
Kaplan’s study, modeling a hypothetical attack on a major city with an initial 1,000 people infected, projected the ring strategy would allow 367,000 people to become infected and 110,000 to die before eliminating the disease after 350 days. Mass vaccinations administered quickly after an attack, it estimated, would allow 1,830 cases and 560 deaths over 115 days.
Henderson, in an interview Friday, argued Kaplan’s study gave short shrift to the ring strategy by using extreme assumptions about the spread of the disease. He criticized the model’s assumption that a single infected person would come into sufficiently close contact with 50 people before the initial case is detected.
“You’ve got to see some of these patients ... These are people that are sick, they’re not wandering around the country.”
Kaplan agreed in an interview that his analysis modeled a worst-case scenario, but argued such a strategy is preferable since terrorists would likely aim to cause the worst amount of damage.
“We believe that when planning a bioterror response policy, it is important to develop a robust approach that can succeed in situations much worse than history has provided,” he said.
Kaplan said Henderson is too conservative about estimating the spread of the disease, saying data suggests infectious people could circulate in society.
Historically, he said, “It is true that more cases were transmitted within households or hospitals than by ‘casual’ transmission — but this does not mean that transmission in the workplace, or via casual contacts (e.g. on a bus, in a marketplace) was insignificant.”
Kaplan cited a slide used by Centers for Disease Control and Prevention officials suggesting at least one-fourth of all smallpox transmissions in Europe did not occur in the home or hospital.
“This [was] in situations of natural outbreaks, and in populations with relatively high levels of immunity (due to past vaccination campaigns or survival from prior smallpox outbreaks), and in much less mobile populations than, say, New York City in the 21st century.”
“Dr. Henderson’s experience involved natural smallpox outbreaks in much less mobile populations that already had moderate to moderately high levels of immunity,” he said.
Kaplan also cited a paper that appeared in the magazine Nature last fall, which provided mathematical models of historical smallpox outbreaks. The models assumed random interactions between infected and susceptible in the population.
“This ‘free mixing’ is what Dr. Henderson objects to — he argues that febrile, bedridden infectious individuals could not possibly be mobile, mixing and spreading disease — and yet these ‘free mixing’ models provide excellent fits to historical data,” Kaplan said.
Response Capabilities
Kaplan also faults the advisory panel for not addressing the probable state of readiness of U.S. authorities to respond to an attack and to contain it effectively using the ring strategy.
“The issue was not addressed because the panel did not perform any analysis of their own ring vaccination response plan. They simply assumed that ring vaccination would work via historical analogy,” said Kaplan.
In recommending against mass vaccination, the panel weighed two primary risks, the side effects of mass vaccination and the probability of an attack.
The advisory committee concluded, “Under current circumstances, with no confirmed smallpox, and the risk of an attack assessed as low, vaccination of the general population is not recommended, as the potential benefits of vaccination do not outweigh the risks of vaccine complications.”
The calculation should have included another factor, Kaplan said, U.S. response capabilities.
When weighing the consequences of mass vaccination versus those of an attack on a society that is not mass vaccinated, the latter “depends critically on what the response policy is” he said.
“The basic lesson is this,” he writes, “If you harbor serious doubts regarding the ability of whatever response policy is employed to control the epidemic, then you should be more willing to vaccinate pre-attack. On the other hand, if you are highly confident that whatever response policy is employed can contain the epidemic, then the pressure to vaccinate before an attack is reduced.”
ACIP Chairman John Modlin said he believes U.S. authorities would respond well if an outbreak occurs today.
“I would just point out that there are no guarantees in life, but the best estimate is that with communication, with knowledge of an outbreak, that even a relatively large initial number of cases could be dealt with.”
Other experts say the nation is generally not yet prepared to deal with a massive biological weapons attack.
“We have seen how much suffering and disruption ensued from 18 cases of anthrax — a treatable disease. In the absence of significant improvements in our public health infrastructure, the country is vulnerable to the potentially calamitous consequences of a large bioterrorist attack,” said Tara O’Toole, director of the Center for Civilian Biodefense Strategies at Johns Hopkins University in testimony earlier this year. O’Toole has praised significant increases in funding passed by Congress in the fiscal 2002 and 2003 appropriations bills.
Analysis Included
Mississippi State Health Officer Ed Thompson who was involved in preparing the panel recommendation, acknowledged the panel had done no such analysis of response capabilities.
“What you were describing was a massive task that would take an enormous length of time,” he said in an interview.
“We’re having to make these decisions and recommendations based on a lot less information than we would like to have. Almost every decision that we’ve made with respect to bioterrorism out of necessity has been made with too little information,” he said.
Other officials say there was no problem with a lack of analysis, and that the issue of readiness was discussed. “We’ve got more models than we could possibly imagine,” said Henderson.
The question “was of course extensively discussed by the committee,” says Modlin, a professor of pediatrics and medicine at Dartmouth Medical School. “It’s one of those areas where there inevitably are more questions than there are answers.”
Modlin said the committee did have the benefit of a CDC draft technical assessment of what would likely happen if an attack did occur.
At the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases at Fort Detrick, Md., anthrax spores discovered outside of secure facilities in April were the result of an accidental release, the Army said Friday (see GSN, April 26).
“The scenario that people thought was the likely cause of those spores being outside the lab was just sloppy methods,” said USAMRIID spokesman Charles Dasey. “The sense of the institute is that it was poor laboratory techniques and not an intentional act.”
In response to the accidental release, USAMRIID officials have begun weekly sampling for contaminants both inside and outside containment laboratories, Dasey said. The sampling, which has never been previously conducted, is part of improved USAMRIID procedures, he said.
The spores discovered in April were found by a scientist conducting unauthorized sampling, according to the Associated Press (David Dishneau, Associated Press/Yahoo.com, July 27).
Link Between Vaccine, Illnesses
Meanwhile, growing evidence might link several lots of anthrax vaccine used to inoculate U.S. troops with types of ailments reported by some Gulf War veterans, the Air Force Times reported this week (see GSN, July 1).
Researchers at Tulane University and Autoimmune Technologies LLC, both in New Orleans, discovered antibodies that indicate the presence of a vaccine-enhancing compound called squalene in certain U.S. troops. Health officials had used four particular lots of anthrax vaccine to inoculate those troops under the Defense Department’s mandatory vaccination program, according to the researchers. In June 1999, the Food and Drug Administration had discovered traces of squalene in three of those four lots, as well as two others, Air Force Times reported.
The results of the current study are similar to those found in a study on Gulf War illnesses released in February 2000, Air Force Times reported. In the 2000 study, 95 percent of participants who had Gulf War illnesses also exhibited antibodies to squalene, but none of the veterans who did not report symptoms of Gulf War illnesses had the antibodies, said Autoimmune Technologies President Russell Wilson.
Squalene can be found naturally in the body and has been used experimentally to boost immune reactions that vaccines are meant to create, according to Air Force Times. Pentagon officials, however, have said they did not add squalene to the anthrax vaccine.
“What needs to be done is an epidemiological study in concert with a determination of antibodies to squalene so that the observation of the linkage between (Gulf War illnesses), the antibodies and lots of anthrax vaccine can be confirmed,” Wilson said (Deborah Funk, Air Force Times, Aug. 5).
Brentwood Can Be Cleaned
In Washington, U.S. Postal Service officials said Saturday that they will be able to safely reopen the anthrax-contaminated Brentwood Road postal facility in Washington after it has been decontaminated (see GSN, July 26).
The Postal Service is expected today to conduct a small-scale test of the chlorine dioxide fumigation process that will be used to decontaminate the facility, according to the Washington Post. If the full Brentwood decontamination is successful, the facility’s 2,500 workers would return to work after several months of renovation work, said Thomas Day, Postal Service vice president for engineering. While officials plan to install a detection system for biological agents, it probably will not be ready by the time the facility reopens, Day said.
Representatives from the American Postal Workers Union, which represents about 1,500 Brentwood workers, said they do not believe the decontamination effort will be as successful as predicted.
“Because the employees have not been regularly briefed about the progress and procedures (of the decontamination process), they are less than confident of the results,” said Roy Braunstein, American Postal Workers Union legislative director.
Christine Armstrong, a mail clerk at Brentwood, said she does not plan to return to the facility, regardless of what precautions were put into place.
“Who would want to go back in there?” Armstrong said. “We have been treated unfairly from the get-go, and they have no idea what we’re going through” (Monte Reel, Washington Post, July 27).
Irradiation Slows Congressional Mail
The irradiation process used to sterilize mail sent to members of Congress has led to delays in responding to constituents, the Philadelphia Inquirer reported today (see GSN, July 2).
Mail sent to members of Congress is routed through an irradiation center in Logan, N.J., according to the Inquirer. There, letters are divided into two categories based on their thickness. An electronic beam uses negatively charged ions to sterilize legal-sized letters. Larger-sized packages undergo an X-ray process, which is weaker but can cover more area, the Inquirer reported.
After mail sent to members of Congress has been sterilized, it is delivered to a special sorting facility in Washington. From there, it goes to the mailrooms of individual federal agencies and then to the addressed member of Congress, according to the Inquirer.
Postal officials have said the entire delivery process should take about a week, but congressional staff members have said the process appears to take much longer, the Inquirer reported. An aide to a Pennsylvania senator said his office stopped delivery of time-sensitive publications. Some members of Congress have altered their Web sites to make it easier to contact them via e-mail, while others have requested that mail be sent to their home district offices, the Inquirer reported.
“The mail is considerably slower than it used to be,” said Representative Robert Andrews (D-N.J.). “It’s unfortunate, but I think it’s necessary” (Jake Wagman, Philadelphia Inquirer, July 29).
For further information, see:
CDC Frequently Asked Questions About Anthrax
FBI Amerithrax Investigation
Journal of the American Medical Association Background on Anthrax
GSN Anthrax Attack Chronology (Dec. 12, 2001)
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Russia plans to open a plant for destroying chemical weapons Aug. 12 in the Gorny settlement of the Saratov region, Sergei Kiriyenko, state commission head for chemical disarmament, said last week (see GSN, March 22; RosBusinessConsulting Database, July 26).
The factory, which will utilize a two-stage process that involves processing chemical agents to make them safe and then disposing of them, will primarily destroy mustard gas, lewisite and their mixtures, according to Russian Economic News. The factory is expected to destroy 1 percent of Russia’s chemical weapons stockpile by the end of next April (Russian Economic News, July 25).
All signatories of the Chemical Weapons Convention, including Russia, are required to scrap their entire chemical weapons arsenals by 2007. The convention allows for postponing the deadline by five years, and Kiriyenko said Russia plans to ask CWC members this fall for permission to extend its deadline to 2012. Russia has the ability to destroy its chemical arsenals before 2012, he added.
The entire Russian chemical weapons destruction program, expected to last from 2001 to 2012, will cost $3.5 billion, Defense and Security reported (Yelena Yevstigneeva, Defense and Security, July 29).
The Gorny plant’s construction cost $160 million, and it is expected to require $704 million to destroy weapons over the first two years, said Zinovy Pak, director general of the Russian Ammunitions Agency.
Pak said that Gorny operations will help officials decide how to destroy chemical weapons at two other sites — in Shchuchye and Kambarka. The Gorny factory might later be used for civilian purposes (Russian Economic News, July 25).
Meanwhile, Kiriyenko expressed hope that the United States would continue to provide financial assistance for building a chemical weapons destruction plant in Shchuchye (see GSN, July 19). Without the U.S. money, Russia will have to build six less-powerful plants to destroy its arsenal, he said (Malaysian National News Agency Bernama, July 26).
For further information, see:
CWC Text
OPCW Main Page
CWC States Parties
British Foreign Ministry official Mike O’Brien is slated to visit Libya within the next two weeks to discuss terrorism and weapons of mass destruction with Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi, the Financial Times reported this weekend (see GSN, May 8). O’Brien is to be the first British minister to visit Libya in almost 20 years, according to the newspaper.
The officials are expected to discuss WMD issues, and O’Brien will probably urge Libya to accede to the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Financial Times reported (see GSN, Dec. 20, 2001). He also plans to ask for Libya’s assistance to collect intelligence in the war on terrorism, particularly in the search for al-Qaeda operatives. The officials will probably discuss Iraq, British Foreign Office sources said, but they added that Iraq is not the main focus of the meeting.
“The visit will be part of the campaign against international terrorism” and “will focus on Libya’s cooperation with the international community to resolve the outstanding issues between us, but it will not be a make-or-break mission,” a Foreign Office official said (Christopher Adams, Financial Times, July 27/28).
For further information, see:
CWC Text
OPCW Main Page
CWC States Parties
Pentagon Executive Summary of CWC
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U.S. representatives and senators are debating how much the Pentagon should tell Congress about performance and estimated costs for U.S. missile defense programs, Congressional Quarterly Weekly reported last week (see GSN, June 26).
A House-Senate conference committee is considering fiscal 2003 defense authorization legislation, for which the White House has requested $7.8 billion in missile defense spending. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has insisted that defense officials report fewer details to Congress even as long-range goals and schedules for missile defense programs become more abstract, according to Congressional Quarterly. If Congress agrees to Rumsfeld’s request, Pentagon officials could shift funding among programs and make other changes without congressional oversight, Congressional Quarterly reported.
Some opponents, however, cite the traditional congressional oversight role.
“What they call ‘flexibility’ means far less congressional oversight than is typical for weapons systems,” said Representative Tom Allen (D-Maine).
House and Senate versions of the defense authorization bill contain different oversight requirements, with the Senate version being the stronger of the two, according to Congressional Quarterly. White House officials have threatened to veto the bill, however, if it requires overly burdensome missile defense reports, Congressional Quarterly reported.
Air Force Lt. Gen. Ronald Kadish, director of the U.S. Missile Defense Agency, has told members of Congress that the agency will provide the information it has available. Such an approach has satisfied some Republican lawmakers, including Senator John Warner (R-Va.), ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee.
“We can always have hearings; we can always get witnesses,” Warner said. “But the cost to the taxpayer of this continually accruing requirement for reports is just incredible.”
Senator John Spratt (D-S.C.) said that it might be a bad idea to give Rumsfeld the reduced oversight he seeks. Spratt said he was disappointed with a lack of information in a recent Pentagon report on the missile defense program’s goals.
Some members of Congress have said that Rumsfeld’s request for less oversight of the missile defense programs is part of a broader preference to keep Congress less informed, according to Congressional Quarterly.
“We’ve noticed in the last several months an increasing reluctance to volunteer information, and even to provide responsive information to inquiries,” said Senate Armed Services Strategic Subcommittee Chairman Jack Reed (D-R.I.). “It does seem to be an operating style that says, ‘They don’t need to know a lot.’”
The White House has repeatedly said it is important to conduct an all-out effort to develop a U.S. missile defense system because of the threat posed by rogue states and terrorist groups seeking to obtain advanced ballistic missiles. Missile defense critics, however, have said the threat is not as high as the Bush administration claims and does not justify getting rid of congressional oversight.
“The administration has overstated the threat from the beginning,” Allen said. “Al-Qaeda isn’t firing missiles at us, Iraq doesn’t have the capability (and) North Korea has suspended its missile program voluntarily.”
“We can take the time to do this right, with proper congressional oversight,” he said (Pat Towell, Congressional Quarterly Weekly, July 27).
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2002 by National Journal Group, Inc. The material in this section is produced independently for NTI by the National Journal Group, Inc. Any reproduction or retransmission, in whole or in part, is a violation of federal law and is strictly prohibited without the consent of the National Journal Group, Inc. All rights reserved.
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