U.S. Response I:  Nuclear, Chemical Plants Step Up Security Efforts

By Bryan Bender
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — The United States is moving to secure more than 100 nuclear power plants and thousands of chemical facilities across the country against terrorist attack, as a growing chorus of government officials and private experts raise alarms about the vulnerability of critical U.S. industries.

While stepping up international nonproliferation efforts to prevent weapons of mass destruction from falling into the hands of terrorists, U.S. officials are also looking to shore up U.S. commercial facilities.  Such sites, while already well-secured, could be attractive targets for terrorists seeking to cause mass casualties and panic by attacking a nuclear reactor, stealing nuclear materials, igniting chemicals or detonating a conventional explosive attached to radiological material.

Two pieces of new legislation, the Nuclear Security Act and the Chemical Security Act, were approved by a Senate committee last week and aim to strengthen security at the 103 nuclear plants and 15,000 chemical plants nationwide (see GSN, July 26).  Also attached to the nuclear security bill is the Dirty Bomb Prevention Act of 2002, which would require radioactive materials that are used in industrial and medical activities to be tracked (see GSN, June 27).

“These bills address the concerns that all of us shared since the tragic events of Sept. 11,” Senator James Jeffords (I-Vt.), chairman of the Environment and Public Works Committee, said last week.  “We must do everything in our power to make sure that terrorists are not able to turn our own resources against us.”  The House of Representatives is taking up similar legislation.

While the legislation is considered a good start, security experts and industry officials believe that more needs to be done to prepare for a possible attack, including more drastic measures such as distributing potassium iodide pills to people who live within 50 miles of nuclear power plants to reduce radiation risk in the event of an attack (see GSN, May 24), as well as shutting down nuclear power plants deemed to be most at risk.

The Nuclear Security Act

Although stopping short of making security personnel federal employees, as some lawmakers originally sought (see GSN, Jan. 18), the Nuclear Security Act calls for a variety of new security measures at power plants, beginning with a comprehensive review of security procedures and the detailing of federal personnel to coordinate facility security — including an evaluation of training standards, facility security plans and emergency response plans.

The Nuclear Security Act also calls for a federal task force responsible for continuing assessments of nuclear power plant security; a federal team to be responsible for coordinating air, water and ground access to nuclear power plants; and creation of a new Nuclear Regulatory Commission office of nuclear security and incident response to coordinate and consolidate the agency’s security functions.  In addition, it would require plants to conduct more force-on-force terrorist mock exercises with larger enemy forces than the three terrorists currently considered the “design basis threat.”

A Comprehensive Nuclear Security Assessment

The NRC, in charge of overseeing the 5,000 private security personnel that guard nuclear power plants, will also conduct the comprehensive security review.

The NRC must “look hard at the … threats that they face and come up with answers as to how best to deal with them, to look at the zone around nuclear power plants to determine … what needs to be done to improve the safety and security of the people living near nuclear power plants,” Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton (D-N.Y.), a committee member and proponent of the legislation, said.

Many observers say a comprehensive security assessment of nuclear power plans must be the first step to beefing up security. 

“Although the possibility of a catastrophic event occurring at a nuclear power plant as a result of accident, natural disaster or deliberate act of terrorism has always been on the table, the events of Sept. 11 demand a re-examination of all aspects of the vulnerability and security of the nation’s nuclear facilities,” Irwin Redlener, president of the Children’s Health Fund, told the Senate committee last month.  “Simply put, what was improbable to the point of impossible has become possible.  Assessment of risk and specific planning scenarios need to evolve to new levels taking into account a much more aggressive, educated, trained and organized terrorist for whom capture or death is not a deterrent to action.”

According to NRC figures, more than 30 security advisories, including threat warnings from the CIA and FBI, have been issued to nuclear power plants since Sept. 11 and some facilities are still using National Guard troops for added security.

The energy industry, too, has called for a comprehensive security assessment followed by greater federal oversight of security, contending that it remains unclear who is responsible — plant owners or the government — for various aspects of the counterterrorist mission.  The United States Energy Association concluded that nuclear power plants “remain among the most secure and protected commercial facilities in the nation,” according to a report issued earlier this month, National Energy Security Post Sept. 11.

Nevertheless, a more thorough assessment, combined with a clear delineation of responsibilities is necessary, according to the association.  “It is imperative that the physical security of critical infrastructure receive a coordinated assessment at the federal level to determine what should be protected, how it will be protected and what the dividing line between the responsibilities of commercial enterprise and the government is with respect to attacks by terrorists or other acts of war,” the report said.

“Nuclear facilities, like other critical infrastructure, were not designed to withstand acts of war and their security forces are not a substitute for the military capability of the United States,” the report added.

Spent Nuclear Fuel Is a Prime Target

Among the vulnerabilities at nuclear power plants, experts believe that the spent fuel stored on site in cooling pools is an attractive target to terrorists and is insufficiently protected.  Terrorists seeking to develop a crude radiological weapon could theoretically use the spent fuel for that purpose.

“The NRC has never tested a power plant guard force’s ability to protect spent fuel being possibly the prime target of a terrorist attack,” according to Danielle Brian, executive director of the Project on Government Oversight.  “The NRC needs to create a target/assets list prioritized by importance,” she said in written testimony to the Senate committee.

Officials worry that some spent fuel pools are located just inside the fence perimeter of nuclear plants and are highly vulnerable to a quick terrorist strike. According to NRC Chairman Richard Meserve, “the concern about spent fuel and the possible vulnerability of spent fuel has been something that has received a great deal of attention by NRC.  Since Sept. 11 … we have significantly upgraded the security that is provided for spent fuel,” he testified last month.

Meserve said that an estimated $30 million will be spent next year for enhanced security efforts.  “That would involve our continuing work on evaluation of vulnerabilities and enhancements of communications capabilities and our own capacity to deal with confidential information and things of that nature,” he said last month.

Still, others say more needs to be done to avoid a catastrophe.  The Children’s Health Fund’s Redlener, for example, believes that potassium iodide pills should be distributed to residents within 50 miles of nuclear power plants.  “If the proper dose of potassium iodide is given prior to or within two hours of exposure … excess thyroid cancers can be almost entirely prevented,” he said.

It remains unclear, however, how worried the public may be.  NRC provided pills for residents within 10 nautical miles of power plants in April, but the program has been slow to take hold.  Of the 20,000 residents who are eligible around the Vermont Yankee nuclear plant, only 660 have applied for the free potassium iodide pills (see GSN, July 9).

Redlener also believes that the security situation at some power plants calls for an outright shutting down of the facility.  “A cogent case can be made for closing nuclear power plants altogether, particularly those with inherent safety problems, those in highly populated areas with inadequate evacuation plans or those with relatively insufficient means of safeguarding spent fuel rods.”

Chemical Security Act

While nuclear security has been most pressing, improving security at the nation’s estimated 15,000 chemical plants is also receiving greater attention.

The Chemical Security Act would require high-priority chemical plants to assess their security vulnerabilities and draft improvement plans, including ways to utilize safer technologies.  It also would require the Environmental Protection Agency and proposed homeland security department to develop regulations to determine which chemical plants should receive high priority.  The legislation would also allow the new department to determine whether a facility should be punished for failing to implement a response plan to address threats.

“There are 123 chemical facilities where worst case release of toxic chemicals could threaten more than 1 million people,” Senator Jon Corzine (D-N.J.) said in June.  “I know that this issue doesn’t get as much headline attention, but I continue to be very concerned.”

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U.S. Response II:  Senate Puts Off Action on New Security Department

The U.S. Senate will not be able to complete work before its August recess on legislation to create a homeland security department, the Washington Times reported today (see GSN, July 29).

“There are a host of issues on the floor that have taken us longer than we had hoped,” said Ranit Schmelzer, spokeswoman for Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle (D-S.D.).

Senators plan to take up the bill by the end of the week and make it pending business once they reconvene after Labor Day, the Times reported.  The legislation would probably face a filibuster if taken up now, Schmelzer said.

Senators Robert Byrd (D-W.Va.) and Ernest Hollings (D-S.C.) have both urged the Senate to proceed cautiously on the legislation, the Times reported.  Senate Republicans, however, have urged action on the bill, saying it should be a “top priority.”

“Every American deserves to feel safe within our borders,” Senate Minority Leader Trent Lott (R-Miss.) said in a statement.  “Unfortunately, the Senate Democratic leadership will not allow the Senate to complete action this week to organize and mobilize the nation’s resources at every level to protect America from terrorist attack.”

Republicans in the House of Representatives, which passed its version of the bill Friday, said they want both versions of the bill complete so legislators can make preparations during the recess for a compromise, according to the Times.  The Senate, however, still has to resolve outstanding issues, Schmelzer said.

“The Republican leadership in the House was able to jam something through over the objections of many in their party, as well as Democrats — that’s not how it works in the Senate,” she said (Stephen Dinan, Washington Times, July 30).

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Export Controls:  Bush Wrongly Eased Computer Controls, Analyst Says

Congressional investigators have found evidence indicating that the Bush administration relaxed export controls on high-performance computers based on false information provided by the computer industry, arms control expert Gary Milhollin said in a column in today’s Los Angeles Times (see GSN, Jan. 3).

In August 2001, a computer industry lobbying group told the administration that by early 2002, a new generation of advanced computers would be on the market that could perform 190 billion operations per second, twice as many as the computers then under controls, said Milhollin, executive director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control.  The group asked the White House to relax export control levels to 190 billon operations per second so U.S. manufacturers could stay competitive, he said.

The U.S. General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of Congress, found that the industry’s claims were false, Milhollin said.  Out of 10 companies that the group said would be ready to sell advanced servers, nine “would not introduce these servers in 2002 or had no plans to manufacture these servers due to the lack of software and a market for such powerful servers,” the GAO reported, according to Milhollin.

According to Milhollin, the GAO report says that the White House’s eventual decision to reduce the export controls “was based not on an independent analysis but rather on information provided by industry.”  Milhollin also said that U.S. Commerce Department officials did not try to verify the lobbying group’s claims and that the GAO found that the White House had relied on the group’s letter for its decision.

According to Milhollin, the GAO also found that the United States decided to relax its export controls on high-performance computers without consent from the other members of the Wassenaar Arrangment — an informal export control regime that regulates computing technologies (see GSN, March 22).

“We can’t ask our allies to keep dangerous equipment away from terrorists and the countries that support them if we don’t control our own sales,” Milhollin said.  “All the other countries in this pact still control computers at much lower operating levels, which makes the United States a rogue exporter as well as a unilateralist” (Gary Milhollin, Los Angeles Times, July 30).

For further information, see:

Wassenaar Arrangement Web site

Participating States of Wassenaar Arrangement

Pentagon Executive Summary of Wassenaar Arrangement

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Iraq:  U.S. Tried to Manipulate Inspectors, Says Former UNSCOM Head

A former U.N. official has said that the United States and some U.N. Security Council members tried to use weapons inspectors in Iraq for their own purposes, including obtaining intelligence information, the Financial Times reported today (see GSN, July 12).

The United States tried to use inspectors to collect information on the location of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, said Rolf Ekeus — who headed the U.N. Special Commission for weapons inspections in Iraq from 1991 to 1997 — on Swedish radio.  Ekeus said he rebuffed U.S. attempts to use the inspectors to collect information, but pressure increased after he left the commission in 1997.

“As time went on, some countries, especially the U.S., wanted to learn more about other parts of Iraq’s capacity,” Ekeus said.

The United States and other countries also tried to persuade the inspectors to investigate sensitive areas such as the Iraqi defense ministry when they wanted to create a crisis, Ekeus said.

“They [Security Council members] pressed the inspections leadership to carry out inspections which were controversial from the Iraqis’ view and thereby created a blockage that could be used as a justification for a direct military action,” he said.

Iraq has refused to allow inspectors to return to the country, citing in part concern that they would be used to gather information or to provoke crisis (see GSN, March 11).  Ekeus’ statements are certain to support Iraq’s argument, according to the Times (Financial Times, July 30).

Air Strikes Not Enough, Rumsfeld Says

Meanwhile, U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said that if the United States decides to attack, it could not rely on air strikes alone to destroy Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (see GSN, July 29).  Iraq’s chemical, biological and nuclear weapons sites are buried too deep or are too mobile to destroy with air power, he said (see GSN, July 24).

Iraq has learned how to hide its military assets, Rumsfeld said.  For example, a biological weapons laboratory might be in a mobile trailer.

“It’s movable, and it looks like most any other trailer,” he said.

Rumsfeld refused to say how the United States might destroy WMD sites (BBC, July 30).

No Military Near Kuwait

Meanwhile, there has been no indication of an Iraqi military buildup along the border with Kuwait, the U.N. Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission, which is responsible for monitoring the border since the 1991 Gulf War, reported today.

“There is nothing in the DMZ (Demilitarized Zone between Iraq and Kuwait) or close to it.  We have no confirmation of that,” UNIKOM spokesman Daljeet Bagga said.

Kuwaiti authorities have been holding internal meetings over the last few days to update emergency plans in preparation for a potential military conflict, Reuters reported (Reuters/Yahoo.com, July 30).

For further information, see:

UNSCOM

UNMOVIC

UNIKOM

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Iran:  U.S. Officials to Urge Russia to End Nuclear Aid

The Bush administration yesterday directed a high-level delegation to Moscow to persuade Russia to end nuclear assistance to Iran that could aid that country militarily (see GSN, July 30).

The officials had planned the visit previously, but Russia’s release last week of a draft document outlining plans to provide Iran with five additional nuclear reactors surprised and angered the White House, according to an administration official.

“It’s fair to say the White House was infuriated by that and extremely surprised,” the official said.

The officials are expected to present Moscow with a list of measures to reduce cooperation with Iran, according to the Washington Post.  The list includes ending exchanges of weapons scientists, blocking sales of dual-use items and strengthening export controls, a senior Bush administration official said (Peter Baker, Washington Post, July 30).

Weapons vs. Energy

The Bush administration has told Russia the reason Iran wants additional nuclear reactors is to develop nuclear weapons, according to Bloomberg.com.  Iran might be able to build an operational nuclear weapon within five years if Russia refuses to end aid, U.S. Deputy Assistant Defense Secretary Marshall Billingslea told a Senate Governmental Affairs subcommittee yesterday.

“This is a pressing matter that has very much got the administration’s attention,” Billingslea said in testimony before the International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services Subcommittee.

Billingslea criticized Iranian claims that the nuclear reactors are needed for energy, according to Bloomberg.com.  Iran has such large quantities of natural gas that it is burning without using six times the amount of any other country, he said, adding that the burned-off natural gas would provide three times the energy of the Bushehr nuclear power plant.

“If Tehran’s agenda were truly to improve its energy reserves, it would just spend a fraction of the money it is spending on Bushehr and generate three times as much power by simply capturing the natural gas it is wasting,” Billingslea said (Paul Basken, Bloomberg.com, July 29).

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South Asia:  U.S. Plans Active Engagement With India and Pakistan

Six senior U.S. officials plan to visit India and Pakistan during the next five months, U.S. officials said yesterday.

The United States wants to remain engaged in the region to help prevent tensions from escalating and possibly leading to war, analysts said (see GSN, July 29).  Secretary of State Colin Powell concluded a two-day visit to the region Sunday.

“Deputy Secretary Richard Armitage will return to the region in August, and other senior U.S. officials will also continue engagement in coming months,” State Department spokesman Phil Reeker said.  Armitage was a leader in the U.S. campaign to persuade India and Pakistan to de-escalate tensions last month, according to United Press International (see GSN, June 24).

The United States is not trying to act as a mediator but is “prepared to provide facilitative assistance if the parties agree,” Reeker said.  “Our role is that of a friend … trying to help both countries address their differences … through a productive dialogue,” he said (see GSN, July 2).  To resolve the conflict, India and Pakistan must enter into dialogue on the disputed Kashmir territory in a way that “takes into account the wishes of the people of Kashmir,” he added (Anwar Iqbal, United Press International, July 29).

For further information, see:

Stimson Center Background on Kashmir

Pakistani Government

Indian Government

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Smallpox:  London Purchased Wrong Vaccine, Report Says

A report prepared by a U.S. research group says the United Kingdom has purchased the wrong type of smallpox vaccine to use as a defense against a biological weapons attack, BBC Online reported today (see GSN, April 15).

The British firm Powderject Pharmaceuticals was awarded a contract worth more than $50 million to provide the United Kingdom with millions of doses of smallpox vaccine based on a strain of smallpox called the Lister strain, according to BBC.  Powderject received the contract shortly after its chief executive had donated more than $78,000 to the governing Labor Party, according to BBC.

The United States, however, has ordered doses of the smallpox vaccine developed by the New York City Board of Health, which is designed to counter a different strain of smallpox that scientists believe terrorists would be more likely to use, according to BBC.  The report, which was prepared by the Potomac Institute, supports the U.S. decision, BBC reported.

British Shadow Health Secretary Liam Fox said the report should prompt an investigation into the vaccine purchase.  Ministers should resign if it is found they purchased the wrong type, he said.

“It is imperative that we have a full independent inquiry into the whole sordid affair of the smallpox scandal,” Fox said.  “If these allegations are true, heads must roll” (BBC Online, July 30).

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United States:  Umatilla Incinerator Test Burns to Begin

The U.S. Army is expected to begin a test burn today of a chemical weapons incinerator at the Umatilla Chemical Depot in Oregon (see GSN, July 15).

High-pressure levels at certain points of the incinerator had delayed the test, but officials approved a permit modification yesterday, according to the Associated Press.  The Army plans to use nontoxic solvents for the exercise, which is expected to last 45 days.  If the incinerator can be shown to destroy 99.9999 percent of the nontoxic chemicals, then Army officials have estimated they can begin destroying the 3,700 tons of chemical weapons agents at the depot by February, AP reported (Associated Press, July 30).

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Japan:  U.S. Delays High-Tech Rocket Aid

The United States is preventing shipments of rocket parts in an effort to pressure Japan to update a bilateral agreement controlling exports of space technology, the Asahi Shimbun reported Saturday.

Japan depends on U.S. suppliers for parts of its H-2A and M-5 rockets, and if shipment delays continue, Japan’s scheduled rocket launches might be postponed, according to the report (see GSN, Feb. 5).

The United States has linked the shipments to a request to update a 1969 accord that committed Japan to obtain U.S. approval for transferring technology from the United States to a third country.  Japan was developing less powerful rockets at the time, and the United States has said it wants to revise the agreement to include components for H-2A and M-5 rockets.

The U.S. request stemmed from a 1993 presidential directive that prohibits the United States from encouraging new rocket development plans that it did not support before the Missile Technology Control Regime was established in 1987, according to the Japanese newspaper.

Japan has refused to update the accord, saying it has sufficient export controls and the 1993 directive is a domestic U.S. issue (Asahi Shimbun, July 27).

For further information, see:

U.S. State Department MTCR Summary

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India:  Washington Considers Allowing Transfer of Arrow Interceptor

By David Ruppe
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — Calling missile defenses an “inherently stabilizing concept,” a senior U.S. defense official yesterday said the United States is considering allowing Israel to sell Arrow missile interceptors to India.

The decision would factor Israeli and Indian needs as well as U.S. obligations under the Missile Technology Control Regime, a voluntary set of export control guidelines intended to limit missile proliferation.

The Pentagon view — delivered by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Marshall Billingslea at a Senate Governmental Affairs subcommittee hearing — appeared at odds with the State Department position expressed at the same hearing and a Washington Post report last week that Secretary of State Colin Powell planned to express his opposition to the deal when he met with Indian officials this past weekend (see GSN, July 23).

State Department officials reportedly were concerned that if India were to obtain the Arrow, it might fuel tensions with Pakistan.  The two nuclear rivals seemed on the brink of war only several weeks ago.

“South Asia is a region of tension, as is obvious by ongoing events.  India is a country that’s pursuing programs of proliferation concern, so by definition, there would be issues that one would have to consider of that nature in deciding whether or not to go ahead with such a sale,” said Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Vann Van Diepen, testifying alongside Billingslea.

The Arrow missile interceptor is coproduced by Israel and the United States, with Washington providing the bulk of the funding.  The cooperative agreement gives the United States the power to veto any transfer of Arrow technology to a third party.

Although it is a defensive system, the Arrow nevertheless triggers the most restrictive MTCR guidelines because its propulsion system is powerful enough to deliver a 500-kilogram payload over a 300-kilometer range.  Such a missile is considered to be “Category 1” system under the MTCR.

“I think clearly the administration has some decisions to make about how to square its missile defense promotion efforts and its missile nonproliferation goals,” said Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association.

“The hearing yesterday made abundantly clear that the Defense and State Departments are crossing wires on this one.  And it’s clear that any Arrow sale would have to cross the MTCR threshold.  The MTCR was designed to prevent that kind of transfer.”

What India Needs

Billingslea’s comments addressed an issue raised last week by Senator Carl Levin (D-Mich.) of how the United States could pursue a national missile defense effort while denying another country the same capability.

“We believe that missile defenses, generally speaking, are part of an inherently stabilizing concept.  The right to defend yourself against these missiles is something that we feel is a matter to explore with the Indians, with the Pakistanis if they’re interested,” Billingslea said.

“What I would say is, we need to look at it more from the standpoint of, what do the Indians feel they need in terms of defense for the region?” he said.

In a report to Congress earlier this month, the Pentagon said it expected aggressive U.S. national missile defense development to drive China to improve and increase its nuclear warhead delivery platforms (see GSN, July 15).

A Nonbinding Regime

The State Department’s Van Diepen stressed Israel’s commitments to restrict transfers of certain, potentially destabilizing missile technology in accordance with the MTCR.

The Arrow, he said, is an “MTCR Category 1 rocket system.   Israel is a country that unilaterally has pledged its adherence to the MTCR.  So it, just as we, or countries that are members of the MTCR, is committed to apply what’s called a ‘strong presumption of denial’ to exports of any Category I system, including Arrow, to any end user for any purpose.”

Billingslea said the administration has not yet developed a position whether the MTCR restrictions should take precedence in an administration decision, saying that might depend on what the Indians say they need for security.

“The Arrow system, because it’s an MTCR-class missile, does raise certain obligations that we have under the MTCR, and I don’t think the administration has come to a position on that whole complex issue of balancing the MTCR, our defense cooperation with India, so on and so forth.  But it’s a matter under active discussion.  Again, we also need to hear from the Indians in terms of what they want and what they need.”

The MTCR is not a legally binding agreement, but rather, includes a set of guidelines that parties voluntarily agree to follow to discourage proliferation of WMD delivery systems.

The regime does not actually forbid transfer of Arrow, or other Category I systems, but the guidelines state there should be “a strong presumption to deny such transfers.”

“Israel would have to go through the necessary procedures to decide that it could overcome that strong presumption of denial and make that sale.  And that’s by definition not an easy matter,” said Van Diepen.

While “the strong presumption is not an absolute ban,” Van Diepen said, “it can be overcome on so-called ‘rare occasions’ that are extremely well justified in terms of five specific nonproliferation and export control factors in the MTCR guidelines.”

The five factors to be considered when allowing sensitive missile-technology transfers are concerns about weapons of mass destruction proliferation; the capabilities and objectives of the missile and space programs of the recipient state; the significance of the transfer in terms of the potential development of delivery systems (other than manned aircraft) for weapons of mass destruction; the assessment of the end use of the transfers, including the relevant assurances of the recipient states; and the applicability of relevant multilateral agreements.

Overruling the guidelines, the United States in the past sold Trident submarine-launched ballistic missiles and conventional Tomahawk cruise missiles to the United Kingdom.

Weakening the Regime

Critics of the potential Arrow transfer to India say it, and other possible exports that could be conceived as violating the spirit of the MTCR, would undermine the regime.  Van Diepen acknowledged such concerns when discussing U.S.-Israeli coproduction plans and the possibility of the United States simply selling fully assembled Arrow systems to Israel.

“In terms of the MTCR guidelines, we would have to be prepared to live with whatever precedents that other countries decided to draw from that sale,” he said.

“If the U.S. said yes to a Category I rocket system export to Israel, it’s going to be hard for us potentially to say no to a Russian export of Category I rocket technology to Iran.”

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