U.S. Response:  Bush Considers Rejecting $5.1 Billion Emergency Fund

By Bill Ghent

CongressDaily

WASHINGTON — The White House had not yet decided yesterday whether to release a $5.1 billion contingency package that Congress authorized in the $28.9 billion fiscal 2002 supplemental spending bill last month, but there are indications President George W. Bush is leaning toward rejecting the money, a move that would aggravate appropriators (see GSN, Aug. 5).

“The issue is still under review,” an Office of Management and Budget spokeswoman said.  “We’ll have a decision as soon as we have a decision.”

A report in Saturday’s Washington Post, quoting unidentified administration sources, said top White House aides were urging Bush to teach Congress a lesson about overspending by rejecting the contingency funds.  The package includes money for veterans’ medical care, the Transportation Security Administration, foreign aid, election reform and a host of other homeland security items.

Appropriators sought to force the administration’s hand on the package, which is mostly made up of money that Bush did not request, by designating it an “all or nothing” item.  The designation forces the White House to either declare the entire $5.1 billion an emergency need and release all the money or to reject the entire package outright and kill projects popular with members of Congress, including leading Republicans.  The president still has nearly three weeks to decide.

During the long debate on the supplemental, the administration complained that Congress was trying to appropriate money that could not be spent by the end of fiscal 2002 and that many agencies still had money left from the $40 billion that Congress appropriated on an emergency basis after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks (see GSN Aug. 12).

In yet another signal that the administration may be prepping Congress for the eventual rejection of the contingency package, the White House budget office released a report late Friday which said that as of June 30, federal agencies had yet to obligate $14 billion of that $40 billion, and that “historic trends would indicate that current funding levels are sufficient to cover agencies for the remaining weeks of the fiscal year.”  The only agencies likely to spend most of their funds were the Defense Department and the Transportation Security Administration, according to the report.  Under the supplemental, Defense received $14.3 billion, while Transportation received $3.85 billion, although $480 million of that is tied up in the contingency account.

A spokesman for Senate Appropriations Chairman Robert Byrd (D-W.Va.) said yesterday that the senator “remains hopeful that the president will agree with Congress on the emergency nature of these items.

If the administration eventually decides to reject the money, it may ask Congress to appropriate additional funds in the fiscal 2003 budget for some of the items — a move that will not sit well with congressional appropriators who have already complained about the White House budget office’s intransigence on fiscal 2003 spending parameters.

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Iraq I:  Commercial Satellites Track Suspected WMD Facilities

By Bryan Bender
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — Using commercial satellite images, U.S. intelligence agencies, independent analysts and arms control organizations are mapping possible weapons of mass destruction facilities in Iraq and have found evidence that Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein has rebuilt at least some facilities previously destroyed in military strikes or dismantled by U.N. weapons inspectors.

U.S. officials and private analysts said the satellite images cannot definitively determine what activities are going on inside Iraqi facilities.  Nor do they help uncover covert activities at facilities unknown to U.S. intelligence officials.

The exercise, they said, is nevertheless providing a window into Iraq previously unavailable to the public as the international community seeks to restart U.N. weapons inspections, and the Bush administration considers plans to depose the Iraqi leader for his suspected pursuit of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.

This unparalleled level of transparency could be also be a defining characteristic of any U.S. military assault on Iraq, offering public images of military forces and battle damage as never before.  Commercial satellite images published by the New York Post last week showed dramatic infrastructure improvements made during the last six months at an air base in Qatar, being readied as a possible launching point for a U.S. military operation against Iraq.

Another satellite image of an Iraqi facility, analyzed by independent experts, provides evidence that Iraq has rebuilt a phosphate-producing fertilizer plant north of Baghdad.  The experts said the plant could be used for the dual purposes of making industrial materials, such as insecticides, as well as chemical weapons.

U.S. Spy Agencies Ordering Commercial Imagery

Both governmental and nongovernmental customers are taking advantage of the availability of commercial satellite imagery to create a digital database of the entire country and to analyze the scores of Iraqi military and industrial facilities long suspected of developing weapons outlawed at the end of the 1991 Gulf War.

According to David Burpee, spokesman for the Pentagon’s National Imagery and Mapping Agency, the U.S. military is buying more imagery than ever before from companies such as U.S.-based Space Imaging and DigitalGlobe, which operate high-resolution imaging satellites and sell satellite photographs to government and private customers depicting objects smaller than one meter square. 

“We continue to buy imagery and use it for a variety of purposes,” Burpee said, although he would not comment on which U.S. agencies requested commercial imagery or the countries they were investigating.  Commercial imagery provides the government a lot of benefits, Burpee said, including the ability to share the data with humanitarian groups, coalition partners and nongovernmental organizations, which are not cleared for the classified images taken by U.S. intelligence satellites, which have resolutions believed to be measured in inches.

CIA Director George Tenet designated NIMA earlier this year to buy commercial imagery wherever possible so that spy satellites could be reserved for the most sensitive missions and to ensure a robust commercial remote sensing industry, envisioned as a valuable tool in verifying arms control agreements and exposing would-be weapons proliferators (see GSN, July 3).

“We can take images of very large areas and overlay that with elevation and other data,” Burpee said.  “And there is plenty of good information from commercial satellites for planning purposes.”

International and Private Institutions Benefit

While supplementing its own satellite intelligence, the U.S. purchase of commercial imagery enables international organizations, such as the United Nations, and independent arms experts to look at some of the data that most interests the intelligence community.  Images ordered by NIMA, except in special circumstances, are placed in the general archives of Space Imaging and DigitalGlobe, where they can be subsequently purchased at much lower costs.

“Somebody with a heck of a lot of money has been quite busy at getting good coverage of Iraq,” an industry official said, suggesting the U.S. government.  “Somebody has gathered all of digital Baghdad,” where experts believe many of Hussein’s hidden WMD programs may be located, including a potential biological weapons facility along the Tigris River in Baghdad that one industry source said “U.S. intelligence officials don’t know what to make of.”

International organizations such as the U.N. Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency are taking advantage of the newly available imagery.  UNMOVIC is seeking to return to Iraq and finish its chemical, biological and missile inspections, as stipulated after the Gulf War.  The IAEA, meanwhile, is using the data to prepare to go into Iraq to monitor nuclear activity.

In its 2001 annual report, published in late July, the IAEA said that one way to supplement its lack of on-the-ground inspections in recent years has been commercial satellite imagery.

“Activities were focused on the improvement of computer-based inspection and analytical tools as well as the detailed analysis of information accumulated from previous field activities and on recent information such as that provided by commercially available satellite imagery,” according to the chapter entitled “Verification in Iraq Pursuant to UNSC Resolutions.”  “These analytical activities have confirmed the validity of the agency’s technically coherent picture of Iraq’s past clandestine nuclear program and nuclear related capabilities as of December 1998,” when the U.N. inspection team was pulled out of Iraq after the Baghdad failed to fully cooperate.  The report notes IAEA’s “readiness to resume monitoring activities in Iraq.”

Independent analysts are also for the first time gathering a digital picture of Iraq.

“UNMOVIC and IAEA, they’ve been to Iraq,” said John Pike of GlobalSecurity.org, an arms control group that frequently uses commercial satellite imagery to conduct independent analysis of nuclear, missile and military facilities.  “We have not been to Iraq.  They are checking up on old friends, whereas we are looking at facilities that have been talked about but not seen.  We want to collect a complete set of special weapons facilities and suspect sites in Iraq, as well as palaces, terrorist training camps and Republican Guard facilities.  There is significant archival coverage” between Space Imaging and DigitalGlobe, Pike said.

Snapshots of Iraqi Facilities

According to Corey Hinderstein, a remote sensing expert at the Institute for Science and International Security, there is at least one chemical plant that appears to have been rebuilt in recent years.  “Al-Qaim, a former phosphate production facility, appears to back up and running,” she said.  The facility is located 300 kilometers north of the capital.

There are “factories for the production of chemical weapons precursors for use in the insecticide business or potentially for dual use, such as nerve gas,” Pike added. 

A set of Iraqi chemical plants — known as Fallujah 1, 2 and 3 — have also drawn interest.  A June 4 DigitalGlobe image of Fallujah 1, which occupies 68 acres about 60 kilometers northwest of Baghdad, shows a “precursor production plant and a secured storage area for probable use in housing finished chemical weapons,” according to images and analysis posted on GlobalSecurity.org.  “On closer examination, the buildings appear to be in a state of disrepair and there is a large quantity of debris strewn about.”  Fallujah 2 “looks more operational,” according to a satellite industry official.

Other facilities being analyzed by Pike and Hinderstein include Iraq’s central nuclear research facility south of Baghdad, as well as twin uranium enrichment facilities at Tarmiya and al-Arqat, neither of which appears to have been upgraded.  Tarmiya was a full-scale, operational electron-magnetic isotope separation facility that was destroyed in the Gulf War.  It still has collapsed roofs and raised buildings, according to Hinderstein.  “There does not appear to be anything going on there,” she said.  “It doesn’t even appear that they cleaned it up.” 

“We have had no idea what these places looked like, or whether they have been rebuilt or are just a parking lot,” said Pike.  “The question we’re trying to answer is how many [weapons and other military facilities] have been rebuilt since [the U.S. bombing of Iraq in December 1998] and how much new construction there has been in secure areas.”

Not a Substitute for On-Site Inspections

While commercial imagery is providing more transparency than ever before, experts acknowledge that the data only does so much to help determine Iraqi intent or weapons activities.  They say the imagery reinforces the need for on-site inspections.

“I have looked at recent [images] of sites that are known weapons-related sites,” said Hinderstein.  “Those are not the sites we are most interested in.”  It is the covert facilities previously unknown by inspectors that have been gone for four years that are “harder to nail down.”

“You’re not looking for biohazard signs on the roof,” Pike said.  “We want people to understand what can be done overhead and what can be done on the ground.”

The information, Pike hopes, will help increase international pressure to address the WMD problem in Iraq.

For further information, see:

UNMOVIC

U.N. Resolution 687 (Sanctions Regime)

U.N. Resolution 1409 (“Smart Sanctions”)

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Iraq II:  No Need for Inspections, Information Minister Says

There is no need for U.N. weapons inspectors to return to Iraq because they completed their mission four years ago, a top Iraqi official said Monday (see GSN, Aug. 12).

The United States is “confused” and has attempted to use the inspections issue to continue the dispute between Washington and Baghdad, said the official, Iraqi Information Minister Muhammad Said al-Sahhaf.

“The work within the U.N. concerning [prohibited weapons] in Iraq, this work has been achieved,” al-Sahhaf said.  “They say that it hasn’t been achieved.  They claim something remains.  This talk can be responded to and disproved” (Salah Nasrawi, Associated Press/Yahoo.com, Aug. 12).

Al-Sahhaf’s comments appeared to take the Bush administration by surprise, according to the Los Angeles Times (see GSN, Aug. 2).

“You take these things with a grain of salt,” a Bush administration official said.  “This is the information minister.  Then the foreign minister says something else.  We’ll take all of this in and see where we are.  But the bottom line is that the inspections are a means to an end, and disarmament is the goal — and disarmament hasn’t been achieved.”

Some U.S. analysts said that al-Sahhaf would not have made his comments without permission from Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.

“He would only reflect a decision.  He doesn’t speak on his own; no one in Baghdad does,” said Judith Yaphe, a former intelligence analyst who is now a senior fellow at the National Defense University in Washington.  “It’s official Iraq policy or he wouldn’t say it.  No government minister speaks out of line” (Robin Wright, Los Angeles Times, Aug. 13).

The U.S. State Department said that Iraq is attempting to confuse the issue and refusing to give an answer on the return of U.N. weapons inspectors.

“They refuse to face up to their obligations and obfuscate and look for ways to move the goal posts when it’s a simple situation,” State spokesman Philip Reeker said.  “The issue is not inspections, but verified disarmament.  Iraq needs to disarm.”

The United Nations does not plan to issue an official reply to al-Sahhaf’s comments, U.N. spokesman Fred Eckhard said.  U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan sent a letter in early August to Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri, Eckhard said (see GSN, Aug. 7).  “We’re still awaiting an official reply to that letter” (Sameer Yacoub, Associated Press/Atlanta Journal-Constitution, Aug. 13).

Iraq is preparing a formal reply to Annan’s letter, Sabri said late yesterday (Wright, Los Angeles Times).

Iraqi Containment Working, Senator Says

Meanwhile, the current U.S. policy of containment in Iraq is working, U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Levin (D-Mich.) said recently.  Some senior U.S. politicians have said they are concerned about any potential military action against Iraq, BBC News reported yesterday (see GSN, Aug. 9).

“It’s almost certain that if we did attack Saddam that he then would use the weapons of mass destruction because he’d have nothing to lose in response to that kind of an attack,” Levin said (see GSN, Aug. 1).

It is unlikely that Hussein would chose to attack first with his WMD arsenal, Levin added.

“He would not, in my judgment, initiate an attack with a weapon of mass destruction, because it would lead to his own destruction,” Levin said Sunday on NBC’s Meet the Press.  “He’s a survivalist.  He is not a suicide bomber” (BBC News, Aug. 12).

International Mood

The United States will need to present a strong case and plans for a post-Hussein regime if it expects European support for military action against Iraq, Spanish Foreign Minister Ana Palacio said yesterday.

A clearly defined case against Iraq will be essential for the United States to obtain European and U.N. support for military action, Palacio said.

“In Europe, we all understand that the world would be a better place without Saddam Hussein.  We are willing to go as far as the U.N. asks us,” Palacio said.  “Nevertheless, we are very much concerned by the day after.  You oust Saddam Hussein, then what?” (Peter Slevin, Washington Post, Aug. 13).

For further information, see:

UNMOVIC

U.N. Resolution 687 (Sanctions Regime)

U.N. Resolution 1409 (“Smart Sanctions”)

U.S. State Department Fact Sheet on Iraqi Sanctions Revisions

U.N. Office of the Iraq Program

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United States I:  Energy Department to Move Two Tons of Fissile Material

The U.S. Energy Department will probably transfer two tons of weapon-grade nuclear materials from the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico to a facility at the Nevada Test Site, officials said yesterday (see GSN, Aug. 12).

It is still unknown when the transfer will begin, according to the Las Vegas Review-Journal.  Energy documents say that the department plans to move the materials to the Device Assembly Facility at the test site for security reasons.

The $180 million assembly facility is a 100,000-square foot bunker designed to control the release of nuclear materials during tests, according to the Review-Journal.  While the structure was originally designed for use in underground nuclear tests, it currently is used for subcritical testing.  Experts have praised the facility’s high security, according to the Review-Journal.

“Special forces have made a run at DAF [the Device Assembly Facility] any number of times and gotten absolutely nowhere,” said Peter Stockton, a nuclear weapons security expert for the Project on Government Oversight, a nonprofit watchdog group.  The structure “probably is the most secure facility in the world,” he said.

The material transfer will probably cost $90 million, which would fund improvements to the assembly facility plus transportation and packaging for the Los Alamos materials, Stockton said.

“The move will pay for itself in about 2 1/2 years because the savings in security and operational costs will be enormous,” he said.

Senator Harry Reid (D-Nev.) said he would support the transfer unless there is anything unfavorable in an environmental impact statement expected to be released next month.

“This is totally different” than plans to ship thousands of tons of nuclear waste to a repository at Yucca Mountain in Nevada, Reid said (see GSN, July 23).

“There are less than two tons of this stuff,” he said.  “It would (add) about $15 (million) to $20 million a year for the test site (budget), mostly for security” (Tony Batt, Las Vegas Review-Journal, Aug. 13).

For further information, see:

Los Alamos National Laboratory

Nevada Test Site

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United Kingdom:  Trident Submarines to Remain All Nuclear All the Time

The United Kingdom has rejected a proposal to convert four Trident submarines to carry conventionally armed cruise missiles as well as nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, the London Times reported yesterday (see GSN, Dec. 13, 2001).

Based on U.S. plans to completely convert four Trident submarines to carry cruise missiles, the British navy had proposed modifying the submarines to carry a combination of ballistic and cruise missiles (see GSN, Feb. 22).  British ministers rejected the proposal, instead choosing to commit all four submarines to a nuclear deterrent mission so that one could always be on 24-hour patrol (Michael Evans, London Times, Aug. 12).

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United States II:  Air Force to Purchase Fewer B-2 Shelters

The U.S. Air Force plans to purchase only five deployable shelters for the B-2 bomber instead of more than a dozen as originally planned, Aerospace Daily reported today (see GSN, July 25).

The shelters were intended to help improve maintenance of the B-2’s stealth by providing large hangers with environmental controls needed to protect the aircraft’s sensitive skin, according to Aerospace Daily.

The Air Force wanted the shelters to be “easily transportable” and quick to build, said Brig. Gen. William Jabour, head of the service’s bomber and fighter program.  “It turned out the technology wasn’t there to do that” (Sharon Weinberger, Aerospace Daily, Aug. 13).

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India:  New Nuclear Command Is Near, Fernandes Says

India plans to establish a chain of command over its nuclear arsenal soon, Defense Minister George Fernandes said Friday (see GSN, April 26).

“The process is on,” he said.

Officials plan to transfer control of the arsenal to the military from the prime minister, according to the Associated Press.  In March, the defense ministry said it plans to appoint a chief of defense staff to manage all strategic weapons.  Fernandes did not say Friday when the arsenal would be integrated into the military or when the post would be created (Rajesh Mahapatra, Associated Press/Yahoo.com, Aug. 9).

For further information, see:

Indian Government

Carnegie Endowment Nuclear Status Map

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International Response:  Central Asian Leaders Discuss Weapon-Free Zone

U.N. Undersecretary General for Disarmament Affairs Jayantha Dhanapala plans to travel Aug. 14-26 to Central Asia for a series of talks on creating a nuclear weapon-free zone (see GSN, Oct. 31, 2001).

Dhanapala’s itinerary includes Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan and he intends to meet with senior officials in each country, according to a U.N. press release (see GSN, Aug. 7).  The focus of the trip is a draft treaty on a nuclear weapon-free zone, which the five countries are negotiating.  Officials proposed the zone at a Central Asian summit in Kazakhstan in 1997 (U.N. release, Aug. 12).

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Anthrax:  FBI Denies Smearing Former U.S. Army Biologist

The FBI said yesterday that investigators have not used leaks to media in an attempt to smear the reputation of Steven Hatfill, the former U.S. Army biologist who has become the public focus of the bureau’s investigation into last fall’s anthrax attacks (see GSN, Aug. 12).

FBI agents did not give Hatfill’s name to the media or alert them in advance of two searches of his Frederick, Md., apartment, said bureau spokesman Chris Murray.

“We’re not aware of any FBI employee who has named a ‘suspect’ in the anthrax deaths investigation,” Murray said.  “The FBI does not alert the news media to the service of search warrants.”

The FBI will, however, investigate some of the claims of misconduct that Hatfill made during a press conference Sunday, Murray said.

“Credible allegations concerning the mishandling of evidence will be investigated thoroughly,” he said.

So far, no physical evidence has been found to connect Hatfill to last fall’s attacks, according to the Baltimore Sun.  Because of this, some outside experts have said they support Hatfill’s claims that the FBI has targeted him unfairly.

“He’s being railroaded,” said Richard Spertzel, head of U.N. biological weapons inspections in Iraq from 1995 to 1998.  “I’m afraid they’re creating another Richard Jewell,” he said, referring to the man who was wrongly implicated with planting a bomb at the 1996 Olympic games in Atlanta.

The FBI’s attempts to determine the presence of anthrax at Hatfill’s apartment so long after the attacks were a waste of time, Spertzel said (see GSN, June 26).

“There were plenty of two-legged guinea pigs in that apartment complex,” he said.  “If the anthrax had been made there, his neighbors would be dead.”

Some of the questions about Hatfill’s possible role in the anthrax attacks come from his public interest in anthrax, the Sun reported.  For example, while Hatfill said Sunday that his research at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases at Fort Detrick, Md., had focused on viral diseases, his resume says he has a “working knowledge” of biological weapons production, including bacterial agents, according to the Sun.  According to the Associated Press, Hatfill copyrighted a novel in 1998, co-authored by Roger Akers, which describes an anthrax attack on Congress, the Sun reported.

Hatfill’s friends have said that his public interest in anthrax only shows how dedicated he is to the field of biological weapons defense.

“The Steve Hatfill I’ve known for years is a very charming, charismatic, sensitive and funny guy,” said Patrick Clawson, a former CNN reporter who has known Hatfill for six years.  “He’s not a sociopath who’d go out and kill people” (Scott Shane, Baltimore Sun, Aug. 15).

Investigation Stalls

Meanwhile, U.S. scientists have said it is no surprise that the FBI’s “Amerithrax” investigation has become stalled, because there is a lack of physical evidence, the Associated Press reported today.  Too much time has elapsed since the attacks, and any scientist knowledgeable enough to conduct them would have destroyed any remaining evidence, they said.

For example, the person responsible could have used household bleach to destroy any lingering traces of anthrax, according to Philip Hanna, a microbiologist at the University of Michigan Medical School.

“Chances of finding something get more and more remote,” he said.

A knowledgeable scientist could also have found an isolated location to create the anthrax powder used in last fall’s attacks, scientists said.

“My best technical guess is that somebody could have grown a gram or so with equipment that fit on the top of your desk,” said Jay Davis, former director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (Ted Bridis, Associated Press/Boston Globe, Aug. 13).

Commentators Weigh in

The Washington Post today cautioned against focusing too extensively on Hatfill as the person responsible for the anthrax attacks.

“At the moment, the public evidence against Mr. Hatfill is far from compelling,” the Post said in an editorial.  “The bureau needs to be exceedingly careful to avoid further stigmatizing someone whom prosecutors are not prepared to charge.”

The FBI’s focus on Hatfill has been appropriate because of his knowledge and expertise with biological weapons as well as the inaccuracies he apparently included in his resume and the fact that he fits the FBI profile in the case, the Post said (see GSN, Aug. 8).  Those facts alone, however, do not make Hatfill guilty, and they do not mean the FBI should neglect investigating other potential suspects, the paper said (see GSN, July 8).

“Until more evidence is in hand, both the bureau and the public should refrain from drawing firm conclusions about Mr. Hatfill and should not rule out other suspects, foreign or domestic,” the Post said (Washington Post, Aug. 13).

New York Times commentator Nicholas Kristof publicly identified Hatfill today as “Mr. Z” — the name Kristof has given Hatfill in past columns on the anthrax investigation (see GSN, July 12).

Kristof also said the FBI focus has been justified.  He said Hatfill has failed three successive polygraph tests this year.  While the FBI initially delayed its investigation into the anthrax attacks, the bureau now is examining a series of hoax letters sent in 1997 and 1999 that are similar to the letters used in the attacks, he said.  The FBI is also looking into an anthrax hoax letter sent to Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle (D-S.D.) from London last November, when Hatfill was known to be in the United Kingdom, Kristof said.

The FBI’s public focus on Hatfill has revealed that the U.S. biological defense research program needs to be more careful, Kristof said, noting the apparent falsehoods on Hatfill’s resume.  There are also questions as to why someone with ties to the former white governments of Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and South Africa could be allowed to work in a U.S. biological research facility handling pathogens such as Ebola, Kristof said.

“With a new wave of funding for smallpox and anthrax research, we must be doubly careful that the spread of pathogens to new labs solves problems rather than creates them,” Kristof said (Nicholas Kristof, New York Times, Aug. 13).

New Jersey Mailbox Tests Positive

In New Jersey yesterday, Governor James McGreevey said that laboratory tests conducted on a public mailbox taken from Princeton, N.J. have come back positive for anthrax (see GSN, Aug. 12).  The mailbox has been removed and there is no threat to the public, he said.

Out of 561 mailboxes that have been tested for anthrax, the Princeton box is the only one to test positive so far, McGreevey said.  Investigators still plan to test 39 more mailboxes, the New York Daily News reported (New York Daily News, Aug. 13).  Investigators have tested mailboxes in 10 counties in New Jersey, two Pennsylvania counties and three counties in Delaware, McGreevey said (Iver Peterson, New York Times, Aug. 13).

Hatfill-Mailbox Connection?

An FBI agent has confirmed that investigators have begun questioning people in Princeton who are in the neighborhood of the mailbox, according to the Newark Star-Ledger.

“They will be [questioning] for quite a while,” said FBI agent Bill Evanina.

Four people who work near the Princeton intersection where the mailbox was located have said that investigators asked them specifically about Hatfill.  A U.S. postal inspector showed them a photograph of Hatfill and asked if they could remember seeing him near the mailbox, the workers said.  No one could remember seeing him, they said (Schwaneberg/Martin, Newark Star-Ledger, Aug. 13).

For further information, see:

CDC Frequently Asked Questions About Anthrax

FBI Amerithrax Investigation

Journal of the American Medical Association Background on Anthrax

GSN Anthrax Attack Chronology (Dec. 12, 2001)

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Bulgaria:  Officials Begin Destroying SS-23 Missiles

Workers began destroying more than 100 Bulgarian SS-23, Scud and Frog ballistic missiles yesterday at a military facility in central Bulgaria (see GSN, June 3).  They are scheduled to complete work by October 30.

Experts from Controlled Demolition, a U.S. contractor aiding the disposal effort, are expected to document the disposal process, which is taking place near the city of Veliko Tarnovo (Associated Press/Yahoo.com, Aug. 12).

Technicians will destroy most of the missile components by incinerating them, but some components will be disposed of separately.  Workers at the Terem military repair facility are disposing of electronic missile system components, facility officials said. 

Bulgaria plans to destroy another two components of the missiles at a site in Romania, said Gen. Nikolay Kolev, Chief of the General Staff of the Bulgarian army.  Bulgaria currently does not have the necessary destruction technology, Kolev said Saturday.  The warheads from the missiles, however, can be disposed of at any missile testing range in Bulgaria, he added (Sofia BTA, Aug. 10 in FBIS-EEU, Aug. 10).

The full destruction of Bulgaria’s stockpile of former Soviet missiles is scheduled to be completed by November, according to the AP (Associated Press, Aug. 12).  The U.S. State Department is expected to cover the $14 million cost of the project (Defense News, July 15).

In a piece published last month in the Sofia Trud newspaper, two Bulgarian commentators said the United States has assured Bulgaria that destroying the missiles will enhance Bulgaria’s efforts to join NATO.

“Washington assured us that the destruction of the missiles would be considered as a dowry that should facilitate an invitation to join NATO at the Prague summit in November,” wrote Vasil Lyutskanov and Angel Naydenov (Lyutskanov/Naydenov, Sofia Trud, July 16 in FBIS-EEU, July 16).

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India:  Task Force Predicts Lunar Launch Ability in Five Years

Indian space scientists believe that they will be able to launch an unmanned lunar probe within five years, the Times of India reported yesterday (see GSN, July 26).

A task force assembled by the Indian Space Research Organization released a report in July saying that India has the technical capability needed to conduct a lunar mission by 2007.  The project would probably cost 4 billion rupees ($82 million), the organization said.  India already has a useable satellite launch vehicle — the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle — and would use a modified version for the lunar mission, according to the Times.

“Our studies clearly indicate that this country has the technical capability to launch this mission and place a satellite in the lunar orbit for carrying out scientific studies,” said George Joseph, head of the lunar mission task force (Times of India, Aug. 12).

India has long maintained that its space program is only for civilian purposes.  Defense experts have said, however, that continued developments in India’s rocket technology are part of an attempt to develop an intercontinental ballistic missile(CNN.com, Aug. 13).

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India:  Congressman Pushes to Allow Arrow Transfer

U.S. Representative Frank Pallone (D-N.J.), who has founded a House group on Indian relations, last month urged U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell to support Indian efforts to import the Arrow missile defense system (see GSN, July 23).

The United States should allow the transfer because the system is not designed for offensive purposes, Pallone said in a July 23 letter.

“The Arrow weapon system was created to defend against short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles,” he said.  “Therefore, India’s interest in the Arrow weapon system is to improve missile defense, not offense, which is a key factor regarding this sale that needs to be considered.”

India has sought to purchase the system from Israel, which developed it jointly with the United States (Frank Pallone release, July 23).

For further information, see:

MDA Terminal Defense Segment

Federation of American Scientists Background on Arrow

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