By Bryan Bender
Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — The U.S. Defense Department, saying the ability to carry out its new nuclear policy is at stake, has urged Congress to fully fund a study of new nuclear weapons designs that can destroy hardened and underground bunkers containing weapons of mass destruction (see GSN, Feb. 11).
As part of a series of memos appealing budget actions taken by the House and Senate Armed Services committees, the Pentagon last week asked lawmakers to approve all of the $15.5 million requested by the Energy Department for the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator when they iron out a final fiscal 2003 defense authorization bill.
House legislation supports the Bush administration proposal, but the Senate bill forbids the National Nuclear Security Administration from pursuing the project. House and Senate conferees plan to negotiate a final bill when they return to Washington next month.
The Pentagon says its recently revised nuclear policy, which raises the profile of nuclear weapons in military planning, depends highly on developing such a weapon design. Without it, the military’s ability to defeat emerging threats to national security would be limited, the Defense Department said.
“This concept is a critical component of the capability envisioned by the Nuclear Posture Review,” the Pentagon’s office of legislative affairs told lawmakers on July 29, “and it is essential that the Congress authorize and fully fund the administration’s $15.5 million request.”
The Bush administration, seeking to strengthen nuclear deterrence, signaled for the first time in the January review that the United States might strike pre-emptively at states or terrorist groups developing chemical, biological or nuclear weapons. The Nuclear Posture Review called for developing a nuclear bunker-buster to attack hidden WMD programs without dispersing contaminants into the atmosphere (see GSN, March 14).
“Cutting the [Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator] program would severely hamper the quest to overcome emerging threats including hard and deeply buried targets,” the Pentagon said.
Key lawmakers and arms control advocates, however, believe that the arguments in favor of a nuclear bunker buster are weak. They fear its development will only harm nonproliferation efforts.
Developing a nuclear warhead to defeat hardened and deeply buried targets would adversely affect both the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the British American Security Information Council said in a July report (see GSN, Aug. 5). The move would raise doubts about Washington’s pledge to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons and might require new nuclear testing to prove the utility of new weapons, the group said.
The money, if fully restored in the final bill, would build on efforts already underway at national labs. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory is studying a modified B83 nuclear warhead and Los Alamos National Laboratory is studying the feasibility of modifying the B61, one version of which can already penetrate earth (see GSN, March 26).
Last week, Maleeha Lodhi finished her second tour as Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States. A veteran commentator on international security and foreign affairs, she spoke Aug. 2 with Global Security Newswire’s Greg Webb and National Journal’s Tish Durkin.
Global Security Newswire: One year ago Pakistan was under U.S. sanctions for its nuclear weapon activities, but soon after the Sept. 11 attacks the Bush administration removed those sanctions (see GSN, Oct. 17, 2001). Is this a reflection of larger changes in the U.S.-Pakistani relationship since Sept. 11?
Maleeha Lodhi: There has been so much good will between the two countries that even when we had sharp differences over issues, as for example over the nuclear issue during the 1990s, we still managed to engage with each other and managed to talk to each other, and a considerable reservoir of good will and the cooperation that we have had during the Cold War carried us through, even at periods where relations were dipping.
The most recent transformation in our relationship came about, contrary to popular perception not after Sept. 11, but when the Bush administration came to power. And it was the Bush administration’s decision — which as a new administration I guess it would do — to undertake a review of its South Asia policy as well as its policy on sanctions across the world, not just sanctions vis-a-vis Pakistan and India, but sanctions as a tool of foreign policy and the extent to which sanctions work or don’t work.
It was part of this review that led to re-engagement between Pakistan and the United States which was, I would say, qualitatively different than the kind of engagement that we had had during the twilight years of the Clinton presidency.
So the Bush administration was already moving in the direction of lifting nuclear-related sanctions on Pakistan and India, which had been imposed after the nuclear tests, when Sept. 11 happened.
Indeed, I would argue that had it not been for this re-engagement — which was a process that was underway prior to Sept. 11 — the kind of swift and smooth cooperation that we witnessed between our two countries as we became part of the global coalition to fight international terrorism would not have been possible. It would have taken perhaps longer, and perhaps it would not have been as smooth a transition to a new status that Pakistan found itself in, which is being once again on the front lines of a global effort.
This time the global effort is to fight terrorism. The last time we had been a frontline state it was to roll back Soviet expansionism and Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Yes, this transformation is there.
We have heard people in this administration also acknowledge that this administration feels that it was a mistake to have walked away from our region when the Cold War ended, and we welcome such an appreciation of past — let’s say — neglect. And for our part also, we look toward the future relationship as obviously different from the past because the past relationship was essentially a Cold War relationship. During the 1990s we were trying to craft a new relationship and redefine it and recraft it and we weren’t able to because we were lurching from one crisis after another in the bilateral relationship.
But as we look toward the future it is qualitatively different from the past for two or three reasons. One, both sides now clearly recognize that we want a relationship in itself and for itself, and not something which is contingent on a third factor or a third country.
Two, the Cold War relationship really had only one anchor, which was a strategic anchor and the other tracks of the relationship remained, shall we say, undeveloped. This time around, the relationship has been broadened. There are multiple tracks in this relationship. You see the strategic part. You see the defense part. You see the cooperation as part of the global coalition against terrorism.
But we also see a new economic engagement between the two countries, cooperation on trade and investment issues, on economic assistance to Pakistan, the United States also cooperating with Pakistan on such issues as science and technology.
The third element I would identify as marking off the relationship from the past is the fact that we have institutionalized this relationship. In other words, we have several joint forums that have been set up which identify areas of cooperation and then we have these institutionalized forums through which we can pursue this cooperation. Again they range from the Defense Consultative Group which will bring together of course the Pentagon and our equivalent to the joint economic forum which is chaired by the secretary of the treasury on the American side and the finance minister on the Pakistani side. We also have a joint working group on law enforcement.
GSN: Does this improved relationship pose domestic political problems for the prime minister and other leaders?
ML: The notion that has existed for some years now is that the United States is an ally of convenience because there is a historical experience, and that historical experience goes back to the time when the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan was rolled back and the public felt that no sooner had the Soviet troops withdrawn from Afghanistan than nuclear sanctions went into force. Those nuclear sanctions came into force for the first time in 1990.
So the public has felt that it was no coincidence and therefore obviously wants greater assurances that the United States is in the region for the long haul; that we have a relationship that goes beyond the joint sort of struggle that we have today against the forces of terrorism, that this is not just a situational or a contextual relationship; that it is a relationship that is there for itself and in itself.
The Bush administration has been very sensitive to that public opinion and therefore we are very pleased that they have publicly reiterated the point that the United States is going to remain engaged, that it is there for the long haul.
GSN: Can Pakistan control the movement of militants across the Line of Control that separates Indian and Pakistani Kashmir?
ML: Well I think the important issue here is, who will verify persistent Indian allegations on this account. We think it’s very important for an impartial, neutral mechanism to be put in place because we can go on like this forever. One country makes a certain allegation. The other country says this is absolutely untrue. Who is to decide?
These two countries happen to have troubled relations and have been on the verge of conflict so many times in the past and have actually gone to war three times in the past. It is very important for the international community to come forward and to see how is it that we can find a verification mechanism.
Now, we think the only way to go for the long run is to put in place some impartial monitoring mechanism. It could be expanding the U.N. force, which already operates on the Line of Control; it only operates on the Pakistani side of the Line of Control because India does not permit it to operate on the Indian side of the Line of Control (see GSN, June 7).
Or we could think in terms of any other group of countries that may be interested and involved in this process (see GSN, June 14). The point that is important to grasp right now is that the two countries have been on the brink for such a long period of time and if international involvement just is based and predicated on the minimalist approach of crisis defusion and not conflict resolution, then we are all waiting for the next crisis to happen.
And that is not the approach that we would advocate. We think it is far too dangerous a situation in the subcontinent
GSN: There are those who say that the United States’ general approach to foreign policy is one of crisis defusion rather than dealing with longer-term issues.
ML: I would say that the U.S.-led international community today needs to have a longer-term approach in dealing with many of the hot spots in the world, and it needs to go beyond playing the role of a fire brigade, to be involved in a manner that prevents the fires from starting in the first place (see GSN, July 26).
Therefore, the United States has a certain responsibility because it is the world’s primary power today, and therefore for it [must] engage in both preventive diplomacy as well as conflict resolution and deal with the underlying causes of tensions, rather than just managing tensions. Tension management is not a viable approach to the problems of South Asia because, as I said, it’s temporary. It’s a Band Aid approach essentially.
GSN: The threat of terrorists acquiring nuclear materials has emerged as a major international concern. Does Pakistan have adequate control over its nuclear weapons and material? Would it consider accepting U.S. or other third party assistance to improve its security over these materials (see GSN, March 18)?
ML: First of all, this is an area where Pakistan has an impeccable record of nuclear safety and security. There has been no incident of nuclear accident, nuclear leakage, nuclear theft, which has emanated from Pakistan.
In fact, most of the incidents that are reported and registered by the International Atomic Energy Agency relate to theft and smuggling from the former Soviet Union. So I think we need to be clear about what we are looking at here.
We have a very well-articulated command and control authority with the president as its chairperson. It’s very clear who does what and we are very confident about the safety of our nuclear material (see GSN, April 11). To the extent that one can always learn from other examples, certainly [we will], but we feel that we can assure the safety and security of our nuclear material ourselves.
GSN: Can you say whether there were any changes made, any additional measures made this year?
ML: This is always a work in progress in the sense that we have a process and a system whereby we are constantly improving, because there is always room for improvement everywhere, in every system, not just Pakistan.
GSN: Would you consider as part of that improvement any U.S. assistance?
ML: We are quite confident that we can assure safety and security ourselves. We have an impeccable record.
GSN: How does India’s interest in buying Israel’s Arrow missile interceptor system affect Pakistan (see GSN, July 30)?
ML: We have raised this issue with the [Bush] administration. Pakistan has conveyed that such a sale would dangerously destabilize the region, and therefore Pakistan is opposed to such a sale and we have made our views known to the administration.
Missile defenses work in different ways in different parts of the world and missile defenses of the kind envisaged if such a sale went through would really undermine, seriously compromise, the operation of deterrence as it exists between Pakistan and India today.
GSN: Related to that, would you anticipate any chain effects of the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty? Some analysts have suggested that one consequence of that decision could be that China will increase its nuclear forces and perhaps then India would try to respond, in turn building pressure on Pakistan (see GSN, July 12). Does the U.S. decision affect Pakistan or is it a totally separate issue?
ML: I think it’s a separate issue, but we do think that the positions and the approach that the United States takes on these issues should be based on a consensual one and that consensus should be built up among the major powers on the general issue of missile defenses. That’s the way to go at the global level because at the global level it’s important that countries are consulted and a consensus is built. Then people know what the United States wishes to do and therefore nothing is left to people’s imaginations. To that extent, I think that would have a stabilizing impact. But I would still say that the ABM Treaty doesn’t affect us in the same manner as the Arrow missile does.
GSN: India’s newly elected president recently reaffirmed India’s policy of promising not to be the first party in a conflict to use nuclear weapons (see GSN, July 22). Does this statement have any positive effect?
ML: Well, like NATO and the United States, we believe no-first-use doctrine has only rhetorical value. So we are in agreement with the U.S. and NATO on this one.
The important issue here is that there should be a no-war pact between Pakistan and India — an agreement between the two countries not to resort to any kind of force (see GSN, July 18).
So my country in fact has gone much further than the Indians. The Indians only talk about the no-first-use of nuclear. We talk about the fact that force itself should be prohibited in some kind of an agreement between the two countries, and President [Gen. Pervez] Musharraf has repeatedly offered a no-war pact — a non-use-of-force agreement — to India, but we have not heard anything on that count. There has been no response to that from the Indian side.
So I think for the Indian President to reiterate this — at a time when it continues to amass close to a million troops on our border — obviously makes us very skeptical about the value of such a statement.
By Kerry Boyd
Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — The United States should expand cooperative threat reduction programs to other countries, taking advantage of the post-Sept. 11 focus on terrorism and a decade of experience securing former Soviet weapons of mass destruction, says a Carnegie Endowment for International Peace paper released this week (see GSN, March 18).
While the United States and its partners must be careful not to detract from efforts to dismantle and secure weapons of mass destruction in the former Soviet Union, there are numerous options for developing cooperative efforts to secure nuclear materials and sites in South Asia and possibly other countries, wrote Rose Gottemoeller of the Carnegie Endowment and Rebecca Longsworth, president of Keen Management Solutions.
Their suggestions come amid debate within the U.S. Congress over whether the United States should expand cooperative threat reduction efforts beyond the former Soviet Union (see GSN, May 7).
The paper, offering guidelines more than a specific proposals, suggests several principles the United States and other potential contributors should follow to apply threat reduction programs to South Asia. Any proposal to begin such cooperation must address Indian and Pakistani national interests, gain eventual commitment from all parties, set priorities with a focus on what sites might be most attractive or accessible to terrorists, apply specifically to the country receiving assistance and work to enhance the global nonproliferation regime, the paper says.
Cooperative programs should also be implemented within the existing U.S. strategy for relations with India and Pakistan, Gottemoeller and Longsworth wrote. Threat reduction efforts are likely to require addressing a much broader agenda that includes “economic, humanitarian and education incentives,” they wrote.
Potential Partners
The majority of cooperative threat reduction programs to date in the former Soviet Union have been government-to-government programs, the authors wrote. Due to costs and varying relationships with potential recipient countries, however, the United States should consider involving more partners if it expands such programs to other countries, they wrote.
The United States could partner with Russia or China, for example, to help initiate programs in India and Pakistan, the paper says. Russia and China might be particularly useful partners due to their long relationships with India and Pakistan respectively. Some experts believe that cooperating with Russia and China might provide an entry to working in South Asia and might improve U.S. relations with the countries, but others have expressed concern that the United States would lose adequate control over cooperative programs, according to the authors.
Any multilateral effort should be well coordinated, the authors wrote, noting the current European Union programs in the former Soviet Union that are separate from U.S. programs but coordinated (see GSN, May 3).
The International Atomic Energy Agency might also be a good partner, strengthening the broader nonproliferation regime and providing a door to increased cooperation with India and Pakistan, the authors wrote. Neither country is party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, but Pakistan has been working with the IAEA on ways to increase nuclear power plant safety. India and Pakistan might not accept activities which they felt the United States or another country was trying impose, but they would be more likely to accept a proposal under the aegis of the agency, according to the authors.
Although the IAEA does not work on projects involving nuclear weapons sites in South Asia, cooperation could begin with civilian nuclear facilities, Gottemoeller and Longsworth wrote.
“The IAEA, through its established relationships, may be a special and effective ‘accelerator’ of cooperation at civilian facilities,” they wrote. Working to enhance security at civilian facilities might increase confidence and strengthen bilateral relationships that would open the door to eventual bilateral “joint work in military facilities.”
Other Avenues
There are various options that the United States could pursue for cooperation bilaterally or with other partners in South Asia, according to the authors. Laboratory-to-laboratory projects worked well in the early years of U.S. efforts to secure weapons of mass destruction after the Soviet Union dissolved, the paper says, adding that such projects build on “natural affinities between and among scientists.”
Former Soviet and U.S. scientists had already established ties before the Soviet Union broke up, but that may not be true in India and Pakistan, the authors wrote. Russian experts have said that Russia has relationships with the Indian scientific community and might be able to help start a laboratory-to-laboratory program, according to the paper.
Another approach would be to initiate a sister laboratory program to establish a relationship with the civilian nuclear sector in a country that would include cooperation on nonsensitive projects, such as managing radioactive waste, the authors suggested.
Exchanging information on “best practices” in particular areas such as export control and nuclear safety training could provide a route for developing relationships and trust between the United States, Pakistan and India, Gottemoeller and Longsworth wrote. In the early stages of cooperation with Russia, the United States offered briefings on U.S. safety and weapons protection programs but did not suggest what information Russia needed. That approach allowed Russia to set its own priorities and propose cooperative programs based on the U.S. briefings and its own experience. The same approach might work well in South Asia, according to the paper.
To build confidence, India and Pakistan also could exchange information with the United States on implementing export controls, the authors suggested.
Successful projects might appeal to the interests of indigenous business leaders and to certain “political players,” Gottemoeller and Longsworth wrote. Using local companies to produce components for cooperative projects would engage the interests of the business community and also establish a base for maintaining projects. Establishing projects such as crisis centers and emergency communication networks would demonstrate that certain programs have a high level of sophistication, which might “bolster the political position of those who establish them in addition to enhancing the crisis response capability of the organization there they are established,” the paper says.
Another possibility that might be particularly appealing to Pakistan, which has a large external debt, would be exchanging debt for nonproliferation efforts, according to the authors. The United States has been pursuing debt swaps for nonproliferation with Russia, and the authors advocated waiting to see if the program with Russia succeeds before offering it to other countries (see GSN, July 26).
For further information, see:
NPT Text
NPT Parties
U.N. Background on NPT
International Atomic Energy Agency
U.S. Defense Department CTR Site
U.S. State Department Fact Sheet on Nonproliferation Programs in Russia (May 24, 2002)
Uzbekistan has stepped up efforts to combat trafficking of nuclear materials across a major European-Central Asia transit route, the Christian Science Monitor reported today (see GSN, April 17).
Even though Uzbekistan itself never had a nuclear capability under the former Soviet Union, its cooperation in preventing smuggling of nuclear materials is “extremely” important because of its location, according to a Western diplomat in the Uzbek capital of Tashkent. Uzbekistan’s role will become more important once a planned highway linking Paris with Shanghai is completed, said Bekhzod Yuldashev, head of the Institute of Nuclear Physics in Tashkent.
“We have nuclear neighbors Russia, Kazakhstan, Pakistan and India,” Yuldashev said. “Uzbekistan plays an important role. Transit (of all goods) is very intensive.”
Prior to the Sept. 11 attacks, Uzbek authorities were among a group of 80 Central Asian border and customs officials who traveled to the United States for a three-week U.S. Customs Service training course, according to the Monitor. There, they discussed how to detect components of weapons of mass destruction using advanced detection devices. In Uzbekistan, customs and border officials use similar devices funded by the United States and European countries in an attempt to stop nuclear trafficking.
“Don’t you worry in America, because we deeply understand the danger of radiation and weapons of mass destruction,” said Col. Jalilov Sadridin, an Uzbek customs official. “This is the first line of our struggle in this region because Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan lost control of their nuclear materials. There are so many sources” (Scott Peterson, Christian Science Monitor, Aug. 7).
North Korea must open its nuclear program to International Atomic Energy Agency inspections or jeopardize an international project to build two light-water nuclear reactors in the country, a senior U.S. diplomat said today (see GSN, Aug. 6).
“It makes no sense” for the United States to continue to help build the reactors if North Korea will not admit IAEA inspectors, said Jack Pritchard, U.S. special envoy to North Korea.
Under the 1994 Agreed Framework, North Korea consented to end its nuclear research program in exchange for the reactors. The multinational Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization runs the construction project at Kumho, an east coast site in South Hamgyong Province.
“(North Korea) must start meaningful cooperation now with the IAEA. This is essential for the health of the project,” Pritchard said during a concrete-pouring ceremony for the reactors at the site. “The success of the light-water reactor project and the Agreed Framework ultimately hinges on the choices North Korea makes.”
Today’s ceremony demonstrated that the United States and its allies are upholding their end of the agreement, Pritchard said. “It is now time for us to see the same kind of tangible progress by (North Korea),” he added (Andrew Ward, Financial Times, Aug. 7).
South Korean officials said they expect that today’s ceremony, which marks the beginning of the construction phase of the reactor project, will aid North Korea’s efforts to improve relations with South Korea, the United States and Japan, according to the Korea Herald. North and South Korea are expected to begin high-level talks in Seoul next week and a U.S. envoy is expected to travel to Pyongyang in the near future, the Herald reported (see GSN, Aug. 1).
“It’s true that the energy-starved North, even while rejecting the IAEA inspection, has feared that the reactor construction would hit a snag under the hard-line Bush administration,” said a senior South Korean Unification Ministry official. “This ceremony, however, sent a clear message to the North that the project would remain on course” (Korea Herald, Aug. 7).
For further information, see:
Agreed Framework Text
KEDO
A U.S. appeals court ruled yesterday against a request by South Carolina Governor Jim Hodges to block plutonium shipments from the Rocky Flats former nuclear weapons plant in Colorado to the Savannah River Site (see GSN, Aug. 2).
Hodges had said that the U.S. Energy Department did not sufficiently examine the environmental impact of the plutonium shipments as required under federal law, according to the Atlanta Journal-Constitution (see GSN, June 19). The three-judge panel, however, voted unanimously in favor of the department.
Hodges said he now plans to take his case to the Supreme Court.
“This weapons-grade plutonium is a threat to the health and safety of our state,” he said. “The Washington bureaucrats have misled us time and time again. Our final hope lies with the Supreme Court.”
The Bush administration supports the court’s decision, an Energy Department spokesman said yesterday.
“This administration is committed to ensuring America’s national security and the security of the people of South Carolina … by proceeding with a program to dispose of weapons-grade plutonium in a safe and responsible manner,” Energy spokesman Joe Davis said (Eric Sundquist, Atlanta Journal-Constitution, Aug. 7).
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