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Even if you had the return of inspectors, I’m not sure they would be able to do enough to be able to guarantee us and our friends in the region that [Saddam Hussein] had, in fact, complied [with U.N. disarmament obligations].
—U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney, questioning the value of sending U.N. weapons inspectors to Iraq.
By Bryan Bender
Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — Fourteen countries and up to 1,000 personnel plan to respond to a simulated terrorist attack on a chemical plant near Moscow next month as part of expanding international efforts to coordinate response plans for terrorist attacks with mass casualties...Full Story 
Iraq has hidden its WMD programs so well that even if U.N. weapons inspectors returned to the country, inspections might not be sufficient to deal with the Iraqi threat, U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney said yesterday (see GSN, Aug. 7)...Full Story
The U.S. Justice Department asked a federal court Tuesday to dismiss a lawsuit filed by 31 members of the House of Representatives to stop the U.S. withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (see GSN, June 12)...Full Story
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By Bryan Bender
Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — Fourteen countries and up to 1,000 personnel plan to respond to a simulated terrorist attack on a chemical plant near Moscow next month as part of expanding international efforts to coordinate response plans for terrorist attacks with mass casualties.
“Bogorodsk 2002,” to take place Sept. 25-27 at Noginsk, 70 miles east of Moscow, is the largest field exercise of its kind since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. The exercise is scheduled to bring together for the first time emergency response teams from more than a dozen nations and several international organizations to prepare for a large-scale terrorist attack.
The drill also marks a dramatic shift in NATO’s role following the end of the Cold War and, more recently, the terrorist attacks in the United States.
“The events of Sept. 11 show that the threats to allies and to our alliance can come from anywhere, at any time,” Marc Grossman, U.S. undersecretary of state for political affairs, wrote in the current issue of NATO Review.
One possibility that has received more attention recently is attacks on chemical production facilities. Such facilities are an attractive option for terrorist groups seeking to cause mass panic and casualties, analysts have said. In the wake of the Sept. 11 attacks, some U.S. lawmakers and other officials have taken steps to upgrade and standardize security at chemical plants, especially those near highly populated areas (see GSN, July 30).
“The specific aim of the exercise is to improve consequence management following an attack with chemical, biological and radiological agents,” says a description from NATO, which is coordinating international assistance to Russian authorities.
Emergency planners have designed the exercise primarily to test the response capabilities of Russia’s Local Emergency Management Authority and other such agencies, NATO officials said. Russia plans to provide two-thirds of the personnel participating in the exercise, according to the officials.
Hundreds of non-Russian emergency personnel — including representatives from the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response coordination center and response unit — also plan to participate, NATO officials said. Up to 15 more European and Central Asian countries have said they plan to join the exercise as observers.
The Attack
The exercise will take place against the backdrop of a hypothetical terrorist infiltration of Russia that will require anti-terrorist forces to mobilize, according to the NATO document, which outlines the scenario. The exercise will begin when mock terrorists attack a fertilizer production factory at dawn, the document says.
In the scenario, an explosion will heavily damage production buildings and set them on fire, releasing a variety of dangerous chemicals into the atmosphere — including ammonia, ammonia nitrate, chlorine, nitric acid, phosgene, phosphor, phosphoric acid and sulfuric acid — and causing fatalities and injuries. The estimated area of contamination will be 60 square kilometers, affecting a population of 150,000, according to the exercise plans.
Russian emergency personnel from the Central Region plan to arrive shortly after the mock attack, but the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs plans to request international assistance by the end of the first day. After evacuating the local population on the second day of the drill, the Russian and international response teams will develop and execute a plan of action to alleviate the hazardous situation, according to the scenario.
Lessons to Learn
Planners have designed the field exercise to hone a variety of skills, including firefighting, evacuating civilians, treating medical problems, decontaminating affected areas, training responders to identify victims, search and rescue in collapsed buildings, coordinating national and international disaster relief elements and deploying various civil or military disaster response elements to a stricken nation, NATO officials said. Officials also plan to assess interoperable communication systems and public information procedures, they said.
Analysts have said they expect more such multinational WMD exercises involving NATO and its new partners.
“There is a greater probability today that millions of Americans and Europeans could be killed by terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction than by new conflicts in the Balkans or a Russian invasion,” said Daniel Hamilton of the Center for Transatlantic Relations at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. “The likelihood is also higher today than during the Cold War. We are not yet equipped to deal with this challenge. Our alliance is best prepared to deal with less likely threats and least prepared to deal with our greatest threats.”
Better preparation “means aligning national homeland defense strategies … with alliance doctrine and civil-military emergency planning,” Hamilton said.
Iraq has hidden its WMD programs so well that even if U.N. weapons inspectors returned to the country, inspections might not be sufficient to deal with the Iraqi threat, U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney said yesterday (see GSN, Aug. 7).
“So many of us, I think, are skeptical that simply returning the inspectors will solve the problem,” Cheney said. His remarks followed similar comments by U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld last week (see GSN, July 31).
“You’ve got to remember, he [Iraqi President Saddam Hussein] has had about four years now to hide everything that he’s been doing, and he’s gotten to be very good at that, worked at it very aggressively,” Cheney said. “So even if you had the return of inspectors, I’m not sure they would be able to do enough to be able to guarantee us and our friends in the region that he had, in fact, complied.”
Also yesterday, President George W. Bush said he has not decided against utilizing diplomatic resources to resolve the Iraq issue. He said he would “explore all options and all tools at my disposal: diplomacy, international pressure, perhaps even the military” (Christopher Marquis, New York Times, Aug. 8).
Bush added that he does not plan to rush into war with Iraq and that he does plan to consult with allies and Congress, which some members of Congress have insisted he do before ordering an invasion (see GSN, Aug. 2).
“I promise you that I will be patient and deliberate,” Bush said. “We will continue to consult with Congress, and of course we'll consult with our friends and allies” (Rowan Scarborough, Washington Times, Aug. 8).
Saudi Arabia Opposes Attack
Meanwhile, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud Faisal denied the U.S. military permission to use Saudi soil for an attack on Iraq (see GSN, May 1).
Saudi Arabia, a U.S. ally in the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq, opposes another military campaign “because we believe it is not needed, especially now that Iraq is moving to implement United Nations resolutions,” he said. U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan rejected an invitation last week for the chief U.N. weapons inspector to visit Baghdad, instead demanding that Iraq accept the terms of U.N. resolutions (Donna Abu-Nasr, Associated Press/Washington Post, Aug. 8).
For further information, see:
UNMOVIC
U.N. Resolution 687 (Sanctions Regime)
U.N. Resolution 1409 (“Smart Sanctions”)
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An increase in smuggling of radiological material has prompted Turkey to enhance security on its border, Jane’s Intelligence Review reported this month (see GSN, Nov. 7, 2001).
The United States has listed some of Turkey’s neighbors — Syria, Iran and Iraq — as countries of proliferation concern (see GSN, April 19). In addition, neighbors Georgia and Armenia are potential nuclear smuggling routes, according to Jane’s. Turkey has 73 checkpoints including 34 along its sea borders, and most radioactive material smugglers choose sea routes, Aysun Yuce, head of the Turkish Atomic Energy Board’s nuclear safety division, told Jane’s.
Turkish police identified two primary nuclear smuggling routes between 1993 and 1999. In one, smugglers transport Kazakh material through Romania and Bulgaria and then ship it by sea to Turkey. In the other route, smugglers transport material across the border from northern Iraq, according to Jane’s.
Most incidents of verified seizures of radiological material from 1993 to 2001 occurred in Istanbul, and a Turkish customs expert said the country needs stronger border security to prevent smugglers from moving material to the city.
“One of the reasons for the apprehension of illicit nuclear material traffickers in Istanbul can be linked to loose security measures at border gates,” the expert said.
With U.S. assistance, Turkey has been implementing measures to increase border security (see GSN, June 26). The United States agreed in January to provide radiation detectors, and Turkey already has distributed 55 hand-held detectors to certain border areas and has installed 14 detection systems at six land crossings and one airport (see GSN, July 1).
Turkey signed an agreement in March with the China Machinery Equipment Import and Export Cooperation to provide Turkish customs with one fixed and two semimobile X-ray systems. In addition, officials have launched a project to establish an Ankara-based command and control center to monitor all 73 checkpoints (Lale Sabrihomuglu, Jane’s Intelligence Review, August).
In a side note, the Chinese firm was one of several sanctioned by the United States in July for exporting chemical weapons technology to Iran (see GSN, July 25; Greg Webb, GSN).
In all the verified cases of seized radioactive material in Turkey, the material has been either natural, low-enriched or depleted uranium, Jane’s reported. Most cases were actually frauds involving osmium — “red mercury” — or other substances that amateurs without significant knowledge of nuclear materials have tried to sell. More sophisticated efforts to smuggle radioactive materials might have avoided detection, Yuce said (Sabrihomuglu, Jane’s Intelligence Review).
A U.S. team of specialists has arrived at the Krasnoyarsk nuclear facility in Russia to help install a physical security system for the site’s chemical plant, ITAR-Tass reported Tuesday (see GSN, Dec. 19, 2001).
The team plans to help install a system to prevent intrusion and modernize other security systems, said Yuriy Revenko, chief engineer for the plant. The United States is expected to fund the purchase and installation of the system, ITAR-Tass reported (Yury Khots, ITAR-Tass, Aug. 6 in FBIS-SOV, Aug. 6).
International officials praised work that began yesterday to build the foundation of a nuclear power reactor in Kumho, North Korea, but some also said that North Korea must allow inspectors to access its nuclear sites (see GSN, Aug. 7).
The original 2003 deadline for completing the $4.6 billion plant’s two light-water reactors — which an international group, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, is building in exchange for a freeze on the North Korean nuclear program — has been postponed until 2008. Until yesterday, KEDO had only leveled the ground at the site and built infrastructure such as housing for workers (see GSN, May 6).
KEDO Executive Director Charles Kartman, U.S. envoy Jack Pritchard and Japanese, European Union and South Korean representatives attended the ceremony yesterday, saying it marked a new stage in efforts to bring peace to the peninsula.
“This ceremony is not only about pouring concrete,” EU representative J.P. Leng said. “It is about peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.”
KEDO plans to complete the building to house the first reactor by mid-2005, U.S. officials have said. If North Korea refuses to allow International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors to examine its nuclear developments as required by the 1994 Agreed Framework pact, however, operations at the plant will be suspended, officials have said (Nicholas Kralev, Washington Times, Aug. 8).
The IAEA has said it will probably need three years for inspections.
If North Korean officials refuse inspections, “there is no chance whatsoever that they will get delivery of the crucial components for these reactors,” Kartman said. “What they will end up with instead is a big hole in the ground, a lot of concrete and some steel fixtures.”
Pritchard also called on North Korea to “begin meaningful work with the energy agency right now.”
Despite concerns, officials at the ceremony expressed continuing support for the reactor project (see GSN, Aug. 6).
“Do you want a completely uncontrolled nuclear program here, or do you want the Agreed Framework? You have to choose,” Kartman said.
Pritchard said that the Bush administration still supports the Agreed Framework (Howard French, New York Times, Aug. 8). He added that granting access to IAEA inspectors is a “separate issue” from potential future U.S.-North Korean talks (Kralev, Washington Times).
For further information, see:
Agreed Framework Text
KEDO
Crews have installed radiation sensors at three entrances to Kirtland Air Force Base in Albuquerque, N.M., to calibrate and test their performance, the Albuquerque Journal reported yesterday (see GSN, March 18).
Developers are using the sensors to determine what natural radiation levels people and vehicles emit as they enter and exit the base, officials said. Those results will later help officials determine what would be an abnormal level of radiation, a possible indicator of an attempt to smuggle in a nuclear or radiological weapon, according to the Journal.
“They have to know what’s normal,” said Nancy Ambrosia, spokeswoman for Los Alamos National Laboratory, which is assisting the project. “You need to ... differentiate between types of nuclear materials so you can look at the person and say, ‘That’s (legitimate,) that’s the real thing,’ or ‘No, you have plutonium in your pocket, and we know it.’”
The Defense Threat Reduction Agency is overseeing the three-week long project, the Journal reported. Officials hope the project will also demonstrate the detection abilities of the sensors, said DTRA spokeswoman Cheri Abdelnour. Kirtland is one of four military bases that are participating in the project, she said (Miguel Navrot, Albuquerque Journal, Aug. 7).
There have been numerous delays in plans to dismantle U.S. nuclear weapons, the Washington Post reported today (see GSN, Aug. 1).
The Energy Department has been experiencing delays at the Pantex plant in Texas where the United States assembles and disassembles nuclear weapons, according to the Post.
The department has not finished dismantling the W79 nuclear artillery shell designed to emit neutron radiation to kill people while leaving infrastructure intact. There is still “ongoing dismantlement work” on the W79 shells, which were retired in 1991 and scheduled to be dismantled by August 2000, Everet Beckner, deputy administrator for defense programs of the National Nuclear Security Administration, told the Senate Armed Services Committee last week.
The department was supposed to have dismantled 500 W56 warheads, used for the Minuteman II ICBM, by September this year, Beckner said, but the work “will continue through fiscal year 2005.”
Beckner said the B61 tactical nuclear bomb is also slated to begin disassembly soon. The U.S. Energy Department also plans to soon begin dismantling the 35 remaining B53 bombs, which officials retired in 1997 when the B61 Mod 11 bomb with an earth-penetrating warhead became operational.
Dismantling nuclear weapons requires years of planning, Beckner said. Current plans to dismantle and refurbish weapons are so expansive that the Pantex plant would require a larger workforce before it could begin new dismantlement plans, he said.
The delay in dismantling weapons and plans to refurbish parts of the nuclear arsenal are behind the decision to not immediately dismantle any of the warheads that will be removed from operational status under the new U.S.-Russia Moscow Treaty, according to the Post (Walter Pincus, Washington Post, Aug. 8).
For further information, see:
U.S.-Russia Nuclear Reduction Treaty Text (U.S. State Department)
Bush Announces Moscow Treaty
U.S. State Department Fact Sheet on Moscow Treaty
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Academic and military records show that Steven Hatfill, a former U.S. Army biological scientist who has recently been the public focus of the FBI in its investigation into last fall’s anthrax attacks, might have falsified several claims in his resume, the Baltimore Sun reported today (see GSN, Aug. 5).
The apparently misleading resume, however, did not prevent the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases from hiring Hatfill in 1995, according to the Sun. The U.S. Defense Department also apparently did not attempt to verify Hatfill’s resume before granting him “secret” security clearance in 1999, the Sun reported.
“Obviously, if this is true, he was not adequately vetted by the U.S. government to work with dangerous pathogens,” said Elisa Harris, a senior research scholar at the University of Maryland who is studying regulation of biological programs.
False Academic Credentials
In a 1997 resume submitted to the National Institutes of Health, Hatfill said he had earned a doctorate degree in “Molecular Cell Biology/Biochemistry” from Rhodes University in South Africa, according to the Sun. Rhodes University Registrar Stephen Fourie, however, said that while Hatfill had been enrolled at the university for a couple of years and submitted a doctoral thesis, he did not earn a degree.
A NIH official said yesterday that the agency has what seems to be a photocopy of a doctoral degree from Rhodes University with Hatfill’s name on it, the Sun reported. A 1999 resume from Hatfill, however, lists a “Ph.D. Thesis” where the previous resume had listed a “Ph.D. Degree,” according to the Sun.
False Military Background
In Hatfill’s 1997 resume, he claimed to have “served with U.S. Army Special Forces” and to have been a member of the 7th Special Forces Group, according to the Sun. According to Army records, however, Hatfill began Special Forces training at Fort Bragg in North Carolina in 1976 but was “academically dropped” after a month, Army spokesman Walt Sokalski said. Without Special Forces training, Hatfill could not have been a member of the 7th Special Forces Group, and his records do not indicate any such service, Sokalski said.
In the 1999 resume, Hatfill no longer mentioned having been a member of the 7th Special Forces Group, according to the Sun. Instead, Hatfill only noted that he had “served with the U.S. Army Institute for Military Assistance,” the institute from which he was dismissed, the Sun reported (Scott Shane, Baltimore Sun, Aug. 8).
Hatfill also has reportedly claimed military experience with two units of the former Rhodesian (now Zimbabwean) military during the white Rhodesian government’s war against black rebels in the late 1970s. Several experts have alleged that the Rhodesian government used biological weapons against rebels during the conflict.
Stephen Dresch, an activist with Forensic-Intelligence.org, however, said former Rhodesian military sources have reported no evidence of Hatfill serving with either of the two military units he has claimed — the C Squadron of the Rhodesian Special Air Service and the Selous Scouts, a Rhodesian paramilitary unit.
“In a nutshell, no one here has ever heard of this man. I have checked with the former commander of the Selous Scouts and two previous commanders of the SAS. Their collective comment of this man’s claims do not bear repeating,” Dresch quoted the source as saying. “Both of the units were very small and it is unlikely that anyone could have served that was soon forgotten” (Mike Nartker, GSN, Aug. 6).
Hatfill’s attorney Victor Glasberg has declined to comment on Hatfill’s resume, the Baltimore Sun reported. USAMRIID spokesman Chuck Dasey said that the responsibility for verifying the claims Hatfill made in his resume rested with the National Research Council, part of the National Academy of Sciences, because Hatfill had been a NRC fellow.
Supercanine Bloodhounds?
Meanwhile, doubts have been raised over a Newsweek report last week that bloodhounds trained to detect the scent of the envelopes used in the anthrax attacks had reacted strongly when taken to Hatfill’s apartment and other locations that he had visited, according to the Sun.
Three expert bloodhound handlers have said they did not think that any useful scent of the person who mailed the anthrax-tainted letters would have remained on the envelopes months after they were sent and decontaminated.
“Anything is possible,” said Weldon Wood, former president of the National Police Bloodhound Association. “But is it feasible after this length of time and what the letters have been through? I would doubt it” (Shane, Baltimore Sun).
FBI Not Close to Arrest
U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft has said the FBI is not close to making an arrest in its “Amerithrax” investigation into last fall’s anthrax attacks, USA Today reported today.
The investigation is still ongoing and at an increased intensity, Ashcroft said a week after the FBI searched Hatfill’s apartment for the second time (see GSN, Aug. 2). Authorities, however, are still not close to a “conclusion” to the case, he said.
“Progress is being made,” Ashcroft said. “But until you cross the thresholds of information that will provide the basis for action, it may be that the progress doesn’t mean a lot” (Johnson/Locy, USA Today, Aug. 8).
Government Mail Delivery Still Slow
U.S. agencies are still experiencing delays in receiving mail, mainly due to sterilization and handling procedures put into place after last fall’s anthrax attacks, the Washington Post reported today (see GSN, July 29).
“I was getting invitations for holiday parties as recently as June of this year,” said Rob Nichols, deputy assistant secretary in the Office of Public Affairs at the Treasury Department. “If someone needs to get a document to us urgently, we will make them aware of the difficulty, and that first-class mail is not the way to do it.”
Out of the 13 U.S. cabinet departments, 10 have reported an average mail delivery time of a week to 10 days after the postmark, according to the Post. The U.S. State Department has reported delays of up to three weeks.
The irradiation process for sterilizing government mail causes most of the delays, the Post reported. The U.S. Postal Service irradiates all government mail sent to Washington at a New Jersey facility, adding four additional days to the delivery.
Each department, however, has its own procedure for further handling once the mail arrives, according to the Post. To standardize the various handling procedures, the General Services Administration released a set of guidelines last month.
According to the guidelines, U.S. agencies should stop routine testing of mailrooms for anthrax spores because of the low probable risk (see GSN, July 22). Gloves and masks are not needed for safety, the guidelines say. Instead, departments should screen all mail with X-rays and place mailrooms in enclosed areas, preferably with separate ventilation systems, according to the guidelines (Helen Rumbelow, Washington Post, Aug. 8).
A Defense Department official has said that a new anthrax vaccine being developed jointly by the Pentagon and the Health and Human Services Department might be available for emergency use in the next few years, Inside the Pentagon reported today (see GSN, July 1).
Under a best-case scenario, the new vaccine would be licensed for use by 2009, said the Pentagon official, a biological defense adviser familiar with the program. The vaccine might be offered to the public sooner under new investigational drug status in the event of a biological weapons attack, according to Inside the Pentagon. Investigational drugs may be used in the event of an emergency if the U.S. Food and Drug Administration grants permission and if the president waives informed consent rules for military personnel, the Pentagon official said.
The new vaccine is not yet in investigational status, said a Pentagon spokesman. Developers will not submit a status application to the FDA until this fall, the spokesman said.
The Pentagon plans to begin fast-track development of the new vaccine to provide an alternative to the current anthrax vaccine, which is solely manufactured by the U.S. pharmaceutical company BioPort. There have been recent concerns over BioPort’s ability to produce the vaccine and the fact that the BioPort vaccine needs to be administered in six doses over 18 months, Inside the Pentagon reported.
“We wanted (a vaccine) that people could feel comfortable with and would not have that kind of baggage,” said George Curlin, a medical officer at the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases who is involved in the new vaccine project. “Whether it is right or wrong, it’s baggage.”
Researchers are developing the Pentagon vaccine using a method called recombinant technology, according to Inside the Pentagon. Experts believe that a recombinant vaccine would cause fewer side effects than the current vaccine, Curlin said.
“Probably every batch they make will pass muster because it is easier to (do) quality control,” which could also make the vaccine cheaper to produce, he added (Malina Brown, Inside the Pentagon, Aug. 8).
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The U.S. Army should be ready to begin destroying chemical weapons agents stored at the Newport Chemical Depot in Indiana by next year, Senator Evan Bayh (D-Ind.) said yesterday (see GSN, May 14).
Crews will probably take nine months to destroy the more than 1,200 tons of VX nerve agent at the depot, completing the project by mid-2004, Bayh said. The Army’s accelerated disposal plan moves the completion date three years ahead of schedule, he said.
“I’m hopeful that at the end of this process we’ll have more peace of mind for all of you and actually save taxpayers some money,” Bayh said.
Bayh supports Indiana’s decision to oppose incineration methods for destroying the Newport nerve agent, he said. The depot plans to destroy the agents through a method called neutralization, according to the Associated Press.
“The neutralization process has been proven to be quicker, safer and ultimately less expensive,” Bayh said.
The depot plans to ship neutralized VX agent out of Indiana for final disposal, AP reported. Where and by what method the final neutralized product will be destroyed is still unknown (Rick Callahan, Associated Press, Aug. 8).
For further information, see:
CDC List of Chemical Agents
Federation of American Scientists Information on Chemical Weapons
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The U.S. Justice Department asked a federal court Tuesday to dismiss a lawsuit filed by 31 members of the House of Representatives to stop the U.S. withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (see GSN, June 12).
The United States formally withdrew from the ABM Treaty in June. Representative Dennis Kucinich (D-Ohio), the lead plaintiff, has claimed that President George W. Bush has no authority to withdraw from the treaty without the consent of Congress. Justice officials, however, argued that the Constitution gives the president full control over the conduct of foreign affairs and most treaty issues.
“The plaintiff’s position also does not take into account Congress’ failure in over 200 years to seek to set for itself a more definite role in treaty termination,” lawyers for the Justice Department wrote in their motion seeking dismissal.
Past legal precedents have shown that federal courts can only become involved in disputes between the president and Congress when the plaintiff can show that he or she has been personally harmed, Justice said in its motion. An allegation that legislative power has been weakened would not qualify, since that could be rectified through the lawmaking process, the department said (Christopher Newton, Associated Press/Yahoo.com, Aug. 6).
For further information, see:
ABM Treaty Text and Associated Documents (U.S. Defense Department)
U.S. Fact Sheet on Withdrawal from ABM Treaty
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2002 by National Journal Group, Inc. The material in this section is produced independently for NTI by the National Journal Group, Inc. Any reproduction or retransmission, in whole or in part, is a violation of federal law and is strictly prohibited without the consent of the National Journal Group, Inc. All rights reserved.
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