International Response I:  Merge Export Control Regimes, Experts Say

By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — The four major export control regimes to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related technologies need to be combined into a unified and more effective super-regime, says a report released this month by the University of Georgia’s Center for International Trade and Security (see GSN, Sept. 20).

“Failure to seek a new institution or institutions to replace and/or complement existing multilateral proliferation controls is to place the security of the United States and its allies in great jeopardy,” the report says.  “If export controls are not improving, they are getting worse, because proliferants continue to seek new channels for acquiring sensitive, WMD-relevant technologies.”

Currently, there are four informal export control regimes — the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which establishes guidelines to govern nuclear transfers so that civilian trade does not aid weapons production; the Australia Group, which covers dual-use items that could be used to produce biological and chemical weapons (see GSN, June 21); the Missile Technology Control Regime, which regulates exports of missile systems and related technologies (see GSN, May 21); and the Wassenaar Arrangement, which covers exports of conventional weapons and sensitive dual-use items such as high-performance computers (see GSN, June 6).

These regimes have helped reduce the threat of WMD proliferation by raising international awareness and delegitimizing various countries’ attempts to obtain weapons of mass destruction, according to the report.  Issues concerning membership and consensus-based decision making, however, have weakened their effectiveness, leaving a need for a single overarching regime, the report says.

According to the report, a new, unified Multilateral Nonproliferation Export Control Regime should consist of:

*         Countries that are major suppliers of WMD-related technologies, to the extent that they are committed to fighting WMD proliferation;

*         Decision making procedures that do not hinder efforts to create more binding multilateral requirements;

*         Agreement on countries seen to be proliferation concerns that should be prevented from obtaining sensitive technologies;

*         Strong enforcement measures to ensure that regime members are complying with unambiguous standards;

*         Information-sharing requirements or incentives; and

*         Demonstrations by regime members that they have the needed resources in place to implement and enforce export controls.

The four existing regimes should merge through a series of steps, the report says.  First, all plenary meetings of the current regimes should move to a single city such as Vienna.  This could increase coordination and reduce administrative costs and personnel requirements, according to the report.

Next, regime members should hold multilateral coordination forums before each individual annual plenary meeting, the report says.  Members could then address common concerns and attending officials could work on a more formal super-regime, according to the report.

Eventually, the report says, the current regimes could become working bodies that focus on such issues as control list maintenance and the study of new list items, while the overarching regime would focus mainly on policy issues.

Weaknesses of Existing Regimes

While existing export control regimes have helped reduce WMD proliferation, several internal problems hinder their ability to “tackle an increasingly complex global political and economic environment,” the report says.  One flaw is the informal nature of the regimes, which has led to vague regulations that allow members to alter their export policies so that they might be contrary to the regime as a whole, according to the report.

The regimes have also been expanded to include several countries that lack effective export controls, weakening the entire regime, according to the report.  Because members do not heavily monitor intraregime trade, a terrorist group based in a member country might obtain WMD-related technology relatively easily, the report says.

Several countries have been allowed to join the regimes without establishing strong national export control regulations, the report says.  “In some cases, countries seeking membership have done little more than copy regime control lists and issue export control regulations, afterward paying little or no attention to implementation and enforcement,” it says.

An increasing membership of the current regimes also helps illustrate flaws in their consensus-based decision making processes, according to the report.  Because the regimes often require unanimous votes to change polices or control lists, they are ill-equipped to handle large numbers of countries with divergent interests, the report says.

“Because of consensus rules, efforts to further enhance the effectiveness of these regimes can be effectively blocked by any member, and unfortunately, this is not uncommon,” the report says.

The members of existing export control regimes have poorly enforced the regimes’ export control regulations, the report says, adding that the regimes themselves lack enforcement procedure standards.  The report cites studies conducted by the Center for International Trade in Security in more than 24 countries, which indicate that export control enforcement is one of the “least harmonized elements” among regime members.

“The lack of concrete standards for enforcing export controls undermines the efficacy of efforts to construct control lists and guidelines in the first place,” the report says.

The current export control regimes were designed to help coordinate export polices among a small number of supplier countries sharing a common goal to stop WMD proliferation, the report says.  Now, however, the regimes are being pressed to address challenges for which they are ill-suited and poorly equipped, it says.

“The compelling nature of the threat posed by continued WMD proliferation and lightly regulated military exports is such that controls are no longer a matter for informal organizations,” the report says.  “A terrorist organization armed with a nuclear, biological or chemical device is a threat that cannot be effectively addressed by four separate regimes operating on the hobbling basis of consensus rules.”

For further information, see:

Australia Group Web Site

U.S. State Department MTCR Summary

Wassenaar Arrangement Web site

Pentagon Executive Summary of the Wassenaar Arrangement

U.S. State Department Nuclear Suppliers Group Fact Sheet

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North Korea:  Bush Says He Will Send Envoy to Pyongyang

U.S. President George W. Bush yesterday confirmed his decision to send an envoy to North Korea, the White House said (see GSN, Aug. 1).  Bush reaffirmed his intentions in a telephone call with South Korean President Kim Dae-jung, White House press secretary Ari Fleischer said.

The main focus of the visit will be to help reduce U.S.-North Korean military tensions, Fleischer said.  Bush and Kim “agreed that real progress with the North depends on full resolution of the security issues on the Korean peninsula, including the North’s possession and pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles,” he said.

The envoy will probably be Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly, according to the Los Angeles Times.  Kelly had been scheduled to travel to North Korea in July, but that trip was canceled after a naval clash between North and South Korea (see GSN, July 3).

Several recent measures taken by North Korea, such as an indefinite extension of its missile testing moratorium, have helped create a new climate for more diplomatic contacts, said Michael Armacost, an Asian studies expert at Stanford University and a former U.S. ambassador to Japan and the Philippines (see GSN, Sept. 18).

Any suggestions of improved relations with North Korea, however, might contrast with the Bush administration’s harsh criticism of Pyongyang, according to the Times.

“Nothing has changed in the president’s thinking about North Korean President Kim Jong Il and the North Korean leader’s starvation of his own people, the militarization efforts that he’s leading, the ... proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,” Fleischer said (James Gerstenzang, Los Angeles Times, Sept. 26).

Bush might be able to use new diplomatic overtures to North Korea, even if they fail, as a means of demonstrating a willingness to negotiate with adversaries, excluding Iraq, according to the New York Times.

“We are determined to make it clear we don’t think one size fits all,” a senior Bush administration official said.   “We’re not looking for confrontation” (David Sanger, New York Times, Sept. 26).

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Iraq I:  United States Is Unlikely to Submit Draft U.N. Resolution This Week

The United States and the United Kingdom are finishing work on a U.N. resolution to set a two-month deadline for Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to demonstrate Iraq’s cooperation with weapons inspections and other previous U.N. resolutions, Bush administration officials and U.N. diplomats said yesterday (see GSN, Sept. 25).

A draft resolution has essentially been completed, a Bush administration official said yesterday (see GSN, Sept. 23).  U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, however, is still negotiating with the three other permanent members of the U.N. Security Council — Russia, France and China — to authorize military force against Iraq if inspections were to fail, according to the administration official.

“The secretary is going to prepare this one very carefully before he slaps something on the table,” a senior State Department official said (Patrick Tyler, New York Times, Sept. 26).

The British Influence

The United Kingdom has worked to persuade the United States to tone down the draft resolution to make it acceptable to other U.N. Security Council members, according to the London Independent.  One draft of the proposed resolution states that any “failure” to comply will result in “international action” under Chapter VII of the U.N. charter, which allows for military actions to enforce decisions, the Independent reported.

The United Kingdom believes that Russian support will be crucial to pass the resolution, and that Russia will not support open threats of military action.   British Prime Minister Tony Blair wants the U.N. Security Council to support any new U.N. resolution unanimously because he believes past abstentions have made it easier for Hussein to violate certain resolutions, according to the Independent.

“The most crucial task is to get something that all five countries can agree on,” a British source said yesterday.

British officials are aiming to reach agreement on the level of a military threat by the end of the week, the Independent reported.  As a compromise, the resolution might indicate that military action would be the result of noncompliance, but would not include “triggers” as pretexts.

“In no way can it contain triggers that would allow one member state to rush off to war,” a Western diplomat said.

Russia, France and China

Meanwhile, Russian President Vladimir Putin called today for a quick, diplomatic end to the Iraq crisis and indicated there is no need for new U.N. resolutions (see GSN, Sept. 18).

“We favor a rapid resolution of the situation by political and diplomatic means, on the basis of existing U.N. Security Council regulations and in line with the principles of international law,” Putin said (London Independent, Sept. 26).

France is still uncommitted to supporting new U.N. resolutions against Iraq, according to the New York Times.  President Jacques Chirac said yesterday that while he supports discussions on new resolutions, he opposes military threats.

China’s position on the issue remains uncertain, the Times reported.  “We request that Iraq comply with U.N. resolutions without any preconditions,” Prime Minister Zhu Rongji said, adding that any U.S. military action outside the United Nations “will lead to severe consequences” (Tyler, New York Times).

The Bush administration appears ready to send U.S. Undersecretary of State Marc Grossman to France and Russia to continue negotiating a draft resolution, according to the Washington Post.  While Grossman’s visits are expected to be completed by Sunday, any resolution would probably not be formally submitted to the U.N. Security Council until next week, the Post reported.

Blix

The delay in submitting a resolution to the U.N. Security Council might hinder efforts by chief U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix to negotiate specific inspection arrangements when he meets with Iraqi officials in Vienna Monday, according to the Post (see GSN, Sept. 24).  With no new resolution, Blix would meet with Iraqi officials without clear instructions, the Post reported.

The longer talks with Blix go on, the more Hussein can claim he is cooperating with the United Nations, said James Steinberg, vice president for foreign policy at the Brookings Institution in Washington and former U.S. deputy national security adviser.

“It will give Saddam a bit of card to play,” Steinberg said.

“It is clear that any meetings he (Blix) has with the Iraqis are done under the authority he has,” U.S. State spokesman Richard Boucher said.  “But we think that for inspections to occur, it would be best for them to occur with the new endorsement and the full endorsement of the Security Council as well as guidelines” (Kessler/Lynch, Washington Post, Sept. 26).

Ultimate Fate

Meanwhile, action by Congress on a resolution authorizing military force against Iraq could remove the need for pressing for a return of U.N. weapons inspectors, a senior Bush administration official has said (see GSN, Sept. 23).

“I personally don’t think weapons inspectors will ever return to Iraq,” the official said.  “The president is not going to worry about the Security Council” because he will have the authorization he needs for military action from Congress, the official said (Tyler, New York Times).

For further information, see:

UNMOVIC

U.N. Resolution 687 (Sanctions Regime)

U.N. Resolution 1409 (“Smart Sanctions”)

U.S. State Department Fact Sheet on Iraqi Sanctions Revisions

IAEA Iraq Action Team

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Iraq II:  White House Says Hussein, al-Qaeda Connected

U.S. President George W. Bush, along with other senior U.S. officials, yesterday alleged possible connections between Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and the al-Qaeda terrorist network (see GSN, Aug. 2).

Bush said he was concerned Hussein and al-Qaeda could decide to work together, adding that the two were already almost indistinguishable.

“The danger is, is that they work in concert,” Bush said during a White House meeting with Colombian President Alvaro Uribe.  “The danger is, is that al-Qaeda becomes an extension of Saddam’s madness and his hatred and his capacity to extend weapons of mass destruction around the world.”

White House press secretary Ari Fleischer attempted to decrease the specificity of Bush’s allegations, according to the Washington Post.  Bush’s comments reflected what he feared could happen, Fleischer said.  It would be a mistake to wait for a concrete proof that Hussein and al-Qaeda were working together, he said.

“In the shadowy world of terrorism, sometimes there is no precise way to have definitive information until it is too late,” Fleischer said.

Other senior Bush administration officials yesterday commented on possible ties between Hussein and al-Qaeda.  A few hours before Bush’s comments, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld also indicated a possible connection.

“I have no desire to go beyond saying the answer is yes,” Rumsfeld said when reporters asked if there were links between Hussein and al-Qaeda (Mike Allen, Washington Post, Sept. 26).

The United States has clear evidence of contacts between senior Iraqi officials and al-Qaeda operatives, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice said yesterday.  Several captured al-Qaeda operatives have said that Iraq provided training in developing chemical weapons, she said.

“So, yes, there are contacts between Iraq and al-Qaeda,” Rice said in an interview with PBS’s Online NewsHour.  “We know that Saddam Hussein has a long history with terrorism in general.  And there are some al-Qaeda personnel who found refuge in Baghdad.”

The United States is not attempting to connect Hussein with the Sept. 11 attacks, Rice said, adding that more details could yet emerge.

“But, yes, there clearly are contacts between al-Qaeda and Iraq that can be documented,” she said.  “There clearly is testimony that some of the contacts have been important contacts and that there's a relationship here” (Margaret Warner, PBS Online NewsHour, Sept. 25).

For further information, see:

UNMOVIC

U.N. Resolution 687 (Sanctions Regime)

U.N. Resolution 1409 (“Smart Sanctions”)

U.S. State Department Fact Sheet on Iraqi Sanctions Revisions

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U.S. Response I:  Military Requests Decontaminating Foam

The U.S. military has made an urgent request for a new decontaminating foam, Bloomberg.com reported Monday (see GSN, July 24).

The foam has “proven effective against all known chemical and biological agents,” according to Mark Tucker, a researcher from Sandia National Laboratories, where the foam was developed.  It is sprayed on equipment or facilities and renders chemical or biological agents harmless within 30 minutes (see GSN, Feb. 8).

The Pentagon approved the request on Aug. 13 and officials are “coordinating an effort to meet this urgent requirement,” according to a release from the office of the deputy assistant to the secretary of defense for chemical and biological weapons.  The U.S. Central Command, which would conduct military operations in a conflict with Iraq, made the request.

Two small private companies in Colorado and Alabama make the foam.  The Pentagon has not determined how much foam will be needed (Tony Capaccio, Bloomberg.com, Sept. 24).

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International Response II:  NATO, Russia Begin Anti-Terrorism Exercise

NATO member countries and the Russian Emergency Situations Ministry yesterday began a joint anti-terrorism exercise that simulates an attack on a chemical installation (see GSN, Aug. 8).  The “Bogorodsk 2002” exercise, which involves more than 1,200 troops in a joint force in the Moscow Oblast city of Noginsk, is also designed to test NATO’s civil-defense information system (RFE/RL NewsLine, Sept. 25).

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U.S. Response II:  White House Plans Stockpile of Gas Masks for Staff

The White House plans to establish a stockpile of gas masks to protect staff members and reporters in the event of a chemical or biological weapons attack, a White House spokesman said yesterday.  The U.S. Capitol has already implemented similar precautions, White House officials said (see GSN, June 27; Deborah Orin, New York Post, Sept. 26).

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U.S. Response:  Experts Call for Revitalizing Nuclear Nonproliferation Efforts

By Bryan Bender
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — To expand critically important nuclear nonproliferation efforts, the United States and its allies must take immediate steps to remove unnecessary hurdles and coordinate new public and private initiatives to secure nuclear weapons materials across the globe, experts told the U.S. Congress this week.

In frank assessments of the current state of global nuclear nonproliferation efforts, two nuclear experts testified Sept. 24 that while progress has been made in preventing nuclear and radiological material from reaching terrorists, overall efforts in this regard remain wholly inadequate in light of the potential consequences of nuclear terrorism.

Rose Gottemoeller of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Matthew Bunn of Harvard University, urged nations to increase financial support for these programs, chided the United States and other countries for placing unnecessary restrictions on nuclear nonproliferation aid and criticized remaining opposition in some quarters to nuclear security cooperation.

In testimony to the House Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security, they proposed a series of new measures to expand what they currently consider to be a paucity of investment in countering the threat of nuclear terrorism.

“We cannot take the chance that the next terrorists attacking the United States could make use of nuclear material that escaped through a hole in a Russian facility fence that would have been repaired” if nonproliferation programs were better implemented, Gottemoeller said.  “The burden of such an outcome would be difficult to bear for all in our policy and government communities.”

One weak link is financing.  “The threat reduction budget for the whole year is what the Defense Department spends in a single day,” Bunn said.

“While a number of key officials in the Bush administration have worked hard in the last year to accelerate efforts to secure stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their essential ingredients around the world, the reality is that the president’s program does not yet match his rhetoric.”

Nevertheless, the United States, which spends an estimated $1 billion a year on nuclear and related nonproliferation programs in the former Soviet Union, has been far more committed to these programs than Washington’s allies, Gottemoeller said.  “Frankly, I wish other countries would do more.”

The Group of Eight economic powers have pledged $10 billion over the next decade to match an equal investment by the United States, but how that money will be raised, managed and spent remains unclear, lawmakers were told (see GSN, Sept. 18).

Overcoming Hurdles

Holding back U.S. and allied nuclear nonproliferation efforts are a series of bureaucratic hurdles and an overall lack of vision, the experts said.

“It remains true that bureaucratic wrangling, lack of coordination, failure to conceive and pursue new approaches, unimaginative program execution, limited planning, and low priority are slowing many of these programs and limiting their success,” Bunn said.

For example, some in Congress remain hesitant to approve a permanent waiver to an annual certification that says Russia is abiding by all arms control agreements. Washington’s has been unable to make such a certification and as a result nonproliferation aid has been delayed (see GSN, Aug. 9). 

At the same time, U.S. nonproliferation aid is currently limited to only the former Soviet Union, although legislative attempts are underway to change that (see GSN, March 20).

Meanwhile, U.S.-Russian disputes continue to delay progress on nuclear security cooperation.  “Because of disputes between the U.S. Department of Defense and the Russian Ministry of Defense over exactly how much access U.S. experts would be given to sensitive sites, there is today urgently needed security upgrade equipment that was purchased five years ago that is still sitting in warehouses, uninstalled, while the vulnerabilities it was intended to fix go unaddressed,” Bunn said.

In addition, the United States lacks some key ingredients in its nuclear nonproliferation efforts, according to Bunn.

“To do an important job, you need three things:  someone in charge, a plan and the resources to get it done,” he said.  “Unfortunately, for this mission, few of these essential ingredients are in place.”

Another major barrier is U.S. unwillingness — and legal prohibition — to participate in nuclear nonproliferation efforts with nations that have not signed certain arms control treaties, such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

Gottemoeller suggested that the United States review this policy, which is hindering much-needed progress.  One venue for cooperating with such countries is the International Atomic Energy Agency.

“The agency’s International Physical Protection Advisory Service offers, even [to] those not cooperating in other aspects of the regime, the opportunity for consultations on improving the security of their civilian nuclear facilities,” she said.

Meanwhile, if Washington engaged such nuclear proliferation concerns as India and Pakistan, it would go along way in advancing nonproliferation as a whole.

“If the United States worked separately with India and Pakistan to share information on protection and control of nuclear assets, the United States would be taking the first step toward transformation of these countries from adversaries to partners in the nonproliferation arena,” she said (see GSN, March 18).

Greater International Cooperation, New Ideas

Gottemoeller and Bunn agreed that, building on the G-8 pledge for new resources, the United States and others must work to build an international coalition against nuclear terrorism, including identifying new sources of financing and international cooperation.

 “Now it is important to engage other countries in new regions, with the primary goal of ensuring the protection of nuclear and radiological assets from terrorists.  This goal is in the national interest of every country,” Gottemoeller testified.

“In the current era, with burgeoning concerns about a larger, more widespread threat, especially involving radiological materials, international efforts to set priorities, divide labor, and establish partnerships will be critical.”  The G-8 pledge, she said, is the perfect means for establishing this enhanced coordination.

She said “Russia should be called upon to play a responsible role, both in facilitating the initiative and contributing resources.”

The two experts outlined a series of new initiatives that could propel nuclear security efforts significantly forward in the coming years.

One novel idea, according to Bunn, would be to relieve Russian debt in exchange for arms control expenditures.  This “debt for nonproliferation swap,” he said, would be modeled after past debt for environment swaps, in which a portion of Russian debts would be canceled in return for Russian financing of agreed arms reduction and nonproliferation projects (see GSN, July 26).

Gottemoeller suggested that new partnerships be established as a way of getting around restrictions to U.S. nonproliferation aid.  For example, if the United States cannot directly provide nuclear security assistance to Pakistan because of sanctions, neighboring Kazakhstan could be enlisted to help dispose of spent nuclear fuel.

“If Pakistan is interested in assistance to improve the secure storage of its spent and fresh fuel at civilian reactors, it might benefit from partnership with a regional player,” she said.  Kazakhstan has particular expertise in this area.

There is a major need to identify more finances for nuclear nonproliferation efforts, she said.  One way is to tap into private financial sources.

“Commercial means should be sought to finance new projects,” she said.  “The goal should be to discover public-private partnerships that lessen the burden of these projects on national budgets …  Such partnerships, in my view, will be an important piece of the resource base necessary to tackle the expanded nuclear terrorism threat.”

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Congo:  Kinshasa Seeks U.S. Removal of Uranium

The Democratic Republic of the Congo has been negotiating with the United States for a year to remove uranium from two sites — a reactor in Kinshasa and a uranium mine in the southern part of the country, a senior Congolese official said yesterday.

Officials have not yet made any decisions on requests for the United States to remove uranium from the reactor, but they are continuing negotiations, said Victor Mpoyo, a Congolese minister of state and a close adviser to former President Laurent Kabila.

There has been speculation that the D.R.C. paid North Korea for military aid by granting it mining concessions around the Shinkolobwe uranium mine, according to the Financial Times (see GSN, Sept. 25).  The North Korean interest in the mine has increased concerns that that area might become a haven for illicit trafficking, the Times reported.  Zimbabwean military forces loyal to D.R.C. President Joseph Kabila currently control the area around the mine.

“Anyone who expresses an interest in Shinkolobwe, or tries to get there, has a habit of disappearing,” a mining industry source familiar with the area said yesterday (Mark Huband, Financial Times, Sept. 26).

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U.S. Testing:  NNSA Plans Rocco Subcritical Test Today

The U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration is conducting a subcritical nuclear experiment today at the Nevada Test Site, the office said in a press release (see GSN, Sept. 3).

The test, named “Rocco,” is designed to examine what happens to plutonium when chemical high explosives shock it.  Researchers believe the test will help “maintain the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile,” according to the press release (NNSA release, Sept. 24).

Today’s experiment is the 19^th subcritical test the United States has conducted and the sixth under President George W. Bush (Kyodo News Service, Sept. 24).

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Russia:  Nuclear Weapons Losses Are Reporting Errors, Former Official Says

Reports of suitcase-sized nuclear devices lost by Russia are more likely the result of faulty accounting than the actual disappearance of weapons, a former Russian diplomat has said (see GSN, Dec. 19, 2001).

Nikolai Sokov, now a senior research associate at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute for International Studies in the United States, wrote in a Los Angeles Times commentary that there has never been “credible information about the loss of even a single nuclear weapon.”

Additionally, small Russian nuclear devices require frequent servicing and if they have been lost, they would be useless by now, Sokov said.  He suggested that resources spent searching for these devices might be used more productively against other threats (Nikolai Sokov, Los Angeles Times, Sept. 26).

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Botulism:  United States Is Unprepared for Attack

The United States is not prepared for a battlefield or terrorist attack involving botulism, USA Today reported today (see GSN, Aug. 6).

The government has not approved a vaccine for the disease — the most advanced version is about four years away — and the antitoxin for botulinum toxin, which causes the disease, is in short supply.  After the 1991 Gulf War, Iraqi officials told weapons inspectors that they had developed botulinum toxin as a weapon and stockpiled vast amounts.

The toxin is extremely dangerous, about 100,000 times more lethal than sarin, according to USA Today.

The current treatment for those exposed to the toxin is developed by vaccinating horses and removing antitoxin from the their blood.  Officials stockpiled thousands of unprocessed doses of antitoxin after the Gulf War but have not disclosed how much they have.  The Army abandoned that project in 1999 and the horses were sent to the Air Force Academy.  A Maryland firm is processing the remaining doses for $500 each, but that batch will not be ready until next year.

“Unfortunately, there’s nothing really available for people yet, other than the horse serum,” said George Lewis, a retired Army microbiologist involved in the Gulf War antitoxin effort (Kevin Moloney, USA Today, Sept. 26).

For further information, see:

Journal of the American Medical Association Background on Botulinum Toxin

CDC Basic Information About Botulism

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U.S. Plans:  Army Awards $626 Million Kwajalein Contract

The U.S. Army’s Space and Missile Defense Command has awarded a $626 million dollar contract to Bechtel Corp. and Lockheed Martin to provide logistical, technical and engineering support to the Kwajalein Atoll test site, InsideDefense.com reported yesterday (see GSN, Sept. 9).

At its current value the contract runs for four years but it could be extended to 15 years and be worth up to $2.5 billion.  Located in the Marshall Islands, the Kwajealein Atoll is used for ballistic missile defense testing and space surveillance operations (John Liang, InsideDefense.com, Sept. 25).

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