Global Security Newswire: By National Journal

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    Issue for Monday, January 13, 2003

  Terrorism  
U.S. Response:  Spain Agrees to Join Container Security Initiative Full Story
Recent Stories

  Weapons of Mass Destruction  
Iraq I:  Bush Administration Considers Offering Better Data to Inspectors Full Story
Iraq II:  Summary of Inspections Full Story
Recent Stories

  Nuclear Weapons  
North Korea:  Pyongyang Threatens to Resume Missile Tests Full Story
Interview:  South Korea’s U.S. Ambassador Yang Sung-chul Full Story
Russia I:  Nuclear Facility Starts to Train Former Weapons Scientists Full Story
Russia II:  At Least Five ICBM Tests Are Planned for This Year Full Story
Recent Stories

  Biological Weapons  
United States:  Scientists Clash Over Alleged Illegal U.S. Research Full Story
Recent Stories

  Chemical Weapons  
United Kingdom:  British Police Charge Four, Arrest Six in Ricin Case Full Story
Recent Stories

  Missile Proliferation  
China:  U.S. Charges Man With Illegally Exporting Dual-Use Goods Full Story
Recent Stories

  Missile Defense  
U.S. Plans:  Navy Chooses Raytheon to Develop Missile Interceptor Full Story
Recent Stories

  Missile Defense  
Recent Stories
 

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We engage.  Exactly the same way you engaged the former Soviet Union or China, we are engaging North Korea — not because we love them, or we ignore or underestimate their repression and human misery
Yang Sung Chul, South Korean ambassador to the United States, explaining his country’s efforts to maintain a dialogue with North Korea. 


North Korea:  Pyongyang Threatens to Resume Missile Tests

North Korea threatened Saturday to resume ballistic missile tests, the Washington Post reported (see GSN, Jan. 10)...Full Story

Biological Weapons:  Scientists Clash Over Alleged Illegal U.S. Research

By David Ruppe
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — In a heated exchange, a U.S. government scientist is publicly disputing a charge made by two independent scientists that the United States is conducting illegal biological weapons programs — activity prohibited by the Biological Weapons Convention...Full Story

Chemical Weapons:  British Police Charge Four, Arrest Six in Ricin Case

British authorities have charged four men with “being concerned in the development or production of chemical weapons” and “possessing of articles of value to a terrorist” after they were arrested last week in connection with the discovery of ricin in a north London apartment, the Associated Press reported today (see GSN, Jan. 10)...Full Story



Current Issue Monday, January 13, 2003
Terrorism

U.S. Response:  Spain Agrees to Join Container Security Initiative

Spain has agreed to join the U.S. Container Security Initiative, the U.S. Customs Service announced Wednesday.  The service plans to station U.S. inspectors at the Spanish port of Algeciras, according to a Customs press release (see GSN, Nov. 6, 2002).

“I applaud the government of Spain for their strong support in helping to make a safer, more secure world trading system,” said Customs Commissioner Robert Bonner.  “CSI is an insurance policy against terrorism.  In signing this declaration of principles today, the government of Spain has taken an important step. CSI will help secure trade moving between the ports of Spain, and the ports of the United States, and it will do so without slowing down trade,” Bonner added.

Officials have previously made arrangements to station U.S. inspectors at ports in Italy, China, Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Canada (see GSN, Nov. 11, 2002; U.S. Customs Service release, Jan. 8).

For further information, see:

Fact sheet on U.S. Container Security Initiative

U.S. Customs Container Security Initiative Information


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Weapons of Mass Destruction

Iraq I:  Bush Administration Considers Offering Better Data to Inspectors

The U.S. National Security Council is debating whether to provide more sensitive intelligence information to U.N. weapons inspectors, according to senior Bush administration officials.  Officials are trying to determine what is the best way to convince U.N. Security Council members that Iraq has chemical and biological weapons, the Washington Post reported Saturday (see GSN, Jan. 10).

“The White House is trying to decide what to lay out to inspectors before they report on Jan. 27 or whether to wait and do it after,” an official said.  “If we then go forward (attacking Iraq), the question also is how much leg do you show ahead of time,” the official added.

The Bush administration has realized that it will need to present evidence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction or noncompliance with inspectors before developing an international coalition for any military action, senior officials said. 

U.S. Defense Department officials want to keep information on Iraqi WMD sites, however, because they would be among the first targets during an U.S. attack, officials said.  If the sites are revealed beforehand, Iraq might attempt to move the weapons, they said.

Another issue in the debate is whether the release of more intelligence information could endanger sources or technical collection systems, according to the Post.  “It all comes down to weighing revealing sources and methods versus making a public case,” a senior Bush administration official said.

U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell said last week that the United States has begun providing inspectors with information and is reviewing other sensitive information that could be presented to U.N. inspectors if they fail to find conclusive evidence of Iraq’s WMD efforts, the Post reported.  A senior official familiar with the information given to inspectors, however, described it as “not that good,” adding, “I don’t expect anything dramatic before Jan. 27.”

The U.S. information provided to inspectors has mostly been general in nature, but has included satellite photographs of suspected WMD storage sites, according to former inspectors familiar with the current system.  Only chief U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix and his top intelligence aide James Corcoran, former head of Canada’s intelligence service, initially review the information, which is then distributed to inspectors within Iraq who do not know its source, the Post reported (Pincus/DeYoung, Washington Post, Jan. 11).

Timeline

Meanwhile, the United States and other U.N. Security Council members are discussing setting a deadline for Iraq to demonstrate its compliance with U.N. resolutions, according to the New York Times.

Blix and Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, are scheduled to brief the Security Council Jan. 27 on the progress of inspections, as called for under the U.N. resolution establishing the inspections regime.  White House officials have said the resolution could be interpreted to mean that Iraq has until then to demonstrate that it has fully cooperated with inspections and has disclosed all of its WMD programs, the Times reported.

Other Security Council members, however, have disagreed that the Jan. 27 briefing should be seen as a deadline, according to the Times.  Diplomats from France and Russia — two of the five permanent council members — have said the resolution contains no deadline at all. 

“We are not in the business of building up military,” said Russian U.N. Ambassador Sergei Lavrov.  “We’re in the business of listening to the inspectors, the professionals,” he said.

British Prime Minister Tony Blair told Parliament last week that Jan. 27 was not a deadline and that inspectors needed “space and time” to carry out their work.  British officials said they would attempt to convince the United States that inspectors would have more success finding incriminating evidence if they were given more time (Julia Preston, New York Times, Jan. 13).

The IAEA believes that weapons inspectors need about a year to conduct complete operations within Iraq, agency spokesman Mark Gwozdecky said.

“For a credible inspection process we believe we do need in the vicinity of a year,” he said in an interview with BBC News.  “It’s a very large country, there is a lot of terrain to cover, a lot of facilities to inspect,” Gwozdecky said.

The IAEA is confident that it will be able to find any evidence of Iraq’s nuclear weapons efforts, Gwozdecky said.

“Given the fairly good access we’ve been given to date, we can — the longer we’re there — have a real role to play in terms of detecting anything illegal,” he said.  “Isn’t a year worth the wait to get a sustainable, long-term peaceful solution to this problem?” Gwozdecky added (BBC News, Jan. 13).

ElBaradei is scheduled to visit Russia for three days beginning tomorrow to meet with Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov and senior Russian Atomic Energy Ministry officials, according to Kyodo News (Kyodo News/Japan Today, Jan. 13).

U.S. War Preparations

As the Security Council debates the possible start of military action against Iraq, the United States has been increasing the number of its troops and equipment in the Persian Gulf region, according to the New York Times (see GSN, Jan. 7).

The U.S. force being assembled in the region would be in a position to attack Iraq in the latter part of February and could have more than 150,000 troops, according to military officials.  Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has signed two deployment orders since Friday — sending about 62,000 troops to the region, the Times reported.  Rumsfeld also signed a deployment order last month that dispatched about 25,000 troops to the Middle East.  The U.S. Central Command sent the first component of a 1,000-member battle staff last week to what could be its wartime headquarters in Qatar.

“We’re going to continue a steady deliberate buildup to provide the president the flexibility he needs to do what he thinks he needs to do,” said Gen. Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

It is expected to take several weeks to assemble the full U.S. military force throughout the Gulf region, in countries such as Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia and, possibly, Turkey, although the troops currently in the region could attack if ordered to do so, officials said.  “By mid- to late February, we’ll be in the best position to provide the president immediate flexible options to respond,” a senior military official said.

The best time to attack Iraq is a period between mid-February and early April, military experts said.  “If you go past March, you get into some really hot weather,” said retired Marine Gen. Anthony Zinni, former head of the U.S. Central Command.  “How long do you keep them there before it begins to affect training, morale and rotation schedules?  It’s very costly,” he added (Eric Schmitt, New York Times, Jan. 12).

The U.S. military has also begun sending e-mails to Iraqi military and civilian leaders, calling on them to defect and to reveal any WMD sites, according to the Sydney Morning Herald.  The e-mails, sent in Arabic, call on Iraqis to refrain from using weapons of mass destruction, to identify the locations of such weapons or to render them inactive, according to the Herald.  The messages warned that failure to cooperate would “lead to grave personal consequences.”

Iraqi officials began receiving the e-mails this month, recent visitors to the country said.  Iraqi authorities, however, have since blocked access to the state-controlled e-mail service, the Herald reported (Sydney Morning Herald, Jan. 13).

Inspections

U.N. inspectors visited at least four suspect Iraqi sites today, according to the Associated Press.  Inspectors from the IAEA and U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission visited Baghdad’s technological university and two science colleges, according to the Iraqi Information Ministry.  An IAEA team also visited the Ibn Rushed company, which performs firefighting equipment maintenance and quality control for construction materials, the ministry said (Hamza Hendawi, Associated Press/Yahoo.com, Jan. 13).

Yesterday, inspectors visited eight sites, according to an IAEA press release.  A joint UNMOVIC and IAEA team visited Sharqat, which once housed an electromagnetic isotope separation facility.  An UNMOVIC missile team visited the al-Rafah Liquid Engine Test Facility to observe a static test of an al-Samoud missile engine.  A second missile team visited al-Mutaseem to observe a static test of the al-Uboor motor, according to the IAEA release.  UNMOVIC missile inspectors also traveled to the southern city of Basra to tag al-Farah missiles at an Iraqi military unit north of the city.

UNMOVIC biological inspectors visited Baghdad University’s College of Medicine’s Microbiology Department and the university’s College of Pharmacy, according to the agency release.  An UNMOVIC biological team conducted a follow-up visit at the Iraqi Air Force’s Technical Military Depot at al-Taji.  Inspectors based in the northern city of Mosul also visited the Jaber Ben Hayan State Establishment, which produces chemical protection equipment (International Atomic Energy Agency release, Jan. 12).

For further information, see:

UNMOVIC

IAEA Iraq Action Team

U.N. Resolution 1441


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Iraq II:  Summary of Inspections

Experts from the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency have conducted hundreds of inspections in Iraq since resuming the post-Gulf War inspection regime Nov. 27.  More than 100 inspectors are now based in the country at two facilities in Baghdad and Mosul.  The following chart summarizes some of the inspectors’ reported activities.

Date Site Activity
Jan. 13 Technological university in Baghdad See GSN, Jan. 13.
Science college in Baghdad
Second science college in Baghdad
Bin Rushed Company
Jan. 12 Sharqat EMIS Facility A joint UNMOVIC and IAEA team visited the site, which was originally designed to house an electromagnetic isotope separation facility (see GSN, Jan. 13).
Al-Rafah Liquid Engine Test Facility UNMOVIC missile inspectors visited the site to observe a static test of an al-Samoud missile engine (see GSN, Jan. 13).
Al-Mutaseem UNMOVIC missile inspectors visited the site to observe a static test of the al-Uboor motor (see GSN, Jan. 13).
Iraqi military unit north of the southern city of Mosul UNMOVIC missile inspectors tagged al-Farah missiles at the unit (see GSN, Jan. 13).
Microbiology Department at Baghdad University’s College of Medicine See GSN, Jan. 13.
Baghdad University’s College of Pharmacy
Air Force Technical Military Depot at al-Taji
Jaber Ben Hayan State Establishment Inspectors visited the site, which produces chemical protection equipment (see GSN, Jan. 13).
Jan. 11 Bin Sina Center UNMOVIC missile inspectors visited several buildings at the site to verify equipment and raw materials used in missile activities (IAEA release, Jan. 11).
Airfield about 300 kilometers west-northwest of Baghdad IAEA release, Jan. 11.
Tiklit University College of Science
Tiklit University College of Agriculture
Tiklit University College of Engineering
Tiklit University College of Medicine
Tiklit University College of Women’s Education
State Company for Drugs and Medical Appliances Marketing at al-Addile See the Jan. 10 entry.
State Company for Drugs and Medical Appliances Marketing at al-Dabash
Mosul Dairy Plant Inspectors determined the site’s current activities and verified previously tagged equipment (IAEA release, Jan. 11.)
Saddam GE Plant IAEA release, Jan. 11.
Qa Qaa Sumood Explosives Plant
Jan. 10 Al-Mamoun Plant of al-Rasheed State Company, about 25 miles southeast of Baghdad UNMOVIC chemical inspectors visited the site, which produces missile propellants (see GSN, Jan. 10).
State Company for Drugs and Medical Appliances Marketing at al-Addile IAEA release, Jan. 10.
State Company for Drugs and Medical Appliances Marketing at al-Dabash
Trade Ministry’s al-Dabbash stores in Baghdad See GSN, Jan. 10.
Trade Ministry’s al-Adel stores in Baghdad  
Jan. 3-9 See GSN, Jan. 10  

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Nuclear Weapons

North Korea:  Pyongyang Threatens to Resume Missile Tests

North Korea threatened Saturday to resume ballistic missile tests, the Washington Post reported (see GSN, Jan. 10).

In announcing the potential lifting of its missile test moratorium, North Korea’s ambassador to China said the isolated nation has the right to maintain “devices to save us from a nuclear attack” and that the United States has “hostile policies” (see GSN, Nov. 18, 2002).

“The development, test, deployment and export of our missiles entirely belong to our sovereignty,” Choe Jin Su said during a press conference in Beijing.  “Because all agreements have been nullified by the United States’ side, we believe we cannot go along with the self-imposed missile moratorium any longer,” he added (Goodman/Pan, Washington Post, Jan. 12).

Analysts do not know if North Korea has any missiles ready to test, but observers say it is working on a Taepodong 2 missile that could reach the United States (Demick/Richter, Los Angeles Times, Jan. 12).

Choe hinted that a resumption of missile tests is contingent on U.S. actions.

“Whatever we do in the future depends on the United States,” he said.  “If the United States fails to change its attitude, this issue may be complicated,” he added (Goodman/Pan, Washington Post, Jan. 12).

North Koreans in New Mexico

North Korean diplomats traveled to Santa Fe last week to meet with New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson and said they had been seeking dialogue with Bush administration officials for weeks, according to the Post.

Han Song Ryol, North Korea’s deputy U.N. ambassador, asked Richardson to arrange meetings with the White House to discuss the nuclear crisis.  Richardson relayed the request for talks to U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, the Post reported (Goodman/Pan, Washington Post).

“They don’t negotiate like others — quid pro quos.  They have their standards, and you have to just work (with) that.  It’s almost an art form to talk with them,” Richardson said.  “This is almost negotiating in a bazaar atmosphere, in a totally different environment,” he added (CNN.com, Jan. 11).

“I think what now needs to happen is that the governments need to talk to each other,” Richardson said.  The governor also said that his talks, which were not on behalf of the White House, “eased tensions a bit.”

During the talks, Han said “that North Korea has no intentions of building nuclear weapons,” according to Richardson.  He did not say, however, if Han or his colleague Mun Jong Chol had explained why their country threatened to resume missile tests (Weisman/Eckholm, New York Times, Jan. 12).

Richardson said that he expects low-level talks at the United Nations between the two countries (Seth Mydans, New York Times, Jan. 13).  U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly said, however, that the New Mexico talks were “a little bit disappointing.”

“We really didn’t hear anything from the North Koreans speaking to him that we hadn’t heard in their public pronouncements,” Kelly said (Peter Goodman, Washington Post, Jan. 13).

Fears of an Arms Race

The missile test announcement fueled fears of weapons proliferation in Northeast Asia, with Japan and South Korea developing missile programs to counter North Korea and China stepping up its development efforts to counter its eastern neighbors, the Post reported.

“The obvious picture here would be a massive arms race,” said Ryoo Kihl-jae, a North Korea expert at Kyungnam University in Seoul.

“It could be a very serious mess,” said Qi Baoliang, a specialist on Korean issues at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations.  “We don’t want things to develop as they did in India and Pakistan,” he added (Goodman/Pan, Washington Post).

A North Korean diplomat in Vienna also said that his country might be able to reactivate a nuclear reactor in a matter of weeks, making spent fuel rods available for nuclear weapons sooner than expected, the Los Angeles Times reported.

Assistant Secretary Kelly is in Seoul today to meet with South Korean officials on the issue, but the flurry of North Korean announcements may be hampering a coordinated response, according to a South Korean official.

“It’s shocking how fast they are going.  It’s too much, we can’t deal effectively like this,” said the official.

Analysts said that Pyongyang is negotiating with the only assets it has left.

“North Korea is a country which is literally bankrupt, which has lost the capacity to pull itself out of the economic quagmire through normal means.  The nuclear card is the only card that North Korea has at its disposal,” said Lee Dong-bok, a former South Korean intelligence official (Demick/Richter, Los Angeles Times).

U.S. Energy Help Possible

Kelly said that after the nuclear issue is solved the United States might be willing to assist with North Korea’s energy problems.

“We know there are energy problems in North Korea.  Once we get beyond the nuclear problems, there may be an opportunity with the United States, with private investors, or with other countries to help North Korea in the energy area,” Kelly said (Los Angeles Times, Jan. 13).

Analysts said that the statement reflects an apparent opening in a hard line U.S. stance.

“It is a concession, a change of position,” said Lee Chung-min, a North Korea expert at Yonsei University.  “It’s an indication of the Bush administration really wanting to settle this diplomatically and probably under a lot of pressure to do so,” he said (Goodman, Washington Post).

Pyongyang Denies Admitting Nuclear Development

North Korea denied that it admitted a nuclear weapons development program during October talks with Kelly in Pyongyang, the New York Times reported (see GSN, Nov. 15, 2002).

“The claim that we admitted developing nuclear weapons is an invention fabricated by the United States with sinister intentions,” North Korean official newspaper Rodong Sinmun said yesterday.  “If the United States evades its responsibility and challenges us, we will turn the citadel of imperialists into a sea of fire,” the newspaper added (Mydans, New York Times).

Powell, however, discounted the North Korean statement.  In October, the North Koreans denied the allegations during a first day of talks and then agreed to them on the second day, Powell said (see GSN, Oct. 17, 2002).

“It took them overnight to evaluate the situation and have their principals meeting,” he said.  “The next morning, they came back and essentially said to [Assistant Secretary] Jim [Kelly], ‘Yes.’  Now they dissembled a little bit since, but we had three interpreters there, especially at the time because (Korean) is a very different language — a lot of nuances — and there is no doubt in our mind that they acknowledged it, that they were agreeing to it.  And that’s what Jim reported,” he added (Goodman, Washington Post).

IAEA Chief Urges Reconsideration

The International Atomic Energy Agency Friday called on North Korea to reconsider its recent decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

“I strongly urge the D.P.R.K. to reverse its decision and to seek instead a diplomatic solution,” said IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei.  “This is the only way to address the D.P.R.K.’s security and other concerns,” he added.

ElBaradei said the North Korean withdrawl was “a continuation of a policy of defiance and was counterproductive to ongoing efforts to achieve peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula (IAEA release, Jan. 10).”

White House Blames Clinton

Meanwhile, a senior Bush administration official blamed the crisis on the 1994 Agreed Framework, which was signed during the Clinton administration.

That agreement “frontloaded all the benefits and left the difficult things to the end,” the senior official said.

The White House has faced recent accusations that President George W. Bush spurred the North Korean crisis by including that country in his “axis of evil” along with Iraq and Iran, the Post reported.

The “idea that the Agreed Framework was going along just fine,” was incorrect, the senior official said.  “We were getting to a crisis very quickly,” the official added.

North Korean officials feel as if the Bush administration began to shut off diplomatic contacts before the crisis began, the Post reported.

“They think the Bush people have closed the door on them just because Clinton had opened it,” said a person involved in the New Mexico talks (DeYoung/Reid, Washington Post, Jan. 12).


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Interview:  South Korea’s U.S. Ambassador Yang Sung-chul

Veteran diplomatic correspondent Lee Michael Katz interviewed South Korean Ambassador Yang Sung-chul on Jan. 6 and 8 for the National Journal.  The edited excerpts below reflect the ambassador’s caution over inflaming heavily armed and unpredictable neighbor North Korea.

National Journal:  How do the South Korean people view the dangers of nuclear tensions with the North?

Yang:  To us, it’s a life-and-death matter.  Any military flare-up over North Korea having nuclear weapons is a life-and-death scenario.  We are not seeing the world or conflict through the TV screens.  So the U.S. and my government, as the closest allies in Asia, adopt a strong position on this.  First, North Korea must dismantle its nuclear projects.  Second, we try to resolve it peacefully and diplomatically, so it’s good for North Korea to come out of this policy of pushing this nuclear weapons program.

NJ:  In Washington, North Korea is a secondary issue.  Is it getting enough attention from the Bush administration, compared to Iraq?

Yang:  This is a different issue.  Ever since the Korean division in 1945, it has become a Gordian knot.  As much as there is now an urgency and gravity to the problem, we have to have an understanding of the intractability of the issue.  It has historical, political, economic, human, regional security, and of course, global power implications.  I’m glad President Bush now says that North Korea is different from Iraq or Iran.

I read a very interesting article, comparing Jesse Helms with Strom Thurmond, in the Washington Post.  Some people may just lump them as conservatives of the South, or Dixiecrats.  But by examining their subtleties, you find the true meaning of how they are different.  The same is true with Korea:  You have to take a deep breath, looking into the complexity of the regional situations and realities of the inter-Korean situation.

NJ:  North Korea has been described as an Orwellian society.  Is it?

Yang:  We take it for granted; it’s one of the worst extreme kinds of authoritarian Communism.  How can we handle them?  You didn’t know how repressive the Stalinist regime was?  You did know.  But during World War II, you collaborated as allies to defeat an even more urgent enemy like Hitler.  We engage.  Exactly the same way you engaged the former Soviet Union or China, we are engaging North Korea — not because we love them, or we ignore or underestimate their repression and human misery.

But after half a century of dealing with North Korea, we came to the conclusion engagement is the most practical formula to deal with North Korea.  We have had phenomenal success for the last nearly five years.

NJ:  How can that be a phenomenal success with North Korea violating agreements, and with this nuclear sword hanging over your people and U.S. troops in the region?

Yang: In humanitarian, nonsecurity areas, we have phenomenal progress.  More than half a million South Koreans have visited North Korea.  They came back with a strong sense of anti-Communism, because they realized what a controlled society North Korea is.  The “sunshine policy” is diplomacy and dialogue based on deterrence.  We’ve pursued engaging North Korea not because we trust — perhaps we mistrust — and because we have suspicions of North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction.

NJ:  Are you saying that if there wasn’t this “sunshine-policy” dialogue, it could be a lot worse?

Yang:  Yes, because in the early 1990s, we were in a panicky situation.  People were buying up things from the supermarkets.  Today, it’s calm: no panic situations.  North and South Koreans are still talking to each other.  Of course, we never forgot the threat, but North Korea is not just a monolithic image threatening neighbors and making bombs.  The starving population is another image.  The economy is bankrupt.

NJ:  Did the International Atomic Energy Agency make a wise decision to give North Korea a second chance to bring back inspectors, or should it have gone immediately to the U.N. Security Council?

Yang:  It’s a prudent decision.  We should give North Korea time and a chance to go back to the original condition.  Virtually the entire world is against North Korea’s nuclear project and is asking North Korea to join the law-abiding international community.

NJ:  Doesn’t North Korea’s plan to reprocess fuel rods for nuclear weapons material pose a dire threat?

Yang:  Even now it’s a grave situation, because after they expelled the two IAEA inspectors, we don’t have any way to know.  That’s why we have to have a creative initiative or breakthrough.  Dialogue doesn’t mean yielding to their nuclear brinkmanship.  Dialogue is to find out what they have in mind and, as Senator [Carl] Levin [(D-Mich.)] said, it can avoid miscalculations, misunderstanding, or misapprehension.  Talk is better than no talk.  Talk with substance is far better.

NJ:  What do you think is the biggest potential danger from North Korea:  using a nuclear weapon against South Korea, or providing nuclear weapons to terrorist groups to use elsewhere?

Yang:  I’m not in a position to speculate what is more or less dangerous.  There is one consensus: My government, the United States, Japan, and China and Russia, all agree that a nuclear weapons-free Korean Peninsula is a must.

NJ:  Is there a legitimate fear that North Korean leader Kim Jong Il could supply nuclear material to others?

Yang:  Not only fear, but a grave concern.  As President Kim [Dae-jung] has said, under no circumstances will the Republic of Korea tolerate North Korea’s nuclear program, including chemical and biological weapons.  He said that when he met Kim Jong Il.

NJ:  One idea mentioned by some is a pre-emptive military strike, if need be, to destroy North Korean nuclear facilities.  Do you think that would be a good idea for the U.S., rather than being subject to nuclear blackmail by North Korea?

Yang: Look, this is my country.  We have 48 million people in the South and 22 million people in the North.... Nobody can experiment with a certain concept.... My country and my government have the final say.

NJ: With the U.S. planning for a war with Iraq, does Kim Jong Il find now an opportune time for his saber-rattling?

Yang: That’s your interpretation.  But in general, there’s a dialogue mode and a fighting mode.  Fighting mode is, you just say, “You are disgusting.”  Then he will be upset and will try to strike at you.

The Korean side must understand the enormous impact of 9/11, that it shook the core of the American psyche.  On the other hand, America must understand we are the only country that still has the legacy of the Cold War.  A Japanese ambassador or French ambassador here will devote a lot of time on cultural, normal diplomatic activities.  But the majority of my time is on this Cold War issue of the last century.

NJ:  North Korea just warned that international “sanctions mean a war.”  Is that ominous?

Yang: It is a routine propaganda statement.

NJ:  But North Korea has kicked the inspectors out and moved to restart its nuclear program.

Yang:  We have to think about the consequences of a certain policy, or the reaction.

NJ:  Are you saying it’s North Koreans’ reaction to America stopping fuel oil deliveries?

Yang:  That’s their official excuse.  That’s one contributing factor.  They cannot go without [being] punished, but we could have given them some breathing space.

NJ:  So you think the United States made a mistake by cutting off the fuel oil?

Yang:  Any sound policy must start from self-reflection rather than self-righteousness.

NJ:  After this week’s joint U.S., Korea, and Japanese meetings, the Bush administration is now willing to talk to North Korea, but only about its nuclear program.  How do you view this approach?

Yang:  There is progress in the sense that the United States is willing to talk to North Korea about how it will meet its obligations to the international community.

North Korea has to act visibly and verifiably to dismantle this program.  Subsequent to that or simultaneously, we have to give what they’re asking for.

President Bush has assured North Korea repeatedly there is no intention of invading North Korea.  But in that context, we have to find some way to talk about the issue if North Korea does dismantle its nuclear program.

NJ:  Reports from South Korea suggest a letter from the United States saying it would not attack North Korea would be a way to do this.

Yang:  I’m sure that’s one of the options that will be discussed.

NJ:  President-Elect Roh Moo-hyun made a startling assertion, in terms of the U.S.-South Korean relationship, that South Korea shouldn’t automatically side with the United States in the dispute over North Korea.  Does that pose problems?

Yang:  It’s just a normal thing, isn’t it?  If it’s close allies, you consult closely.  That’s what we are doing today.  Not automatically follow the other side.  That’s unilateralism — America has a policy and then Korea is just following automatically.

NJ:  Do you think the U.S. practices too much unilateralism on Korean issues?

Yang:  Korea today is very different: 80 percent of the population now is post-Korean War generation.  They are young, highly educated, assertive, independent, and they don’t have the old baggage of ideology.  So Korea in 1950 is very different from Korea in 2003.

NJ:  So you don’t necessarily take direction from Uncle Sam?

Yang:  What I’m saying is, Uncle Sam must know what has changed in Korea.  In a Korean saying, in 10 years, even mountains and rivers change.

NJ:  After some U.S. troop incidents, they’re burning the American flag in South Korea, a nation that many American soldiers died to protect.

Yang:  American forces and 22 other nations under the U.N. flag came to the rescue in 1950 in the nick of time in the face of Communist aggression.  So there’s a fundamental gratitude all Korean people have.  But now when you get these demonstrations, it’s starting with a specific issue:  two young Korean middle-school girls run over by an armed vehicle.

NJ:  These demonstrations have apparently left members of Congress very angry.  How do you address that?

Yang:  I have sympathy with [the members], because my president is the first one who condemns burning American flags.  Both the president and president-elect urged restraint in the demonstrations.  Like American hippies and yippies during the Vietnam War period, you have all kinds of people doing all kinds of ugly and stupid things.  The same is true in Korea.  They’re not just like North Koreans, all cowed and regimented.  That’s the price you have to pay for democracy.

NJ:  Do you think that North and South Korea will be unified in your lifetime?

Yang:  I wish, I wish. I am 63 years old.  I wish that Korea is unified before I die.


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Russia I:  Nuclear Facility Starts to Train Former Weapons Scientists

Russia’s largest nuclear research facility opened a new training center Saturday to help former Soviet nuclear weapons scientists learn software programming, according to the Moscow Times (see GSN, Jan. 9).

Moscow’s Kurchatov Institute plans to retrain about 500 former weapons scientists to work in the information technology industry, the Times reported.  Optima Program — an IT company created by the institute, Kurchatovsky Tekhnopark, the Optima systems integrator and the U.S. -based CTG Software Inc. — will hire program graduates.

“What we are looking for is transition from exporting brains to exporting products and services,” Kurchatov Institute President Yevgeny Velikhov said.

The Russian software company Luxoft has used the institute to retrain former weapons scientists through the U.S. Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program since November 2001, the Times reported (see GSN, Oct. 5, 2001).  The United States is providing more than $22 million for the program this year, with funding going to more than 80 projects in Russia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine (Larisa Naumenko, Moscow Times, Jan. 13).


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Russia II:  At Least Five ICBM Tests Are Planned for This Year

Officials in Russia’s Strategic Missile Forces have said at least five ballistic missile tests have been planned for this year, ITAR-Tass reported Thursday (see GSN, Dec. 10, 2002).  The Russian Defense Ministry is examining conducting the tests from silos at Russian missile bases, according to ITAR-Tass.  Previous missile tests over the past 10 years have occurred at Russian space centers (ITAR-Tass, Jan. 9 in FBIS-SOV, Jan. 9).


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Biological Weapons

United States:  Scientists Clash Over Alleged Illegal U.S. Research

By David Ruppe
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — In a heated exchange, a U.S. government scientist is publicly disputing a charge made by two independent scientists that the United States is conducting illegal biological weapons programs — activity prohibited by the Biological Weapons Convention.

In articles appearing recently in two prominent publications, professors Mark Wheelis of the University of California at Davis and Malcolm Dando of the United Kingdom’s University of Bradford hypothesized the administration had scuttled a proposed treaty inspection protocol primarily to prevent discovery of growing, illicit U.S. research (see GSN, Nov. 21, 2001).

The “United States may have rejected the bioweapons protocol because it is committed to continuing and expanding secret programs,” they wrote in an article published by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists this month.

Offering no new evidence to support their hypothesis, the authors contend illicit research offers the best explanation for the U.S. opposition despite support from the closest U.S. allies, including the United Kingdom.

“Why did the U.S., unlike any other major Western power, conclude that the protocol would not enhance its security?  What was perceived as so threatening in the protocol that it justified opening a serious rift between the U.S. and its closest allies?” they ask in the CBW Conventions Bulletin, a quarterly journal produced by the Harvard-Sussex Program on CBW Armament and Arms Limitation.

“The U.S. rejection of the protocol raises the possibility that there are new classified biodefense programs that are deemed too sensitive politically or technically for even the limited disclosure that the protocol would require,” they conclude.

Charge Disputed

Alan Zelicoff, senior scientist at the Center for National Security and Arms Control at Sandia National Laboratories, complained about the charges on an international e-mail forum widely read by biological arms control specialists.  He said he was “insulted.”  Zelicoff’s center develops technologies to improve WMD counterproliferation, and to verify arms control treaties.

The authors “indulge in an ugly exercise allegedly based on scientific hypothesis formation, concluding that the explanation most consistent with the U.S. rejection of the protocol is that the U.S. is pursuing an illicit program to develop biological weapons to wage warfare,” he wrote.  “Perhaps they are correct, but I doubt it,” he said.

Zelicoff cited the Bush administration’s official explanations for its opposition to the inspections protocol, which led to a dramatic suspension of a treaty review conference in December 2001 and the limited agreement last November which does not include the protocol (see GSN, Nov. 15, 2002).

“The current administration rejected the protocol because its studies (funded by the previous administration) showed that the risk of loss of proprietary national security and business-related information far outweighed the benefits of the protocol (and indeed, few benefits at all could be demonstrated in those studies),” Zelicoff wrote.

In November, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control Stephen Rademaker said there was a concern the protocol would have required the United States to declare agents created for biological defense research, information that could aid U.S. enemies.

No Personal Knowledge

Zelicoff also argued that he personally has no knowledge of any illegal biological weapons work in the U.S. biological defense program.  He said if he knew of any he would make it public.

If the United States were “developing biological weapons for warfare, as opposed to peacekeeping or riot control, I suspect I would have to be in line behind anyone else making phone calls to the New York Times,” he told Global Security Newswire Friday.

The scientist wrote in the e-mail he has regular access to classified documents describing U.S. biological defense work and the “intent behind it,” and wrote “never (that is to say, not once, never) have I had any suspicion that the U.S. biodefense program was intended in any way to develop weapons for use on the battlefield.”

Wheelis and Dando “do an enormous disservice to the people working on biodefense to suggest that they … know better or are somehow more sensitive to the possibility of illegal work.  They aren’t,” he wrote.

Zelicoff, who previously has publicly denied there is a secret, illicit U.S. program, said in the interview he took the charges personally.

“There are three explanations — I’m stupid, I’m a dupe of the U.S. government or I’m lying — those are the only three explanations for what they said and I reject them all.  That’s why I said I was insulted.  I chose that word carefully,” he said.

He said there are a small number of biological defense scientists in the U.S. intelligence community and he knows them all.

“I’ve asked them looking into their eyes, ‘Has the U.S. in your agency violated the Biological Weapons Convention?’  And they looked me right back in the eye and said, ‘no.’ Could they be lying to me?  Sure.  And this building might fall down too.  It’s possible, but it’s extremely unlikely,” he said.

“It’s not possible to keep that kind of a secret,” he said.

No Evidence Provided

Wheelis and Dando provided no evidence to substantiate the charge of a secret, growing biological weapons program.  They wrote in the CBW Conventions Bulletin it is a possibility that “has not, to our knowledge, been discussed much, but which seems to be in the air.”

They cited, however, previously reported revelations of controversial U.S. biological research, including a 2001 New York Times report that the CIA had conducted work that could be construed to have violated the treaty and reports following the October 2001 anthrax attacks in the United States that the government was producing dried, weaponized anthrax for biological defense testing.

The treaty allows for small quantities of such biological weapons agents to be produced for peaceful purposes.  Regarding the weaponized anthrax, the professors wrote, “the U.S. won’t tell anyone how much it made, and for what purpose.”

The United States “not only pressed, or passed, the limits of legality under the treaty; it also failed to honor its obligation to report these programs” in accordance with treaty confidence-building measures, the professors wrote.

Wheelis and Dando urged the U.S. Congress to investigate classified U.S. biological defense programs.

“If we are right, the implications for arms control are very serious, and threaten to fatally undermine the BWC and the CWC [Chemical Weapons Convention] by leading to a new biological and chemical arms race,” they concluded.

Zelicoff said the only nondefensive chemical or biological weapons work he was aware of is a “very small program, mostly farmed out to places like Penn State University from the intelligence community to study the feasibility of developing [chemical] incapacitants for peacekeeping and riot control purposes.”

Differentiating Offensive From Defensive

Experts say the Biological Weapons Convention allows countries to produce small quantities of offensive biological agents to test defensive equipment or vaccines.

The State Department’s Rademaker last November said such defensive research activity could closely resemble offensive work and lead international investigators to misconstrue work as offensive.

“To conduct biodefense, you basically have to create a biological weapon to figure out how to defend against it,” he said. 

When asked whether the United States was, therefore, building biological weapons for defensive research, he clarified his statement to indicate that it is not necessarily that weapons are created for defensive purposes, but “agents,” allowable by the treaty.

Zelicoff in his comments suggested Wheelis and Dando were misinterpreting defensive work as offensive.


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Chemical Weapons

United Kingdom:  British Police Charge Four, Arrest Six in Ricin Case

British authorities have charged four men with “being concerned in the development or production of chemical weapons” and “possessing of articles of value to a terrorist” after they were arrested last week in connection with the discovery of ricin in a north London apartment, the Associated Press reported today (see GSN, Jan. 10).

The four men — Mouloud Feddag, Sidali Feddag, Samir Feddag and Mustapha Taleb — are scheduled to appear in court today.

British officials also charged Nasreddine Fekhadji, arrested last week in connection with the case, with forgery and counterfeiting charges.  A sixth man thought to be involved in the case was arrested again for drug and immigration offenses and a seventh man was transferred to immigration officials, AP reported.

Authorities arrested six more people yesterday in connection with the ricin investigation, AP reported.  Five men and a woman were picked up in Bournemouth on England’s south coast, according to the AP report (Associated Press/USA Today, Jan. 13).

All the suspects arrested last week hold Algerian passports, the Financial Times reported today (Mark Huband, Financial Times, Jan. 13).

Police are now looking for one more suspect, who officials believe is the leader of the alleged terrorist group, the Straits Times reported today (Alfred Lee, Straits Times, Jan. 13).

Authorities have denied earlier reports that the suspects were arrested after a tip from French officials, the Financial Times reported (Huband, Financial Times, Jan. 13).

The United States began experimenting with ricin toward the end of World War I, but former U.S. President Richard Nixon ended all such research in 1969, the New York Times reported.

U.S. researchers determined that although ricin is easy to produce, it is difficult to use as a weapon of mass destruction, the Times reported (William Broad, New York Times, Jan. 12).


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Missile Proliferation

China:  U.S. Charges Man With Illegally Exporting Dual-Use Goods

U.S. officials charged a California man Friday with illegally exporting microwave amplifiers, which can be used in both commercial applications and missile guidance systems, to China, according to the Washington Times (see GSN, Jan. 3).  Qing Chang Jiang, also known as Frank Jiang, appeared in federal court Friday in San Jose, Calif. and is now being held without bail.  He is scheduled to have a detention hearing Jan. 16 (Washington Times, Jan. 12).

He was arrested Friday following a 12-month investigation of federal export rule violations, U.S. prosecutors in San Francisco said (San Francisco Chronicle, Jan. 13).


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Missile Defense

U.S. Plans:  Navy Chooses Raytheon to Develop Missile Interceptor

The U.S. Navy has chosen Raytheon over Lockheed Martin to develop a missile interceptor meant to fulfill the Scud-intercepting requirement of the canceled Navy Area missile defense program, Defense Week reported today (see GSN, Aug. 22, 2002).

The Naval Sea Systems Command announced last week that Raytheon would be given a sole-source deal to develop the Extended Range Active Missile.  The missile will be the first naval-based interceptor able to guide itself to targets more than 200 miles away without the aid of a warship’s radars and will also be able to engage enemy aircraft and cruise missiles, according to Defense Week.  The ERAM program could be worth about $10 billion, according to an industry executive.

In its announcement, the Navy said Raytheon is the only company that could fulfill the missile program’s requirements by fiscal 2010.  “Award to any other source would likely result in substantial duplication of cost to the government that is not expected to be recovered through competition,” the service said (Donnelly/Hodge, Defense Week, Jan. 13).

 


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