U.S. President George W. Bush yesterday said that prior to the recent escalation in U.S.-North Korean tensions, he had ordered “a bold initiative, an initiative which would talk about energy and food, because we care deeply about the suffering of the North Korean people” (see GSN, Jan. 14).
Bush was responding to a question regarding U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly’s remarks that the United States might help Pyongyang’s energy needs if the North Korean leadership abandons its nuclear weapons aspirations.
“We expect them to disarm. We expect them not to develop nuclear weapons. And if they so choose to do so — their choice — then I will reconsider whether or not we will start the bold initiative that I talked to Secretary [of State Colin] Powell about,” Bush said.
Bush also said that the White House was prepared to talk to Pyongyang about the current crisis.
“People say, well, are you willing to talk to North Korea?” Bush said. “Of course we are. But what this nation won’t do is be blackmailed. And what this nation will do is use this as an opportunity to bring the Chinese and the Russians and South Koreans and the Japanese to the table to solve this problem peacefully,” he added (White House transcript, Jan. 14).
The initiative was never offered to the North Koreans and the details were not made public, the Washington Post reported. Bush’s mention of energy aid referred to a proposed update of North Korea’s electrical grid so that energy sources can be better used, the Post reported (Glenn Kessler, Washington Post, Jan. 15).
North Korea, however, rejected U.S. offers to talk and labeled them as “deceptive drama.”
“The U.S. loudmouthed supply of energy and food aid are like a painted cake pie in the sky as they are possible only after the D.P.R.K. is totally disarmed,” said a statement on the Korean Central News Agency today (Reuters, Jan. 15).
Call to Dismantle Yongbyon
The Bush administration yesterday indicated that any future agreement would require North Korea to go far beyond the commitments it made in the 1994 Agreed Framework. Specifically, the United States will demand that North Korea dismantle the Yongbyon nuclear reactor, Newsday reported.
That reactor was shut down as part of the 1994 Agreed Framework, but to dismantle the facility “represents a different way to go that assures the peace so North Korea cannot later flip a switch and turn on nuclear weapons,” White House spokesman Ari Fleischer said.
Echoing earlier comments from Secretary of State Powell, Fleischer said that any settlement between the two countries must be in the form of a “new arrangement” (William Douglas, Newsday, Jan. 15).
China Offers to Host Talks
China yesterday increased its participation in the crisis by offering to host U.S.-North Korean talks, the Post reported. Assistant Secretary of State Kelly was due to arrive in Beijing today to discuss an increased Chinese role in dealing with Pyongyang.
“We hope the United States and North Korea can resume dialogue swiftly because we think that talks are the most effective channel for resolving this problem,” said Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue. “If the relevant sides are willing to hold dialogue in Beijing, I think we would have no difficulties with that,” she added.
China at first kept a low profile as the crisis unfolded, but Chinese President Jiang Zemin called Bush Jan. 10 on a rarely used hotline between Beijing and Washington, according to the Post.
“Since then China has become more and more involved,” said Shi Yinhong, an international security expert at People’s University in Beijing.
Analysts believe that North Korea insulted China by using Beijing as the setting to announce a possible resumption of missile tests. Experts also suggest that North Korea has, in recent years, distanced itself diplomatically from China and encouraged warmer relations with Moscow (John Pomfret, Washington Post, Jan. 15).
Russian President Vladimir Putin is sending Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov to China, North Korea and the United States in an effort to mediate the crisis, according to Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov.
“During the last few days, there have been encouraging statements,” Ivanov said (Russia Journal, Jan. 14).
By Bryan Bender
Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — U.S. officials and private experts are increasingly concerned a developing Iranian nuclear power industry might demand more attention at the same time the United States wrestles with nuclear crises in Iraq and North Korea. They contend that Iran’s efforts to build a nuclear power plant and other nuclear fuel cycle facilities could provide Iran with valuable nuclear expertise and materials.
The third member of U.S. President George W. Bush’s so-called “axis of evil,” Iran has until recently remained largely in the background. The United States has instead trained its attention first on the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein and his suspected WMD arsenal and now on North Korea, which last week pulled out of the Nonproliferation Treaty.
Recent revelations of two new Iranian nuclear facilities, however, threaten to complicate U.S. foreign policy.
“If Iraq is a crisis at our doorstep and North Korea is a crisis we keep kicking down the road, then Iran, I believe, could well turn out to be the crisis just around the bend in the road,” Michael Eisenstadt, senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, said Monday at a seminar sponsored by the Arms Control Association.
Experts contend that the two sites, made public last month, could be used to advance a nuclear weapons program, adding to long-running official U.S. concern over the construction of a light-water reactor at Bushehr on the Gulf coast.
A planned visit by the International Atomic Energy Agency next month to survey the new suspect Iranian facilities will again place the issue at the forefront of the U.N. disarmament and Bush foreign policy agenda.
In the meantime, private experts are urging both the United Nations and the Bush administration to act sooner rather than later to avoid the problems encountered with North Korea.
Pyongyang last year bowed out of a 1994 agreement with the United States to freeze its nuclear weapons program, withdrew from the Nonproliferation Treaty last week and is now moving to restart mothballed plutonium production facilities. The CIA says North Korea produced enough plutonium to construct one or two nuclear bombs prior to the 1994 freeze agreement. Only in recent days has the Bush administration agreed to talk to Pyongyang.
By refusing to engage with North Korea and branding it a member of the ‘axis of evil,” critics charge, the Bush administration is partially to blame for the recent nuclear brinkmanship.
Washington-Moscow Rift
The global stakes could be even higher in addressing Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons program. The issue puts Washington at odds with Russia, one of the most active supporters of the U.S. war on terrorism.
Russian officials say that no part of their nuclear assistance to Iran violates nuclear nonproliferation regimes. This week a senior Russian official reiterated Moscow’s intention to complete construction of the Bushehr reactor and to continue planning to build one or more additional nuclear power plants in Iran.
Alexander Rumyantsev, Russia’s atomic energy minister, said Monday that “continuing the construction of atomic power plants in Iran” would be among the Russian energy sector’s “main areas” of attention in 2003.
That pledge will only serve to fuel growing U.S. consternation with Russian nuclear assistance to Iran, according to government officials and private analysts.
Last month, the private Institute for Science and International Security released commercial satellite images depicting two facilities — one near the town of Arak and the other near the city of Kashan — where Iran appears to be building a heavy-water plant and a uranium enrichment facility (see GSN, Dec. 13, 2002).
“We’re in their face all the time because we still have serious concerns,” U.S. Ambassador to Russia Alexander Vershbow said in Washington last week. “We think that the best course would be for [Russia] to terminate the Bushehr project, but if that can’t be achieved, we are pushing for a variety of steps to contain the proliferation risk.”
Last month Russia and Iran agreed in principle to return all spent fuel from the Bushehr reactor to Russia, a key step that U.S. officials say is critical to preventing Iran from diverting nuclear material to make a bomb.
“Now an intergovernment agreement must be agreed between the ministries and agencies,” Rumyantsev said last month after returning from a trip to Iran, where he toured the Bushehr reactor. “It begins with the words that Russia undertakes to deliver and the Iranian side undertakes to return spent nuclear fuel” (see GSN, Dec. 31, 2002).
The United States would welcome such a step, Vershbow said last week, but Washington’s concerns go beyond the Bushehr reactor, originally a German-assisted project before Washington persuaded Berlin to cut off assistance.
“We think the Russians definitely should not build any more reactors, despite provisional agreements in the ’90s to build a second one at Bushehr and potentially another four at other sites,” Vershbow said Jan. 9 at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
“In the coming year Russia really needs to make some fundamental choices,” Vershbow added. “It needs to fully contain the proliferation risks from the light-water reactor that they’re building at Bushehr. In addition, the Russians need to crack down more effectively on other transfers of technology to Iran, both for WMD and ballistic missiles.”
“If the situation doesn’t get better,” he added, “it will likely get worse in terms of pressures for new U.N. sanctions and new political frictions.”
Iran’s Security Requirements
The experts said Iran is seeking a nuclear weapons capability for what in Tehran’s view are legitimate security reasons.
Facing neighboring Iraq, which has a long history of seeking nuclear weapons, along with the existence of a potential nuclear enemy in Pakistan, Iran’s nuclear ambitions are considered by many experts to be defensive.
“Iran is undoubtedly laying the infrastructure that is needed to make a decision at some later point” whether to develop nuclear weapons, said Gary Sick, director of the Middle East Institute at Colombia University. “A big driver has been Iraq,” he said.
Experts currently doubt that Iran will change its approach in the coming years (see GSN, Nov. 18, 2002). Indeed, U.S. policy regarding its own nuclear weapons and its strategies for containing Iran will have as much impact as anything, according to a recent RAND report (see GSN, Dec. 31, 2002).
Iran’s military and security services deeply believe that the country cannot count on outside assistance in a time of crisis, Iran experts told a nonproliferation conference sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in November. With growing uncertainty about some of its immediate neighbors, Tehran will continue to pursue a nuclear deterrent that it sees as the only guarantee of security, the experts said.
“They need a country-protecting” weapon, said Patrick Clawson, director of research at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
Growing Proliferation Risk
New U.S. intelligence information indicates that Iran is accelerating its search for such a weapon. Despite Russian assertions that its nuclear assistance to Iran is for purely civilian purposes, U.S. officials say there is growing evidence of Tehran’s true nuclear intentions.
A CIA report released last week, updating U.S. lawmakers on several countries’ acquisition of WMD technology between July 1 and December 31, 2001, repeated earlier charges of nuclear weapons proliferation in Iran (see GSN, Jan. 8).
“Despite Iran’s status in the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the United States is convinced Tehran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program,” the report said.
Of most concern is the Bushehr reactor, estimated by Russian officials to be about 70 percent complete. “Despite Bushehr being put under IAEA safeguards, Russia’s provision of expertise and manufacturing assistance has enabled Iran to develop its nuclear technology infrastructure – which, in turn, can benefit directly Tehran’s nuclear weapons R&D program,” according to the CIA.
“In addition,” according to the report, “Russian entities continued associations with Iranian research centers on other nuclear-fuel-cycle activities” during the reporting period. “Facing economic pressures, some Russian entities have shown a willingness to provide assistance to Iran’s nuclear projects by circumventing their country’s export laws. “
Meanwhile, Iranian opposition sources contend that the two new suspect sites, in Arak and Kashan, are being developed through a series of phony Iranian trading companies to obscure the true nature of the nuclear program.
Double Standard?
U.S. efforts to rein in the Iranian nuclear program are hampered by the appearance of what some experts consider a double standard.
The Bushehr reactor is considered similar to those the United States agreed to build for North Korea in return for its pledge to end its nuclear activities and Iran, as a member of the NPT, has the right to pursue nuclear energy
“Our position now is that anything poses a nuclear threat and it doesn’t matter what the treaty says about the right to civilian nuclear power,” Sick said.
Moreover, the experts said, the Bushehr reactor — like the proposed reactors in North Korea — is not well suited to developing nuclear weapons. For example, Anton Khlopkov of the Russian Center of Political Studies said recently that it was extremely difficult to produce plutonium from the Bushehr reactor to build a nuclear weapon.
He said that only time a weapon has been successfully developed from plutonium produced in a light-water reactor was in 1962 in the United States and only after 62 unsuccessful attempts.
As a result, Iran — unlike North Korea — is believed to be years away from having a usable nuclear weapon. “They are nowhere close to moving toward a weapon at this stage,” said Sick.
“The problem is that Iran is not cheating” any arms control regimes, said Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center. “They haven’t broken any rules, and they won’t until they have weapons,” he said.
The good news is that “there is still time,” Sick said. “This is the time to talk to Iran, before they make a decision and before they go down that road.”
Planned IAEA Visit
The International Atomic Energy Agency is expected to try its hand next month. Director General Mohamed ElBaradei is to visit Iran Feb. 25 to address allegations the country’s civilian nuclear efforts are being used to pursue an atomic bomb.
“I’m scheduled to meet with President [Mohammad] Khatami,” ElBaradei said in Washington Jan. 10 after meeting with members of the U.S. Congress. “And I’m supposed to visit the facilities that are being constructed there. I’ve discussed with them two facilities … that are being built right now in Iran. They indicated to me that they are ready to show maximum transparency, that they will take us to these facilities and others,” he said.
Due to the growing attention on Iran’s nuclear ambitions with the release of the recent satellite data, “I think it will be a lot harder for Iran to put off that trip,” which was already delayed once, said Corey Hinderstein of the Institute for Science and International Security. “They will declare those sites and allow IAEA access,” she predicted.
However, “a visit is not same as an inspection,” she warned, calling on the IAEA to conduct a thorough survey of the facilities and to take the allegations seriously. “We are worried that the IAEA visit will legitimize the [two new suspect] sites” as civilian nuclear facilities. “We hope the IAEA will use the situation to press for the Additional Protocol to be signed by Iran,” she said.
The Additional Protocol to each NPT nation’s IAEA safeguards agreement is designed to empower the agency to conduct more intrusive monitoring and verification activities than the original safeguards agreements allowed. The protocol was created following the 1991 Gulf War when IAEA inspections in Iraq revealed weaknesses in the safeguard systems. To date, however, only 28 of the more than 180 NPT parties have brought the protocol into force.
ElBaradei indicated last week that he intends to urge Iran to adopt the Additional Protocol when he travels there. “I also would like to impress on them the importance of maximum transparency, the importance of joining what we call our Additional Protocol which gives us additional authority to visit sites,” he said.
Others expect the visit will put pressure on Tehran. “The IAEA has tightened up their procedures,” added Sick. “I can’t believe they will go in and just walk by. They are worried about their own reputation. I don’t believe they will come in heavy and hostile, but I think they will do a serious look,” Sick said.
Call for Engagement
Supporting increased transparency is what some experts said is the only way to avoid a future nuclear crisis with Iran, and transparency will come only through engagement with Tehran, not isolation, they said.
Sick supports offering Iran incentives to rein in its nuclear program, including security guarantees and cooperation on the Bushehr reactor. “There are things that can be done that Iran would consider very seriously,” he said.
The message Tehran is getting from the U.S.-North Korean standoff, he added, is that Washington will negotiate with countries if they are nuclear powers, according to Sick, who served in the Carter administration.
“By increasing the demand for nuclear weapons by threatening to attack them, our policy encourages them” to seek nuclear weapons, he said. The Iranian view is that “the U.S. will make deals with you” if you have nuclear weapons. They believe that “when they are close [to developing a nuclear weapon] we will talk to them. By then we’ll have to give more,” Sick said.
“The way to deal with Iran is to engage them and talk before they have made a final decision and are on their way to drop out of the NPT,” he said. “My way might not work, but I think you could buy years and slow them down and accomplish what nonproliferation, as opposed to counterproliferation, was intended to do, buy time,” Sick said.
“You have to be willing to give something and we haven’t even been willing to talk to them,” he concluded. “Pre-emptive strikes are not the most effective way to deal with this problem,” Sick said.
By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — All five declared nuclear weapons states have submitted their views on a draft treaty banning nuclear weapons from five Central Asian states, and talks between the two sets of countries are planned for March, the top U.N. disarmament official said yesterday (see GSN, Dec. 20, 2002).
The three Western nuclear powers — the United States, the United Kingdom and France — submitted written proposals to modify the treaty’s text during a Dec. 17 New York meeting, U.N. Undersecretary General for Disarmament Affairs Jayantha Dhanapala told Global Security Newswire.
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are now considering the suggestions and will respond at a meeting expected to occur in March, Dhanapala said, adding that the Central Asian states do not appear willing to make major revisions to the existing draft.
Russia and China, the other two nuclear states, have previously expressed support for the treaty. They recommended few changes during last month’s meeting, Dhanapala said.
At last month’s meeting, all five declared states expressed support, in principle, for creation of a Central Asian weapon-free zone, Dhanapala said. Western nuclear powers’ concerns range from editorial changes to long-standing concerns over several treaty provisions, he said (see GSN, Nov. 22).
The three Western states have had concerns with treaty provisions on the transit of nuclear weapons through the zone and the zone’s possible expansion. Dhanapala said it was odd these provisions would become the subject of such debate during the negotiations because they are similar to provisions in other nuclear weapon-free zone treaties, such as the Pelindaba Treaty, which created a weapon-free zone in Africa.
Dhanapala also provided further details on the Western nuclear states’ continuing concern about a treaty provision that addresses the relationship between the weapon-free zone and other regional agreements, primarily the Treaty of Tashkent — a security agreement between Russia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The provision was the result of a carefully worded compromise among the Central Asian states that preserves the non-nuclear aspects of such security agreements while still prohibiting nuclear weapons in the zone — a position supported by Russia.
The three Western states have called for further clarification and have suggested that the treaty does not need the provision, Dhanapala said. The provision, however, helped gain Kazakh support for the zone, and extensive modification could jeopardize the larger agreement, Dhanapala warned.
The Central Asian states want to sign the treaty by April. While not setting a formal deadline, the Central Asian states want to avoid open-ended treaty discussions, Dhanapala said (see GSN, Sept. 4, 2002).
While the five nuclear weapons states cannot prevent the creation of a nuclear weapon-free zone, the Central Asian countries have asked them to sign a protocol to the proposed treaty agreeing to respect the zone and to refrain from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against zone members.
There have been previous examples of weapon-free zones being launched without the initial support of all five declared states, Dhanapala said. For example, France long resisted signing the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which created a weapon-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean. The Central Asian zone, however, will have increased value if the declared states offer their support from the outset, Dhanapala said.
The negotiations over the Central Asian treaty raise questions about the role of the declared states in the creation of nuclear weapon-free zones, Dhanapala said. If the nuclear powers can withhold their support until a zone is created more to their liking, it will make the entire process more difficult, he said, noting the positive impact such zones have had in global disarmament.
There is also an increasing likelihood of a new “Great Game” playing out in Central Asia because of the region’s oil and natural gas resources, Dhanapala said, referring to the 19th century regional rivalry between the British Empire and czarist Russia. The creation of the nuclear weapon-free zone in the region will help to remove the nuclear aspect from any potential conflict that might emerge, he said.
For further information, see:
Bangkok Treaty Text (Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-free Zone)
Pelindaba Treaty Text (Africa Nuclear Weapon-free Zone)
Rarotonga Treaty Text (South Pacific Nuclear Weapon-free Zone)
Treaty of Tlatelolco Text (Latin America and Caribbean Nuclear Weapon-free Zone)
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