U.N. and U.S. officials have taken a wait-and-see approach to yesterday’s discovery of a number of empty Iraqi chemical warheads. A U.N. spokesman said the discovery is not yet regarded as “a smoking gun” that Iraq has continued to develop weapons of mass destruction, the Washington Post reported today (see GSN, Jan. 16).
U.N. inspectors yesterday discovered 11 empty 122 mm chemical warheads, along with one warhead that required further testing, that were not listed in the declaration Iraq submitted to the U.N. Security Council on its weapons of mass destruction, U.N. officials said. While the discovery appears to place Iraq in violation of U.N. resolutions, both Bush administration officials and U.N. officials have so far played down the find’s significance, according to the Post.
“This was an important discovery. This was clearly something they should not have had,” a U.N. official said. Inspectors did not immediately determine, however, that the warheads are “a smoking gun that proves conclusively Iraq is hiding” or producing chemical weapons, the official added (Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Washington Post, Jan. 17).
Chief U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix said today that he was “not worried” that the warheads’ discovery could be used as potential rationale for an attack on Iraq.
“There are no chemical weapons inside them. However, clearly they were designed to carry chemical weapons. I think we should destroy them, that’s the rules,” Blix said.
Iraq needs to provide more information to inspectors about the warheads, Blix said. “What I see from the American reaction is that they too would like to have a little further information about it, and so I’m not so worried,” he added (John Leicester, Associated Press/Yahoo.com, Jan. 17).
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations John Negroponte said yesterday that he could not assess the significance of the discovery without further information (Financial Times, Jan. 17).
Other U.N diplomats debated yesterday’s find, according to the Los Angeles Times. Some said that the warheads should not be considered chemical weapons if they do not contain agent, while others say Iraq is required under U.N. resolutions to disarm itself of even the capabilities to deliver such weapons.
“Why keep the warheads if you say you don’t have the chemical agents?” a Security Council diplomat asked (Maggie Farley, Los Angeles Times, Jan. 17).
Iraqi Gen. Hussam Mohamed Amin, the chief Iraqi liaison with inspectors, dismissed the discovery yesterday, saying Iraq had merely forgotten to include the warheads in its declaration. The warheads were overlooked because they were kept in a box similar to those used to store conventional 122 mm warheads, Amin said.
“Nobody opened this box,” Amin said during a press conference held shortly after inspectors announced their discovery. “There was no intention to keep them,” he added (Chandrasekaran, Washington Post).
The warheads might never have been filled with chemical agents, they might have been filled but emptied prior to 1998 or they might have been filled and emptied recently, said Raymond Zilinskas, director of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation program at the Monterey Institute of International Studies.
If the warheads had been filled and emptied recently, “that would be a very serious issue because the Iraqis have declared that they don’t have any of the stuff, and that could lead to ‘material breach’ being declared under [U.N. Security Council] Resolution 1441,” Zilinskas said, referring to the resolution that established the current inspections regime.
If the warheads had never been filled, however, it would be “a very, very small story,” because it would only mean that a small number of warheads had escaped destruction during past inspections, he said (Edith Lederer, Associated Press/Yahoo.com, Jan. 17).
Bush administration officials have expressed more interest in a number of documents taken yesterday from the home of Iraqi physicist Faleh Hassan, according to the Washington Post. Hassan, director of the Razi military installation, which specializes in laser development, argued briefly with inspectors before traveling with them to U.N. headquarters, the Post reported. Iraqi officials were present while Hassan was questioned and they were given copies of the Arabic-language documents (DeYoung/Pincus, Washington Post, Jan. 17).
Blix to Baghdad
U.N. inspectors believe that Iraqi WMD personnel are an important source of information and are planning to conduct more personal interviews, Blix said yesterday during a meeting with European officials in Brussels en route to a meeting in Baghdad scheduled to begin Sunday (see GSN, Jan. 15).
“A precondition for the interviews to be credible will be that the persons can talk without feeling intimidated,” Blix said. “If Iraq is absolutely sure that there is nothing that they have to hide, then they should be anxious that the interviewees could speak without intimidation,” he added.
Calling the situation “very tense and very dangerous,” Blix said he would urge Iraq during his visit to cooperate with inspections (Farley, Los Angeles Times).
Security Council Debate
Meanwhile, the United States resisted calls from other countries yesterday for the U.N. Security Council to approve any future military action against Iraq, according to the New York Times.
“A unilateral military operation against Baghdad that is not sanctioned by the U.N. Security Council is capable only of worsening the already difficult situation in the region,” Interfax quoted Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov as saying.
U.S. President George W. Bush has agreed to consult with the Security Council, but has retained the option of attacking Iraq without a second U.N. resolution, White House press secretary Ari Fleischer said.
“The president will continue to work with other nations on this matter,” Fleischer said. “And many nations have already weighed in and said they don’t think a second resolution is necessary. And whether someone thinks a second resolution is necessary, or whether a different nation says a resolution is not necessary, the president will continue to work with one and all to build a coalition of the willing,” he added.
British Prime Minister Tony Blair also expressed support for a second resolution, but left open the possibility of military action without one.
“Of course we all want a second U.N. resolution. I believe we will get one,” Blair said, but “where there is an unreasonable veto put down, we will not rule out action,” he added (Stevenson/Sanger, New York Times, Jan. 16).
Ousting Hussein
Saudi Arabia is encouraging the Iraqi military to oust Hussein and his ruling circle, according to Time (see GSN, Jan. 9). The plan requires a U.N.-provided amnesty for most Iraqi officials if they participate in the coup, Western and Arab diplomats said. The amnesty would extend to all but 100 to 200 of the most senior Baath party officials and would be offered shortly before any military action, according to Time. To secure international support for the plan, the amnesty would be conditioned on the officials’ full and active cooperation with implementing U.N. disarmament resolutions.
“If there is amnesty for the rest of the government, Saddam will be checkmated,” a diplomat said.
Saudi Arabia has launched its plan to oust Hussein, in part, because of concerns that the United States will do little to rebuild Iraq after an invasion, diplomats said. Arab leaders have little faith in the various exiled Iraqi opposition groups and believe that a brand-new regime would have little chance of surviving, Time reported.
“If things go wrong, the troops will get back on their ships and leave,” an Arab diplomat said. “We in the region will be left with the consequences. It will be a never-ending story,” the diplomat added.
Arab diplomats are concerned that the United States will only see the Saudi plan as a delay tactic and will not support it. Western diplomats, however, have said the Saudi plan is similar to U.S. thoughts on removing Hussein.
“Politically, there would be nothing better for President Bush than to remove Saddam and disarm Iraq without firing a shot,” a Western diplomat said. “All along, Washington’s hope has been that as pressure gets high enough, the people around Saddam will take matters into their own hands,” the diplomat added (Scott Macleod, Time, Jan. 16).
Inspections
U.N. inspectors have visited at least three suspect Iraqi sites today, according to Reuters. Chemical experts from the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission visited the Fallujah 1 and Fallujah 2 sites northwest of Baghdad, Iraqi officials said. UNMOVIC biological inspectors visited al-Saweira, about 30 miles south of Baghdad (Reuters, Jan. 17).
Yesterday, inspectors visited at least nine sites, according to an IAEA press release. UNMOVIC missile inspectors visited the al-Nidaa State Company and held technical discussions with site personnel to verify information obtain during previous inspections. They also visited the Nissan 17 Factory in Baghdad, which produces components for the al-Samoud ballistic missile, according to the IAEA release. UNMOVIC chemical inspectors visited storage facilities located at the Rasheed State Company for Production of Construction and Building Materials (International Atomic Energy Agency release, Jan. 16).
For further information, see:
UNMOVIC
IAEA Iraq Action Team
U.N. Resolution 1441
By Bryan Bender
Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — A senior Democratic lawmaker this week chided Republican colleagues for obstructing U.S. efforts to dismantle former Soviet weapons of mass destruction and materials.
From the conception of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program more than 10 years ago, U.S. legislators have established conditions that recipient states must meet before they can receive U.S. support.
Some of these congressionally mandated restrictions forced President George W. Bush to sign two waivers last week freeing $466 million to help destroy Russian chemical weapons and initiate other threat reduction programs in the former Soviet Union (see GSN, Jan. 15).
“These petty restrictions, these hurdles that have to be cleared, are wholly disproportionate to the enormity of the problem before us,” House Armed Services Committee member John Spratt (D-S.C.) told the Arms Control Association Monday. “It’s the nature of the congressional process, but this is something that the president, the administration could deal with with forthright public statements saying that this is impeding important progress that affects our national security,” Spratt said.
Congressional critics, mostly Republicans in the House of Representatives, have sought to freeze some of the threat reduction funds out of concern that Russia is not spending enough of its own money on threat reduction programs and has not been fully transparent or provided adequate access to its weapons programs.
Another meddlesome restriction, according to program supporters, has been the requirement to certify that Russia is fully compliant with arms control treaties before releasing all threat reduction funds.
“There will be someone who wants to exact a concession,” Spratt said of his colleagues. However, “we need to make it clear to everybody that what we’re talking about is not Russia’s security, but our security,” he said.
He singled out the Nuclear Cities Initiative as an example of a U.S. threat reduction program that has been held hostage by politics. The decade-old project, now called the Russian Transition Initiative, is designed to provide scientists in Moscow’s closed nuclear facilities with alternative compensation in light of Russia’s economic troubles in recent years.
“These programs have never been terribly popular among my colleagues from across the aisle,” Spratt said, nor among senior Bush administration officials, who fear some of the money has been diverted. “I know from a personal engagement that [national security adviser] Condoleezza Rice was not particularly impressed with the Nuclear Cities Initiative,” he said.
Funding for the effort has been reduced over the years, despite its obvious utility, in some years by almost $20 million, he said. In recent years the program has received as much as $57 million.
“It’s in jeopardy of coming down even more. This is one of the areas where we should be really worried,” Spratt said.
Overall, he added, the CTR program is “succeeding in spite of these impediments that we’ve laid in Congress, but we need more money. Based upon their success, we need more emphasis, and these programs deserve more credit,” Spratt said.
By Bryan Bender
Global Security Newswire
The U.S. Defense Department yesterday awarded contracts worth up to $500 million each to Space Imaging Corp. and DigitalGlobe Inc. to purchase commercial satellite images to supplement U.S. spy satellites in what could be a boost to nonproliferation efforts (see GSN, July 3, 2002).
The National Imagery and Mapping Agency announced the contracts following orders last year from CIA Director George Tenet, who has oversight of all U.S. intelligence agencies, to dramatically increase the intelligence community’s reliance on high-resolution imagery from private companies.
“This is a new approach to the purchase of commercial satellite imagery,” said Mark Brender, Space Imaging’s executive director of government relations and corporate communications.
The multiyear deal will make publicly available more timely, precise and affordable pictures of the Earth than ever before, as images purchased by government or private clients are kept in publicly available archives, with few exceptions.
The move is expected to help the nonproliferation community. Greater access to high-resolution space imagery would assist international arms inspectors, strengthen diplomatic efforts to pressure would-be proliferators and treaty violators, and otherwise improve the ability of governments, international bodies, independent analysts and nongovernmental organizations to monitor WMD-related activities around the globe.
Commercial imagery has been used recently by nongovernmental organizations to track WMD developments. For example, arms control experts have used it to monitor suspected Iraqi weapons facilities (see GSN, Aug. 13, 2002), as well as to confirm the existence of two new nuclear facilities under construction in Iran (see GSN, Dec. 13, 2002).
“This technology is moving from the black world of intelligence — where it has resided for the last 40 years — to the white world of commerce,” Brender said. The new contract will make available “high quality, map-accurate imagery of any place on the globe for innumerable uses,” he said.
Space Imaging’s satellite, orbiting 423 miles above the Earth, can pick out objects on the ground as small as a three-square-foot table, according to Reuters, while DigitalGlobe’s satellite can distinguish objects as small as two feet across from 280 miles in space.
Yesterday’s contract installment for Space Imaging was $120 million, while DigitalGlobe received an initial award of $96 million.
Ewen Buchanan, currently the chief spokesman for the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, spent 10 years as a British diplomat, focusing largely on arms control issues, before joining the U.N. inspection effort in 1995.
Veteran diplomatic correspondent Lee Michael Katz interviewed Buchanan for the National Journal on Jan 12. In the following edited excerpts, Buchanan addresses many critical issues, including expected deadlines, Iraqi intransigence, Saddam’s potentially deadly arsenal, U.S. intelligence-sharing, and spying controversies.
National Journal: The Jan. 27 inspection update for the U.N. Security Council is seen in Washington, as one U.S. official termed it, as the “beginning of the final phase” in dealing with Iraq. Isn’t this a really significant deadline?
Ewen Buchanan: It’s not the end of the line for us. It is an important date, but neither will inspections end on the 27th of January. The intention is to clearly go on beyond that date, because there is much work to be done. The next thing on our calendar is the quarterly report due to the council on the 1st of March.
I think the U.N. secretary general was right to point out that this is not just a one-week wonder. There are hundreds more sites to inspect, much investigation to be done. To do a credible job, it does take time. You cannot simply spend six or seven weeks on inspections and then call it done.
NJ: And your time frame is nine months to a year as a practical matter?
Buchanan: Well, that is the time frame set out in Resolution 1284, and it continues to be the guideline for us. I stress that these decisions are up to the Security Council. We take our marching orders from them.
NJ: But your work requires more time?
Buchanan: People have to realize that inspections are not just a simple rushing into a factory and seeing if there is anything there. It’s a bit like trying to put together a jigsaw puzzle. Something that makes no sense one day might make sense a week later, when you see something at another site. The media have been dogging us in Baghdad just because we do not find a whole shed full of ballistic missiles. It doesn’t mean we aren’t finding out activities or taking samples.
NJ: So Saddam Hussein should not take comfort in the recent declaration by UNMOVIC’s chairman, Hans Blix, that you found no “smoking gun” in Iraq?
Buchanan: No. It’s a simple statement that we had found nothing of significance up to that date. It does not preclude that Iraq may be hiding something. [U.S. Defense] Secretary [Donald] Rumsfeld has said many times that absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. We have to recall that our predecessor, UNSCOM, was on the ground for seven years. We just, as UNMOVIC, passed the seventh week.
NJ: Isn’t it the same organization?
Buchanan: What has changed is that UNSCOM was set up to be staffed and run by people provided and paid by governments. And that did lead to the perception — and I underline the word “perception” — that if you’re being paid by a government, are your loyalties divided between your paymasters and the U.N.? So what was decided when UNMOVIC was set up in `99, for greater integrity, the new organization should be staffed by people who are on the U.N. payroll. And that is a big difference.
NJ: There has been criticism of the experience level of current inspectors, compared to UNSCOM’s. Is that valid?
Buchanan: Of the 300 people we have, about a third have some form of UNSCOM experience. It’s nonsense, as some people have contended, to say that all of our inspectors are brand new and wet behind the ears.
NJ: Is Iraq in “material breach” of the U.N. resolutions, a key trigger point for the Bush administration?
Buchanan: Dr. Blix has been very clear that he does not believe that is for us to determine. Our job is simply to report.
He also added that opening doors is not enough. The Iraqis have to be more active, by trying to answer questions. When UNSCOM left Iraq in 1998, there were many outstanding questions. Those were listed in a report, which ran to some 280 pages. So far, Iraq has not provided hardly anything, frankly, in this declaration we got in December, which goes to answering those questions. That clearly surprised some of us, particularly the old hands. By and large, the stuff Iraq provided was simply recycled material given to the previous inspection regimes. As Dr. Blix said, it was rich in volume, but poor in substance.
Sadly, that declaration has so far done virtually nothing by way of filling the gaps. And in some cases, actually, the declaration raises more questions. So Iraq seems to have missed an opportunity. It was quite clear that this declaration was going to be an important part of the system whereby Iraq declares and the U.N.’s agencies verify. What happened throughout the `90s was, more or less, Iraq hides and the U.N. seeks.
NJ: Blix and International Atomic Energy Agency head Mohamed ElBaradei plan to visit Baghdad on Jan. 19. Will they lecture Iraq on its poor compliance?
Buchanan: Clearly, it’s a chance for us to lay down to Iraq the importance that the Security Council attaches to this whole business. Opening doors is not enough. We need concrete evidence from the Iraqi side to try to fill some of these outstanding questions. These are not questions new to the Iraqi side.
A classic example is anthrax production. The Iraqis claim they have produced some 8,500 liters of anthrax. This was never verified by inspectors. And in fact, the inspectors concluded, based on unaccounted-for material, that Iraq could have made three times as much anthrax as it declared.
And our outstanding question is, just how much did they make? Did Iraq in fact destroy it, as they claimed? So far, Iraq has done virtually nothing by way of providing evidence that the anthrax was destroyed.
NJ: Could Iraq have conceivably made the anthrax that was used in the U.S. attacks?
Buchanan: It has been a question. But I don’t know that anybody has come forward with any direct evidence. Just from what I’ve seen in the U.S. media, the main suspicion seems to be on some domestic sort of element rather than foreign.
But clearly Iraq is a country that did produce anthrax on a very large scale, and certainly weaponized anthrax into bombs and warheads. We have to get to the bottom of what happened to all of Iraq’s anthrax program. And anthrax is a particularly worrying agent, in that it’s very, very stable; it remains viable for a long time.
NJ: What are some other examples? VX?
Buchanan: The toxic nerve agent, VX, is another well-known one. Iraq, eventually after many years of denial, did admit to having produced 3.9 tons of VX. Yes, there was evidence that some of it was destroyed, but it’s very difficult to quantify. And like the anthrax case, Iraq could have made an awful lot more of VX. We know they had equipment available to them, the building blocks of chemical weapons.
They are the ones with the records, bills, contracts. So the burden of proof is really on them if they want to get out of this. They have to convince us that, indeed, this stuff is gone.
There are also questions in the missile area, about warheads and missile production capabilities. And the Iraqis have gone to great extent to try to cover their tracks by destroying equipment, prototypes, melting down things even, to try to keep us from determining just how much they had achieved in the missile programs.
NJ: What is now the biggest gap in Iraqi credibility? Is it that they claimed to have destroyed weapons, but have no evidence of it?
Buchanan: It goes back to a choice they made back in the 1990s. The original resolution said that proscribed materials should be destroyed under international supervision. Iraq chose not to have that happen. So for inspectors, it became a forensic exercise. And so the question mark is, well, if you did destroy, where did you destroy it? Who did this? Where are the remains? There are many serious concerns. The most question marks are clearly in the biological file, the middle one is chemical, and probably the least question marks are in the missile area.
NJ: You mentioned the biological weapons program. There’s an Iraqi scientist whose nickname is “Dr. Germ.” Would you like to speak to her — in or out of Iraq?
Buchanan: Clearly, she was an important part of Iraq’s biological weapons program. You referred to her as Dr. Germ. Her real name is Dr. Rihab Taha. She was in charge, I believe, of the bacteria side of the biological weapons program, principally the anthrax production program. She was interviewed many times in the past in Baghdad. Obviously, we don’t want to declare in advance who we want to interview.
NJ: A major issue is whether weapons scientists will be interviewed outside of Iraq. Are you glad the United States has offered asylum to them and their families?
Buchanan: The resolution adopted in November gives us the authority to take people outside of Iraq, including their families. But Dr. Blix said several times he does not see us being a defection agency or an abduction agency. We would normally take people out of Iraq with their consent.
A number of questions are still being wrestled with. How many people do you take? How do you provide for security? What happens if they don’t wish to go back to Iraq? What happens if they don’t give us any great tips and simply repeat things we already know? Would that be grounds for sending them straight back to Iraq?
NJ: Do you think the United States has provided enough information for the commission to do its job in a timely fashion? The IAEA’s ElBaradei just said he needed more “actionable” information from Washington for nuclear inspections.
Buchanan: We, like the IAEA, have an ongoing need for timely information from any country that has it — not just the United States. And in fact, the resolution requires member states to support us. We have set up a system to encourage states to give us information by dealing with intelligence very much on a need-to-know basis. We certainly know that if we are not careful with other people’s intelligence, the tap will be turned off.
And clearly, we need timely information. That was often a problem for UNSCOM, because you’d go to a site and you could see by the layers of dust or marks on the floor that there had been some crates or something here before. So the information had been correct, but it was stale. So there’s a need to have timely information.
NJ: U.S. officials, in withholding intelligence, have cited a concern that there is no American deputy chairman of the current inspection commission, unlike its predecessor, UNSCOM.
Buchanan: UNMOVIC was set up pursuant to guidance by the Security Council. I think UNSCOM was perceived, at least, to have lost some of its legitimacy because of being perceived to be too close to the intelligence agencies, having too cozy of a relationship.
NJ: With the United States?
Buchanan: Well, not just the United States, but others too. Countries that were named at the time include the U.K. and Israel as well. One of the recommendations taken up by the Security Council is that, henceforth, intelligence matters should be a one-way street. We are not in the business of sharing or trading or swapping.
There may well be individuals in various quarters unhappy with this arrangement, but we believe, overall, governments understand that the system is important for our integrity.
NJ: The vice president of Iraq just accused inspectors of “playing an intelligence role.” Does it bother you to be accused of spying?
Buchanan: Frankly, it’s a distraction. Iraq should be devoting more time to answering our questions than firing off these charges, which seem to have no foundation. The Iraqis have been saying we’re asking inappropriate questions. It’s for us to judge what are appropriate questions or not. We’ve been acting in a professional and effective manner. If Iraq has specific allegations to make about individuals, rather then just blanket claims, they would be welcome to bring these up with Dr. Blix when he visits Baghdad. Dr. Blix has said that if he were to discover people who were working for governments, he would boot them out.
NJ: Do you think Saddam Hussein has had a change of heart in dealing with inspectors?
Buchanan: It’s really difficult to tell. But the whole situation, politically, is very different now from what it was in the late 1990s. Now we have a united Security Council behind us. There has to be sustained support for UNMOVIC, and not the mere adoption of a resolution. We can only be as effective as the council is strong behind us.
One of the things UNSCOM suffered from was Security Council fatigue of the issue. It was because of the diminished political support for UNSCOM that Iraq took advantage.
NJ: It’s heading toward 12 years now that U.N. inspections have been going on. Didn’t the first U.N. inspection chief think this could be done very quickly, with Iraq’s cooperation?
Buchanan: I believe he more or less said to his wife, “I will take this job on and I’ll be back in six months.” This exercise was never meant to be like this. Dr. Blix sometimes gets asked, how long do you think this might take to wrap up? And the honest answer is, it depends entirely on Iraq.
If they were to cooperate fully, some of this can be wrapped up within nine months to a year. But, this whole business — had Iraq chosen to cooperate in the first place — could have been wrapped up in the 1991 and 1992 time frame.
NJ: Are we going to be talking about this 12 years from now?
Buchanan: I don’t believe the Security Council is willing to go back to the game of cat and mouse, or cheat and retreat. I don’t think the council will have that much patience.
Experts from the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency have conducted hundreds of inspections in Iraq since resuming the post-Gulf War inspection regime Nov. 27. More than 100 inspectors are now based in the country at two facilities in Baghdad and Mosul. The following chart summarizes some of the inspectors’ reported activities.
| Date | Site | Activity | | Jan. 17 | Fallujah 1, northwest of Baghdad | See GSN, Jan. 17. | | Fallujah 2, northwest of Baghdad | | Al-Saweira, about 30 miles south of Baghdad | | Jan. 16 | Al-Nidaa State Company | UNMOVIC missile inspectors held technical discussions with site personnel to verify information obtain during other inspections (see GSN, Jan. 17). | | Nissan 17 Factory in Baghdad | UNMOVIC missile inspectors visited the site, which produces al-Samoud ballistic missile components (see GSN, Jan. 17). | | Rasheed State Company for Production of Construction and Building Materials | See GSN, Jan. 17 | | Ukhaider Ammunition Storage Area | Inspectors discovered at least 11 empty chemical warheads and are conducting further testing (see GSN, Jan. 16). | | Home of physicist Faleh Hassan | See GSN, Jan. 16. | | Home of nuclear scientist Shaker el-Jibouri | | Al-Salamiyat agricultural area, about 10 miles west of Baghdad | Inspectors traveled to the site with Hassan to inspect an apparently manmade earth mound (see GSN, Jan. 16). | | Site in Karkh belonging to the Iraqi-supported Iranian opposition group Mujahedine Khalq | See GSN, Jan. 16. | | Ghazaliyeh neighborhood of Baghdad | | Jan. 15 | Mosul Technical Institute | See IAEA release, Jan. 16. | | Saad State Company in West Baghdad | See GSN, Jan. 16. | | Khan Dari Stores | | Nassr al-Adheem State Company | | Biology department of the College of Education for Women at the Anbar University in Ramadi | | College of Science at the Anbar University in Ramadi | | College of Education at the Anbar University in Ramadi | | College of Medicine at the Anbar University in Ramadi | | Al-Ameen Factory | | Al-Rasheed SC Headquarters | UNMOVIC missile inspectors visited the site to verify information obtained from personnel at the al-Ameen Factory (see GSN, Jan. 16). | | Al-Zafaraniya Military College of Engineering | UNMOVIC missile inspectors visited the site to verify information obtained from personnel at the al-Ameen Factory (see GSN, Jan. 16). | | Isakandariya State Establishment for Mechanical Industries | See GSN, Jan. 16. | | Al-Mutaz Technical Institute | | Hatteen State Company | | Tiklit Munitions Depot, located at a Mujahedine Khalq-owned site | | Al-Jamhoury presidential palace in central Baghdad | See GSN, Jan. 15 | | Private farm in Doura, south of Baghdad | | Jan. 14 | Al-Rabia Center for Agricultural Research in Baghdad | See GSN, Jan. 15. | | Air Force Technical Military Depot in al-Taji | | Al-Mutaseem site | UNMOVIC missile inspectors visited the site to tag al-Fatah missiles (see GSN, Jan.15). | | Inskandariya Explosives Research and Development facility | See GSN, Jan. 15. | | Tho al-Fukar Mechanical Plant | | Sumood Factory | | Nassr State Establishment | | Qa Qaa Stores | | Missile engine testing plant | See GSN, Jan. 14. | | Military depot | | State-owned company housed in the National Monitoring Directorate complex | | Jan. 13 | Al-Ameer Factory | UNMOVIC missile inspectors visited the site, which had produced Scud missile components before 1991 (see GSN, Jan. 14). | | Airstrip near al-Muhammadiah | See GSN, Jan. 14. | | Storage area adjacent to the airstrip near al-Muhammadiah | | Bombing range near al-Muhammadiah | | Baghdad Technology University | UNMOVIC chemical inspectors conducted a rebaselining inspection and inspected the Department of Chemical Technology. IAEA inspectors verified the scientific and technical activities conducted at the site (see GSN, Jan. 14). | | Baghdad University College of Science for Women | See GSN, Jan. 14. | | Department of Biology at the Baghdad University College of Science | | Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center | IAEA inspectors visited the site to confirm sections of the Iraqi declaration (see GSN, Jan.14). | | Ibn Rushed Company | See GSN, Jan. 13. | | Jan. 12 | National Chemical Plastic Industry in Baghdad | IAEA release, Jan. 13. | | Sharqat EMIS Facility | A joint UNMOVIC and IAEA team visited the site, which was originally designed to house an electromagnetic isotope separation facility (see GSN, Jan. 13). | | Al-Rafah Liquid Engine Test Facility | UNMOVIC missile inspectors visited the site to observe a static test of an al-Samoud missile engine (see GSN, Jan. 13). | | Al-Mutaseem | UNMOVIC missile inspectors visited the site to observe a static test of the al-Uboor motor (see GSN, Jan. 13). | | Iraqi military unit north of the southern city of Mosul | UNMOVIC missile inspectors tagged al-Farah missiles at the unit (see GSN, Jan. 13). | | Microbiology Department at Baghdad University’s College of Medicine | See GSN, Jan. 13. | | Baghdad University’s College of Pharmacy | | Air Force Technical Military Depot at al-Taji | | Jaber Ben Hayan State Establishment | Inspectors visited the site, which produces chemical protection equipment (see GSN, Jan. 13). | | Jan. 11 | Bin Sina Center | UNMOVIC missile inspectors visited several buildings at the site to verify equipment and raw materials used in missile activities (IAEA release, Jan. 11). | | Airfield about 300 kilometers west-northwest of Baghdad | IAEA release, Jan. 11. | | Tiklit University College of Science | | Tiklit University College of Agriculture | | Tiklit University College of Engineering | | Tiklit University College of Medicine | | 
Back to top
