U.S. and British diplomats have settled on their diplomatic strategy in the U.N. Security Council: win nine votes for a new resolution on Iraq, the bare minimum needed for passage, and then challenge China, France and Russia to veto the measure, Bush administration officials said yesterday (see GSN, Feb. 20).
Previously, the two countries had hoped for a 15-0 council vote on a new resolution that would authorize military action against Iraq, according to the New York Times. Some officials involved in the discussions over the new approach had argued that a resolution approved by a divided council would be seen as weak. Over the last few weeks, however, White House officials have decided that even a resolution passed by a slim majority would still have authority, the Times reported.
U.S. and British officials worked yesterday on resolving their differences on the language of the draft resolution, according to the Times. It is likely to be introduced in the Security Council next week, possibly Monday, Bush administration officials said.
U.S. and British officials also discussed how to persuade five of the council’s six uncommitted, nonpermanent members — Angola, Guinea, Cameroon, Mexico, Chile and Pakistan — to support the new resolution, diplomats said. Currently, only Bulgaria and Spain have openly supported the U.S.-British position, the Times reported. The United States and the United Kingdom, which support an attack on Iraq, and France and Germany, which oppose such action, have said they are not using economic pressure to sway the remaining nonpermanent members. The foreign aid programs provided to these countries, however, are an important factor in the discussions, diplomats said.
The six countries “are really feeling the heat, and they’re going to be feeling even more heat in coming days,” said a Bush administration official. “On the other side, the French and Germans are turning up the pressure, too,” the official added (Weisman/Barringer, New York Times, Feb. 21).
Blix Prepares Questions
Chief U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix plans Monday to give his advisory board a list of about 30 unresolved questions related to Iraq’s disarmament, according to Reuters. The list is part of preparations for a written report Blix is expected to submit to the Security Council on either Feb. 28 or March 3. A briefing, scheduled for March 7, will then follow that report, diplomats said.
The entire list of remaining questions, almost 300 pages, has been compiled by the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission over the past several years, Reuters reported. The UNMOVIC advisory group is expected to receive a condensed version “in clusters” during meetings Monday and Tuesday (Evelyn Leopold, Reuters/MSNBC.com, Feb. 21).
Iraq’s Illegal Missiles
Meanwhile, Blix is expected to send a letter to Iraq today demanding that it destroy all of its al-Samoud 2 ballistic missiles, which an expert panel has recently determined violate U.N. mandates because of their range, diplomats and U.N. officials said yesterday (see GSN, Feb. 20; Edith Lederer, Associated Press/Yahoo.com, Feb. 21).
U.N. inspectors last night were preparing the order, which would cover 100 al-Samoud 2s, 50 of which have already been sent to the Iraqi army; and 380 illegally imported SA-2 engines that were meant for use in al-Samoud 2 production, the National Post reported. Iraq is also expected to be ordered to destroy casting chambers that could be used to produce engines for missiles capable of traveling farther than the U.N.-allowed range of 150 kilometers (Steven Edwards, National Post, Feb. 20).
Blix is still deciding whether to set a formal deadline for Iraq’s destruction of the missiles, knowing that if Iraq refuses to do so, it could set off war, according to U.N. and U.S. officials.
“The discussions today were on setting an artificial timeline of when destruction should begin and end,” a U.N. official said yesterday. During those discussions, Blix and other officials recognized that Iraq’s refusal to carry out the missile destruction order “would constitute the most direct and visible defiance of the United Nations since inspections resumed,” the U.N. official added.
During the previous inspections regimes from 1991 to 1998, inspectors operated under different practices for the destruction of prohibited weapons and the equipment used to produce them, according to the Washington Post.
“In the beginning, destruction was immediate or very rapid,” said former U.N. inspector Timothy McCarthy. “There were negotiations about disposition of equipment, but ultimately we destroyed whatever we wanted. At no time was there an item that we wished to destroy that we didn’t destroy,” he added (Walter Pincus, Washington Post, Feb. 21).
Iraq has claimed that the missiles flight-tested beyond U.N.-allowed ranges because they were not equipped at the time with warheads and guidance systems, which would have made them heavier. Baghdad wants U.N. technical experts to travel to Iraq to “to see that these missiles cannot exceed in any way 150 kilometers, and not to limit themselves to a written paper, a theoretical report,” Iraq’s U.N. Ambassador Mohammed al-Douri said (Lederer, Associated Press).
U.S. Troops Ready to Invade
The United States and the United Kingdom have amassed a military presence large enough in the Persian Gulf region to invade Iraq at any time, U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said yesterday.
“I would characterize it as ample,” Rumsfeld said of the U.S.-British military force, during an interview on PBS’s NewsHour With Jim Lehrer. “We are at a point where, if the president (George W. Bush) makes that decision (to attack), the Department of Defense is prepared and has the capabilities and the strategy to do that,” he said.
So far, the United States and the United Kingdom have assembled more than 150,000 troops, dozens of warships and hundreds of aircraft, defense officials said. Six aircraft carriers, five U.S. and one British, are also expected to join the force soon, which could number more than 200,000 troops by the end of the month, according to U.S. officials.
Rumsfeld, however, refused to provide more details on the exact makeup of the U.S.-British force. “I don’t do numbers,” he said (Reuters/Financial Times, Feb. 21).
Inspections
Inspectors yesterday conducted a second reconnaissance flight over Iraq using a U.S. U-2 aircraft — the second such flight this week, according to the Associated Press. During yesterday’s flight, the aircraft spent more than six hours over Iraq, the Iraqi Foreign Ministry said (see GSN, Feb. 18).
Iraq has also submitted to inspectors a list of people involved in the destruction of prohibited biological weapons and missile items, Buchanan said. Iraq had previously submitted a list of 83 people who were reported involved in the destruction of banned chemical weapons.
“Those lists are being studied, and clearly might be potential names for interviews,” Buchanan said (Niko Price, Associated Press/Boston Globe, Feb. 21).
Two French Mirage 4 surveillance aircraft left an airbase in southern France today and are expected to later arrive at an undisclosed location in the Persian Gulf region, according to Agence France-Presse. The aircraft, along with two refueling planes and a 70-member support team, were offered to inspectors as part of a French-German-Russian proposal to strengthen inspections (see GSN, Feb. 12; Agence France-Presse/Yahoo.com, Feb. 21).
Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said yesterday inspectors were being subjected to unwelcome, heavy pressure.
“Inspectors are being subjected to very strong pressure in order to provoke their departure from Iraq, as occurred in 1998, or to present Security Council assessments which could be used as a pretext for the use of force against Iraq,” he said.
While declining to identify the source of such pressure, Ivanov has previously accused “certain circles” in the United States of doing so (Reuters/Gulf News, Feb. 21).
Inspectors visited at least 23 suspect Iraqi sites yesterday, according to an International Atomic Energy Agency press release. UNMOVIC missile teams placed additional tags on al-Samoud 2 missiles and warheads located in Baghdad. Missile experts also visited al-Qudis factory and al-Wazariya site. Inspectors also conducted an aerial survey via helicopter of several sites northwest of Baghdad, located up the Tigris River to the city of Tikrit.
UNMOVIC chemical inspectors visited al-Aaela Factory for Sulfochemicals, where they conducted a rebaselining inspection, according to the IAEA release. UNMOVIC biological inspectors performed aerial inspections on a site west of Baghdad and a site southwest of the city. Biological inspectors also visited via helicopter an alcohol-producing factory south-southwest of the city of Amarah in southeastern Iraq.
IAEA inspectors inspected flow-forming equipment at al-Karama facility and the Ghraib facility, the agency release said. IAEA inspectors also visited the Shakyli Stores at the Tuwaitha site, to inspect materials from Iraq’s past centrifuge program, and al-Eyz Company. Agency inspectors conducted radiation surveys at ElBasel Company-ElNahrawan, the Sabaa (Seven) Nissan General Company, an oil workers residential complex, the Department of Oil Truck Maintenance and an air defense unit east of Baghdad (IAEA release, Feb. 20).
For further information, see:
UNMOVIC
IAEA Iraq Action Team
U.N. Resolution 1441
A former U.S. Air Force master sergeant was convicted yesterday of offering U.S. intelligence to Iraq and China but a jury could not decide whether he had tried to sell Baghdad documents on nuclear weapons, military satellites or U.S. war plans, the Associated Press reported.
If the jurors decide that Brian Regan tried to sell those secrets to Iraq, he would be eligible for the death penalty.
The jury acquitted Regan, a father of four from Maryland, of spying for Libya.
Regan worked at the National Reconnaissance Office, which operates U.S. satellites. He was arrested in 2001 at Dulles International Airport in Virginia while boarding a flight for Switzerland, allegedly while carrying top-secret information.
Prosecutors said that Regan offered to sell U.S. military secrets to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein for $13 million.
Defense attorneys said that Regan fantasized about spying, but never followed through with the effort (Jonathan Salant, Associated Press/Boston Globe, Feb. 21).
U.S. District Judge Gerald Lee sent the jury home for the weekend and said he hoped the trial would not end without resolving the Iraq charge.
“They have not reached the conclusion that they are hung, but it sounds like they are struggling to reach unanimity in answering that question,” he said (Jerry Markon, Washington Post, Feb. 21).
Experts from the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency have conducted hundreds of inspections in Iraq since resuming the post-Gulf War inspection regime Nov. 27. More than 200 U.N. personnel, including about 150 inspectors, are now based in the country at two facilities in Baghdad and Mosul. The following chart summarizes some of the inspectors’ recently reported activities.
| Date | Site | Activity | | Feb. 20 | Areas in Baghdad | UNMOVIC missile inspectors placed additional tags on al-Samoud 2 missiles and warheads (see GSN, Feb. 21). | | Al-Qudis factory | See GSN, Feb. 21. | | Al-Wazariya site | | Sites northwest of Baghdad, located up the Tigris River to the city of Tikrit | Inspectors an aerial survey via helicopter (see GSN, Feb. 21). | | Al-Aaela Factory for Sulfochemicals | UNMOVIC chemical inspectors conducted a rebaselining inspection (see GSN, Feb. 21). | | Site west of Baghdad | UNMOVIC biological inspectors performed an aerial inspection (see GSN, Feb. 21). | | Site southwest of Baghdad | UNMOVIC biological inspectors performed an aerial inspection (see GSN, Feb. 21). | | Alcohol-producing factory south-southwest of the city of Amarah in southeastern Iraq | See GSN, Feb. 21. | | Al-Karama facility | IAEA inspectors inspected flow-forming equipment at the site (see GSN, Feb. 21). | | Ghraib facility | IAEA inspectors inspected flow-forming equipment at the site (see GSN, Feb. 21). | | Shakyli Stores at Tuwaitha | IAEA inspectors inspected materials from Iraq’s past centrifuge program (see GSN, Feb. 21). | | Al-Eyz Company | See GSN, Feb. 21. | | ElBasel Company-ElNahrawan | IAEA inspectors conducted radiation surveys (see GSN, Feb. 21). | | Sabaa (Seven) Nissan General Company | | Oil workers residential complex | | Department of Oil Truck Maintenance | | Air defense unit east of Baghdad | | Taji missile site | See GSN, Feb. 20. | | Ibn al-Haytham missile site | | Al-Quds missile site | | Karameh missile site | | Al-Samoud Factory | | Al-Basil Company | | Feb. 19 | Al-Samoud Factory | See GSN, Feb. 20. | | Tikrit University’s College of Agriculture | | Tikrit University’s College of Sciences | | Tikrit University’s College of Engineering | | Tikrit University’s College of Women Education | | Dairy factory in south Tikrit | | Ibn al-Waleed State Company in Baghdad | | Al-Feda’a hydraulics factory | | State Company of Mechanical and Electrical Contracts’s manufacturing, storage and repair facility | | Areas east of Baghdad | IAEA inspectors conducted a radiation survey (see GSN, Feb. 20). | | Abu Ghraib | An al-Samoud missile site, northwest of Baghdad (see GSN, Feb. 19). | | Al-Mamoun | UNMOVIC team inspected this military compound near Baghdad (see GSN, Feb. 19). | | Ibn al-Haithem | UNMOVIC team inspected this military compound near Baghdad (see GSN, Feb. 19). | | Al-Fidaa | UNMOVIC team inspected this military compound near Baghdad (see GSN, Feb. 19). | | Al-Muthanna | UNMOVIC chemical team visited site near Baghdad (see GSN, Feb. 19). | | Vegetable oil factory | Inspectors visited factory in Baghdad (see GSN, Feb. 19). | | Al-Nidaa | IAEA inspectors visited military compound (see GSN, Feb. 19). | | Al-Zawra | IAEA inspectors visited military compound (see GSN, Feb. 19). | | Nahrawan | IAEA inspectors visited military compound south of Baghdad (see GSN, Feb. 19). | | Feb. 18 | Al-Khadima | Facility responsible for final assembly of al-Samoud missiles (see GSN, Feb. 19). | | Al-Harith | Missile engine and gyroscope research and development facility (see GSN, Feb. 19). | | Al-Qaid | Site where al-Samoud missile warheads are filled (see GSN, Feb. 19). | | Al-Radwan | Facility manufactures missile parts and containers (see GSN, Feb. 18). | | Deployed al-Samoud missiles | UNMOVIC missile team visited deployed missiles (see GSN, Feb. 19). | | Al-Mutanna | Team visited facility to continue destroying artillery shells filled with mustard agent but were delayed by weather (see GSN, Feb. 19). | | Sa’ad State Company | UNMOVIC team visited mechanical engineering and design center (see GSN, Feb. 19). | | Al-Naser al-Adheem General Company | IAEA team visited facility in Baghdad’s Daura district (see GSN, Feb. 19). | | Al-Qa Qaa | U.N. teams visit this chemical and explosives production plant (see GSN, Feb. 18). | | Mansour State Company | IAEA radiation survey of electronics manufacturing facility (see GSN, Feb. 18). | | Dar al-Salam chemical plant | (See GSN, Feb. 18). | | Al-Tahidi factory | Production plant for electrical cables and high-voltage generators (see GSN, Feb. 18). | | Qadasiyah Dairy Factory in southern Diwaniya province | (See GSN, Feb. 18). | | Feb. 17 | Al-Khadimia and al-Samoud Factories | UNMOVIC missile inspectors examined these facilities that work on liquid-fueled engines (see GSN, Feb. 18). | | Al-Assma Company | Manufacturing plant for al-Fateh missile components (see GSN, Feb. 18). | | Al-Mutasim airfield | Site of Iraqi UAV testing (see GSN, Feb. 18). | | Al-Ameen Factory | Site of static testing of al-Fateh and al-Abour missile motor cases (see GSN, Feb. 18). | | Um al-Maarik General Establishment | Manufacturing facility for missile and rocket motor cases (see GSN, Feb. 18). | | Al-Muthanna | UNMOVIC chemical experts visited “in connection with the mustard gas destruction process and took some chemical samples for analysis” (see GSN, Feb. 18). | | Al-Zahif al-Kabeer Center | Chemical plant designed to extract minerals and chemical compounds from mining and seawater (see GSN, Feb. 18). | | Al-Fuwayjah | UNMOVIC biological experts visited this seed processing facility (see GSN, Feb. 18). | | Hadr Ammuntion Storage Facility | UNMOVIC teams “focused primarily on artillery and small-caliber munitions” (see GSN, Feb. 18). | | Samarra | IAEA radiation survey (see GSN, Feb. 18). | | Al-Nida | IAEA experts visited this heavy industrial manufacturing plant (see GSN, Feb. 18). | | Um al-Maarik | IAEA “no-notice” inspection (see GSN, Feb. 18). | | Tho al-Fekar | IAEA team investigates flow forming equipment and processes (see GSN, Feb. 18). | | Feb. 16 | Food processing facility at Baquba | UNMOVIC biological inspectors visited (see GSN, Feb. 18). | | Biology Department of the College of Sciences at Baquba University | | Food processing facility at Diyala | | Diyala Tuberculosis and respiratory center | | Al-Kindi | UNMOVIC missile experts visited this missile development site (see GSN, Feb. 18). | | Ibn al-Haytham | UNMOVIC missile experts tagged SA-2 missile engines (see GSN, Feb. 18). | | Taji | Missile experts tagged al-Samoud 2 missiles (see GSN, Feb. 18). | | Al-Mamoun | Missile inspectors examined casting chambers rebuilt by Iraq after U.N. inspectors destroyed them in the 1990s (see GSN, Feb. 18). | | Fallujah 3 | UNMOVIC chemical experts conducted an “inspection involved [in] the verification of declared items” (see GSN, Feb. 18). | | Hadr Ammunition Storage Facility | UNMOVIC teams “covered a vast amount of ground, which included roughly 300 storage warehouses, bunkers, brick stores, metal containers and external munitions dumps” (see GSN, Feb. 18). | | Feb. 15 | Al-Nida | UNMOVIC missile inspection of solid propellant mixer plant (see GSN, Feb. 18). | | Nissan Factory 17 | Production plant for al-Samound missile components (see GSN, Feb. 18). | | Salah al-Din State Company | Manufacturing facility for fuses and printed circuit boards for missiles (see GSN, Feb. 18). | | Saddam Center for Biotechnology Research | UNMOVIC biological team visited to “follow up the movement of items notified by the Iraqi National Monitoring Directorate” (see GSN, Feb. 18). | | Chemistry Department of Saddam University College of Science | (See GSN, Feb. 18). | | Southern Refinery Company | UNMOVIC chemical experts sought evidence of chemical weapons production at this facility in Basra (see GSN, Feb. 18). | | Tuwaitha | Rockclimbing IAEA inspectors explore previously inaccessible underground chambers at the Israeli-bombed Tamuz 1 reactor complex (see GSN, Feb. 18). | | Tuwaitha | IAEA officials inspected and prepared to remove “a small amount of natural uranium slurry,” previously intended for removal in 1998 (see GSN, Feb. 18). | | Radwan and Yarmouk facilities | IAEA radiation surveys (see GSN, Feb. 18). | | Taji Engineering facility | IAEA inspectors examined this aircraft engine facility (see GSN, Feb. 18). | | Feb. 7-13 | See GSN, Feb. 14. | |
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By David Ruppe
Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON ð— Less than one year after successfully ousting the leader of an international arms control organization, the United States is trying to replace the head of another: the organization that implements the treaty banning nuclear weapons tests worldwide, a senior U.S. official said yesterday.
Wolfgang Hoffmann, executive secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), however, indicated he has no plans to leave his Vienna post.
The Bush administration is seeking to find a successor for Hoffmann, a long-time German diplomat, once he has completed seven years of running the organization in 2004. CTBTO rules require that all professional staff leave after a maximum seven years and the U.S. view is that the seven-year rule applies to Hoffmann.
“We are not trying to remove Ambassador Hoffmann prior to the end of his tenure in office. However, there is a limited tenure policy with the CTBTO and, therefore, given the importance of the job we do think it is important to look for a good replacement recognizing that Ambassador Hoffmann is not going to be able to remain in the job indefinitely,” according to the official.
Hoffmann’s administration maintains that that tenure rule does not apply to the executive secretary, who is reappointed to his post annually through a vote each November of the treaty’s signatory states.
“Mr. Hoffmann is not a staff member and the rule applies to staff members in the professional category,” CTBTO spokeswoman Daniela Rozgonova said from Vienna.
A Matter of Principle
The decision to find a replacement for Hoffmann is motivated by a matter of principle and not his politics or management record, the U.S. official said.
“If we have a tenure policy, and if we exempt the director from tenure policy, and that’s the only person we exempt from tenure policy, what you’re going to end up with is a bunch of lawsuits in the ILO [International Labor Organization] from other people who get removed by the tenure policy,” the official said.
In a separate matter over that policy, at least 44 CTBTO staffers filed a complaint last October with the ILO, which adjudicates labor disputes involving international organizations, asking that the seven-year rule begin counting in 1999, when the rule was passed, and not retroactively for people hired before then (see GSN, Jan. 10).
The U.S. official said once a suitable replacement is identified, “then the issue is to try to talk to both Hoffmann and the Germans to make sure that a transition happens in as quiet and peaceful a fashion as possible.”
If no suitable replacement is found, then changing the organization’s tenure policy might be considered, though U.S. officials do not favor that course, the official said.
U.S. Disputes Hoffman’s Exemption
Hoffmann’s spokeswoman Rozgonova asserted the whole matter was settled during meetings, which were mediated by the United Kingdom, earlier this month and said Hoffmann will stay on for as many years as he continues to receive an annual reappointment.
“That issue has been resolved and Mr. Hoffmann will continue to serve, to carry out his duties leading the Secretariat,” she said.
The U.S. official responded, “It’s the first we’ve heard about it. I know Hoffmann considers himself above the PTS [Provisional Technical Secretariat] and therefore that the seven-year rule does not apply to him. But that is not a position that we have taken formally and I do not think that this matter has been formally resolved yet.”
The Provisional Technical Secretariat consists of the organization’s 250-member professional staff responsible for supervising and coordinating a global monitoring system to detect nuclear testing.
Alexander Graf Lambsdorff, a press attache at the German embassy in Washington, said his government does not view the matter as “a major political issue,” but rather a technical one.
“What it boils down to is a technicality. It’s a matter for the lawyers who are looking at it,” he said.
A Critic of the U.S. View
Hoffmann has led the CTBTO since its creation on November 19, 1996, enlisting 166 signatories and 97 ratifications to the test ban treaty in nearly seven years.
Presently, 27 countries have not signed and 96 countries have not ratified, including the United States. President George W. Bush’s determination not to ratify the pact, as well as the refusal of 12 other countries to join, effectively prevents the treaty from entering into force under its rules.
A prominent critic of the Bush administration’s nuclear testing policy criticized the U.S. position that Hoffmann should be replaced.
“I find it interesting that the United States is so bold as to have an opinion about matters of principle on the CTBT when it has abandoned its solemn commitments and promises to pursue the entry into force of the CTBT and has done much to undermine the CTBTO by unilaterally withdrawing support for work related to on-site inspections,” said Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association in Washington.
“Ambassador Hoffmann has built the CTBTO from the ground up and by all accounts he has done a very good job. What probably matters more than arbitrary rotation rules is that the best person remains in the job,” he said.
While the Bush administration policy opposes ratification of the treaty and an inspections mechanism for checking suspicious activity, the United States nevertheless historically has contributed at least one-fifth of annual funding to the organization in accordance with treaty rules. U.S. military officials previously have said they value CTBTO’s network of more than 100 monitoring stations worldwide and growing as a supplement to U.S. capabilities (see GSN, March 19, 2002).
Management, Politics Said Not an Issue
The Bush administration last year drew some criticism when it led the ouster of the head of another international arms control organization, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which implements the Chemical Weapons Convention.
In that case, U.S. officials published a long list of grievances against OPCW head Jose Bustani and asserted he was mismanaging the organization by, among other things, budgeting for activities beyond the scope of the organization (see GSN, April 12, 2002), a view backed by many independent arms control experts.
Bustani, now Brazil’s ambassador to the United Kingdom, maintained his removal was sought because of political differences, chiefly, that that the Bush administration did not favor his official views on inspections of chemical facilities that might affect the United States or on Iraq. Bustani advocated encouraging Iraq to sign the treaty, which would make Iraq subject to chemical inspections. U.S. officials last year privately expressed concern that such inspections might undermine efforts to compel Iraq to disarm by forestalling the threat of force.
The United States was criticized for pressuring for Bustani’s ouster, rather than allowing him to be voted out at the end of his term, and for withholding its substantial annual dues to the OPCW until Bustani was removed.
In the case of Hoffmann, the senior U.S. official said the U.S. search was not motivated by any concerns with Hoffmann’s management or politics.
“He’s been doing as good a job as can be expected under the circumstances. He’s got an organization … for a treaty that’s not about to enter into force. He’s therefore limited very severely in terms of what kinds of activities he is able to engage in and that gives you a certain amount of difficulty in terms of budget size and morale of your staff, and we think he’s done a pretty good job with those things,” the official said.
The Bush administration admittedly differs with Hoffmann on a couple of key issues: whether the treaty should enter into force and whether the organization should make preparations to conduct on-site inspections of suspected tests. U.S. officials say no to both.
Bush has indicated he will not ratify the treaty which then-President Bill Clinton signed in 1996. U.S. officials have said they prefer to keep U.S. options open for possible future testing, though there are no plans to break a current moratorium. Some within the administration have argued testing could be needed to ensure the viability of the U.S. nuclear arsenal and possibly for proving new nuclear weapons, as the administration is presently considering whether to develop low-yield weapons for destroying bunkers with reduced potential damage to surrounding areas. The administration last year unsuccessfully sought congressional approval for reducing the preparation time for resumed testing if a decision is made.
Unlike during the Clinton administration, the current State Department Web site does not list the treaty in its sections on “current treaties and agreements” or “past treaties and agreements.”
With respect to CTBTO dues, the administration also last year began withholding money for inspections-related activities, maintaining they are unnecessary since the treaty has no chance of entering into force.
Asked whether the U.S. view on Hoffmann’s tenure was at all related to his advocacy of entering the treaty into force, the official said:
“No. Wolfgang is free to express his views on that is he will express them certainly in some respects in the responsibility of the position he holds. I wouldn’t say we’ve agreed with all of his views on that,” the official said.
International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Mohamed ElBaradei is leading an agency team to Iran this weekend amid charges from an opposition group that Tehran is maintaining a secret nuclear facility disguised as a watch factory (see GSN, Feb. 20).
The National Council of Resistance of Iran said yesterday that one building of the facility houses equipment to test centrifuges, and opposition officials predicted that the IAEA team would not be allowed into that building.
“If the IAEA is denied access to a building, it will be a very serious matter,” said David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security.
The IAEA team is scheduled to visit a recently revealed uranium enrichment plant at Natanz, about 200 miles south of Tehran. The nuclear officials will be looking for confirmation of Iran’s claims that the nuclear program is being developed for peaceful purposes.
“It’s an opportunity for Iran to really open up and come clean about all its nuclear activities, which we now know are very extensive, or it could be a weekend where there’s a serious confrontation between the inspectors and the Iranian government,” according to Albright (David Ensor, CNN.com, Feb. 20).
The United States contends that Iran is developing nuclear weapons.
“We believe Iran is actively and secretly pursuing a nuclear weapons program under the guise of a ‘peaceful’ civilian program,” said U.S. State Department spokesman Lou Fintor.
Fintor described the Iranian opposition group, however, as “an anti-Iranian terrorist organization.”
The IAEA visit coincides with heavy activity and construction at Natanz (Anwar Iqbal, United Press International, Feb. 20).
The Natanz site consists of three main areas, according to analysis of commercial satellite images by the ISIS. The first has three large underground structures and a vehicle tunnel leading underground, as well as several incomplete underground structures. The two largest underground buildings could contain centrifuges to enrich uranium, the analysis says.
The second area contains six large, fenced, aboveground buildings. The third has a large, separate and unfenced building, which is most likely the main administrative building or a research and development facility, according to the ISIS (Institute for Science and International Society analysis, Feb. 20).
U.S.-Russian Talks
The United States and Russia are slated to discuss Iran’s nuclear fuel production and potential efforts to prevent Tehran from developing nuclear weapons, Reuters reported.
Undersecretary of State John Bolton, the top U.S. arms control official, is expected in Moscow for three-day talks beginning Monday.
“A lot of the basis for the Russian argument that Iran’s nuclear program is not a problem has now disappeared, and we need to talk to them about that and to think about how to deal with Iran in the post-Saddam period,” a U.S. official said (Reuters/MSNBC.com, Feb. 20).
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By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire
DENVER — While Japan’s Aum Shinrikyo cult became infamous for the murderous sarin attacks the group conducted in the mid-1990s, most notably the 1995 sarin attack in the Tokyo subway, the group also conducted a biological weapons attack in 1993 that went undetected for years, biologist Paul Keim of Northern Arizona University said Sunday.
Had the 1993 Tokyo attack, which failed, been detected and investigated, the cult might have been prevented from carrying out its later sarin attacks, Keim said during a panel discussion here at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.
The case began in late June 1993, when residents near a cult-owned building in the Kameido section of Tokyo filed more than 160 complaints over a four-day period of a strong odor coming from the building. When Japanese authorities arrived to investigate, cult members refused allow them into the building, saying the odor was the result of cooking beans. Soon after the complaints, the cult closed the facility and left, Keim said.
Photographs of the building, taken while Japanese authorities investigated the complaints, showed a mist being emitted from the roof, Keim said. When authorities entered the building after the cult had departed, they found that the cult had apparently pumped a liquid up to the roof from containers in the basement, Keim said.
This method, however, resulted in leakage, which produced slime on the walls of the building, Keim said, and Japanese authorities collected five sample vials. Four of the vials were tested in an effort to determine the makeup of the slime, Keim said, but no tests for anthrax were conducted. The tests did go so far as to look for the presence of human proteins, on the theory that the slime was the result of the cult boiling human bodies, he added.
While the tests on the four vials resulted in little information, the fifth vial sat in storage until the Tokyo subway attack in 1995, Keim said. As Japanese authorities interviewed captured Aum members, they described the cult’s earlier efforts to conduct an anthrax attack, which had gone undetected because of a total absence of casualties or reported symptoms. Keim said he was able to receive the forgotten fifth vial of slime recovered from the Kameido facility, from which he was able to grow a culture of anthrax through a series of experiments conducted in 2001. In a foreboding coincidence, Keim said he had submitted a paper on his research on the 1993 incident on Sept. 12, 2001.
From his experiment, Keim was able to determine why the attack had resulted in no casualties and why it had been able to go undetected for so long. For some reason, Aum had decided to use the Sterne strain of anthrax; a nonvirulent strain often used to produce animal anthrax vaccines.
Keim offered three possible explanations why the cult had used a harmless anthrax strain.
First, perhaps the cult was simply incompetent. Keim discounted this theory, however, because the cult membership included a number of scientists and because the veterinary supply company where the cult obtained its original samples would probably have told them it was a nonvirulent strain.
A second, more frightening theory is that the 1993 incident was only a dry run for a later attack that would have used virulent pathogens, Keim said.
A third explanation, Keim said, is that the cult suffered from poor leadership. The cult’s leader, Shoko Asahara, had been known to order the assassination of his own followers, which instilled in the members of the cult a fear for their lives (see GSN, May 23, 2002). When Asahara ordered in 1993 that a biological weapons attack be carried out, Aum members were probably too afraid to acknowledge that they did not have the necessary materials, so they attempted to obtain whatever they could quickly get their hands on, leading to the failed attack, Keim said.
Since the Tokyo subway attack, a number of Aum members have been prosecuted and sentenced for their roles in the development of the nerve agent and its subsequent use (see GSN, Feb. 4). Last year, two Aum scientists were sentenced to death for their roles in the two sarin attacks the cult conducted in Japan in 1994 and 1995 (see GSN, Oct. 11, 2002). Last month, Japanese prosecutors requested the death penalty for another Aum scientist believed to have been involved in the cult’s sarin attacks (see GSN, Jan. 30).
Keim said, however, that he had no information as to whether any of the cult members were charged for the 1993 incident. It is doubtful that Japanese authorities have done so because of the seriousness of the other charges involved and the long criminal trials for Aum members involved in the cult’s sarin attacks, he said.
By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire
DENVER — The United States needs to develop a microbial forensics capability to better detect and investigate acts of biological terrorism and crime, says a report by the American Society for Microbiology released Sunday.
While acts of biological terrorism, such as the autumn 2001 anthrax attacks, are rare, they have shown that authorities have difficulty identifying those responsible and gathering evidence suitable for a criminal prosecution, according to the report, released here at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. Investigators should be able to call on trained microbiologists, who rarely participate in criminal prosecutions, the report says.
“If not us, who?” Georges Benjamin, executive director of the American Public Health Association, told Global Security Newswire yesterday.
Public health scientists need to learn proper evidence handling techniques so that samples can be used in a later criminal prosecution, Benjamin said, adding that specimens from bioterrorism acts are likely to make their way through the public health system. Scientists do not want to be responsible for allowing the perpetrator of such an act to go unpunished, he said.
Therefore, the United States needs to develop better systems to track and detect suspicious outbreaks of diseases and to gather evidence during the course of an investigation, the report says.
“Developing systems and methods to detect and track bioattacks will lead to greater safety and security for our nation against international terrorists,” the report says. “But it will also benefit the investigation of all biocrimes, including those carried out in a personal matter,” it adds.
At the scene of a biological attack, law enforcement and public health officials need to be trained to both protect those on-site from infection and to properly gather evidence, according to the report. To do this, permanent communication and cross-discipline education programs need to be created for both types of personnel, it says. In addition, certain first responders in each community should received forensics training and panels of experts with knowledge of pathogens that could be used in attack should be created in order to provide additional expertise if needed.
Those who will be the first to arrive on the scene of a suspected biological attack will also need to be trained in how to properly recover pieces of possible evidence, the report says. It recommends that standard operating procedures be developed for the collection, storage, and documentation of samples so they can be used later in a criminal prosecution. Such procedures could be based on the FBI’s evidence-gathering standards.
During the course of an investigation, it will also become important to identify both the pathogen used and its source, the report says. To do this, a national disease surveillance network should be established for both humans and animals to detect suspicious outbreaks (see GSN, Jan. 23). Such a network could be based on the PulseNet surveillance system, which tracks outbreaks of food-borne diseases. Test kits should be created to better identify pathogens, according to the report. The United States should encourage private development of these kits through increased research funding, it says.
The United States also needs to develop an improved capability to differentiate between intentionally caused outbreaks and naturally occurring diseases, according to the report. To do this, databases should be created that include information on pathogens that occur regionally and those that would raise suspicion by their presence. For example, while anthrax occurs naturally in regions with large livestock industries, the 2001 outbreaks in urban areas of Florida and the northeast United States raised immediate suspicion.
Genetic sequencing is another tool that can be developed to help identify an attack pathogen and to help locate its source, the report says. Such methods have been used during the course of the investigation into the autumn 2001 anthrax attacks. The report recommends that more complete genomic sequencing of all possible biological terrorism agents such be done to assist in identification. High priority pathogens should have up to 20 strains sequenced to better understand the biological variation between them, the report says. The United States should also compile a national strain repository to establish a centralized repository of live cultures and reference strains, the report says.
U.S. authorities should conduct frequent re-evaluations of priority lists of agents that could be used in a biological attack, according to the report. By doing so, they could better determine what pathogens would be attractive to terrorists. These re-evaluations should also consider pathogens that could cause economic damage, as well as those that could cause mass casualties. Those pathogens that can cause easily communicable diseases and those for which there are no vaccines or treatments should be given a higher priority, it says. Plant, animal and food-borne pathogens should be given more attention than they are currently, where the focus is more on military agents, the report adds (see GSN, Feb. 3).
The United States should also create a pyramid system of microbial forensics laboratories, which is currently “nonexistent,” the report says. Such a system could be based on the Laboratory Response Network, which is a four-tiered system of U.S. laboratories with the capability to conduct progressively more complex procedures — ranging from hospital and commercial reference laboratories at the bottom of the pyramid to a relatively few laboratories that can perform a wide range of tests, including genomic sequencing.
The United States also needs better education and training of scientists, law enforcement officials and first responders, according to the report. Microbiologists need to receive forensics training, while forensic personnel should be trained in microbiology, it says. Public health personnel should also receive forensic training to take advantage of the existing architecture.
In addition, first responders also need to be better trained in biological safety and criminal investigation procedures, the report says.
“In most cases, first responders will not be trained in knowing how to deal with a potential biocrime scene,” the report says. “Education is key to inform likely first responders how to determine whether there might be a biological threat,” it adds.
Experts agreed of the need to train microbiologists and public health scientists in forensic methods so they would be better able to investigate an act of biological terrorism.
This would require additional funding, however, said APHA’s Benjamin. “The real issue here” is whether public health officials will receive increased resources, such as higher numbers of laboratory technicians, to handle the increased forensics responsibilities, he said. To better allocate such limited resources, Benjamin recommended creating “centers of excellence” — laboratories that would focus on microbial forensics. Either the public or private sector could operate such facilities, he said.
The United States is already on its way to being better able to investigate acts of bioterrorism, Benjamin said. Necessary technologies, such as genetic information libraries and an information-sharing infrastructure, already exist he said. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, along with the FBI, have already begun conduct courses in epidemiological forensics, which train scientists in detecting suspicious disease outbreaks and determining if they were intentionally caused, he said. Benjamin predicted that within the next two years there would likely be a new, aggressive capability, to track down biological terrorists.
As of Wednesday, more than 4,000 U.S. civilians have received smallpox inoculations and no serious reactions have been recorded, U.S. health officials said yesterday (see GSN, Feb. 14).
The Pentagon has immunized more than 100,000 personnel and has experienced five serious reactions. The Defense Department said that all five are in good condition.
Another six military personnel had mild rashes that might be classified as generalized vaccinia.
Of the 4,213 civilians immunized, seven people reported reactions but none were considered life threatening (Laura Meckler, Associated Press/The Australian, Feb. 21).
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The Pentagon has increased the production of new chemical and biological protective suits by more than 10,000 units per month, according to Pete Aldridge, the Defense Department’s acquisition chief (see GSN, Nov. 27, 2002).
Congressional officials have criticized the Pentagon for deploying soldiers with older, bulky suits that in some cases have proven defective (see GSN, Oct. 2, 2002).
As of December, defense contractors are producing 90,000 of the lighter and more effective suits per month, up from 79,000 per month. Each soldier being deployed to the Persian Gulf region is given two of the new suits.
“As the inventory builds up, they will be given more, but that’s sufficient for the time being,” Aldridge said. “I don’t know what more we can do. We’d like them to have four,” he added.
The Pentagon had received 1.8 million of the new Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology suits by the end of January, Bloomberg.com reported. The suit, which is worn over combat clothing, is designed to last up to 45 days and can go through six cleanings. After a chemical or biological attack the suit provides 24 hours of protection, Bloomberg.com reported (Tony Capaccio, Bloomberg.com, Feb. 20).
Meanwhile in Washington, Pentagon security officials will begin distributing emergency escape hoods to building employees Monday, the Associated Press reported.
The hoods provide protection from a chemical or biological attack for about one hour, AP reported.
The Pentagon has also positioned chemical, biological and radiological sensors inside and outside the building, and samples are tested daily, according to officials (Pauline Jelinek, Associated Press/Philadelphia Inquirer, Feb. 21).
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2002 by National Journal Group, Inc. The material in this section is produced independently for NTI by National Journal Group, Inc. Any reproduction or retransmission, in whole or in part, is a violation of federal law and is strictly prohibited without the consent of the National Journal Group, Inc. All rights reserved.
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