Two competing proposals on Iraq were introduced yesterday to the U.N. Security Council, but U.S. officials indicated that the United States would go to war regardless of how the council votes on the resolution. The sole outstanding issue for the Bush administration was whether the council would support the war or cast itself into irrelevance, officials said (see GSN, Feb. 24).
In meetings with officials from Security Council members, U.S. officials have indicated that the decision to go to war has already been made, according to the Washington Post. For example, in meetings with Russian officials yesterday, Undersecretary of State John Bolton said the United States was going ahead with war regardless of the Security Council’s decision and that the U.S. focus was on maintaining the unity of the council, a senior Bush administration official said.
A senior diplomat from another Security Council member said his government had also been told to not worry about making a decision on possibly launching war.
“You are not going to decide whether there is war in Iraq or not,” the diplomat said U.S. officials told him. “That decision is ours, and we have already made it. It is already final. The only question now is whether the council will go along with it or not,” the diplomat added, quoting the U.S. officials.
The United States has been conducting a high-level diplomatic campaign to rally the support of a majority of the Security Council for a new resolution introduced yesterday, according to the Post. So far, however, only Spain and Bulgaria have openly sided with the United States and the United Kingdom on the new resolution. Out of the 10 nonpermanent members, Germany and Syria are considered as being solidly in the “no” column. Pakistan is believed to be going to vote no or abstain, the Post reported.
While the United States appears willing to accept a 9-2 vote in favor of the new resolution, with four abstentions, other council members have said such a result would equal a false victory. The resolution has to be adopted by “an important majority,” including most of the five permanent members, to maintain any sense of relevance, a nonpermanent council member diplomat said.
“This idea of putting three members with veto power on the outside is not something that sounds much like unity,” the diplomat said. “Are they going to declare the Security Council “relevant” by virtue of submission by the smallest states?” the diplomat added (Karen DeYoung, Washington Post, Feb. 25).
A New Resolution and a Memorandum Introduced
With U.S. and Spanish support, the United Kingdom introduced the new draft resolution yesterday, formally charging that Iraq is still in violation of its disarmament obligations. If adopted, the resolution would have the council decide “that Iraq has failed to take the final opportunity afforded it in Resolution 1441” to eliminate its weapons of mass destruction — which would likely lead to war. Resolution 1441, agreed to unanimously by the council in November, gives Iraq a final opportunity to disarm or face “serious consequences.”
At the same time, France began circulating a two-page memorandum calling for “reinforced inspections” with timelines for Iraq’s cooperation on a schedule that could extend into the summer. The paper, supported by Germany and Russia, says, “Our priority should be to achieve [disarmament] peacefully through the inspection regime. The military option should only be a last resort. So far, the conditions for using force against Iraq are not fulfilled.”
The memorandum is not a draft resolution. Rather, it is more of a counterpoint to the British draft. The authors of the memo say a second resolution is not needed. According to Ambassador Gunter Pleuger of Germany, the memo “is based on the present system of Security Council resolutions and therefore we feel we do not need a second resolution right now.” Pleuger said the memorandum “proposes things that have been proposed earlier [by the three governments] and have been repeated by the European Union on Feb. 17, that is, we have the common goal to disarm Iraq in a peaceful way.”
British Ambassador Jeremy Greenstock, in introducing the draft resolution yesterday, told the council, “Today, 15 weeks on from 1441, we are no further advanced towards that objective of complete disarmament.” He said the council was seeing “an all-too-familiar pattern of Iraq trying to get us to focus on small concessions of process, rather than on the big picture. The cardinal point is that there is no semblance of wholehearted cooperation, nothing like voluntary and active disarmament.”
The one-page draft resolution does not explicitly authorize using force against Iraq, but that is the clear implication of the paper because the bulk of the draft details how Iraq has not cooperated with weapons inspectors. The draft would have the council decide “that Iraq has failed to take the final opportunity afforded it in resolution 1441.” It does not give any deadlines, so passage of the resolution could be enough to trigger the use of force.
Speaking to reporters, U.S. Ambassador John Negroponte said, “We have not seen what this council insisted on seeing — a strategic decision by Iraq to disarm. That is the bar set by Resolution 1441 and Iraq is immensely far from reaching that bar and we all know it.”
French Ambassador Jean-Marc de la Sabliere countered, “The time has not come to discuss a military option. We do think that the use of force should be the last resort. We have never ruled out the use of force, but we have always stated that it should be the last resort.”
The French memorandum calls for more inspections and invokes the timeline established in Resolution 1284, adopted in December 1999. The memo says the inspectors should create a program of work that would identify “the key remaining disarmament tasks to be completed by Iraq.” Following on from 1284, the inspectors would then have 120 days to pursue inspections before presenting a new report on Iraqi cooperation to the council. Such a timeline, if immediately enacted, would push a possible invasion off to the hottest time of the year in the Middle East. The paper also says the inspection regime should include more inspectors, mobile inspections units and increased aerial surveillance.
“We are saying that while Iraq is not yet fully cooperating, Iraq is making some progress,” de la Sabliere said. “Inspections are making some results. We must have a timeline.”
Russian Ambassador Sergei Lavrov told journalists, “We don’t think the chance for the peaceful disarmament of Iraq has been lost or missed. We are convinced on the contrary that the inspections are proceeding effectively and that Iraq is responding to the demands of the international community and to the pressure exerted on it and we think that this should continue.”
Negroponte said the French memo “is much more process than substance. We don’t see it as contributing to the disarmament of Iraq. We view that paper with deep skepticism.”
The next report by the head of the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, Hans Blix, is due March 1, the same day Iraq must begin destroying its missiles that exceed the range permitted by the council (see related GSN story, today). The council is scheduled to meet March 7 to discuss the latest reports from Blix and the International Atomic Energy Agency. A drive for a vote on the draft resolution could follow at time after that, diplomats said.
Greenstock told journalists, “We haven’t set a date because we’re not setting an ultimatum in those terms.” He added, “There is still an opportunity to avert conflict. But the council’s judgment that Iraq has made the wrong choice should be clear and consensual.”
Syrian Ambassador Mikhail Wehbe said that as an Arab country, “we could not accept such a draft resolution to come at this stage and as a declaration of war against the Iraqi people. We are not going to support such a resolution, as Resolution 1441 has not been exhausted fully.”
At one level, this is a debate about the relative value of two council resolutions governing the activities of the inspectors. Resolution 1284 created UNMOVIC and laid out a program of work and a timetable for the inspectors once they got back into Iraq following the departure of UNMOVIC’s predecessor, the U.N. Special Commission, in 1998. Resolution 1441 gave the inspectors authority for a more intrusive regime and warned Iraq of “serious consequences” if it did not fully cooperate with UNMOVIC and the IAEA. An element of the debate is how much value the earlier resolution still has.
“The problem about the memorandum and its wish for a much longer period of inspections under Resolution 1284 is that it sets aside the extra pressure which is being produced by 1441,” Greenstock said.
Lavrov, however, said Resolution 1284 “is part of international law. Unless explicitly cancelled by the council, it remains the basis for the inspectors work, together with 1441. There is no contradiction.”
The council will continue its debate tomorrow over the two conflicting initiatives (Jim Wurst, Global Security Newswire, Feb. 25).
Inspectors’ Security Council Briefing
IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei will present his report on nuclear inspections within Iraq to the Security Council at the same time as the March 7 Blix briefing, IAEA spokeswoman Melissa Fleming said today.
ElBaradei had originally been scheduled to hold a separate briefing on April 11, according to Reuters (Reuters/MSNBC.com, Feb. 25).
Blix met yesterday with the U.N. College of Commissioners, an advisory board, to review the report he will present to the Security Council on the status of weapons inspections in Iraq. The meetings are scheduled to last through today (U.N. press release, Feb. 24).
Inspections
U.N. inspectors visited at least 19 suspect Iraqi sites yesterday, according to an IAEA press release.
UNMOVIC missile inspectors tagged SA-2 missiles that had undergone maintenance at the al-Harith Company. They also inspected al-Rasheed Company, al-Qaid Factory, al-Eyz State Company and al-Mutasim Factory.
UNMOVIC chemical inspectors conducted a rebaselining inspection at the Baghdad Institute of Technology, according to the IAEA release. UNMOVIC biological inspectors visited an airfield and a munitions test range, both located southwest of Baghdad. They also inspected munitions fragments at an old destruction site. Biological experts inspected the Environmental Engineering Laboratory at Mosul University’s Department of Civil Engineering and shelters and bunkers related to the Mosul Airfield.
IAEA inspectors conducted a radiation survey in an area southwest of Baghdad, the agency release said. They also inspected the use of high-strength magnets at al-Midlad State Company, formerly known as al-Furat; al-Karama site; al-Razzi State Company, formerly known as Taji Laser; and al-Yarmook site (IAEA release, Feb. 24).
For further information, see:
UNMOVIC
IAEA Iraq Action Team
U.N. Resolution 1441
A U.S. federal jury decided yesterday that Brian Regan had not attempted to sell U.S. war plans or information on specific weapons systems, including nuclear weapons, the Washington Post reported today (see GSN, Feb. 21).
Regan was convicted last week on two counts of attempted espionage and one count of gathering national defense information, the Post reported. If the jury had agreed that he had attempted to sell specific information, Regan would have been eligible for the death penalty. He could face up to life in prison May 9, when he is scheduled to be sentenced.
“As much as I am disappointed that he was convicted, I am so proud of this jury for not collapsing in this time of fear of terror,” said Jonathan Shapiro, one of Regan’s lawyers. “This should never have been a death penalty case to begin with. That message was sent loud and clear,” he added.
A juror agreed with Shapiro, saying the prosecution did not produce enough evidence.
“We weren’t even considering what the punishment would be,” the juror said (Jerry Markon, Washington Post, Feb. 25).
Experts from the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency have conducted hundreds of inspections in Iraq since resuming the post-Gulf War inspection regime Nov. 27. More than 200 U.N. personnel, including about 150 inspectors, are now based in the country at two facilities in Baghdad and Mosul. The following chart summarizes some of the inspectors’ recently reported activities.
| Date | Site | Activity | | Feb. 24 | Al-Rasheed Company | See GSN, Feb. 25. | | Al-Qaid Factory | | Al-Eyz State Company | | Al-Mutasim Factory | | Baghdad Institute of Technology | UNMOVIC chemical inspectors conducted a rebaselining inspection (see GSN, Feb. 25). | | Airfield southwest of Baghdad | See GSN, Feb. 25. | | Munitions test range southwest of Baghdad | | Old munitions destruction site | UNMOVIC biological inspectors inspected munitions fragments (see GSN, Feb. 25). | | Environmental Engineering Laboratory at Mosul University’s Department of Civil Engineering | See GSN, Feb. 25. | | Mosul Airfield | UNMOVIC biological inspectors inspected shelters and bunkers related to the site (see GSN, Feb. 25). | | Area southwest of Baghdad | IAEA inspectors conducted a car-borne radiation survey (see GSN, Feb. 25). | | Al-Midlad State Company | IAEA inspectors inspected the use of high-strength magnets at the sites (see GSN, Feb. 25). | | Al-Karama | | Al-Razzi State Company | | Al-Yarmook | | Missile engine and guidance system production plant | See GSN, Feb. 24. | | Missile engine and guidance system production plant | | Chemical and explosives plant | | Anti-aircraft missile maintenance facility | | Feb. 23 | Al-Rafah | UNMOVIC missile inspectors observed a static test of an al-Samoud 2 missile (see GSN, Feb. 24). | | Al-Quadissiya | See GSN, Feb. 24. | | Al-Melad | | Al-Murage Company for Perfume Production in Baghdad | | Tabook State Company, formerly known as the Karbala Ammunition Filling Plant | | Veterinary College at Mosul University in Mosul | | Ninevah Food Industrial Company in Mosul | | Al-Muthanna area | IAEA inspectors conducted a radiation survey (see GSN, Feb. 24). | | Feb. 22 | Ibn al-Haytahm | UNMOVIC missile inspectors inventoried al-Samoud 2 missile components and subassemblies (IAEA release, Feb. 22). | | Undisclosed area | UNMOVIC missile inspectors inspected the remains of a liquid engine propellant test stand and tagged two pieces of manufacturing equipment (IAEA release, Feb. 22). | | Al-Nasser | IAEA release, Feb. 22. | | Iraqi Army Liquid Propellant Analytical Laboratory in west Baghdad | | Research center in the Baghdad area | UNMOVIC biological inspectors observed the destruction of a small amount of previously monitored out-of-date bacterial growth media (IAEA release, Feb. 22). | | Testing laboratory in the Baghdad area | | Yarmouk GE Site area | IAEA inspectors conducted a radiation survey (IAEA release, Feb. 25). | | Al-Kadessiya General Establishment | IAEA release, Feb. 22. | | Al-Nahrawan munitions factory | | Feb. 21 | Musaayib Power Station | UNMOVIC missile inspectors checked for possible storage of missile-related items (IAEA release, Feb. 21). | | Area west of Baghdad | UNMOVIC biological inspectors conducted an aerial inspection of an undisclosed site (IAEA release, Feb. 21). | | Area northwest of Baghdad | UNMOVIC biological inspectors conducted an aerial inspection of an undisclosed site (IAEA release, Feb. 21). | | Feb. 14-20 | See GSN, Feb. 21. | |
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By David McGlinchey
Global Security Newswire
U.S. and Russian Cooperative Threat Reduction programs and shared scientific research projects have the potential to significantly increase the transparency and efficiency of nuclear disarmament, according to a policy brief released yesterday by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (see GSN, Feb. 11).
U.S. companies have access to Russian programs because of U.S. threat reduction efforts that have existed for more than a decade, but Russian companies “do not have the same opportunities to develop industrial relationships at U.S. facilities,” according to Rose Gottemoeller, a senior associate in the Carnegie Endowment’s Russian and Eurasian program.
“In effect, they lack the natural transparency that accrues from these relationships,” she added.
Token contracts for Russian companies, such as disposal of scrap metal, could go a long way to make the process more even handed and build Moscow’s faith, Gottemoeller argues. Even briefing Russian officials on the timetable and location of the U.S. disarmament projects could build confidence and trust between the two countries, according to the brief.
Gottemoeller also wrote that new scientific techniques could speed the disarmament process.
“There is no arms control or reduction task to which the U.S. and Russian scientific and technical communities could not immediately contribute as a team. This is a radical departure from earlier arms control talks, when technologies or procedures were developed in their initial form by one side, then proposed to the other and laboriously negotiated over many months or even years,” the brief says.
Benefits of the Moscow Treaty
The U.S-Russian Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, which could be discussed on the U.S. Senate floor this week, might be the applicable tool to make such nuclear reductions a reality in the current political climate (see GSN, Feb. 5).
Much thinner than it’s Cold War predecessors, the treaty’s slight content might allow modern tools, U.S.-Russian technical cooperation and existing Cooperative Threat Reduction programs to work, the policy brief says.
While the treaty does not set out a timeline for reducing nuclear stockpiles, the Cooperative Threat Reduction “contracting process has become so established that it could effectively become the means for transparent Russian reductions, Gottemoeller wrote.
The 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty between Washington and Moscow included 500 pages of detailed instructions, hammered out over several years, but “there is no stomach on either side for another round of Cold War-style arms control negotiations,” the policy brief says.
“The Moscow Treaty, by contrast, was negotiated in a few months and ended up at fewer than three pages,” according to Gottemoeller. “It is a straightforward, simple commitment to nuclear arms reduction, without the high level of detail in START I — which in fact points to START’s Cold War limitations. Officials had no other way of attaining a high level of confidence in the reductions of the other side,” she added.
The abundance of new tools means that Washington and Moscow no longer need to rely on treaty mechanisms alone to enforce disarmament obligations, according to Gottemoeller.
As relations grow warmer between the former Cold War adversaries, officials are facing a new opportunity to speed and enhance the disarmament process, the policy brief says. While older treaties such as START I provide a solid underpinning, existing programs and innovative technologies can now be used to reduce stockpiles, make the process more transparent and produce “a better and quicker way to achieve nuclear arms reduction than the old treaty system alone could provide,” Gottemoeller wrote.
“Nuclear weapons will not magically go away without direct attention from policymakers, notwithstanding the absence of threats between the United States and Russia. Negotiation, for better or worse, has historically been the major facilitator of nuclear arms reduction by both countries. In the future, however, cooperation need not be limited by past models,” Gottemoeller wrote.
During his inauguration today, South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun said he would continue to engage Pyongyang but he warned that “North Korea’s nuclear development can never be condoned” (see GSN, Feb. 24).
“It is up to Pyongyang whether to go ahead and obtain nuclear weapons or to get guarantees for the security of its regime and international economic support,” he said, as 45,000 people gathered for his swearing-in ceremony. “Pyongyang must abandon nuclear development. If it renounces its nuclear development program, the international community will offer many things it wants,” he added.
Roh noted the U.S. contribution to South Korea’s growth and security, but said that the two countries must develop more balanced ties.
“We will see to it that the alliance matures into a more reciprocal and equitable relationship,” Roh said.
Washington and Seoul are scheduled to take part in meetings to review their military alliance, the Korea Herald reported (Hwang Jang-jin, Korea Herald, Feb. 25).
In his farewell address, delivered yesterday, former President Kim Dae-jung urged Washington and Pyongyang to sit down to negotiations.
“Dialogue between North Korea and the United States is the important key to a solution,” he said. Kim also defended his “sunshine policy” of engagement with North Korea and said it had “greatly eased tension” on the peninsula. Roh has said he will continue the policy.
The inauguration took place shortly after South Korea announced that Pyongyang had tested an anti-ship missile, the Financial Times reported (see related GSN story, today; Reuters/Andrew Ward, Financial Times, Feb. 24).
U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, who attended the inauguration, said such a missile test was “not surprising.”
“It seems to be a fairly innocuous kind of test,” he added.
Powell also announced today that the United States will donate 40,000 metric tons of food to North Korea and is willing to donate another 60,000 metric tons later this year, the Associated Press reported (George Gedda, Associated Press/Salon.com, Feb. 25).
Japan announced today that it does not plan to resume food shipments to North Korea, citing security concerns and kidnapped Japanese citizens.
“Japan is negative about providing additional food aid to North Korea,” said an aide to Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. “Japan has two issues of priority, abduction and security concerns including missiles and nuclear weapons,” he added.
North Korea might follow today’s missile test with another tomorrow, Agence France-Presse reported (Agence France-Presse, Feb. 25).
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New York State is set to begin distributing to law enforcement agencies this spring 113 trailers equipped to combat biological and chemical terrorism, according to the New York Post (see GSN, Feb. 13).
The trailers, which cost about $200,000 each and are funded through a $25 million grant, are equipped with hazardous-materials suits, chemical and biological detection equipment and sample collection kits. New York City will receive 17 of the trailers, with the rest going to New York State Police and other local law enforcement agencies (Kenneth Lovett, New York Post, Feb. 25).
Meanwhile, the U.S. Congress has appropriated $4 million to help the New York City Police Department purchase new protective equipment, such as gas masks, Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton (D-N.Y.) said yesterday. The funding, included in an appropriations bill approved Feb. 13, would enable the department to purchase about 15,000 masks, according to the New York Times. The department could also use the money to purchase other protective equipment, officials said.
The city and its Police Department, however, still need an additional $900 million to cover adequately the costs of preparing for a possible future terrorist attack, Clinton and police union officials, said. The Police Department has requested $261 million, the Times reported.
“We need more help from the federal government for the additional burdens that are being imposed on the N.Y.P.D., the burdens that require the constant vigilance that this city is known for,” Clinton said. “But we’re not getting the help we need, and it is a grave concern throughout the city and at every level of government,” she added.
Ed Mullins, president of a union that represents police sergeants, echoed the call for more funding. “To continue to go about putting cops on the street without preparing them for a disaster is no different than sending canaries into a coal mine,” Mullins said (William Rashbaum, New York Times, Feb. 25).
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By David Ruppe
Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON ð— An Iraqi officer described as the “father” of Iraq’s chemical weapon development program received offensive and defensive chemical, biological and radiological warfare tactics instruction from the U.S. Army in the early 1960s, according to U.S. sources (see GSN, Jan. 28).
Gen. Nizar Attar — who as late as the mid-1990s served as a key, senior Iraqi chemical and biological weapons official and was also a reputed adviser to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein — received the instruction as a junior officer in 1961 through the U.S. military assistance program at the Army Chemical School in Fort McClellan, Ala., according to former senior U.N. weapons inspector Richard Spertzel. Such training was then considered legal under international law, as there were no treaties banning the possession of such weapons.
Spertzel met with Attar in the mid-1990s, while conducting missions in Iraq as head of the U.N. inspectors’ biological weapons team from 1994 to 1998.
Another U.S. source knowledgeable about Attar’s history, also said the Iraqi officer attended the Army school. Army and Pentagon spokespeople said they had no information available on the activities from that period.
Attar probably received more extensive instruction from the Soviet Union, as he later attended the Timoshenko Military Academy of Chemical Defense in Moscow in 1964, and apparently spent another 18 months in the Soviet Union in 1975 and 1976, according to Spertzel.
Former U.N. weapons inspectors believe Attar went on to direct Iraq’s chemical weapons development program and head its main research and production facility, the Muthanna State Establishment, from around 1979 until 1987, overlapping with the period when Iraq was aggressively producing and using chemicals against Iranian forces during the 1980s Iran-Iraq war.
As late as the mid-1990s, Attar was believed to be heading Iraq’s principal agency suspected of acquiring materials for biological weapons. His current circumstances could not be ascertained.
Offensive and Defensive Tactics
Attar was one of as many as 19 Iraqi officers to receive the U.S. Army training from 1957 to 1967, and among hundreds of other non-U.S. military officials from around the globe.
The courses included defensive subjects described by the Army as “defense against biological attack” and “CBR [chemical, biological and radiological weapons] protective devices and equipment.”
They also included apparently offensive subjects as “unconventional warfare,” “principles of CBR employment” and “calculation of chemical munitions requirements.”
Indicating the courses were intended to provide information for dissemination back in the homeland, they also included instruction in “conducting CBR training.”
The United States and the Soviet Union at the time, each with significant offensive chemical and biological weapons programs, were competing for influence in the Middle East and elsewhere, and officials viewed military assistance as an important tool in that competition.
Still, experts question the wisdom of providing instruction in offensive tactics.
“In no way, anyway, would we [the British military], under a foreign training program, have offered any information like that, for obvious reasons,” said John Eldridge, editor of Jane’s Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defense.
He said the United Kingdom also trained Iraqi, Iranian and other foreign militaries in chemical and biological warfare during the 1960s, but only taught defensive tactics, reflecting the fact that the United Kingdom had renounced possessing such weapons in the 1950s.
The U.S. Army viewed those weapons differently. In 1958, it quietly reversed its policy to not use chemical or biological weapons first in a conflict, in existence since 1943. The United States did not sign the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the first use of such weapons until 1975.
Beginning particularly in the late 1950s, the Army also funded a public campaign to promote chemical and biological weapons as humane, useful and necessary weapons for deterrence.
Tactical Training
Because the U.S. training provided Attar was described as tactical, experts said it probably would not have aided him greatly in his roles running chemical and biological development programs.
The instruction was provided at a time, however, when Middle Eastern and other countries around the globe were beginning to develop an interest in chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and there was a concern at the time that U.S. technical assistance might encourage proliferation.
“You could argue that you were laying the seeds for interest in senior military officers in some particular weapons,” said Leitenberg.
“It doesn’t necessarily have to happen from the top down, it can happen from the bottom up,” said Harvard professor Matthew Meselson, who co-directs the Harvard-Sussex Program on chemical and biological arms control.
“If you send them to chemical defense school, these guys might see their careers in chemical weapons. And, then it just depends on how good they might be in building a little bureaucracy, convincing their leadership,” he said.
Key Positions
Attar is not well known by many Western experts on Iraq, perhaps because of his government’s notorious efforts to conceal suspected illicit activities. A number of former U.N. inspectors, however, say Attar was a key figure in the chemical weapons development program, some calling him the “father” of that program.
A 1999 U.N. inspectors report also attributed to Attar the resurgence of Iraq’s biological weapons program in the mid-1980s.
A February 1991 U.S. intelligence bulletin further identified Attar as a senior adviser to Hussein. The declassified bulletin, produced by the Defense Intelligence Agency and containing “not finally evaluated” information, said Attar “had studied in both the United States and in the Soviet Union and had served as a chief adviser to the chief of staff and to Saddam Hussein.”
Attar was jailed sometime prior to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, but was released six months later, according to bulletin.
When Spertzel met with Attar between 1994 and 1998, the Iraqi official was believed to have headed the Iraq’s Technical and Scientific Materials Import Division, according to a 1999-published book by former weapons inspector Tim Trevan called Saddam’s Secrets, The Hunt for Iraq’s Hidden Weapons. The division was suspected to have been the main procurement agency for Iraq’s biological weapons program.
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North Korea fired a short-range, anti-ship missile yesterday into the Sea of Japan, officials said (see GSN, Feb. 13). While the move appeared to be designed to disrupt the inauguration of South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun, South Korean and U.S. officials played down the event.
The cruise missile flew for about 30 miles before sinking into the Sea of Japan, officials said. They added that the missile did not appear to be a multi-stage system capable of traveling long distances.
The launch appeared to coincide with Roh’s inauguration, which is scheduled for today, according to the Washington Post. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell and Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi both traveled to Seoul for the event.
“This certainly is not a congratulatory message. It is part of a detailed and calculated move to escalate this crisis,” said Paik Jin-hyun, a professor of international law at Seoul National University (Doug Struck, Washington Post, Feb. 25).
Powell described the missile launch as “fairly innocuous” and “not surprising.” U.S. officials had known that such a launch would happen, he said (BBC News, Feb. 25).
“This is something that they test periodically,” a U.S. official said (Howard French, New York Times, Feb. 25).
Did the North End its Moratorium?
Experts disagreed on whether the test indicated North Korea was ending the self-imposed missile testing moratorium it has adhered to since 1998 (see GSN, Jan. 13).
“Strictly speaking, this is a violation of the missile moratorium,” said Yasuhiko Yoshida, a North Korean expert at Osaka University for Economics, but Seoul professor Paik said the test moratorium only applied to missiles with ranges greater than 180 miles.
There is also some confusion as to the exact type of missile North Korea launched yesterday, according to reports. A White House official identified the missile as a Styx, an anti-ship missile first developed by the Soviet Union in the 1950s (Struck, Washington Post). Japanese media, however, described the missile as a Chinese-developed Silkworm, according to Agence France-Presse (see GSN, Jan. 22).
China today denied that it had exported to North Korea the missile used in yesterday’s launch, calling such reports “groundless.”
“Regardless of whether they allude to or directly say these missiles are China’s, made in China or made with Chinese technology, all such reports are extremely irresponsible and groundless,” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Kong Quan said. Noting China’s weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile export controls, Kong added, “In this area, China is a very responsible country. Under these circumstances, we are firmly opposed to anyone spreading these groundless and irresponsible comments” (see GSN, Nov. 15, 2002; Agence France-Presse, Feb. 25).
Iraqi President Saddam Hussein suggeseted in television interview excerpts shown yesterday that he will not destroy his stockpile of al-Samoud 2 missiles, which the United Nations has order him to do (see GSN, Feb. 24).
U.N. chief weapons inspector Hans Blix has ordered Hussein to destroy the missiles, which have been determined to have flight ranges beyond U.N. mandates, by the end of the week. In an interview with CBS, however, Hussein maintained that Iraq is “allowed” to keep the missiles.
“Iraq is allowed to prepare proper missiles and we are committed to that,” CBS quoted Hussein as saying. When asked if the al-Samoud 2 missiles could be considered “proper,” he replied, “We do not have missiles that go beyond the proscribed range.”
Senior Iraqi officials said today that a decision has not been made on whether to destroy the missiles. “It’s being studied,” Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz said during a meeting with Egyptian officials.
The United Nations has said that the destruction order cannot be negotiated, according to the Associated Press. Blix said he was sending his chief deputy, Demetrius Perricos, to Baghdad to discuss the pace of the destruction.
“We have set the date for the commencement of the destruction of these missiles and we expect that to be respected,” Blix said. “There will be a discussion about the pace of the destruction and Mr. Perricos, as my deputy, will be there for that purpose,” he added.
U.S. President George W. Bush will not be satisfied even if Hussein does comply with the U.N. order, said White House press secretary Ari Fleischer, noting that stockpiles of chemical weapons were still missing.
“This is not about public relations. This is about protecting the lives of the American people,” Fleischer said. “If Saddam Hussein destroys the missiles that he said he never had ... you’ve got to wonder what other weapons does he have?” he added.
In his interview with CBS news anchor Dan Rather, Hussein challenged Bush to a debate, to be held via satellite linkup, the network said.
“I am ready to conduct a direct dialogue — a debate — with your president,” CBS quoted Saddam as saying. “I will say what I want and he will say what he wants,” he added (Associated Press/MSNBC.com, Feb. 25).
Missiles Part of Larger Effort, Analysts Say
Meanwhile, analysts have said that the al-Samoud 2 missile, while not posing a major threat by itself, could be part of efforts to develop a longer-range missile, which is why the United Nations has ordered its destruction.
“The real problem with al-Samoud isn’t the missile’s marginal violation on United Nations restrictions, but the fact it is part of a far larger program to acquire long-range methods of attacking neighbors with weapons of mass destruction,” said Loren Thompson, an analyst with the Lexington Institute. “If Iraq were to fully realize its goals for that program, it would acquire a fearsome capability that would largely nullify the U.S. military advantage,” Thompson said.
In its current one-stage configuration, the al-Samoud 2 is not much of a threat, said former U.N. missile inspector Timothy McCarthy, adding that its purpose is to be used as a second-stage missile. In that configuration, the missile would have the ability to hit targets in most of Turkey, all of Israel and in the Persian Gulf down to the Straits of Hormuz, said former Pentagon official Richard Speier.
It would take Iraq time, however, to modify the current al-Samoud 2 into a two-stage missile, analysts said. “To go from here to there is not an insignificant battle,” McCarthy said (Guynn/Tamayo, Miami Herald, Feb. 25).
United States Attacks Missile Systems
Meanwhile, U.S. aircraft today attacked three Iraqi surface-to-surface missile systems located just south of the northern city of Mosul, the U.S. European Command said in a press statement.
“The coalition carried out today’s strike after Iraqi forces moved the mobile surface-to-surface missile systems above the 36th parallel — inside the northern no-fly zone — and in range to threaten coalition forces,” the statement said (Associated Press/USA Today, Feb. 25).
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A U.S. District Court in Los Angeles dismissed a lawsuit against a missile defense contractor yesterday after U.S. attorneys said that documents requested by the defendant could threaten national security (see GSN, Jan. 2).
The federal government had in effect replaced the lawsuit’s original plaintiff when the contractor said it would need access to classified documents.
Nina Schwartz, a former senior engineer for defense contractor TRW, initiated the lawsuit against her former employer seven years ago, the Los Angeles Times reported. Schwartz alleged that TRW falsely claimed that a 1996 missile defense test demonstrated that TRW’s equipment could differentiate enemy warheads from decoys or debris, the Times reported.
The former engineer brought the lawsuit under the False Claims Act, which allows citizens to sue government contractors on Washington’s behalf. The United States may join the plaintiff at any point in a False Claims Act lawsuit, but U.S. officials declined to do so in 1996.
Schwartz pursued the case on her own, and in November 2002, the court granted TRW an order directing the United States to provide documents that U.S. officials said were classified, the Times reported. At that point the United States joined the lawsuit and U.S. lawyers, acting as the plaintiff, cited the classified documents and sought to dismiss the case.
Schwartz said she would appeal the ruling and her lawyer, Joseph Barrera, said U.S. officials had colluded with TRW “to cover up their own problems.”
“The whole thing is a travesty,” said Stephen Young, a senior analyst with the Union of Concerned Scientists, a lobbying group that has been supporting Schwartz.
Schwartz has companion whistle-blower and wrongful-termination lawsuits pending in federal courts, according to Barrera.
“They say it will endanger national security, but I say that if this doesn’t go to trial the national security will be in danger,” Schwartz said.
The company was “gratified” with the ruling, according to a TRW spokeswoman.
“TRW always maintained the case is without merit, but agreed with the government’s position that it could not be tried without the use of classified information,” she said (John O’Dell, Los Angeles Times, Feb. 25).
U.S defense officials are examining new systems to help improve cruise missile defense training, including improved simulations and the use of more realistic targets, Jane’s Defense Weekly reported this week (see GSN, Oct. 4, 2002).
The Pentagon’s Joint Cruise Missile Defense Joint Test and Evaluation program, which ends in mid-2005, is examining two options for improved training: new cruise missile defense simulations to assess gaps in defenses and a “Remote Operations Center,” which would include more realistic targets that could be deployed at training ranges, Jane’s reported.
The improved simulation capability is being established at Boeing’s Virtual Warfare Center in St. Louis, which will store threat and scenario information, said program Technical Director Geri Lentz. Program officials are also seeking to establish a network of regional nodes throughout the country where air defense operators can train, according to Jane’s.
The Remote Operations Center is a set of software that will help augment testing range equipment and analyze cruise missile defense exercises, Jane’s reported. The center will also use the Small Manned Aerial Radar Target Model-1 to simulate cruise missiles during exercises. The piloted SMART-1 allows for more realism because range safety concerns hamper the use of drones, said U.S. Air Force Col. Bill Holway, director of the project. The SMART-1, however, can be flown in a manner to both address safety concerns and to simulate cruise missile trajectories when needed, he said.
The Pentagon program plans to use the Remote Operations Center during the Roving Sands 2003 air-defense exercise, scheduled for June at White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico (Michael Sirak, Jane’s Defense Weekly, Feb. 26).
The United States will send a “few hundred” troops to Jordan to help operate three Patriot missile interceptor batteries deployed there, Jordanian Prime Minister Ali Abul Ragheb said yesterday (see GSN, Feb. 6).
“A few hundred American troops will man the Patriot batteries which are destined to protect Jordanian airspace against any missiles that could be fired over Jordan from any direction,” Ragheb said in an interview obtained by Agence France-Presse.
Jordan received the three Patriot batteries from the United States on Feb. 6 to help improve the country’s defenses in advance of potential military action against Iraq, a diplomat said. The Jordanian Army will deploy the batteries around the capital Amman and the city of Irbid, about 80 kilometers north of Amman, the diplomat said (Agence France-Presse/Jordan Times, Feb. 25).
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2002 by National Journal Group, Inc. The material in this section is produced independently for NTI by National Journal Group, Inc. Any reproduction or retransmission, in whole or in part, is a violation of federal law and is strictly prohibited without the consent of the National Journal Group, Inc. All rights reserved.
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