U.S. Response:  Officials Brace for Mock Chicago Terror Attack in May

A weeklong exercise designed to ready Chicago officials in the event of a chemical, biological or nuclear attack will begin next month, the Associated Press reported.

The drill is linked to another fabricated terrorist event in Seattle that will commence May 11 (see GSN, April 22).  The Seattle exercise will lead to a mock health crisis in Chicago that will involve officials from the U.S. Homeland Security and State departments, as well as locally from surrounding counties, according to the Associated Press.

Officials are keeping the details of the drill closely to create an element of surprise, Ross Rice, spokesman for the FBI’s Chicago office, said.  “The agents that are going to be directly involved in the training exercises, such as evidence recovery people, counterterrorism, SWAT teams — they don’t know any of the particulars,” he said (Associated Press, April 24).

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Iraq I:  U.S.-Led Forces Capture Suspect Chemical Site in Baghdad

U.S.-led troops have captured a warehouse complex in Baghdad filled with chemicals where Iraqi scientists are suspected of testing unconventional weapons on animals within the past year, the New York Times reported today (see GSN, April 23).

The warehouse complex was heavily looted before members of Mobile Exploitation Team Alpha (MET Alpha) and other coalition forces captured it, weapons experts and officers who have seen the site said.  The experts and officers described the warehouse complex as being filled with broken parts and equipment debris consistent with a full-scale laboratory. 

Iraqi citizens have told U.S. experts that scientists tested various agents on animals at the site, the experts said, noting that they have begun collecting samples from debris at the warehouse complex to test for biological and chemical weapons agents, the Times reported.  The samples are currently being analyzed at a U.S. laboratory.

The warehouse complex is typical for Iraq, and Baghdad is home to hundreds of such sites, according to the Times.  Because of this, it would have been almost impossible to find this particular site or determine whether it was connected with WMD efforts without the aid of Iraqis willing to discuss what had taken place there, a weapons expert said (Judith Miller, New York Times, April 24).

Sanctions

Meanwhile, the United States yesterday rejected a French proposal to temporarily suspend sanctions against Iraq until the country’s WMD disarmament could be certified.

“With the regime gone, the United States position is economic sanctions are no longer necessary,” White House press secretary Ari Fleischer said.  “They shouldn’t be merely suspended, they should be out-and-out lifted,” he said (Joseph Curl, Washington Times, April 24).

British Defense Secretary Geoff Hoon said today that any discovery of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq would need to be independently verified, but did not explicitly say if this task should be carried out by U.N. inspectors.

“I do not necessarily believe that it has to be the United Nations that provides that independent verification.  Clearly, the United Nations could be one of the organizations that does so,” Hoon said.  “We have not necessarily specified that that (verification) should be the United Nations.  There could be other countries who could identify ... particular chemicals, precursors for nerve agents or gas,” he added (Reuters/MSNBC.com, April 24).

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U.S. Response:  Bush Administration Ready to Strike First to Keep U.S. Safe

By David McGlinchey
Global Security Newswire

ALBUQUERQUE, N.M. — The United States is prepared to use pre-emptive military action again in the effort to stop the worldwide proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, a top U.S. nuclear official said yesterday (see GSN, April 7).

“Nonproliferation strategies will fail.  We will have to counter proliferation through other means,” said Linton Brooks, acting administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration.  Brooks delivered a keynote address to an international security conference hosted by the Energy Department’s Sandia National Laboratories.  Brooks said military action is an important tool to prevent WMD attacks.

“The armed forces have to be prepared to act in advance to prevent their use,” he said.

U.S. President George W. Bush has established a policy that using force pre-emptively — before the United States detects a specific, imminent threat — may be necessary to prevent rogue states or terrorist groups from using or proliferating WMD.  The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq was the first major demonstration of the new policy.

The Bush administration “realizes that proliferation threats have to be dealt with,” Brooks said.

He said the post-Cold War era is over, and the world now faces “The Age of Terrorism and Counterterrorism.”  Efforts to fight WMD proliferation, including diplomatic and military strategies, must become a central component of U.S. foreign policy in this new age, according to Brooks.

International Cooperation

Brooks also called for greater international coordination to advance initiatives to combat WMD proliferation, including military options.

“Nations need to work together however they can and wherever they can.  All nations have an interest,” he said.

This cooperation, however, should take place on an “ad hoc basis,” according to Brooks.  He noted that is was a “coalition of the willing” that initiated the military action in Iraq, not a standing international organization.

Brooks envisioned “nations dealing together to limit the threat, or where it can’t be limited, to eliminate it.”

Revitalizing the Nuclear Stockpile

As for his role, Brooks said the Bush administration is committed to revitalizing the nation’s nuclear stockpile and infrastructure (see GSN, April 23).

“The administration has, through the (Nuclear Posture Review), re-conceptualized the idea of a strategic triad,” Brooks said.

That triad, according to Brooks, includes an offensive strike component, a missile defense capability and the “revitalization of our nuclear weapons infrastructure” to provide a “credible and responsive deterrent.”

“Intellectually it’s a huge departure,” he told Global Security Newswire.  The effort carries “an intellectual importance that translates into budgetary importance,” he said.

Brooks said the strategic triad would be of particular benefit to the Energy Department’s Facilities and Infrastructure Recapitalization Program, designed to revitalize the physical infrastructure of the nuclear weapons program and reduce maintenance backlogs.

The Bush administration has requested $6.3 billion for nuclear stockpile stewardship in the fiscal 2004 budget.

The increased focus on the strategic triad “will prevent us from ignoring the (nuclear) infrastructure” by making it “more visible,” Brooks said.

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Iraq II:  U.S. Troops Capture Three Iraqi Most-Wanted Officials

U.S. forces in Iraq yesterday captured three Iraqi officials included in a list of the 55 most-wanted members of ousted Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s regime, according to the Associated Press (see related GSN story, today).

With yesterday’s capture, 14 Iraqi officials included on the list have either been captured or are believed to have been killed.  U.S. officials hope that interrogations with captured Iraqi officials could provide useful information in the search of Iraq weapons of mass destruction.

Among the officials captured in Baghdad yesterday was Muzahim Sa’b Hassan al-Tikriti, former head of Iraq’s air defense network and No. 10 on the U.S. list.  Al-Tikriti is also believed to have helped train the Fedayeen Saddam paramilitary forces.

U.S. troops also captured Gen. Zuhayr Talib Abd al-Sattar al-Naqib, former head of the Directorate of Military Intelligence and No. 21 on the U.S. list; and former Iraqi Trade Minister Muhammad Mahdi al-Salih, No. 48 on the U.S. list (Associated Press/USA Today, April 24).

In an interview conducted with the Los Angeles Times prior to surrendering to U.S. troops, al-Naqib denied that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction or that he had done anything that could be considered as a crime against humanity.

“This was the military — you move up from position to position,” al-Naqib said.  “I was just following orders,” he said (Rubin/Slackman, Los Angeles Times, April 24).

In addition to al-Tikriti, al-Naqib and al-Salih, U.S. forces have also captured:

Muhammad Hazmaq al-Zubaidi, Central Euphrates region military commander and former deputy prime minister, No. 18 on the U.S. list;

Samir Abd al-Aziz al-Najm, Baath Party chairman for the Diyala region, No. 24 on the U.S. list;

Jamal Mustafa Abdallah Sultan al-Tikriti, deputy chief of tribal affairs, No. 40 on the U.S. list;

Hikmat al-Azzawi, former Iraqi finance minister, No. 45 on the U.S. list;

Watban Ibrahim al-Tikriti, Baath Party official and former intelligence minister, No. 51 on the U.S. list;

Barzan Ibrahim Hasan al-Tikriti, Baath party official and former head of the Mukhabarat intelligence service, No. 52 on the U.S. list;

Humam Abd al-Khaliq Abd al-Ghafur, former minister of higher education and scientific research, No. 54 on the U.S. list; and

Amir Hamudi Hasan al-Sadi, former presidential scientific adviser, No. 55 on the U.S. list (BBC News, April 23).

“Chemical Ali" — Dead or Alive?

Meanwhile, Baghdad hospital workers have said they saw Ali Hassan al-Majid — known as “Chemical Ali” for ordering a 1998 chemical weapons attack on Kurdish rebels in Northern Iraq — alive shortly before the city was captured (see GSN, April 10).

Al-Majid was twice reported to have been killed during coalition air raids on the southern city of Basra, first on March 22 and then on April 5, according to the Philadelphia Inquirer.  Two workers at the Baghdad Nursing Hospital, part of the Saddam Hospital Complex, said they saw a healthy al-Majid arrive after the April 5 airstrike.

“Of course I was very, very surprised to see him, because the radio said he was killed,” a nurse at the hospital said (Juan Tamayo, Philadelphia Inquirer, April 24).

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North Korea I:  Pyongyang Declares Nuclear Weapons; Talks End

North Korean diplomats today declared that Pyongyang possesses nuclear weapons and threatened to test them, a source told CNN today (see GSN, April 23).

In a “blatant and bold” statement on the second day of talks in Beijing, North Korean envoy Ri Gun told U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly that his country has nuclear weapons, the source said.  Ri also threatened that North Korea would conduct a visible test of its weapons to prove that it was a nuclear power, the source added.

“What are you going to do about it?” a North Korean diplomat was reported to have said during the exchange.

A senior Bush administration official said today that the White House was still working to determine what exactly the North Koreans meant by their claim (CNN.com, April 24).

The planned three-day series of talks between the United States, North Korea and China, which began yesterday, came to an abrupt end today after the North Korean claim. 

U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell warned Pyongyang against leaving with “the slightest impression that the United States and its partners and the nations in the region will be intimidated by bellicose statements or by threats or actions.”

Bilateral talks between the United States and China, as well as between China and North Korea, could still occur tomorrow, Powell said (BBC News, April 24).

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North Korea II:  U.S. Ready to Seek U.N. Security Council Action if Talks Fail

By David McGlinchey
Global Security Newswire

ALBUQUERQUE, N.M. — If North Korea scuttles negotiations that are intended to defuse the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula, the U.N. Security Council will need to take action and Chinese opposition could be minimal, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control Stephen Rademaker said yesterday (see GSN, April 23).

The United States took part in talks this week with China and North Korea, but the talks ended abruptly today reportedly after North Korea declared that it possesses nuclear weapons and threatened to test them (see related GSN story, today).  Rademaker’s remarks preceded those developments.

U.S. officials have been sharply critical of the United Nations and the Security Council for failing to enforce U.N. resolutions on Iraq, but they have maintained their desire for U.N. involvement in the North Korean crisis.

If the current talks fail, particularly if they fail because of North Korean “intransigence,” then the issue should be brought before the Security Council, Rademaker told Global Security Newswire.

China has opposed earlier Security Council attempts to reprimand North Korea for withdrawing from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (see GSN, April 8).

Asked why the Security Council would be more effective in dealing with North Korea than it was in dealing with Iraq, Rademaker said that current negotiations are giving North Korea a way out.  If Pyongyang foils the talks, however, Rademaker expects China will be less supportive of its communist neighbor when the issue reaches the United Nations.

Rademaker made his comments after a panel discussion at a conference here hosted by the Energy Department’s Sandia National Laboratories.

The United States suspects North Korea is developing nuclear weapons and Washington has so far insisted it will not offer economic or energy aid until Pyongyang dismantles its nuclear facilities.

Pyongyang announced earlier this year that it is withdrawing from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.  North Korean officials have said they are prepared to begin reprocessing spent nuclear fuel rods, a key first step to building nuclear weapons.  North Korea’s state-run media outlets have said the country needs a powerful military capability to deter a U.S. invasion.

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U.S.-Russia:  Bush Officials Optimistic on Plutonium Conversion Deal

By David Ruppe
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — The Bush administration is optimistic it will finalize this year a deal initiated eight years ago to dispose of Russian weapon-grade plutonium by converting it to fuel for use in nuclear reactors (see GSN, Jan. 30).

However, the United States still needs to raise an additional $600 million from other nations to support the agreement.  So far other Group of Eight countries have committed $400 million toward a goal of $1 billion, a senior administration official said yesterday on a panel at the American Enterprise Institute.  The United States would match the $1 billion, according to the plan.

“Based on what we can reasonably forecast from the U.S. perspective … we can reasonably say this year we will be able to top $1 billion,” said the official, who asked not to be identified.  “We are hoping to have an agreement by the end of the year,” the official said.

The origins of the deal go back to 1995 when then-U.S. President Bill Clinton declared as surplus 50 tons of U.S. plutonium not needed for U.S. nuclear weapons.  Boris Yeltsin, the Russian president at the time, reciprocated in 1997 by declaring 50 tons of Russian plutonium to be in excess of Russian military needs.  In 2000, the two nations agreed to dispose of 34 tons each primarily by converting the plutonium into reactor fuel (see GSN, Jan. 23, 2002).

Russia has indicated it would not begin implementing the deal until it could be sure the estimated $2 billion cost could be funded, according to the U.S. official, who also noted that the United States has secured commitments from all G-8 members — except Germany — to achieve the $400 million total, but acknowledged that some of them had not publicly stated those commitments.

Dispute Over Plan

The administration is pitching the plan as the best way to deal with the Russian plutonium, which some experts fear could be passed on to terrorists or other governments.  The reactors would burn the fuel, turning it into waste that experts say would be far less usable for nuclear weapons, and put the material under international control.

Some critics say the plan creates proliferation problems because it could encourage the construction of plutonium-fueled nuclear reactors.

“I’m not going to argue that this program is risk-free … I do believe that the program has far fewer risks than the only alternative,” said the senior official.

The alternative, the official said, would be for Russia to store the material in its weapon-grade form “indefinitely” until Russia someday uses it for energy.  Moscow would never adopt an alternative proposal to degrade the material by mixing it with nuclear waste products, he added. 

Panelist Henry Rowen, a professor of public policy and management at Stanford University, charged the plan would be more dangerous than retaining the material at Russian storage sites and that the U.S. funding could be put to better use hastening security improvements for Russian nuclear materials.

“I have one suggestion for these billions of dollars.  Give it to the Nunn-Lugar program,” a U.S. effort to secure and dismantle former Soviet weapons of mass destruction, he said (see GSN, March 13).

Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, which cosponsored the panel, also expressed concern over the security of Russian plutonium in transit.

“We’re taking a route, in the name of making this material less accessible, that will make it more accessible,” he said. “If Japan loses 50-plus bombs of material, and cannot tell where it is, in 15 years, what are the odds without IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] safeguards in the case of Russia that Russia will do better?” he asked (see GSN, April 2).

Potentially Lucrative Deal

Critics suggested certain government and financial interests were driving the deal.

Sokolski, a nonproliferation official in the administration of former President George H.W. Bush, said today the deal’s “key beneficiaries” would include the company Cogema, a U.S. subsidiary of a French firm.

“It owns a major portion of the entity that … won the bid for the construction of the (Russian) plant,” he said.

That company — Duke, Cogema, Stone-Webster — is  “one entity,” Sokolski said.  Those two companies also do nuclear-related work for the Energy Department, which experts said also favors the deal.

Other potential beneficiaries are the Energy Department’s Savannah River Site, as well as Russia, from the facility to be constructed for processing the fuel, Sokolski said (see GSN, Dec. 6, 2002).

“They will get title to the (plutonium fuel) plant,” and after processing the 34 tons could use the plant for processing other countries’ plutonium — 50,000 nuclear weapons worth — that would need to be transported and could be subject to diversion, he said.

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Russia:  Atomic Energy Ministry Designing New Plutonium Reactor Fuel

After conducting research in secret for almost a decade, the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry has acknowledged that it is working with the United States on a program to use weapon-grade plutonium as a component in a new type of nuclear power plant fuel, the Moscow Times reported today (see GSN, March 12).

The U.S.-Russian program looks to create nuclear power plant fuel by combining weapon-grade plutonium with the radioactive metal thorium.  The plutonium would then trigger a chain reaction out of the material to produce energy.  While supplies of uranium, the current main component of nuclear fuel, are dwindling, according to the Times thorium is abundant in a number of locations around the world.

“The possibility of using thorium fuel in existing reactors is very significant because it means we will not have to change the reactors,” said Valery Rachov, deputy director of the Atomic Energy Ministry’s scientific research department and head of the Russian component of the program.

The United States and Russia are already involved in a program to reduce plutonium stockpiles through converting the material to mixed oxide (MOX) fuel (see related GSN story, today).  For Russia to do this, however, a special MOX production plant would have to be built at a cost of $2 billion, the Times reported.  Supporters of the thorium program, which includes U.S. Representative Curt Weldon (R-Pa.), have said it is faster, cheaper and safer than the MOX program.

“I have strongly supported additional funding to test the thorium process,” Weldon said.  “The thorium process provides the double benefit of reducing weapons-usable fissile material and producing advanced, proliferation-resistant nuclear reactor and fuel cycle technologies.  As such, it is in the best interests of the United States to provide funding to advance this technology,” he said.

The United States has provided $5 million for the thorium project — $2 million in government funding and $3 million from Thorium Power, a private U.S. company.  Weldon has urged the United States to provide $3.5 million for the project this year.  The U.S. Energy Department said earlier this month, however, that no budget funding would be specifically allocated for the project this year.  Even so, Weldon said he was confident that funding could be found.

“My intention is to convince my colleagues in Congress that the thorium process can play a vital role in preventing nuclear weapons materials from falling into the wrong hands, and its development should receive the funds necessary to continue its progress,” Weldon said (Yevgenia Borisova, Moscow Times, April 24).

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Iran:  France Urges Tehran to Sign IAEA Additional Protocol

French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin urged Iran today to sign an additional protocol to its International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards agreements (see GSN, March 13).  The protocol would permit the agency to conduct more intrusive inspections of suspected Iranian nuclear sites.

“We think it is essential to continue confidence-building measures, in particular by signing the additional protocol of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as demanded by [IAEA Director General Mohamed] ElBaradei,” de Villepin said (Agence France-Presse, April 24).

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Japan:  Prosecutors Call For Death Penalty for Aum

Japanese prosecutors today called for the death penalty for Shoko Asahara, leader of the Aum Shinrikyo cult, which conducted several sarin attacks in the mid-1990s (see GSN, Feb. 21).

“The seriousness of the crime is unprecedented in this country,” prosecutors said in their closing statement, which ran hundreds of pages long.  “There is no room to consider leniency,” they said.

Asahara, who has been on trial since 1996, has been accused of being responsible for 26 deaths, including 12 suffered in a 1995 sarin attack in Tokyo’s subway system.  Asahara’s defense attorneys, however, have said the cult’s crimes were conducted by his followers without his involvement.

“Prosecutors completely failed to establish a link between the alleged crimes and Asahara,” chief defense attorney Osamu Watanabe said.  “I’m appalled,” Watanabe added.

Nine Aum members have been sentenced to death for their roles in the 1995 subway attack and other crimes.  Judges are not expected to issue a verdict in Asahara’s case until early next year (Mari Yamaguchi, Associated Press, April 24).

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United States I:  Pentagon Analyzing Patriot Success Rate in Iraq War

By David Ruppe
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — Although U.S. military officials and independent analysts have praised the track record of the Patriot theater missile defense system during the conflict in Iraq, a senior U.S. Army official said today an analysis is not yet completed on the success rate (see GSN, April 16).

The U.S. Central Command is conducting an analysis of the Patriot record and the results will be released as soon as they are available, said Lt. Gen. Joseph Cosumano, director of the Army Space and Missile Defense Command.

Speaking at an event sponsored by the National Defense University Foundation and the National Defense Industrial Association, he repeated a previously reported Army statement that the system had successfully “engaged” nine Iraqi missiles fired within the range of deployed Patriot systems during the war.

The engagements were determined successes based on the fact that none of those Iraqi missiles destroyed anything, Cosumano said.

“The commander in the field says it was apparently effective because there was nothing damaged,” he said.

That calculation, however, does not take into account the possibility that the missiles could have been poorly aimed or inaccurate and may have simply missed their targets.

“The data is being collected right now as we speak,” he said.

The engagements “appeared to be effective because of new sources of data that we have,” he said, including ship-based radar.  “We’re sorting through all of that data now to give the scientific answer as to how effective Patriot was.”

The Boston Globe on April 16, citing a Central Command official, reported that eight of the missiles were “destroyed in the air,” while the other was “significantly damaged” and landed without causing harm.

During the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the Army estimated a high success rate for an early version of the Patriot missile defense system, which was later shown to be incorrect.  In the recent war, U.S. forces used a combination of older Patriots and an upgraded system called Patriot Advanced Capability 3.

Cosumano also said a separate investigation was underway to determine the cause or causes of three incidents in which Patriot batteries engaged friendly aircraft (see related GSN story, today).

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United States II:  Electronic Confusion Could Be Responsible for Patriot Friendly Fire Incidents

Large amounts of electronic information in today’s battlefield could make it more difficult for the Patriot missile interceptor system to distinguish aircraft from ballistic missiles, Inside the Pentagon reported today (see GSN, April 17).

U.S. Army Brig. Gen. Howard Bromberg, commanding general of the 32nd Army Air and Missile Defense command, noted in an interview late last month that some battlefield electronics could confuse the Patriot’s radar system.  “We’re not 100 percent sure what the effect of those electronic signatures (is) on the battlefield,” he said.

During the month-long war in Iraq, the Patriot was involved in two friendly fire incidents that resulted in the loss of a British Tornado aircraft on March 23 and a U.S. F/A-18 Hornet on April 2, according to the U.S. Defense Department.

In the Tornado incident, “the airplane didn’t look like an airplane to the operator,” Bromberg said.

The fact that the Patriot system operator did not recognize the Tornado as an aircraft could be an important factor in the investigation into the friendly fire incident.  No Iraqi aircraft flew during the war, which would give the operator little reason to think that an aircraft he saw on radar was hostile, according to Inside the Pentagon.

“We have not ruled out human error,” Bromberg said prior to the downing of the F/A-18 Hornet.

Other Pentagon officials have said that a combination of human error and technical problems could be responsible for a friendly fire incident.

“I think it’s key to remember that the Patriot operator and the system have to make very, very rapid decisions as to whether to engage or not,” Air Force Maj. Gen. Dan Leaf, senior air component representative to the ground headquarters at Camp Doha in Kuwait, said in an interview April 8.  The detection of an incoming enemy missile, the launching of the Patriot interceptor and the intercept of the incoming missile all occur within a matter of seconds, Leaf said (Elaine Grossman, Inside the Pentagon, April 24).

A spokesman for the U.S. defense contractor Raytheon, which produces the Patriot system, said it was too soon to determine the performance of the missile interceptor system during the Iraq war (see related GSN story, today).  Company spokesman Steve Brecken referred all questions about the system to the U.S. Central Command.

“We’re only the manufacturer of the system, not its operational user,” Brecken said.

Central Command spokesman Lt. Cmdr. Charles Owens said the interceptor’s overall performance during the war was “pretty good,” but the U.S. military still plans to investigate the friendly fire incidents (Hans Greimel/Associated Press, Anchorage Daily News, April 23).

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Radiological Weapons:  Potassium Iodide Ineffective Against Dirty Bomb Blast, Study Says

A study published today in the Journal of the American Medical Association says potassium iodide pills would be ineffective in preventing cancer after exposure to a “dirty bomb” blast (see GSN, April 8).

Potassium iodide has been found to prevent thyroid cancer after exposure to a nuclear blast or a nuclear reactor meltdown, said doctors attending a recent forum sponsored by the American Thyroid Association and the American Association of Clinical Endocrinologists.  A dirty bomb blast, however, would not create the radioactive isotope iodine 131, which potassium iodide counters, said E. Dillwyn Williams, emeritus professor of histopathology at the University of Cambridge (Audrey Hudson, Washington Times, April 24).

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