The United Kingdom is urging the United States to offer captured senior Iraqi officials leniency if they provide information that aids the coalition’s search for Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, the London Times reported today (see GSN, June 17).
London wants to offer the captured officials — 32 out of the 55 U.S. most-wanted — the assurance that their assistance would be taken into account if they appear before a war crimes tribunal. If an official offered particularly useful information, he or she could be granted immunity and a new life in another country, according to the Times.
The United States, however, is divided over the British proposal, officials said. Some U.S. Defense Department officials oppose any agreement that could lower the officials’ possible sentences if they are convicted of war crimes.
“We have been trying for ages to persuade the Americans but they have come up with all kinds of legal arguments,” a British official said (Michael Evans, London Times, June 18).
Meanwhile, another coalition search tactic, the use of the massive Iraq Survey Group of weapons teams and intelligence analysts, bears many resemblances to the U.N. weapons inspection regime that U.S. officials criticized prior to the war, according to senior military and intelligence officials in Iraq.
The group will not be fully operational for several more weeks, officials said. When it is up and running, its 1,400 members will live in mobile trailers and work at a facility that will be constructed within one of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s palaces near the Baghdad airport, according to the Los Angeles Times. The group will also operate two satellite bases in the northern and southern sections of Iraq.
Advance survey group teams have already been assigned to find and interview certain Iraqis, with other teams assigned to translating and analyzing recovered documents and computer data, the Times reported. In addition, some group teams have been given the task of investigating Iraq’s former covert procurement efforts.
“This is truly going to be looking for all the clues,” a Pentagon official said. “We haven’t done that before,” the official said.
Brig. Gen. Steve Meekin, the senior Australian officer in the group, said the new effort “absolutely” resembles the U.N. inspection regime because it will focus on collecting information and not just site searches.
The Iraq Survey Group has several advantages, however, over the previous U.N. effort, the Times reported. For example, the group will rely heavily on U.S. and British intelligence operatives who have been dubbed “secret squirrels” by U.S. commanders. The group will also have what one commander called “unfettered access to Iraqis at all levels.”
“We have a full deck of cards,” the commander said. “The U.N. had about 35,” the commander added (Bob Drogin, Los Angeles Times, June 18).
Bush Defends WMD Claims
In the past two days, U.S. President George W. Bush has twice attacked the growing criticism coming from some in the U.S. Congress, as well as overseas, that no weapons of mass destruction have been found in Iraq.
“I know there’s a lot of revisionist history now going on, but one thing is certain: He [Hussein] is no longer a threat to the Free World, and the people of Iraq are free,” Bush said yesterday (Mike Allen, Washington Post, June 18).
Bush and his aides believe that Americans’ relief over the fall of Hussein will counter any questions over the case the White House built to justify going to war, Bush administration officials and Republican strategists said.
“We see a very similar pattern to the commentary around the military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq — the premature drawing of conclusions, based on a picture that is still incomplete,” said White House Communications Director Dan Bartlett. “Americans are patient. They are willing to wait and see what we find,” he said.
Former House Speaker Newt Gingrich agreed that Bush is likely to experience little fallout over the lack of a discovery of weapons of mass destruction. “The president is 99 percent safe on this one,” he said.
“The literary class that dislikes Bush and dislikes American activism is thrilled, whether in Europe or in the U.S., to have this question to raise,” Gingrich said. “But in the United States at least, given the mass graves, given the level of torture and brutality by the Baath Party regime, you’re asking the American people to side with the apologists for replacing Saddam. Does even the most left-wing Democrat want to defend the proposition that the world would be better off with Saddam in power?” he added.
Some Republicans are concerned, however, that the growing criticism British Prime Minister Tony Blair is facing over the lack of success in finding weapons of mass destruction could have an influence in Washington, according to the New York Times.
“After all, we were all working off the same shared evidence,” said a senior coalition diplomat. “If it was wrong for one, it was wrong for all,” the diplomat said (Sanger/Hulse, New York Times, June 18).
DIA Doubted Iraqi Use of Chemical Weapons
U.S. intelligence analysts told the Bush administration last year that while Iraq had begun to deploy chemical weapons, it would not use them unless the fall of Hussein’s regime was imminent, U.S. officials said yesterday.
In a November 2002 report, the Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence Agency said it was unlikely that Iraq would resort to using weapons of mass destruction as long as U.N. sanctions were in place. Hussein would use such weapons only “in extreme circumstances,” the report said, “because their use would confirm Iraq’s evasion of U.N. restrictions,” according to the report, portions of which were read to a reporter by an intelligence official (James Risen, New York Times, June 18).
U.S. Intelligence Review
U.S. House and Senate intelligence committees are expected to begin hearings today on the prewar U.S. intelligence on Iraq, according to Reuters.
The House committee is set to hold a closed hearing today to interview intelligence analysts about the compilation of National Intelligence Estimate reports on Iraqi WMD programs, with a focus on the last such report, produced in October 2002. Committee members plan to ask analysts how the report was prepared, how the report was used and how it differed from other intelligence reports, congressional aides said. The committee is expected to hold a second closed hearing tomorrow on the current search for Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.
The Senate intelligence committee is scheduled to meet today to discuss procedures for future hearings. The committee is then expected to hold a closed hearing tomorrow on Iraq-related intelligence reports (Tabassum Zakaria, Reuters/Yahoo!News, June 18).
The House International Affairs Committee voted 23-15 along party lines yesterday to unfavorably report a resolution calling on Bush to release all Iraq-related documents within 14 days of the measure’s adoption (Sara Steines, CongressDaily, June 18).
British Intelligence Review
Former British International Development Secretary Claire Short yesterday accused Blair of “honorable deception” in drawing the United Kingdom into war.
“I believe that the prime minister must have concluded that it was honorable and desirable to back the U.S. in going for military action in Iraq, and therefore it was honorable for him to persuade us through various ruses and ways to get us there — so for him I think it was an honorable deception,” Short said before the British Parliament’s House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, which is examining the case Blair made for going to war (Ben Russell, London Independent, June 18).
Australia Senate to Conduct Inquiry
The Australian Senate has decided to conduct an inquiry into Australia’s prewar intelligence on Iraqi WMD programs, the Sydney Morning Herald reported today (Sydney Morning Herald, June 18).
A spokesman for the opposition Labor Party today accused Australian Prime Minister John Howard of seeking to deter intelligence officials from answering questions during the inquiry.
“Mr. Howard may have a grand political strategy in mind about how to create a public political environment which makes life difficult for those agencies if they cooperate,” opposition foreign affairs spokesman Kevin Rudd said (Sydney Morning Herald II, June 18).
By David Ruppe Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — The U.S. experience in the 1990s suggests the threat of force to obtain objectives short of war tends to fail more often than it succeeds, according to a new book.
Furthermore, it says when such threats fail they tend to produce either of two outcomes: all-out war or a credibility- and power-risking political retreat.
“Coercive diplomacy” should therefore be undertaken cautiously and only when leaders are willing to go to war over the objective, according to The United States and Coercive Diplomacy, which was published by the United States Institute of Peace and released yesterday.
“Coercive diplomacy is difficult and has a relatively low success rate,” the book says, advising to “never resort to coercive diplomacy unless you are prepared to go to war should it fail, or unless you have devised a suitable political escape hatch if war is not acceptable.”
Assessing the circumstances in which coercive diplomacy was used by the United States during the 1990s, and the likelihood that the country will remain the sole global superpower for years to come, the book predicts that coercive diplomacy will remain a common tool of U.S. strategy in the future.
“The need to back U.S. diplomacy with force will not go away; consequently, political-military coercion short of all-out war will remain a highly attractive option to U.S. leaders,” wrote the book’s editor, Brandeis University professor Robert Art.
“I expect to see a lot more instances of coercive diplomacy. We have just seen the most recent failure of coercive diplomacy in the second Gulf War,” Art said at a panel here accompanying the release of the book yesterday, referring to the U.S. military takeover of Iraq.
Art said the extent of global U.S. military commitments, particularly in occupied Iraq, might inhibit the application of coercive diplomacy.
25 Percent Success Rate Seen
Providing eight case studies of instances in which the United States threatened or used limited force to compel action by other governments during the last decade, the book concludes that in only two instances, or 25 percent of the time, was coercive diplomacy clearly successful — once in 1994 to compel regime change in Haiti, and a rollback in Serb aggression and end to the war in Bosnia in 1995.
Some failures, the book says, include efforts to compel:
* North Korea in 1994 to freeze its nuclear weapons program;
* the Yugoslav government in 1999 to end repression of Kosovo;
* Somali clans from 1992 to 1994 to disarm to allow for creation of a civil reconstruction program, a new government and strengthening of peacekeeping and civilian reconstruction efforts;
* changes in Iraqi government behavior from 1990 to 1998, which, while producing some successes, was deemed overall to be a failure; and
* al-Qaeda to stop terrorism by bombing sites in Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998.
It described as “ambiguous” the U.S. response to Chinese coercive diplomacy against Taiwan in 1996, finding the U.S. response was as much about deterrence than coercion — or preventing action rather than changing it.
The book concluded the United Sates and Taiwan were arguably successfully coerced in that incident, as both altered their behavior to some degree after the encounter in response to Chinese pressure.
On North Korea
The studies were performed by American academics, think-tank analysts and a senior Bush administration official from the Agency for International Development. Art summarized them in an introduction and conclusion.
Two panelists yesterday not associated with the book — Arnold Kanter, a senior fellow at the Forum for International Policy, and former Ambassador Robert Gallucci, who was a principal player in the 1994 North Korea episode — praised its conclusions.
However, Gallucci disagreed that coercive diplomacy failed in that case, contending that the implied threat of force through a noticeable military buildup probably helped bring North Korea to the negotiating table.
Also in attendance was the author of the case study, William Drennan, who said former President Jimmy Carter was the primary instrument of the solution and the avoidance of war, and that the United States appeared to be successfully coerced by North Korea during that period.
There is “a lot more evidence that North Korea … actually did the coercing, and the United States did the reacting,” said Drennan, the deputy director of the USIP’s Research and Studies Program.
“The argument that for a brief moment Carter hijacked our foreign policy is not an unreasonable argument,” said Gallucci, but added that he was not sure Carter was essential to eventually concluding an agreement.
Regarding the Bush Administration
Drawing from the case studies, the book offered additional lessons on the application of coercive diplomacy. For instance, it concluded that success is difficult to predict regardless of the situation, that military superiority does not guarantee success and that the probability of success appeared to have no correlation to the objective.
Art said coercive diplomacy often produces a “game of chicken.”
“The dynamics of the game of chicken are such that usually a crisis escalates before it de-escalates, because crises, after all, being games of chicken, are tests of wills. Part of the problem with games of chicken, or in coercive diplomatic encounters, is it’s very difficult to estimate whose resolve is stronger before you have this crisis or this test,” he said.
“In most of the cases we looked at, the target cared very strongly about what it was trying to do, what it was trying to achieve, and therefore it was not willing to bow to U.S. threats to use force or very limited use of force,” he added.
The book said offering carrots, as well as the stick of threatened force, can increase the probability of success, but is more likely to do so if incentives are offered prior to threats and not after.
Threatened leaders, Art said, often would prefer to stand up to a threat rather than back down and lose power and credibility, thereby escalating tensions and bringing the situation closer to war.
“Coercive diplomacy asks a very difficult thing of the target, it asks that it sacrifice some of its credibility, willingness to stand firm … or to diminish its power,” he said.
The head of Britain’s MI5 said it is “only a matter of time” before terrorists strike a Western city using nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological materials, the London Independent reported yesterday.
“Renegade scientists” — most likely from Pakistan — have given Islamic extremists information to create weapons of mass destruction, Eliza Manningham-Buller, the director general of the security service, said in her first public remarks since she became head of the service in October.
“We are faced with a realistic possibility of a form of unconventional attack that could include chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN),” Manningham-Buller said. “It is only a matter of time before a crude version of a CBRN is launched on a Western city, and it is only a matter of time before the crude version becomes more sophisticated,” she added (Jason Bennetto, London Independent, June 17).
Romania plans to implement new transparency measures soon that would be based on information-exchange procedures approved earlier this month by the Australia Group, a group of 33 countries that coordinate export controls on dual-use items that could be used to create biological or chemical weapons, the Rompres news agency reported yesterday (see GSN, June 11).
The planned Romanian transparency measures are intended to help prevent the diversion of biological and chemical products to weapons use. During a plenary meeting of the Australia Group held earlier this month in Paris, group members also approved a Romanian proposal on the distribution of an electronic collection of members’ export control systems to aid in licensing and implementation activities (Rompres/BBC Monitoring, June 17).
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