Responding to an International Atomic Energy Agency statement asking Iran to show restraint in its nuclear program, Tehran said yesterday that it would continue with scheduled plans to add nuclear materials to a uranium enrichment plant (see GSN, June 19).
The 35-member IAEA board of governors yesterday appealed to Iran to hold off from putting nuclear material into the enrichment facility “as a confidence-building measure.”
Iran’s IAEA representative, Ali Akbar Salehi, said the nuclear development would continue and that Iran would not accept additional inspections of its facilities.
“Iran is already being fully cooperative. We are happy that the board did not yield to pressure to adopt a resolution (condemning Iran),” he said. “The U.S. is probably not very happy with the outcome because they wanted a resolution and they were not able to get (it) … The reason the resolution failed is that everyone knew there were political motivations behind it,” he said (Financial Times, June 20).
Salehi said Iran was opposed to allowing more intrusive international monitoring of its nuclear activities, but he reiterated that Iran would cooperate with existing IAEA activities in the country.
“We cannot bind ourselves to doing more than we are already committed to,” Salehi said. “The process of cooperation with the IAEA will go on unhindered,” he added (Joby Warrick, Washington Post, June 19).
The U.S. representative to the IAEA, Kenneth Brill, said the statement released yesterday by the board of governors sent a message of concern to Iran.
“I’m very satisfied with the outcome,” Brill said. “We have an important message from the board that supports the U.S. position and concern about the Iranian program,” he said (Richard Bernstein, New York Times, June 20).
IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei said yesterday the agency needs more information about Iran’s nuclear development efforts. He also repeated his appeal for Iran to adopt the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement, which would allow more intrusive inspections of nuclear facilities by IAEA officials.
“The jury is still out,” ElBaradei said. “We still have a lot of work to do and we will be hopefully in a much better position to make a judgment by September or earlier if we can,” he added (IAEA release, June 19).
Russian President Vladimir Putin said Iran is close to signing the Additional Protocol, Agence France-Presse reported today.
“According to information that we have in hand, the leadership of Iran is ready to join all protocols, to all demands of the IAEA, concerning control of (Iran’s) nuclear program,” he said. “We will build our relations with any country — including Iran — based on their openness in relation to the IAEA,” Putin added (Agence France-Presse, June 20).
The president of TVEL, the Russian nuclear fuel producer that is slated to supply nuclear material to Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power plant, said that the deal is contingent on Iran’s compliance with the IAEA.
“No fuel will be supplied until Iran’s entire nuclear industry is put under IAEA monitoring,” said Alexander Nyago (Interfax, June 18 in FBIS-SOV, June 18).
Iranian President Mohammad Khatami reportedly telephoned Putin to assure him that Iran was not developing or procuring nuclear weapons technology (Financial Times).
Bolton Says Military Action Possible
The United States has the right to use military force to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons but the thought is “far from our minds,” U.S. Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton told BBC today.
U.S. President George W. Bush “has repeatedly said that all options are on the table. But that (military action) is not only not our preference, it is far from our minds,” Bolton said.
He added, however, that a military strike “has to be an option” and said that Iran is “pursuing multiple routes to nuclear weapons, and we need to get that stopped” (Agence France-Presse, June 20).
The United States has prepared a draft document that it hopes will push the U.N. Security Council to censure North Korea for developing nuclear weapons, the Associated Press reported today (see GSN, June 19).
John Negroponte, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, discussed the draft with Russian, British and French diplomats Wednesday. Negroponte met separately with Chinese diplomats yesterday, according to AP.
China has opposed any Security Council action on North Korea, and it reiterated that stance Wednesday.
In the draft, which would take the form of a statement from the council, Washington criticizes North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs “and the actions the regime has taken since last October when it acknowledged it was pursuing a uranium enrichment program.”
“The council calls upon the D.P.R.K. to immediately and completely dismantle its nuclear weapons program in a verifiable and irreversible manner, and come into full compliance with its obligations” under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
Although Negroponte refused to discuss the negotiations over the draft, he said “we will certainly continue to pursue” the effort (Associated Press/USA Today, June 20).
The United States has informed Japan, South Korea and other partners about its effort to gain Security Council condemnation of North Korea’s actions.
Traveling to a meeting of Asian and Pacific states this week, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell said, “we will make judgments in the weeks ahead as to whether we want the U.N. to take any action” (Kyodo News Agency, June 19).
North Korea, meanwhile, said again this week that it plans to develop a nuclear deterrent to a U.S. invasion.
“The D.P.R.K. will put further spurs to increasing its nuclear deterrent force for self-defense as a just self-defense measure to cope with the U.S. strategy to isolate and stifle the D.P.R.K.,” the state-run Korean Central News Agency reported Wednesday (Korean Central News Agency, June 18 in FBIS-EAS, June 18).
By David Ruppe Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — The 1968 treaty banning nuclear weapons from all but five countries continues to be battered by insufficient compliance, the holdout of key nations and outright cheating, two former senior U.S. diplomats said Wednesday. The situation is threatening the fragile consensus upon which the treaty was built, they said.
To be effective, “the NPT must continue to be taken seriously by all of its members … and that means the nuclear weapons states, including the United States, need to be serious about their own NPT obligations,” former Undersecretary of State John Holum said in prepared remarks presented to a bipartisan congressional task force on nonproliferation issues.
The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty needs stronger safeguards and more rigorous enforcement, he said. It is also challenged by risks posed by nonmember nuclear aspirants and from the failure of nuclear weapons states “to negotiate in good faith toward disarmament,” Holum said.
Although treaty parties agreed to a permanent extension to the treaty in 1995, that “clearly did not end the nonproliferation struggle,” he said.
The Basic Bargain
Thomas Graham, former general counsel of the defunct Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, said the treaty was made possible through a “basic bargain” between the nuclear states at that time and the rest of the world. The former would agree to share peaceful nuclear technology and gradually move toward nuclear disarmament, and the latter would renounce efforts to acquire nuclear weapons.
Graham offered a snapshot of what the world might look like without the treaty.
Had the treaty not existed, he said in prepared remarks, “there could be as many as 50 nuclear weapons states today.” He cited a recent International Atomic Energy Agency estimate that 60 to 70 states around the world currently have the capability to build nuclear weapons.
“In such a world, every conflict would carry with it the risk of going nuclear, it would be impossible to keep nuclear weapons out of the hand of terrorists because they would be so numerous and so widespread and indeed civilization as we know it would hang in the balance every day,” he said.
Half of the Bargain
Graham said the bargain was not being sufficiently honored by the nuclear weapons states, citing the United States in particular.
While 183 nations have signed on to refrain from nuclear arms, he said, “we have to face the fact that the nuclear weapons states have not fully lived up to their half of the NPT basic bargain.”
He cited four issues on which non-nuclear treaty parties had expected progress:
* entry into force of the nuclear test ban treaty, which the Bush administration has rejected;
* deep reductions in nuclear weapons;
* a treaty terminating the production of fissile material; and
* a legally binding agreement for nuclear states to refrain from using nuclear weapons on non-nuclear states.
Graham noted that the nuclear powers in 1995 had recommitted to those goals in exchange for an agreement on a permanent extension to the treaty.
On the fourth point, he cited a Bush administration policy in particular.
“The United States, in its recent Nuclear Posture Review, indicated it did not believe itself bound by these assurances in that five states that were then NPT non-nuclear weapons states (Syria, Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea) were singled out as possible targets of U.S. nuclear weapons,” he said.
Holum criticized the administration for its interest in possibly developing new low-yield nuclear weapons and for abandoning the START II Treaty and other disarmament goals by instead signing the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty last year.
That treaty, also known as the Moscow Treaty, codified “low-hanging fruit” agreed to in 1997, he said, but it “actually slows the pace of [nuclear arms] reductions, and will leave higher numbers available at the end.” It also requires no destruction of warheads or delivery platforms, he said.
“As you evaluate these programs, I invite you to measure their security rationale against the risks they pose to the NPT regime and the global consensus on nuclear nonproliferation,” he said.
Administration’s Different View
Bush administration officials have also expressed an interest in a strong NPT and suggested it is in jeopardy, but have argued the threat is weakened by insufficiently rigid enforcement and not by a lack of progress in nuclear disarmament.
The treaty is “dangerously out of balance,” said Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation John Wolf at a preparatory meeting for the 2005 NPT review conference in April (see GSN, April 28).
“Without strict enforcement, the international confidence that has underpinned the treaty will dissolve, and the basis for peaceful sharing of nuclear technology will be destroyed,” he said.
Wolf said the United States “remains firmly committed to its obligations under the NPT,” and cited the Moscow Treaty and “other U.S. actions” as evidence of the United States moving to “promote the goal of nuclear disarmament.”
“Disarmament continues, and in fact took a significant step forward with the signing of the Moscow Treaty,” he said.
“In two decades, the United States will have eliminated or decommissioned three-quarters of its strategic arsenal. We have also given up whole classes of tactical nuclear weapons, and we have withdrawn remaining stocks from almost every overseas site,” Wolf said.
A senior Russian military official has said Russia plans to maintain all three aspects of its nuclear triad — air-, ground- and sea-based nuclear weapons — for the foreseeable future, Interfax reported yesterday.
“Russia will definitely keep its nuclear triad by the date set for the fulfillment of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, and in the following years,” said Col. Yuri Baluyevsky, first deputy chief of the Russian General Staff.
Baluyevsky also said he believed Russia would fulfill its Moscow Treaty obligations by the 2012 deadline (see GSN, June 5). “We will definitely fulfill this document,” he said (Interfax/CDI Russia Weekly, June 19).
For further information, see:
U.S.-Russia Nuclear Reduction Treaty Text (U.S. State Department)
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